CN109362062A - VANETs anonymous authentication system and method based on ID-based group ranking - Google Patents
VANETs anonymous authentication system and method based on ID-based group ranking Download PDFInfo
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- CN109362062A CN109362062A CN201811391465.9A CN201811391465A CN109362062A CN 109362062 A CN109362062 A CN 109362062A CN 201811391465 A CN201811391465 A CN 201811391465A CN 109362062 A CN109362062 A CN 109362062A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W4/44—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for communication between vehicles and infrastructures, e.g. vehicle-to-cloud [V2C] or vehicle-to-home [V2H]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W4/46—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for vehicle-to-vehicle communication [V2V]
Abstract
The present invention relates to wireless network secure technical fields, a kind of VANETs anonymous authentication system based on ID-based group ranking is provided, including third party's trust authority, roadside unit and vehicle unit, third party's trust authority is communicated between vehicle unit by roadside unit.The present invention also provides a kind of methods for carrying out anonymous authentication using above system, third party's trust authority is that vehicle unit generates initial assumed name, initial trust value and signature private key, after generating signature private key, group's private key and group's public key for roadside unit, vehicle unit and roadside unit execute V2I authentication protocol, V2V authentication protocol is executed between vehicle unit and shared key is generated when all legal, last roadside unit assisting third parties trust authority tracking sends the true identity of the vehicle unit of malicious messages, and for further processing.The present invention can guarantee the anonymity of vehicle node identity, avoid certificate storage and administration overhead, improve secret protection intensity and authentication efficiency.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to wireless network secure technical field, more particularly to a kind of based on ID-based group ranking
VANETs anonymous authentication system and method.
Background technique
In recent years, at full speed with movable self-organization (AdHoc) network and Internet of Things (Internet ofThings, IoT)
Development, intelligent transportation system have become the research hotspot of academia and industry.Vehicular ad hoc network (Vehicle Ad
Hoc Networks, VANETs) an important component part as intelligent transportation field is a kind of to mention for vehicle user
It is a kind of special mobile ad hoc network for the effective technology of extensive security application, using vehicle as basic information unit (BIU), utilizes
The roads entity such as vehicle and roadside infrastructure is connect by the technologies such as wireless access with transportation network, forms intelligent network.It according to
Rely in trusted authorization authentication center (Trust Authorities, TAs), vehicle unit (Road-Side-Unit, RSU) and road
Side unit (On-Board-Unit, OBU), wherein RSU is widely distributed in road edge, and to meet specific service, and OBU is then
It is mounted in the vehicle of VANETs.By Dedicated Short Range Communications technology (DSRC), the node in network can be traveled freely
During with roadside infrastructure cell node (Vehicle to Infrastructure, V2I) or with other vehicle units
Node (Vehicle toVehicle, V2V) is in communication with each other.Believed by fixed time broadcast position, direction, speed, traffic events etc.
Breath, user can obtain the information of real-time road condition information and neighbours' vehicle node to evade traffic risk.VANETs can
Effectively prevent potential hidden trouble of traffic, for the acquisition and publication of traffic safety information, accident early warning, accident investigation, vehicle-mounted does
The new solutions of offers such as public affairs amusement can also provide point-to-point (Peer to Peer, P2P) service and access for user
The value-added services such as Internet, to realize the functions such as Cooperative Security driving, intelligent scheduling, chargeable service between vehicle.As it can be seen that
VANETs can enhance the driving experience of vehicle user, improve people's lives quality, have weight to the development of intelligent city
Want meaning.
However, there is also many safety issues by VANETs.VANETs is a kind of open visit environment, is had very high hidden
Private sensitivity characteristic, if rogue attacks person accesses network, it is easy to many privacy informations for stealing legitimate node, such as user's body
Part, wheelpath etc..If this security sensitive network cannot consider and solve safety problem, can exist threaten, risk and
Loophole easily brings economic loss or even life-threatening safety to user.The security protocol of VANETs must assure that basic peace
The full privacy (identity and location privacy) for requiring (authentication and non repudiation) and vehicle user, to prevent unwarranted
Entity access, tracking or analysis.
In current VANETs access authentication method, anonymous authentication technology is mostly used, come while reaching authentication reliability,
It realizes secret protection, while can also cope with flow analysis attack well.In current VANETs anonymous access authentication method,
Most commonly used is the anonymous access authentication method based on certificate and the anonymous access authentication method based on group ranking, wherein base
The anonymity that general digital signature does not have is capable of providing due to its group ranking technology in the anonymous access authentication method of group ranking,
Group members can be represented, and entire group signs and only group master discloses its true identity.In these methods, although
It can realize that privacy of identities is protected to a certain extent, but require to safeguard a large amount of anonymous credential or anonymous Identity, cause to demonstrate,prove
The management of book and key and storage overhead are larger.As Identity Based Cryptography rises, since it can be better solved
Cipher key management considerations are stated, so that the VANETs anonymous access authentication method of many identity-baseds is proposed in succession, but these methods
Authentication, privacy in VANETs are realized in the case where taking into account safe and efficient situation still without complete and mature scheme is formed
The identification and revocation of protection and malicious node.
Summary of the invention
In view of the problems of the existing technology, the present invention provides a kind of VANETs anonymity based on ID-based group ranking and recognizes
System and method is demonstrate,proved, can guarantee the anonymity of vehicle node identity, and avoids certificate storage and administration overhead, to improve vehicle
The secret protection intensity and authentication efficiency of node, while reducing the computing cost and communication overhead of certificate scheme.
The technical solution of the present invention is as follows:
A kind of VANETs anonymous authentication system based on ID-based group ranking, it is characterised in that: trust including third party
Mechanism, multiple roadside units and multiple vehicle units；
Third party's trust authority is connect by network with roadside unit, and the vehicle unit is single by network and roadside
Member is connected, and third party's trust authority is communicated between vehicle unit by roadside unit；Third party's trust authority
It is trusted each other between roadside unit, third party's trust authority is trusted completely by vehicle unit, the vehicle unit and road
Mutual mistrust between the unit of side, mutual mistrust between the vehicle unit, mutual mistrust between the roadside unit；
Third party's trust authority is roadside unit and registers into the vehicle unit of VANETs, the third party
Trust authority is the signature private key that vehicle unit generates initial assumed name, initial trust value and vehicle unit, and the third party trusts
Mechanism is signature private key, group's private key and the group's public key that roadside unit generates roadside unit；
The roadside unit is the infrastructure established in roadside, and the roadside unit is that the vehicle unit of legal access is raw
Key is signed at new assumed name, group and group signs the validity period of key；
The vehicle unit is the communication unit being loaded in vehicle node, the vehicle unit with vehicle node movement
Switch between different roadside units in the process, the vehicle unit is responsible between corresponding vehicle node and roadside unit,
Communication between corresponding vehicle node and other vehicle nodes can directly lead in neighbor scope between different vehicle unit
Letter passes through chance routing mode outside neighbor scope and is communicated；The vehicle unit can regularly publish security message, the peace
It totally disappeared assumed name, present speed, position and the road conditions that breath includes vehicle node corresponding to vehicle unit；The vehicle unit is right
The vehicle node answered is registered after entering VANETs to third party's trust authority, and the vehicle unit passes through two-way with roadside unit
Certification obtains being that new assumed name, group's label key and group that the vehicle unit generates sign key as the roadside unit of group manager
Validity period；
Only third party's trust authority can learn the true identity of vehicle unit, and only tripartite's trust authority can be to vehicle
Unit carries out destruction operation；The roadside unit can assist in third party's trust authority and chase after to the true identity of vehicle unit
Track.
A method of anonymous authentication being carried out using the above-mentioned VANETs anonymous authentication system based on ID-based group ranking,
It is characterised in that it includes following step:
Step 1: the roadside unit and vehicle unit are registered in the initial stage to third party's trust authority, the third party
Trust authority is the signature private key that vehicle unit generates initial assumed name, initial trust value and vehicle unit, and the third party trusts
Mechanism is signature private key, group's private key and the group's public key that roadside unit generates roadside unit；
Step 2: in the moving process of vehicle unit, when vehicle unit is moved to the channel radio of accessible roadside unit
When believing in range, V2I authentication protocol is executed between vehicle unit and roadside unit, whether to authenticate vehicle unit and roadside unit
All legal, if vehicle unit and roadside unit are all legal, roadside unit is that the vehicle unit of legal access generates new assumed name, group
It signs key and group signs the validity period of key；
Step 3: completing the legal two vehicle unit OBU of V2I certificationaWith OBUbBetween execute V2V authentication protocol, with
Complete two-way authentication, i.e. OBUaWith OBUbWhether legal, if OBU if being mutually authenticatedaWith OBUbIt is all legal, then OBUaWith OBUbObtain
The second shared key for subsequent secure communication；
Step 4: in two vehicle unit OBUaWith OBUbBetween communication process in, work as OBUbReceive OBUaIt sends
When message m, OBUbMessage m can be verified, if message m is unverified, judge that message m for malicious messages, and is sent
Alert message is to neighbouring roadside unit；Alert message is sent to third party's trust authority in turn by neighbouring roadside unit；The
Tripartite's trust authority is according to alert message to OBUaTrue identity be tracked；
Step 5: third party's trust authority reduces trust value to the vehicle unit for sending malicious messages, and checks the vehicle list
The trust value of member, if the trust value of the vehicle unit is less than critical value N, which is judged as malicious node, third
The initial assumed name of the vehicle unit is broadcast to all roadside units by square trust authority, stops all roadside units to this
Vehicle unit provides access service, while third party's trust authority carries out being further processed under line, and cancels the vehicle unit.
The step 1 includes the following steps:
Step 1.1: vehicle unit is registered in the initial stage to third party's trust authority, is specifically included:
Step 1.1.1: vehicle unit submits the true identity of vehicle unit by safe lane to third party's trust authority
ID；
Step 1.1.2: third party's trust authority randomly selectsAs the private key of third party's trust authority, then select
Select the symmetric encipherment algorithm E that key is KK() come calculate vehicle unit initial assumed name be VID=EKIt (ID), is later vehicle list
Member setting initial trust value is N0, and the signature private key for calculating vehicle unit isWherein, H0For Hash letter
Number, P ∈ G1, G1For the module of third party's trust authority selection, P G1Interior generation member,For finite field；
Step 1.1.3: third party's trust authority is by safe lane by { sv,VID,N0It is sent to vehicle unit；
Step 1.1.4: vehicle unit is to { the s receivedv,VID,N0Stored；
Step 1.2: roadside unit is registered in the initial stage to third party's trust authority, is specifically included:
Step 1.2.1: roadside unit submits the true identity of roadside unit by safe lane to third party's trust authority
RID；
Step 1.2.2: third party's trust authority calculate roadside unit signature private key beThird party
Trust authority randomly selectsAs group's private key of roadside unit, and the group's public key for calculating roadside unit is PKg=sgP；
Step 1.2.3: third party's trust authority is by safe lane by { sR,sg,PKgIt is sent to roadside unit；
Step 1.2.4: roadside unit is to { the s receivedR,sg,PKgStored.
In the step 2, V2I authentication protocol is executed between vehicle unit and roadside unit, specifically include the following steps:
Step 2.1: roadside unit is periodically to surrounding broadcast first message { RID,PKg,σ1,TS1}；
Wherein, σ1It is generated for the first signature and by roadside unit, Indicate the signature private key s using roadside unitRPass through identity-based signature scheme
BLMQ is to information { PKg, TS1Sign, TS1For timestamp, hRSU=H1(PKg||TS1,x1), H1For hash function,G is module G1In a point, rRSUFor random number,VRSU=(rRSU+hRSU)sR；
Step 2.2: when vehicle unit enters in the communication range of roadside unit, receiving first message { RID,PKg,
σ1,TS1, the first review time stabs TS1Whether effectively, if time stamp T S1Effectively, then the first signature sigma is verified1, judge equation one
It is whether true；
Wherein, e is bilinear map, PpubFor the system public key that third party's trust authority generates, Ppub=sP；
If equation one is set up, the roadside unit is legal, and vehicle unit selects random number rOBU, use the label of vehicle unit
Name private key sVBy identity-based signature scheme BLMQ to information { rOBU, TS2Sign, generate the second signatureThen it is calculated between vehicle unit and the roadside unit
First shared key KV-R=PKgrOBU=sgPrOBU, the use of key is later KV-RSymmetric encipherment algorithmTo initial vacation
Name VIDWith random number rOBUEncryption generates ciphertextFinally to the roadside unit send second message c,
rOBUP,σ2,TS2, and enter step 2.3；
Wherein,TS2For timestamp, hOBU=H1(rOBU||TS2,x2),VOBU=(rOBU+
hOBU)sV；
If equation one is invalid, vehicle unit refusal accesses the roadside unit and is moved to next roadside unit；
Step 2.3: roadside unit receives second message { c, r from vehicle unitOBUP,σ2,TS2After, first check
Time stamp T S2Whether effectively, if time stamp T S2Effectively, then the first shared key K is calculatedV-R=rOBUPsg=rOBUPKg, and use
First shared key KV-RCiphertext c is decrypted, the V of vehicle unit is obtainedIDAnd rOBU, then verify the second signature of vehicle unit
σ2, judge equation two
It is whether true:
If equation two is set up, the vehicle unit is legal, enters step 2.4；
If equation two is invalid, roadside unit refusal provides access service for the vehicle unit；
Step 2.4: vehicle unit selects random number xOBU, the use of key is then KV-RSymmetric encipherment algorithmIt is right
xOBUP encryption generates third messageAnd third message c is sent to roadside unit1；Wherein,
Step 2.5: roadside unit receives the third message c from vehicle unit1Later, it is shared first using first close
Key KV-RBy third message c1Decryption, obtains the x of vehicle unitOBUThen P selects i-th of random numberI-th of new assumed name V is generated for vehicle uniti={ Vi,1,Vi,2, then be vehicle unit generation
I-th crowd of label key ski=sgH3(Vi,2,rOBUxOBUP), and T is selected to sign the validity period of key as group, is using key later
KV-RSymmetric encipherment algorithmTo i-th of new assumed name Vi, i-th crowd of label key skiAnd group signs the validity period T encryption of key
Generate i-th of the 4th messageAnd i-th of the 4th message c are sent to vehicle unit2i；Wherein,
Vi,1=uiP,H2、H3It is hash function；
Step 2.6: vehicle unit receives i-th of the 4th message c2iLater, using the first shared key KV-RBy i-th
4th message c2iDecryption, obtains < ski,Vi, T >, then by < ski,Vi, T > is stored in the TPD of vehicle unit, final to obtain
Cipher key list { < sk is signed to group1,V1, T >, < sk2,V2, T > ..., < ski,Vi, T > ..., < skn,Vn, T > }.
In the step 3, two vehicle unit OBUaWith OBUbBetween execute V2V authentication protocol, specifically include following steps
It is rapid:
Step 3.1:OBUaRandomly choose a new assumed name Vj={ Vj,1,Vj,2And new assumed name VjCorresponding group signs key
skj, generate OBUaGroup sign public keyThen the group signature scheme IGS of identity-based is executed to group
Public key PKgAnd OBUaGroup sign public keyIt signs, generates third signatureAnd to OBUbSend the 5th message
Wherein, TSaFor timestamp；
Step 3.2:OBUbReceive the 5th messageAfterwards, the first review time stabs TSaWhether have
Effect, if time stamp T SaEffectively, then third signature sigma is verified3；If third signature sigma3It is proved to be successful, OBUbRandom selection one new false
Name Vk={ Vk,1,Vk,2And new assumed name VkCorresponding group signs key skk, generate OBUbGroup sign public keyThen the group signature scheme IGS of identity-based is executed to group's public key PKgAnd OBUbGroup sign it is public
KeyIt signs, generates the 4th signatureSelection is random later
NumberFor OBUbWith OBUaBetween calculate the second shared key KV-V=nbRa=nbnaP, and second is shared
Key KV-VIt is stored in OBUbTPD in, then to OBUaSend the 6th messageWherein, TSbFor when
Between stab；
Step 3.3:OBUaReceive the 6th messageAfterwards, the first review time stabs TSbWhether
Effectively, if time stamp T SbEffectively, then the 4th signature sigma is verified4；If the 4th signature sigma4It is proved to be successful, then calculates the second shared key
KV-V=naRb=nanbP, and by the second shared key KV-VIt is stored in OBUaTPD in.
The step 4 includes the following steps:
Step 4.1: in two vehicle unit OBUaWith OBUbBetween communication process in, work as OBUbReceive OBUaIt sends
Message m when, OBUbMessage m can be verified, if OBUbUse the second shared key KV-VMessage m can not be decrypted,
Then message m is unverified, judges message m for malicious messages and generates alert message alert, alert message alert includes
OBUaThe message m and OBU of transmissionaThe new assumed name V usedj, alert message alert is then sent to neighbouring roadside unit；
Step 4.2: after neighbouring roadside unit receives alert message alert, by safe lane by alert message
Alert is sent to third party's trust authority；
Step 4.3: after third party's trust machine receives alert message alert, according to OBUaThe new assumed name V usedj=
{Vj,1,Vj,2, calculate OBUaInitial assumed nameFinally to initial
Assumed name VIDIt is decrypted to obtain OBUaTrue identity ID；Wherein, Vj,1=ujP,
The invention has the benefit that
First, the anonymous Identity certificate scheme based on ID-based group ranking is applied the vehicle section in VANETs by the present invention
In the privacy of identities protection of point, assumed name and group ranking are used, ensure that vehicle node in the true identity not sticked one's chin out
In the case of complete access authentication and secure communication, can guarantee the anonymity of vehicle node identity, to improve vehicle node
Secret protection intensity；
Second, present invention employs the mechanism system of identity-based, do not need to store a large amount of public key certificate, to avoid
Certificate storage and administration overhead, improve authentication efficiency, reduce the computing cost and communication overhead of certificate scheme, greatly
Improve the performance of Verification System.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the structure chart of the VANETs anonymous authentication system of the invention based on ID-based group ranking.
Specific embodiment
Below in conjunction with drawings and examples, the invention will be further described.
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of VANETs anonymous authentication system and method based on ID-based group ranking comes
Guarantee the anonymity of vehicle node identity, and avoid certificate storage and administration overhead, to improve the secret protection of vehicle node
Intensity and authentication efficiency, while reducing the computing cost and communication overhead of certificate scheme.
As shown in Figure 1, being the structure chart of the VANETs anonymous authentication system of the invention based on ID-based group ranking.?
In Fig. 1, TA (TrustedAuthority) indicates third party's trust authority of the invention, and TA is generally by government administration section control
System；RSU (Road Side Unit) indicates that roadside unit of the invention, OBU (Onboard Unit) indicate vehicle of the invention
Unit.
VANETs anonymous authentication system based on ID-based group ranking of the invention, it is characterised in that: including third party
Trust authority, multiple roadside units and multiple vehicle units；
Third party's trust authority is connect by network with roadside unit, and the vehicle unit is single by network and roadside
Member is connected, and third party's trust authority is communicated between vehicle unit by roadside unit；Third party's trust authority
It is trusted each other between roadside unit, third party's trust authority is trusted completely by vehicle unit, the vehicle unit and road
Mutual mistrust between the unit of side, mutual mistrust between the vehicle unit, mutual mistrust between the roadside unit；
Third party's trust authority is roadside unit and registers into the vehicle unit of VANETs, the third party
Trust authority is the signature private key that vehicle unit generates initial assumed name, initial trust value and vehicle unit, and the third party trusts
Mechanism is signature private key, group's private key and the group's public key that roadside unit generates roadside unit；
The roadside unit is the infrastructure established in roadside, and the roadside unit is that the vehicle unit of legal access is raw
Key is signed at new assumed name, group and group signs the validity period of key；
The vehicle unit is the communication unit being loaded in vehicle node, the vehicle unit with vehicle node movement
Switch between different roadside units in the process, the vehicle unit is responsible between corresponding vehicle node and roadside unit,
Communication between corresponding vehicle node and other vehicle nodes can directly lead in neighbor scope between different vehicle unit
Letter passes through chance routing mode outside neighbor scope and is communicated；The vehicle unit can regularly publish security message, the peace
It totally disappeared assumed name, present speed, position and the road conditions that breath includes vehicle node corresponding to vehicle unit；The vehicle unit is right
The vehicle node answered is registered after entering VANETs to third party's trust authority, and the vehicle unit passes through two-way with roadside unit
Certification obtains being that new assumed name, group's label key and group that the vehicle unit generates sign key as the roadside unit of group manager
Validity period；
Only third party's trust authority can learn the true identity of vehicle unit, and only tripartite's trust authority can be to vehicle
Unit carries out destruction operation；The roadside unit can assist in third party's trust authority and chase after to the true identity of vehicle unit
Track.
A method of anonymous authentication being carried out using the above-mentioned VANETs anonymous authentication system based on ID-based group ranking,
It is characterised in that it includes following step:
Step 1: the roadside unit and vehicle unit are registered in the initial stage to third party's trust authority, the third party
Trust authority is the signature private key that vehicle unit generates initial assumed name, initial trust value and vehicle unit, and the third party trusts
Mechanism is signature private key, group's private key and the group's public key that roadside unit generates roadside unit；
Step 2: in the moving process of vehicle unit, when vehicle unit is moved to the channel radio of accessible roadside unit
When believing in range, V2I authentication protocol is executed between vehicle unit and roadside unit, whether to authenticate vehicle unit and roadside unit
All legal, if vehicle unit and roadside unit are all legal, roadside unit is that the vehicle unit of legal access generates new assumed name, group
It signs key and group signs the validity period of key；
Step 3: completing the legal two vehicle unit OBU of V2I certificationaWith OBUbBetween execute V2V authentication protocol, with
Complete two-way authentication, i.e. OBUaWith OBUbWhether legal, if OBU if being mutually authenticatedaWith OBUbIt is all legal, then OBUaWith OBUbObtain
The second shared key for subsequent secure communication；
Wherein, V2I (Vehicle to Infrastructure) authentication protocol refers to that vehicle unit and roadside unit carry out
The authentication protocol of communication is one kind that t is communicated in VANETs；V2V (Vehicle to Vehicle) authentication protocol, refers to vehicle
The bidirectional identification protocol communicated between unit and vehicle unit.
Step 4: in two vehicle unit OBUaWith OBUbBetween communication process in, work as OBUbReceive OBUaIt sends
When message m, OBUbMessage m can be verified, if message m is unverified, judge that message m for malicious messages, and is sent
Alert message is to neighbouring roadside unit；Alert message is sent to third party's trust authority in turn by neighbouring roadside unit；The
Tripartite's trust authority is according to alert message to OBUaTrue identity be tracked；
Step 5: third party's trust authority reduces trust value to the vehicle unit for sending malicious messages, and checks the vehicle list
The trust value of member, if the trust value of the vehicle unit is less than critical value N, which is judged as malicious node, third
The initial assumed name of the vehicle unit is broadcast to all roadside units by square trust authority, stops all roadside units to this
Vehicle unit provides access service, while third party's trust authority carries out being further processed under line, and cancels the vehicle unit.
The step 1 includes the following steps:
Step 1.1: vehicle unit is registered in the initial stage to third party's trust authority, is specifically included:
Step 1.1.1: vehicle unit submits the true identity of vehicle unit by safe lane to third party's trust authority
ID；
Step 1.1.2: third party's trust authority randomly selectsAs the private key of third party's trust authority, then select
Select the symmetric encipherment algorithm E that key is KK() come calculate vehicle unit initial assumed name be VID=EKIt (ID), is later vehicle list
Member setting initial trust value is N0, and the signature private key for calculating vehicle unit isWherein, H0For Hash letter
Number, P ∈ G1, G1For the module of third party's trust authority selection, P G1Interior generation member,For finite field；
Step 1.1.3: third party's trust authority is by safe lane by { sv,VID,N0It is sent to vehicle unit；
Step 1.1.4: vehicle unit is to { the s receivedv,VID,N0Stored；
Step 1.2: roadside unit is registered in the initial stage to third party's trust authority, is specifically included:
Step 1.2.1: roadside unit submits the true identity of roadside unit by safe lane to third party's trust authority
RID；
Step 1.2.2: third party's trust authority calculate roadside unit signature private key beThird party
Trust authority randomly selectsAs group's private key of roadside unit, and the group's public key for calculating roadside unit is PKg=sgP；
Step 1.2.3: third party's trust authority is by safe lane by { sR,sg,PKgIt is sent to roadside unit；
Step 1.2.4: roadside unit is to { the s receivedR,sg,PKgStored.
In the step 2, V2I authentication protocol is executed between vehicle unit and roadside unit, specifically include the following steps:
Step 2.1: roadside unit is periodically to surrounding broadcast first message { RID,PKg,σ1,TS1}；
Wherein, σ1It is generated for the first signature and by roadside unit, Indicate the signature private key s using roadside unitRPass through identity-based signature scheme
BLMQ is to information { PKg, TS1Sign, TS1For timestamp, hRSU=H1(PKg||TS1,x1), H1For hash function,G is module G1In a point, rRSUFor random number,VRSU=(rRSU+hRSU)sR；
Step 2.2: when vehicle unit enters in the communication range of roadside unit, receiving first message { RID,PKg,
σ1,TS1, the first review time stabs TS1Whether effectively, if time stamp T S1Effectively, then the first signature sigma is verified1, judge equation one
It is whether true；
Wherein, e is bilinear map, PpubFor the system public key that third party's trust authority generates, Ppub=sP；
If equation one is set up, the roadside unit is legal, and vehicle unit selects random number rOBU, use the label of vehicle unit
Name private key sVBy identity-based signature scheme BLMQ to information { rOBU, TS2Sign, generate the second signatureThen it is calculated between vehicle unit and the roadside unit
First shared key KV-R=PKgrOBU=sgPrOBU, the use of key is later KV-RSymmetric encipherment algorithmTo initial vacation
Name VIDWith random number rOBUEncryption generates ciphertextFinally to the roadside unit send second message c,
rOBUP,σ2,TS2, and enter step 2.3；
Wherein,TS2For timestamp, hOBU=H1(rOBU||TS2,x2),VOBU=(rOBU+
hOBU)sV；
If equation one is invalid, vehicle unit refusal accesses the roadside unit and is moved to next roadside unit；
Step 2.3: roadside unit receives second message { c, r from vehicle unitOBUP,σ2,TS2After, first check
Time stamp T S2Whether effectively, if time stamp T S2Effectively, then the first shared key K is calculatedV-R=rOBUPsg=rOBUPKg, and use
First shared key KV-RCiphertext c is decrypted, the V of vehicle unit is obtainedIDAnd rOBU, then verify the second signature of vehicle unit
σ2, judge equation two
It is whether true:
If equation two is set up, the vehicle unit is legal, enters step 2.4；
If equation two is invalid, roadside unit refusal provides access service for the vehicle unit；
Step 2.4: vehicle unit selects random number xOBU, the use of key is then KV-RSymmetric encipherment algorithmIt is right
xOBUP encryption generates third messageAnd third message c is sent to roadside unit1；Wherein,
Step 2.5: roadside unit receives the third message c from vehicle unit1Later, it is shared first using first close
Key KV-RBy third message c1Decryption, obtains the x of vehicle unitOBUThen P selects i-th of random numberI-th of new assumed name V is generated for vehicle uniti={ Vi,1,Vi,2, then be vehicle unit generation
I-th crowd of label key ski=sgH3(Vi,2,rOBUxOBUP), and T is selected to sign the validity period of key as group, is using key later
KV-RSymmetric encipherment algorithmTo i-th of new assumed name Vi, i-th crowd of label key skiAnd group signs the validity period T encryption of key
Generate i-th of the 4th messageAnd i-th of the 4th message c are sent to vehicle unit2i；Wherein,
Vi,1=uiP,H2、H3It is hash function；
Step 2.6: vehicle unit receives i-th of the 4th message c2iLater, using the first shared key KV-RBy i-th
4th message c2iDecryption, obtains < ski,Vi, T >, then by < ski,Vi, T > is stored in the TPD of vehicle unit, final to obtain
Cipher key list { < sk is signed to group1,V1, T >, < sk2,V2, T > ..., < ski,Vi, T > ..., < skn,Vn, T > }.
Wherein, TPD (TamperProofDevice) is tamper resistant device, for executing safety operation, such as signature and letter
With update.BLMQ is PauloS.L.M.Barreto, BenoitLibert, NoelMcCullagh and Jean-
The identity-based signature scheme that JacquesQuisquater is proposed, in BLMQ, user is not necessarily to other side's public key, it is only necessary to right
Whether the signature that side's offer identity can verify other side is legal.When generating group's label key, while third party being needed to trust machine
The relevant parameter of structure and roadside unit, attacker can not forge, therefore only legal group members could sign message, and
Other group members signature can not be represented, signature only has third party's trust authority that can open and restore the true identity of signer,
The anonymity for protecting user identity realizes the privacy of identities protection of system.
In the step 3, two vehicle unit OBUaWith OBUbBetween execute V2V authentication protocol, specifically include following steps
It is rapid:
Step 3.1:OBUaRandomly choose a new assumed name Vj={ Vj,1,Vj,2And new assumed name VjCorresponding group signs key
skj, generate OBUaGroup sign public keyThen the group signature scheme IGS of identity-based is executed to group
Public key PKgAnd OBUaGroup sign public keyIt signs, generates third signatureAnd to OBUbSend the 5th message
Wherein, TSaFor timestamp；
Step 3.2:OBUbReceive the 5th messageAfterwards, the first review time stabs TSaWhether
Effectively, if time stamp T SaEffectively, then third signature sigma is verified3；If third signature sigma3It is proved to be successful, OBUbRandom selection one new
Assumed name Vk={ Vk,1,Vk,2And new assumed name VkCorresponding group signs key skk, generate OBUbGroup sign public keyThen the group signature scheme IGS of identity-based is executed to group's public key PKgAnd OBUbGroup sign it is public
KeyIt signs, generates the 4th signatureSelection is random later
NumberFor OBUbWith OBUaBetween calculate the second shared key KV-V=nbRa=nbnaP, and second is shared
Key KV-VIt is stored in OBUbTPD in, then to OBUaSend the 6th messageWherein, TSbFor when
Between stab；
Step 3.3:OBUaReceive the 6th messageAfterwards, the first review time stabs TSbWhether
Effectively, if time stamp T SbEffectively, then the 4th signature sigma is verified4；If the 4th signature sigma4It is proved to be successful, then calculates the second shared key
KV-V=naRb=nanbP, and by the second shared key KV-VIt is stored in OBUaTPD in.
Wherein, IGS (ID-basedGroup Signature) i.e. ID-based group ranking, is Pankaj Sarde,
The group signature scheme for the identity-based that Amitabh Banerjee is proposed, in IGS, user can be used as a group members, with
The name of entire group generates signature.In the present invention, the group signature scheme IGS of identity-based is entered applied to vehicle node
During the anonymous access authentication of VANETs, it can be ensured that legal and subsequent communications the safety of vehicle node identity, effectively
Protect the privacy of identities of vehicle node.
The step 4 includes the following steps:
Step 4.1: in two vehicle unit OBUaWith OBUbBetween communication process in, work as OBUbReceive OBUaIt sends
Message m when, OBUbMessage m can be verified, if OBUbUse the second shared key KV-VMessage m can not be decrypted,
Then message m is unverified, judges message m for malicious messages and generates alert message alert, alert message alert includes
OBUaThe message m and OBU of transmissionaThe new assumed name V usedj, alert message alert is then sent to neighbouring roadside unit；
Step 4.2: after neighbouring roadside unit receives alert message alert, by safe lane by alert message
Alert is sent to third party's trust authority；
Step 4.3: after third party's trust machine receives alert message alert, according to OBUaThe new assumed name V usedj=
{Vj,1,Vj,2, calculate OBUaInitial assumed nameFinally to initial
Assumed name VIDIt is decrypted to obtain OBUaTrue identity ID；Wherein, Vj,1=ujP,
It is above-mentioned that an embodiment of the present invention is described in detail.Obviously, above-described embodiment is only of the invention
A part of the embodiment, instead of all the embodiments；Above-described embodiment for explaining only the invention, is not constituted and is protected to the present invention
Protect the restriction of range.Based on the above embodiment, those skilled in the art are obtained without making creative work
Every other embodiment namely it is all within the spirit and principles of the present application made by all modifications, equivalent replacement and improvement
Deng being all fallen within the protection domain of application claims.
Claims (6)
1. a kind of VANETs anonymous authentication system based on ID-based group ranking, it is characterised in that: trust machine including third party
Structure, multiple roadside units and multiple vehicle units；
Third party's trust authority is connect by network with roadside unit, and the vehicle unit passes through network and roadside unit phase
Even, third party's trust authority is communicated between vehicle unit by roadside unit；Third party's trust authority and road
It is trusted each other between the unit of side, third party's trust authority is trusted completely by vehicle unit, and the vehicle unit and roadside are single
Mutual mistrust between member, mutual mistrust between the vehicle unit, mutual mistrust between the roadside unit；
Third party's trust authority is roadside unit and registers into the vehicle unit of VANETs that the third party trusts
Mechanism is the signature private key that vehicle unit generates initial assumed name, initial trust value and vehicle unit, third party's trust authority
Signature private key, group's private key and the group's public key of roadside unit are generated for roadside unit；
The roadside unit is the infrastructure established in roadside, and the roadside unit is that the vehicle unit of legal access generates newly
Assumed name, group sign key and group signs the validity period of key；
The vehicle unit is the communication unit being loaded in vehicle node, the vehicle unit with vehicle node moving process
In switch between different roadside units, the vehicle unit is responsible between corresponding vehicle node and roadside unit, is corresponding
Vehicle node and other vehicle nodes between communication, can communicate directly in neighbor scope between different vehicle unit,
Pass through chance routing mode outside neighbor scope to be communicated；The vehicle unit can regularly publish security message, the safety
Message includes assumed name, present speed, position and the road conditions of vehicle node corresponding to vehicle unit；The vehicle unit is in correspondence
Vehicle node enter after VANETs and registered to third party's trust authority, the vehicle unit with the two-way of roadside unit by recognizing
Card obtains being that new assumed name, group's label key and group that the vehicle unit generates sign having for key as the roadside unit of group manager
The effect phase；
Only third party's trust authority can learn the true identity of vehicle unit, and only tripartite's trust authority can be to vehicle unit
Carry out destruction operation；The roadside unit can assist in third party's trust authority and be tracked to the true identity of vehicle unit.
2. a kind of VANETs anonymous authentication system using as described in claim 1 based on ID-based group ranking carries out anonymous
The method of certification, which is characterized in that include the following steps:
Step 1: the roadside unit and vehicle unit are registered in the initial stage to third party's trust authority, and the third party trusts
Mechanism is the signature private key that vehicle unit generates initial assumed name, initial trust value and vehicle unit, third party's trust authority
Signature private key, group's private key and the group's public key of roadside unit are generated for roadside unit；
Step 2: in the moving process of vehicle unit, when vehicle unit is moved to the wireless communication model of accessible roadside unit
When enclosing interior, V2I authentication protocol is executed between vehicle unit and roadside unit, to authenticate whether vehicle unit and roadside unit all close
Method, if vehicle unit and roadside unit are all legal, roadside unit is that the new assumed name of vehicle unit generation, the group's label of legal access are close
Key and group sign the validity period of key；
Step 3: completing the legal two vehicle unit OBU of V2I certificationaWith OBUbBetween execute V2V authentication protocol, with complete
Two-way authentication, i.e. OBUaWith OBUbWhether legal, if OBU if being mutually authenticatedaWith OBUbIt is all legal, then OBUaWith OBUbIt is used for
Second shared key of subsequent secure communication；
Step 4: in two vehicle unit OBUaWith OBUbBetween communication process in, work as OBUbReceive OBUaThe message m of transmission
When, OBUbMessage m can be verified, if message m is unverified, judge that message m for malicious messages, and sends warning and disappears
Cease neighbouring roadside unit；Alert message is sent to third party's trust authority in turn by neighbouring roadside unit；Third party's letter
Appoint mechanism according to alert message to OBUaTrue identity be tracked；
Step 5: third party's trust authority reduces trust value to the vehicle unit for sending malicious messages, and checks the vehicle unit
Trust value, if the trust value of the vehicle unit is less than critical value N, which is judged as malicious node, third party's letter
Appoint mechanism that the initial assumed name of the vehicle unit is broadcast to all roadside units, stops all roadside units to the vehicle
Unit provides access service, while third party's trust authority carries out being further processed under line, and cancels the vehicle unit.
3. the VANETs anonymous authentication method according to claim 2 based on ID-based group ranking, which is characterized in that institute
Step 1 is stated to include the following steps:
Step 1.1: vehicle unit is registered in the initial stage to third party's trust authority, is specifically included:
Step 1.1.1: vehicle unit submits the true identity ID of vehicle unit by safe lane to third party's trust authority；
Step 1.1.2: third party's trust authority randomly selectsAs the private key of third party's trust authority, then select close
Key is the symmetric encipherment algorithm E of KK() come calculate vehicle unit initial assumed name be VID=EK(ID), it is set later for vehicle unit
Setting initial trust value is N0, and the signature private key for calculating vehicle unit isWherein, H0For hash function, P
∈G1, G1For the module of third party's trust authority selection, P G1Interior generation member,For finite field；
Step 1.1.3: third party's trust authority is by safe lane by { sv,VID,N0It is sent to vehicle unit；
Step 1.1.4: vehicle unit is to { the s receivedv,VID,N0Stored；
Step 1.2: roadside unit is registered in the initial stage to third party's trust authority, is specifically included:
Step 1.2.1: roadside unit submits the true identity R of roadside unit by safe lane to third party's trust authorityID；
Step 1.2.2: third party's trust authority calculate roadside unit signature private key beThird party trusts
Mechanism randomly selectsAs group's private key of roadside unit, and the group's public key for calculating roadside unit is PKg=sgP；
Step 1.2.3: third party's trust authority is by safe lane by { sR,sg,PKgIt is sent to roadside unit；
Step 1.2.4: roadside unit is to { the s receivedR,sg,PKgStored.
4. the VANETs anonymous authentication method according to claim 3 based on ID-based group ranking, which is characterized in that institute
It states in step 2, V2I authentication protocol is executed between vehicle unit and roadside unit, specifically include the following steps:
Step 2.1: roadside unit is periodically to surrounding broadcast first message { RID,PKg,σ1,TS1}；
Wherein, σ1It is generated for the first signature and by roadside unit, σ1=Sign_BLMQ_SKsR{PKg, TS1}={ hRSU, VRSU,
Sign_BLMQ_SKsR{PKg, TS1Indicate to use the signature private key s of roadside unitRPass through BLMQ pairs of identity-based signature scheme
Information { PKg, TS1Sign, TS1For timestamp, hRSU=H1(PKg||TS1,x1), H1For hash function,g
For module G1In a point, rRSUFor random number,VRSU=(rRSU+hRSU)sR；
Step 2.2: when vehicle unit enters in the communication range of roadside unit, receiving first message { RID,PKg,σ1,
TS1, the first review time stabs TS1Whether effectively, if time stamp T S1Effectively, then the first signature sigma is verified1, judge equation one
It is whether true；
Wherein, e is bilinear map, PpubFor the system public key that third party's trust authority generates, Ppub=sP；
If equation one is set up, the roadside unit is legal, and vehicle unit selects random number rOBU, private using the signature of vehicle unit
Key sVBy identity-based signature scheme BLMQ to information { rOBU, TS2Sign, generate the second signature sigma2=Sign_
BLMQ_SKsV{rOBU, TS2}={ hOBU, VOBU, the first shared key is then calculated between vehicle unit and the roadside unit
KV-R=PKgrOBU=sgPrOBU, the use of key is later KV-RSymmetric encipherment algorithmTo initial assumed name VIDAnd random number
rOBUEncryption generates ciphertextFinally second message { c, r are sent to the roadside unitOBUP,σ2,TS2,
And enter step 2.3；
Wherein,TS2For timestamp, hOBU=H1(rOBU||TS2,x2),VOBU=(rOBU+hOBU)sV；
If equation one is invalid, vehicle unit refusal accesses the roadside unit and is moved to next roadside unit；
Step 2.3: roadside unit receives second message { c, r from vehicle unitOBUP,σ2,TS2After, the first review time
Stab TS2Whether effectively, if time stamp T S2Effectively, then the first shared key is calculatedAnd it uses
First shared key KV-RCiphertext c is decrypted, the V of vehicle unit is obtainedIDAnd rOBU, then verify the second signature of vehicle unit
σ2, judge equation two
It is whether true:
If equation two is set up, the vehicle unit is legal, enters step 2.4；
If equation two is invalid, roadside unit refusal provides access service for the vehicle unit；
Step 2.4: vehicle unit selects random number xOBU, the use of key is then KV-RSymmetric encipherment algorithmTo xOBUP
Encryption generates third messageAnd third message c is sent to roadside unit1；Wherein,
Step 2.5: roadside unit receives the third message c from vehicle unit1Later, the first shared key K is used firstV-R
By third message c1Decryption, obtains the x of vehicle unitOBUThen P selects i-th of random numberI=1,2,3 ...,
N }, i-th of new assumed name V is generated for vehicle uniti={ Vi,1,Vi,2, then i-th crowd of label key sk are generated for vehicle uniti=
sgH3(Vi,2,rOBUxOBUP), and T is selected to sign the validity period of key as group, the use of key is later KV-RSymmetric encipherment algorithmTo i-th of new assumed name Vi, i-th crowd of label key skiAnd group signs validity period T encryption i-th of the 4th message of generation of keyAnd i-th of the 4th message c are sent to vehicle unit2i；Wherein, Vi,1=uiP,H2、H3It is hash function；
Step 2.6: vehicle unit receives i-th of the 4th message c2iLater, using the first shared key KV-RBy i-th the 4th
Message c2iDecryption, obtains < ski,Vi, T >, then by < ski,Vi, T > is stored in the TPD of vehicle unit, finally obtains group
Sign cipher key list { < sk1,V1, T >, < sk2,V2, T > ..., < ski,Vi, T > ..., < skn,Vn, T > }.
5. the VANETs anonymous authentication method according to claim 4 based on ID-based group ranking, which is characterized in that institute
It states in step 3, two vehicle unit OBUaWith OBUbBetween execute V2V authentication protocol, specifically include the following steps:
Step 3.1:OBUaRandomly choose a new assumed name Vj={ Vj,1,Vj,2And new assumed name VjCorresponding group signs key skj, generate
OBUaGroup sign public keyThen the group signature scheme IGS of identity-based is executed to group's public key PKg
And OBUaGroup sign public keyIt signs, generates third signature
And to OBUbSend the 5th messageWherein, TSaFor timestamp；
Step 3.2:OBUbReceive the 5th messageAfterwards, the first review time stabs TSaWhether effectively,
If time stamp T SaEffectively, then third signature sigma is verified3；If third signature sigma3It is proved to be successful, OBUbRandomly choose a new assumed name Vk
={ Vk,1,Vk,2And new assumed name VkCorresponding group signs key skk, generate OBUbGroup sign public key
Then the group signature scheme IGS of identity-based is executed to group's public key PKgAnd OBUbGroup sign public keyIt signs, generates the
Four signaturesRandom number is selected laterFor OBUb
With OBUaBetween calculate the second shared key KV-V=nbRa=nbnaP, and by the second shared key KV-VIt is stored in OBUbTPD
In, then to OBUaSend the 6th messageWherein, TSbFor timestamp；
Step 3.3:OBUaReceive the 6th messageAfterwards, the first review time stabs TSbWhether effectively,
If time stamp T SbEffectively, then the 4th signature sigma is verified4；If the 4th signature sigma4It is proved to be successful, then calculates the second shared key KV-V=
naRb=nanbP, and by the second shared key KV-VIt is stored in OBUaTPD in.
6. the VANETs anonymous authentication method according to claim 5 based on ID-based group ranking, which is characterized in that institute
Step 4 is stated to include the following steps:
Step 4.1: in two vehicle unit OBUaWith OBUbBetween communication process in, work as OBUbReceive OBUaThe message of transmission
When m, OBUbMessage m can be verified, if OBUbUse the second shared key KV-VMessage m can not be decrypted, then message m
It is unverified, message m is judged for malicious messages and generates alert message alert, and alert message alert includes OBUaIt sends
Message m and OBUaThe new assumed name V usedj, alert message alert is then sent to neighbouring roadside unit；
Step 4.2: after neighbouring roadside unit receives alert message alert, being sent out alert message alert by safe lane
Give third party's trust authority；
Step 4.3: after third party's trust machine receives alert message alert, according to OBUaThe new assumed name V usedj={ Vj,1,
Vj,2, calculate OBUaInitial assumed nameFinally to initial assumed name VID
It is decrypted to obtain OBUaTrue identity ID；Wherein, Vj,1=ujP,
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