CN112637814A - DDoS attack defense method based on trust management - Google Patents

DDoS attack defense method based on trust management Download PDF

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CN112637814A
CN112637814A CN202110110690.6A CN202110110690A CN112637814A CN 112637814 A CN112637814 A CN 112637814A CN 202110110690 A CN202110110690 A CN 202110110690A CN 112637814 A CN112637814 A CN 112637814A
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vehicle
trust
node
representing
trust value
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神显豪
臧一豪
秦运枝
张晔鑫
常招展
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Guilin University of Technology
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Guilin University of Technology
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]

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Abstract

The invention discloses a DDoS attack defense method based on trust management, which relates to the network security technology and comprises the following steps: step 1: initializing a system; step 2: updating a node trust value; and step 3: authentication and trust evaluation from vehicle to vehicle. The credibility of the vehicle nodes is enhanced by using a key technology in a system constructed by an authoritative trust authority, an authoritative trust authority agent and a roadside unit; the method for constructing the node trust value and actually refreshing the trust value ensures that the communication between the vehicle nodes in the vehicle-mounted network is safer and more efficient, and the DDoS attack can be effectively resisted.

Description

DDoS attack defense method based on trust management
Technical Field
The invention relates to a network security technology, in particular to a DDoS attack defense method based on trust management in a vehicle-mounted network.
Background
Currently, Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) are applications of mobile ad hoc network technology in vehicle communication, and wireless communication networks interconnecting vehicles and roadside units are quickly constructed through communication equipment equipped in vehicles. On the basis of the VANET, a series of applications such as auxiliary driving, traffic accident early warning, inter-vehicle communication, automatic payment, Internet information service and the like can be realized, so that the traffic efficiency can be effectively improved, safe and reliable support and convenience can be provided for the trip of people, and a severe safety problem is also faced.
Among various network security problems of the vehicle-mounted network, DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack is a common attack mode, which destroys a communication channel by sending a large amount of redundant messages to the communication channel in the vehicle-mounted network, and this attack may destroy the network, and when a driver or a passenger cannot use the Service, the unavailability of the Service may result in serious consequences, even traffic accidents.
Many solutions have been proposed to solve the DDoS attack problem in VANETs, and are mainly classified into two categories, namely encryption technology and traditional trust scheme. The former can provide security in vehicle navigation terminals but at the cost of additional time delay and power consumption, thus limiting its scope of application in dynamic environments, especially where energy is limited the latter attempts to assess the trustworthiness of a node and eliminate dishonest nodes from the vehicle navigation system. These methods do not take into account message quality and assume that if a node is trusted, then the message from that node is also reliable. However, in certain cases, honest nodes may also send or forward malicious messages in VANETs. The security of the node cannot be fully guaranteed.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention mainly aims to provide a DDoS attack defense method based on trust management, which greatly improves the credibility of vehicle communication nodes and effectively defends DDoS attacks, thereby ensuring the safety of a vehicle-mounted network.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows: a DDoS attack defense method based on trust management comprises the following steps:
step 1: initializing a system;
step 2: updating a node trust value;
and step 3: authentication and trust evaluation from vehicle to vehicle.
Further, the step 1 comprises:
each ATA, RSU and OBU needs to perform offline registration in TA before entering the vehicle-mounted network communication;
each ATA first registers with the TA in its coverage area via its real identity, and the TA then uploads the following keys in the ATA:
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
wherein
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
A private key representing each trust authority agent,
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
a public key representing each trust authority agent,
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
a private key representing a trust authority,
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
representing a shared key;
each roadside unit then registers the corresponding ATA of the blade with its true identity, which then uploads the following keys on the RSU:
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
wherein
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
Represents the private key of the roadside unit,
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
a public key representing a roadside unit is shown,
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
the public key representing the ATA,
Figure 847576DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
representing a shared key;
finally, each vehicle ' V ' registers first with the TA and then with the ATA through its real identity, the TA and ATA upload the following keys and initialize trust values, encrypted with the TA's public key and pseudo-identity, respectively, as follows:
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
wherein
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
Private key representing vehicle node' V
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
A public key representing the vehicle node 'V',
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
represents the private key of the roadside unit,
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
a trust value representing a vehicle node 'V';
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
public key representing authoritative agents:
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
wherein
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
Indicating that the true identity of the vehicle 'V' is encrypted with a public key,
Figure 787849DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
meaning encrypted with the public key of the TA,
Figure 423361DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
which represents a shared secret key, is,
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
representing the regional zip code of the vehicle.
Further, the step 2 includes:
the stage is an updating process of the trust value in the process that the vehicle is continuously added, and the range of the trust value is 0 to 1;
first of all, the neighbor vehicle node VjTo vehicle ViSending a test message to check its reliability;
then ViReceives this message and forwards it to VjSending a message for comparing the test information;
neighbor node VjSends its pair V to TAiTrust value to prevent it from getting authentication of test message directly from target communication node, and also to prevent ViThe trust value is always 0 and cannot be added to communication;
TA calculation and V generationiNew basic trust value is formed by n neighbor node pairs ViThe confidence value is evaluated, and the specific calculation is shown as the following formula:
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
wherein
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
Representing the total trust value of n neighbor nodes;
when node V from any of its neighboring vehiclesjWhen data is acquired, V will be completed by TAiThe trust evaluation of (1) is updated as shown in the following equation:
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
wherein
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Representing a vehicle node ViThe old value of trust is then used,
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
representing a vehicle node ViA new trust value;
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
representing a vehicle node VjTo vehicle node ViThe trust value of (c).
Still further, the step 3 includes:
firstly, a safety message sent by communication between vehicle nodes comprises a unique message, a hash encryption code, a trust value and a pseudo identity identifier of a source node vehicle node and a timestamp;
when a certain vehicle node obtains the safety message, the safety message firstly passes through the previous safety message
Figure 100002_DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
Sharing the key to determine a hashed encrypted keycode, if the determined encrypted keycode is the same as the obtained hashed encrypted keycode, which means that the sending vehicle is authenticated, and if not, the message trustworthiness is generally not satisfied, and then the message they obtained is discarded;
the subsequent stage is that the trust value of a sending vehicle, namely a source node vehicle is checked, the encoded trust value is decoded by a destination node of a receiving vehicle node by utilizing a public key of a TA (trusted application) to preliminarily confirm the trust income of the sending vehicle;
then screening the obtained trust value, and checking whether the trust value exceeds a minimum trust threshold value; if the trust value is below the minimum trust threshold, the message will be discarded, otherwise it will be acknowledged and the trust value of the sending vehicle node refreshed.
The invention has the advantages that:
(1) the credibility of the vehicle nodes is enhanced by using a key technology in a system constructed by an authoritative trust authority, an authoritative trust authority proxy and a roadside unit;
(2) the method for constructing the node trust value and actually refreshing the trust value ensures that the communication between the vehicle nodes in the vehicle-mounted network is safer and more efficient, and the DDoS attack can be effectively resisted.
In addition to the objects, features and advantages described above, other objects, features and advantages of the present invention are also provided. The present invention will be described in further detail below with reference to the drawings.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this application, illustrate embodiments of the invention and, together with the description, serve to explain the invention and not to limit the invention.
FIG. 1 is a system structure diagram corresponding to the DDoS attack defense method based on trust management;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a DDoS attack defense method based on trust management of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a graph showing the variation of the transmission rate of the AODV of the prevention strategy of the present invention, the AODV not under attack, and the AODV under DDoS attack with the increase of the number of nodes;
FIG. 4 is a graph of the change of the AODV of the prevention strategy of the present invention, the AODV not under attack, and the AODV under DDoS attack with the increase of the number of nodes;
fig. 5 is a graph of end-to-end delay variation of AODV of the prevention strategy of the present invention, AODV not under attack, AODV under DDoS attack with increasing node number.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
Referring to fig. 1 to 5, a method for defending against DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks based on trust management includes:
step 1: initializing a system;
step 2: updating a node trust value;
and step 3: authentication and trust evaluation from vehicle to vehicle.
Further, the step 1 comprises:
each ATA (Agent of TA, trust Authority Agent), RSU (Road of Unit), OBU (On Board Unit, vehicle Unit) needs to perform offline registration in TA (Trusted Authority) before entering vehicle network communication;
each ATA first registers with the TA in its coverage area via its Real identity (RIDA, Real-ID ATA), and the TA then uploads the following keys in the ATA:
Figure 536067DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
wherein
Figure 548016DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
A private key representing each trust authority agent,
Figure 544791DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
a public key representing each trust authority agent,
Figure 554466DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
a private key representing a trust authority,
Figure 636692DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
representing a shared key;
each roadside unit then registers the corresponding ATA of the blade with its true identity, which then uploads the following keys on the RSU:
Figure 514649DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
wherein
Figure 113733DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
Represents the private key of the roadside unit,
Figure 809157DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
a public key representing a roadside unit is shown,
Figure 863832DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
the public key representing the ATA,
Figure 466851DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
representing a shared key;
finally each Vehicle ' V ' registers first with the TA and then with the ATA via its Real-ID Vehicle (RIDV), the TA and ATA upload the following keys and initialize trust values, encrypted with the TA's public key and pseudo-identity respectively, as follows:
Figure 923371DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
wherein
Figure 399483DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
Private key representing vehicle node' V
Figure 456301DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
A public key representing the vehicle node 'V',
Figure 339376DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
represents the private key of the roadside unit,
Figure 899670DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
a trust value representing a vehicle node 'V';
Figure 687629DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
public key representing authoritative agents:
Figure 700584DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
wherein
Figure 396139DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
Indicating that the true identity (Real-ID) of the vehicle 'V' is encrypted with a public key,
Figure 155147DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
meaning encrypted with the public key of the TA,
Figure 425592DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
which represents a shared secret key, is,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE019A
representing the regional zip code of the vehicle.
Further, the step 2 includes:
the stage is an updating process of the trust value in the process that the vehicle is continuously added, and the range of the trust value is 0 to 1;
first of all, the neighbor vehicle node VjTo vehicle ViSending a test message to check its reliability;
then ViReceives this message and forwards it to VjSending a message for comparing the test information;
neighbor node VjSends its pair V to TAiTrust value to prevent it from getting authentication of test message directly from target communication node, and also to prevent ViThe trust value is always 0 and cannot be added to communication;
TA calculation and V generationiNew basic trust value is formed by n neighbor node pairs ViThe confidence value is evaluated, and the specific calculation is shown as the following formula:
Figure 627641DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
wherein
Figure 376154DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
Representing the total trust value of n neighbor nodes;
when node V from any of its neighboring vehiclesjWhen data is acquired, V will be completed by TAiThe trust evaluation of (1) is updated as shown in the following equation:
Figure 661773DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
wherein
Figure 837539DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Representing a vehicle node ViThe old value of trust is then used,
Figure 906645DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
representing a vehicle node ViA new trust value;
Figure 944002DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
representing a vehicle node VjTo vehicle node ViThe trust value of (c).
Still further, the step 3 includes:
firstly, a Safety Message (SMSGV) sent by communication between Vehicle nodes comprises a unique Message, a hash encryption code, a trust value and a pseudo identity of a Vehicle node of a source node and a timestamp;
when a certain vehicle node obtains the safety message, the safety message firstly passes through the previous safety message
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE027A
Sharing a Key to determine a hashed Encryption Key Code (HC) if the determined Encryption Key Code matches the obtained hashed Encryption Key CodeThe same, which means that the sending vehicle is verified, and if not the same, the message trustworthiness is typically not satisfied, and then the messages they obtained are discarded;
the subsequent stage is to check the trust value of the sending vehicle, namely the vehicle of the source node, and the destination node of the receiving vehicle node decodes the coded trust value by utilizing the public key of the TA to preliminarily confirm the trust income of the sending vehicle (namely the result that the received message may appear);
then screening the obtained trust value, and checking whether the trust value exceeds a minimum trust threshold value (set to be 0.5); if the trust value is below the minimum trust threshold, the message will be discarded, otherwise it will be acknowledged and the trust value of the sending vehicle node refreshed.
The above description is only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not to be construed as limiting the invention, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements and the like that fall within the spirit and principle of the present invention are intended to be included therein.

Claims (4)

1. A DDoS attack defense method based on trust management is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: initializing a system;
step 2: updating a node trust value;
and step 3: authentication and trust evaluation from vehicle to vehicle.
2. The method of claim 1 for defending against DDoS attacks based on trust management, wherein
In that, the step 1 comprises:
each ATA, RSU and OBU needs to perform offline registration in TA before entering the vehicle-mounted network communication;
each ATA first registers with the TA in its coverage area via its real identity, and the TA then uploads the following keys in the ATA:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
A private key representing each trust authority agent,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
a public key representing each trust authority agent,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
a private key representing a trust authority,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
representing a shared key;
each roadside unit then registers the corresponding ATA of the blade with its true identity, which then uploads the following keys on the RSU:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
Represents the private key of the roadside unit,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
a public key representing a roadside unit is shown,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
the public key representing the ATA,
Figure 120724DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
representing a shared key;
finally, each vehicle ' V ' registers first with the TA and then with the ATA through its real identity, the TA and ATA upload the following keys and initialize trust values, encrypted with the TA's public key and pseudo-identity, respectively, as follows:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
Private key representing vehicle node' V
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
A public key representing the vehicle node 'V',
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
represents the private key of the roadside unit,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
a trust value representing a vehicle node 'V';
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
public key representing authoritative agents:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
Indicating that the true identity of the vehicle 'V' is encrypted with a public key,
Figure 733802DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
meaning encrypted with the public key of the TA,
Figure 201955DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
which represents a shared secret key, is,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
representing the regional zip code of the vehicle.
3. The method of claim 1 for defending against DDoS attacks based on trust management, wherein
In that, the step 2 includes:
the stage is an updating process of the trust value in the process that the vehicle is continuously added, and the range of the trust value is 0 to 1;
first of all, the neighbor vehicle node VjTo vehicle ViSending a test message to check its reliability;
then ViReceives this message and forwards it to VjSending a message for comparing the test information;
neighbor node VjSends its pair V to TAiTrust value to prevent it from getting authentication of test message directly from target communication node, and also to prevent ViThe trust value is always 0 and cannot be added to communication;
TA calculation and V generationiNew basic trust value is formed by n neighbor node pairs ViThe confidence value is evaluated, and the specific calculation is shown as the following formula:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
Representing the total trust value of n neighbor nodes;
when node V from any of its neighboring vehiclesjWhen data is acquired, V will be completed by TAiThe trust evaluation of (1) is updated as shown in the following equation:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
Representing a vehicle node ViThe old value of trust is then used,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
representing a vehicle node ViA new trust value;
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
representing a vehicle node VjTo vehicle node ViThe trust value of (c).
4. The method of claim 1 for defending against DDoS attacks based on trust management, wherein
In that, the step 3 includes:
firstly, a safety message sent by communication between vehicle nodes comprises a unique message, a hash encryption code, a trust value and a pseudo identity identifier of a source node vehicle node and a timestamp;
when a certain vehicle node obtains the safety message, the safety message firstly passes through the previous safety message
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
Sharing the key to determine a hashed encrypted keycode, if the determined encrypted keycode is the same as the obtained hashed encrypted keycode, which means that the sending vehicle is authenticated, and if not, the message trustworthiness is generally not satisfied, and then the message they obtained is discarded;
the subsequent stage is that the trust value of a sending vehicle, namely a source node vehicle is checked, the encoded trust value is decoded by a destination node of a receiving vehicle node by utilizing a public key of a TA (trusted application) to preliminarily confirm the trust income of the sending vehicle;
then screening the obtained trust value, and checking whether the trust value exceeds a minimum trust threshold value; if the trust value is below the minimum trust threshold, the message will be discarded, otherwise it will be acknowledged and the trust value of the sending vehicle node refreshed.
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Citations (4)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
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CN110958135A (en) * 2019-11-05 2020-04-03 东华大学 Method and system for eliminating DDoS (distributed denial of service) attack in feature self-adaptive reinforcement learning
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Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20140222955A1 (en) * 2013-02-01 2014-08-07 Junaid Islam Dynamically Configured Connection to a Trust Broker
CN107835077A (en) * 2017-09-22 2018-03-23 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Mutual trust cluster collaborative verification method for anonymous authentication of vehicle-mounted network
CN110958135A (en) * 2019-11-05 2020-04-03 东华大学 Method and system for eliminating DDoS (distributed denial of service) attack in feature self-adaptive reinforcement learning
CN112235287A (en) * 2020-10-13 2021-01-15 李晓晓 Internet of vehicles application layer safety protection system

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
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Application publication date: 20210409