CN112349441A - Safety processing method for cable fire misoperation of nuclear power plant - Google Patents
Safety processing method for cable fire misoperation of nuclear power plant Download PDFInfo
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- CN112349441A CN112349441A CN202011162655.0A CN202011162655A CN112349441A CN 112349441 A CN112349441 A CN 112349441A CN 202011162655 A CN202011162655 A CN 202011162655A CN 112349441 A CN112349441 A CN 112349441A
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
- G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
- G21D3/04—Safety arrangements
- G21D3/06—Safety arrangements responsive to faults within the plant
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
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Abstract
The invention discloses a safety processing method for cable fire misoperation in a nuclear power plant, which comprises the following steps: s1, checking electrical equipment which possibly generates misoperation and affects the safe operation of the nuclear power plant by using the database information of the equipment of the nuclear power plant to obtain a list of the misoperation equipment and a fireproof subarea thereof; s2, acquiring cable information corresponding to the equipment in the list, upstream electric panels for power supply, power failure positions of pneumatic valves and signal alarm conditions of switches or relays; s3, carrying out false operation safety analysis by taking a single fire-proof partition in the list as an analysis unit, and screening out items which do not influence safety to update the list; s4, performing circuit failure analysis on the updated equipment in the list to classify the equipment into a thermal short circuit, a short circuit to the ground or an open circuit; and S5, taking corresponding counter measures according to the circuit failure analysis result. The invention analyzes the circuit failure aiming at the cable fire misoperation equipment of the nuclear power station to make corresponding reasonable measures, thereby ensuring the safety and the reliability of the nuclear power station.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of nuclear industry safety, in particular to a safety processing method for cable fire misoperation in a nuclear power plant.
Background
Fires pose a significant potential safety threat to nuclear power plants. Once a fire disaster occurs in a nuclear power plant, equipment of the nuclear power plant and related cables are damaged by the fire disaster under the condition of the fire disaster, so that the related equipment cannot act or malfunction occurs, the operation and control of a unit are influenced, nuclear safety related system accidents can be caused, serious economic loss and social influence are caused, and the consequence is extremely serious.
In case of fire, electrical equipment is more susceptible to fire than mechanical equipment. Not only can a fire directly interact with equipment causing the equipment to become unusable, the fire can also cause the equipment to become unusable or otherwise fail through interaction with the equipment's cables or circuits. In order to prevent the occurrence of fire accidents and put out the fire in time when the fire happens, the nuclear power station carries out systematic analysis and research aiming at the influence of the fire accidents on the safe shutdown of the reactor in the design and operation processes.
Nuclear power plants operate on hundreds of systems and associated equipment, which communicate control and measurement signals to and from the equipment via cables. Cables of the nuclear power plant are distributed in each plant of the nuclear power plant and are connected with different devices through cable bridges, trays and holes. When a fire accident occurs, the cables may be affected by the fire and damaged, and in this case, different cables arranged on the same bridge may be short-circuited to cause short-circuit, open circuit or ground fault. The cable with the fault may transmit an erroneous signal to the related equipment, so that the equipment malfunction is caused and the safety of the nuclear power unit is affected.
The cables of the nuclear power plant are various in types, and can be divided into power cables (medium voltage cables and low voltage cables), measuring cables and control cables according to different transmission signals. The cable can be divided into thermoplastic cables, thermosetting cables, armored cables and the like according to different cable materials. The functions performed by different types of cables and the failure modes and mechanisms in case of fire are different. The failure of the cable can cause that the connected equipment can not receive related signals or receive error signals to cause the equipment to generate misoperation, thereby influencing the safe shutdown control of the unit.
The effects of fire on circuits and equipment include multiple malfunctions, loss of power, loss of control, false indications, etc. Multiple false actions are a relatively special failure mode of electrical equipment in a fire situation: electrical equipment or cables are short circuited under the influence of a fire, causing the electrical equipment to signal an error or to change state erroneously if the power support system is available. The short circuit of the electrical equipment or the cable under the influence of fire occurs, and under the condition that the power supply support system is available, the electrical equipment sends out an error signal or changes the state by mistake, which is called fire misoperation, and the fire misoperation is a special failure mode of the electrical equipment under the fire scene. In the prior art, an analysis processing method and a system aiming at cable fire misoperation of a nuclear power plant are lacked.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above, it is necessary to provide a method for safely handling cable fire malfunction in a nuclear power plant, which includes the following steps:
the utility model provides a nuclear power plant cable fire malfunction safety processing method, which comprises the following steps:
s1, determining list of malfunction equipment and fire-proof subareas thereof: the method comprises the steps that a database list of equipment of the nuclear power plant is utilized, electrical equipment which possibly generates misoperation and affects safe operation of the nuclear power plant is checked, a fireproof subarea where the electrical equipment is located is correspondingly determined, and a list of the misoperation equipment and the fireproof subarea is obtained, wherein the determined range of the electrical equipment which affects the safe operation of the nuclear power plant comprises equipment which performs the functions of reactivity control, primary circuit pressure control, primary circuit water charge control, reactor core waste heat discharge and process monitoring, and power, cooling and ventilation support system equipment;
s2, determining relevant information of the malfunction equipment: acquiring cable information, a power-loss position of an upstream electric panel and a pneumatic valve for power supply and signal alarm conditions of a switch or a relay corresponding to the equipment in the list of the misoperation equipment and the fire-proof subareas thereof;
s3, performing error action safety analysis according to the relevant information determined in S2: taking a single fire protection subarea in the list of the malfunction equipment and the fire protection subarea thereof as an analysis unit, and if any one of the following conditions is met, screening the malfunction equipment and the fire protection subarea thereof from the list to update the list of the malfunction equipment and the fire protection subarea thereof, wherein the screening conditions comprise: 1) the fire-proof subarea can not generate fire; 2) the fire-proof subarea has important malfunction equipment or an important equipment switchboard, but the malfunction can not be caused when the fire disaster happens to the fire-proof subarea; 3) the fire-proof subarea has important malfunction equipment or an important equipment switchboard, but the malfunction has no influence on the nuclear safety of the power plant;
s4, performing circuit failure analysis on the updated malfunction equipment and the malfunction equipment in the list of the fire-proof subareas thereof, and classifying the circuit failure analysis according to the following three types: thermal short, short to ground, and open circuit;
s5, if the circuit failure type of the malfunction equipment is thermal short circuit, the countermeasure is to check the power-on condition of the relay for controlling the equipment to be opened or closed, and judge whether the relay causes the unexpected electric valve to be opened or closed; if the circuit failure type of the misoperation equipment is short circuit to the ground, the countermeasure is to check whether the power supply of the control circuit of the equipment is lost; if the circuit failure type of the misoperation equipment is open circuit, the countermeasure is to check the power supply condition of the power supply of the equipment and check whether the equipment state of the normally powered equipment is changed.
Furthermore, the control circuit of the equipment comprises a first control branch and a second control branch which are arranged in parallel and a control power supply for supplying power to the control branch, a control switch for opening a first relay of the equipment and a corresponding first electric valve are arranged on the first control branch in series, and a control switch for closing a second relay of the equipment and a corresponding second electric valve are arranged on the second control branch in series;
if a thermal short circuit occurs between the first relay and the first electrically operated valve, causing an undesired opening of the electrically operated valve; if a thermal short circuit occurs between the second relay and the second electrically operated valve, it results in an undesired closing of the electrically operated valve.
Furthermore, the control circuit of the equipment comprises a first control branch and a second control branch which are arranged in parallel and a grounding control power supply for supplying power to the first control branch, a control switch for opening a first relay of the equipment and a corresponding first electric valve are arranged on the first control branch in series, and a control switch for closing a second relay of the equipment and a corresponding second electric valve are arranged on the second control branch in series;
if the short circuit to the ground occurs on the main circuit on one side of the ground control power supply, the fuse of the ground control power supply is fused, and the power supply of the control circuit is lost; if a short circuit to ground occurs between the control switch of the second relay and the second electrically operated valve, the fuse of the ground control power supply is blown and the power supply of the control circuit is lost when the control switch of the second relay is closed; before the control switch of the second relay is closed, no influence is generated.
Furthermore, the control circuit of the equipment comprises a first control branch and a second control branch which are arranged in parallel and an ungrounded control power supply for supplying power to the first control branch, a control switch for opening a first relay of the equipment and a corresponding first electric valve are arranged on the first control branch in series, and a control switch for closing a second relay of the equipment and a corresponding second electric valve are arranged on the second control branch in series;
if the short circuit to the ground occurs on the main circuit at the two sides of the grounding control power supply, the fuse of the grounding control power supply is fused, and the power supply of the control circuit is lost; if a short circuit to ground occurs between the control switch of the second relay and the second electric valve and on the trunk on the side close to the second electric valve, the fuse of the ground control power supply is blown and the power supply of the control circuit is lost when the control switch of the second relay is closed; before the control switch of the second relay is closed, no influence is generated.
Furthermore, the control circuit of the equipment comprises a first control branch and a second control branch which are arranged in parallel and a control power supply for supplying power to the control branch, a control switch for opening a first relay of the equipment and a corresponding first electric valve are arranged on the first control branch in series, and a control switch for closing a second relay of the equipment and a corresponding second electric valve are arranged on the second control branch in series;
if the open circuit occurs on the main circuit on one side of the control power supply, the operation of the equipment is interrupted; if an open circuit occurs on the first control branch, the opening of the device is affected.
Further, in step S2, the relevant information of the malfunctioning device is determined by referring to the system design manual, the cable path list, the cable tray, and the sub-tray layout diagram related to the nuclear power plant.
Further, after step S3, the method further includes: and comparing the result with the fire malfunction safety analysis result of the similar power plant, and if the malfunction situation is omitted, carrying out malfunction safety analysis on the missing item again.
The invention has the following advantages:
a. analyzing and determining cables which are possibly influenced by fire in different fireproof subareas of the nuclear power plant to cause equipment misoperation through a cable fire misoperation safety analysis method;
b. the method includes the steps that targeted protection measures are taken for cables which are possibly affected, and the reliability and integrity of the cables under fire accidents or incidents are guaranteed;
c. circuit failure analysis is carried out aiming at cable fire misoperation equipment of a nuclear power station to make corresponding reasonable measures, so that the safety of the nuclear power station is ensured, and the safety and the reliability of a nuclear power unit are improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a safety handling method for cable fire malfunction in a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2-1 is a schematic diagram of a thermal short circuit of a ground circuit provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2-2 is a schematic diagram of a thermal short circuit of a non-grounded circuit provided by an embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 3-1 is a schematic diagram of a short circuit to ground for a ground circuit provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3-2 is a schematic diagram of a short to ground circuit for a non-grounded circuit provided by an embodiment of the invention;
fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of the ground circuit breaker according to the embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the technical solutions of the present invention better understood, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," and the like in the description and claims of the present invention and in the drawings described above are used for distinguishing between similar elements and not necessarily for describing a particular sequential or chronological order. It is to be understood that the data so used is interchangeable under appropriate circumstances such that the embodiments of the invention described herein are capable of operation in sequences other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," as well as any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions.
The short circuit of the electrical equipment or the cable under the influence of fire occurs, and under the condition that the power supply support system is available, the electrical equipment sends out an error signal or changes the state by mistake, which is called fire misoperation, and the fire misoperation is a special failure mode of the electrical equipment under the fire scene. In an embodiment of the present invention, a method for safely processing cable fire malfunctions in a nuclear power plant is provided, and referring to fig. 1, the method for safely processing fire malfunctions includes the following steps:
s1, determining list of malfunction equipment and fire-proof subareas thereof: the method comprises the steps of utilizing a database list of equipment of the nuclear power plant to investigate electrical equipment which possibly generates misoperation and affects safe operation of the nuclear power plant, correspondingly determining a fireproof subarea where the electrical equipment is located, and obtaining a list of the misoperation equipment and the fireproof subarea.
In particular, the normal operation of a nuclear power plant comprises hundreds of systems that perform different functions, only some of which perform nuclear safety related functions, and the important nuclear safety functions during the operation of the nuclear power plant include devices that perform the functions of reactivity control, primary circuit pressure control, primary circuit water charge control, core waste heat removal, process monitoring, and power, cooling, and ventilation support system devices.
The equipment for realizing the functions has important influence on the safety of the nuclear power plant, and the failure or misoperation of the equipment can cause serious nuclear safety consequences. And obtaining a list of the equipment which possibly generates misoperation and causes serious consequences under the condition of fire and the corresponding fire-proof subareas thereof through screening and analysis.
S2, determining relevant information of the malfunction equipment: acquiring cable information, a power-loss position of an upstream electric panel and a pneumatic valve for power supply and signal alarm conditions of a switch or a relay corresponding to the equipment in the list of the misoperation equipment and the fire-proof subareas thereof; the control of the nuclear power unit depends on cables corresponding to a plurality of devices to form various circuits, and the safety and the reliability of the cable circuits directly determine the state of the unit.
Specifically, the basis for performing the malfunction analysis is the list of important malfunction devices in each area, and according to the malfunction definition, the cause of malfunction of these important malfunction devices is short circuit of the electrical devices themselves or their cables due to fire, and the ultimate damage is to change the state or send out an error signal.
The above information required for further analysis is obtained by consulting nuclear power plant-related data (including but not limited to system design manuals, cable route lists, cable trays, sub-tray layouts, etc.): equipment cable information, upstream electrical panels (power, 125V, 48V, 30V) supplying power, pneumatic valve de-energizing position, and signal alarm condition of switches or relays.
And S3, performing error operation safety analysis according to the relevant information determined in the S2.
The goal of fire malfunction analysis is to determine which areas will malfunction and have a significant impact on the safety of the nuclear power plant. The misoperation analysis takes a single fire-proof subarea as an analysis unit, and performs preliminary misoperation analysis on each area, so as to screen out areas which do not generate misoperation or generate misoperation and have no influence on safety, and leave areas with important safety for further detailed analysis.
Specifically, a single fire protection subarea in the list of the malfunction equipment and the fire protection subareas thereof is taken as an analysis unit, and the screening condition or the screening principle comprises the following steps: 1) the fire-proof subarea can not generate fire; 2) the fire-proof subarea has important malfunction equipment or an important equipment switchboard, but the malfunction can not be caused when the fire disaster happens to the fire-proof subarea; 3) the fire-proof subarea has important malfunction equipment or an important equipment switchboard, but the malfunction has no influence on the nuclear safety of the power plant. If any of the above conditions is met, the partition area may be screened out from the list (without further analysis of the devices within its area range) to update the list of the malfunctioning devices and their fire partitions.
Referring to fig. 1, after preliminary malfunction screening, if there is a condition, it can be compared with the result of malfunction analysis of fire in similar power plants to determine that no important malfunction situation is missed. If missing, the error operation analysis is needed to be carried out again for the missing item so as to ensure the integrity of the analysis.
And carrying out misoperation safety analysis on each fire-proof subarea according to the determined principle. The malfunction safety analysis process mainly comprises the steps of carrying out failure analysis on related equipment circuits in each fire-proof subarea, and determining equipment which can malfunction under the condition of fire in each fire-proof subarea by determining a failure mode of the equipment and analyzing equipment malfunction conditions and consequences possibly caused by failure.
S4, performing circuit failure analysis on the updated malfunction equipment and the malfunction equipment in the list of the fire-proof subareas thereof, and classifying the circuit failure analysis according to the following three types: thermal short, short to ground, and open circuit.
Nuclear power plants must be designed to prevent fire damage and to maintain a safe shutdown after a fire. The impact of a fire in each fire zone is evaluated by the impact of the fire damaging the circuitry within that fire zone that provides control and motion pictures for the "safety trip critical" equipment and the "hot trip required" equipment. According to the related experiment results and the analysis and research conclusions, the basic fault modes of the nuclear power plant cable fire can be divided into three types according to the change of voltage and current: thermal short, short to ground, open circuit.
S5, if the circuit failure type of the malfunction equipment is thermal short circuit, the countermeasure is to check the power-on condition of the relay for controlling the equipment to be opened or closed, and judge whether the relay causes the unexpected electric valve to be opened or closed; if the circuit failure type of the misoperation equipment is short circuit to the ground, the countermeasure is to check whether the power supply of the control circuit of the equipment is lost; if the circuit failure type of the misoperation equipment is open circuit, the countermeasure is to check the power supply condition of the power supply of the equipment and check whether the equipment state of the normally powered equipment is changed.
The following is for three cases: the thermal short circuit, the ground short circuit and the open circuit are respectively explained in detail:
the first type: thermal shorts, which are insulation breakdown between wires of the same cable, or between wires of different cables caused by a fire, resulting in an undesirable applied voltage on a particular wire. The potential effect of this undesirable applied voltage would be to cause the device to operate in an undesirable manner or to fail. The external voltage can be generated between two leads of the same cable, which is called as the thermal short circuit in the cable; or between two conductors in separate cables, referred to as an inter-cable thermal short.
Thermal shorts are classified into two types according to the grounding condition of the device circuit: a thermal short of a grounded circuit and a thermal short of an ungrounded circuit.
Thermal shorting of ground circuit referring to fig. 2-1, fig. 2-1 is a typical ground control circuit for an electrically operated valve, with No.1 and No.2 thermal shorting marks in fig. 2-1.
As shown in fig. 2-1, the control circuit of the device includes a first control branch and a second control branch arranged in parallel, and a control power supply for supplying power to the first control branch, a control switch and a corresponding first electric valve for opening a first relay of the device are arranged in series on the first control branch, and a control switch and a corresponding second electric valve for closing a second relay of the device are arranged in series on the second control branch;
a thermal short circuit at No.2 occurs between the first relay and the first electrically operated valve, where the thermal short circuit may cause the relay for opening to be energized, resulting in undesired opening of the electrically operated valve;
a thermal short circuit at No.1 occurs between the second relay and the second electrically operated valve, where it may cause the relay to energize for closing, resulting in an undesired closing of the electrically operated valve.
Thermal short-circuiting of ungrounded circuits referring to fig. 2-2, a single thermal short-circuiting may be sufficient to cause a malfunction for the case of an ungrounded circuit. Fig. 2-2 shows a typical non-grounded control circuit for an electrically operated valve, and fig. 2-2 shows two thermal short marks No.1 and No. 2.
Likewise, a thermal short circuit at No.1 occurs between the second relay and the second electrically operated valve, where it can cause the relay for closing to be energized, causing an undesired closing of the electrically operated valve; a thermal short circuit at No.2 occurs between the first relay and the first electrically operated valve, where it may cause the relay for opening to be energized, resulting in an undesired opening of the electrically operated valve.
The second type: short-circuiting to ground, which is a fire-induced fault generated by the cable insulation system, results in the potential of the conductor being grounded. A short to ground may result in loss of power or control of the safety shutdown device. Furthermore, short-circuiting to ground may also affect other equipment in the power distribution system in some cases. Specifically, the ground short circuit is classified into two types according to the grounding condition of the device circuit: a short to ground for a grounded circuit and a short to ground for a non-grounded circuit.
Ground short circuit to ground referring to fig. 3-1, in the case of a circuit ground, a ground short on any part of the circuit can create a potential for triggering an electrical protection device, resulting in loss of control power. Fig. 3-1 is a schematic diagram of a typical ground circuit to ground short circuit, and fig. 3-1 has two ground short circuit marks No.1 and No. 2.
As shown in fig. 3-1, the control circuit of the device includes a first control branch and a second control branch arranged in parallel, and a ground control power supply for supplying power to the first control branch, a control switch and a corresponding first electric valve for opening a first relay of the device are arranged in series on the first control branch, and a control switch and a corresponding second electric valve for closing a second relay of the device are arranged in series on the second control branch;
the short circuit to ground at No.1 occurs on the trunk on the side of the ground control power supply, which results in the blowing of the control power supply fuse and the loss of power to the control circuit. This would result in the device not being able to be operated using the control switch. Depending on the relevant characteristics between the protection device of the circuit and the upstream circuit, the power supply of other circuits may be affected;
the short circuit to ground at No.2 occurs between the control switch of the second relay and the second electrically operated valve, and the short circuit to ground at position No.2 will not affect the circuit until the control switch indicating off/stop is closed. If the switch is closed, the effect will be the same as that produced by the short to ground in position No.1 above. The device can still be turned on/on if the control switch indicating on/off is closed in preference to the control switch indicating off/off.
Short to ground of non-grounded circuits referring to fig. 3-2, for the case of an ungrounded circuit, on any part of the circuit, it is assumed that only one short to ground condition may not cause triggering of the electrical protection device. To cause a circuit to lose control of the power supply requires another short circuit to ground on the same circuit or on another circuit from the same power supply. Fig. 3-2 is a schematic diagram of a typical ground short circuit of a non-grounded circuit, and fig. 3-2 has three ground short circuit marks No.1, No.2 and No. 3.
If there is a No.3 short to ground on the same circuit or on another circuit from the same power supply, the short to ground at the No.1 position will cause the control power fuse to blow, causing the control circuit to power down. This would result in the device not being able to be operated using the control switch. If multiple grounds may occur within a single fire zone, it should be assumed that they occur simultaneously.
The combination of the No.2 position and the No.3 position short to ground will not affect the circuit until the control switch indicating off/stop is closed. If the switch is closed, the effect will be the same as that produced by the short to ground at position No.1 above. The device may still be on/active if the control switch representing on/active is closed prior to the control switch representing off/inactive.
In the third category: the circuit failure caused by the open circuit refers to the internal disconnection of a wire, the fusing of a fuse or the loss of the continuity function of the circuit caused by the triggering of a circuit breaker. An open circuit typically impedes the ability to control or power the affected device. While for a normally powered device, an open circuit may also cause the device state to change. Fig. 4 shows an example of the disconnection of the ground control circuit, in which there are two disconnection marks No.1 and N0.2.
As shown in fig. 4, the control circuit of the device includes a first control branch and a second control branch arranged in parallel, and a control power supply for supplying power to the first control branch, a control switch and a corresponding first electric valve for opening a first relay of the device are arranged in series on the first control branch, and a control switch and a corresponding second electric valve for closing a second relay of the device are arranged in series on the second control branch;
the open circuit at No.1 occurs on the trunk on the control power supply side, which results in hindering the operation of the target device; the open circuit at No.2, which occurs in the first control branch and is not between the control switch of the first relay and the first motor-operated valve, may hinder the opening and starting of the target equipment but does not affect the function of closing and stopping the equipment.
The invention provides a safety analysis method aiming at the cable fire misoperation of the nuclear power plant, analyzes and determines the cables which are possibly influenced by the fire in different fire-proof subareas of the nuclear power plant to cause the equipment misoperation, adopts targeted protection measures aiming at the possibly influenced cables, and ensures the reliability and integrity of the cables under the fire accident or event, thereby ensuring the safety of the nuclear power plant and improving the safety and reliability of the nuclear power unit.
The above description is only for the preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and all modifications of equivalent structures and equivalent processes that can be directly or indirectly applied to other related technical fields using the contents of the present specification and the accompanying drawings are included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. A safety processing method for cable fire misoperation in a nuclear power plant is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, determining list of malfunction equipment and fire-proof subareas thereof: the method comprises the steps that a database list of equipment of the nuclear power plant is utilized, electrical equipment which possibly generates misoperation and affects safe operation of the nuclear power plant is checked, a fireproof subarea where the electrical equipment is located is correspondingly determined, and a list of the misoperation equipment and the fireproof subarea is obtained, wherein the determined range of the electrical equipment which affects the safe operation of the nuclear power plant comprises equipment which performs the functions of reactivity control, primary circuit pressure control, primary circuit water charge control, reactor core waste heat discharge and process monitoring, and power, cooling and ventilation support system equipment;
s2, determining relevant information of the malfunction equipment: acquiring cable information, a power-loss position of an upstream electric panel and a pneumatic valve for power supply and signal alarm conditions of a switch or a relay corresponding to the equipment in the list of the misoperation equipment and the fire-proof subareas thereof;
s3, performing error action safety analysis according to the relevant information determined in S2: taking a single fire protection subarea in the list of the malfunction equipment and the fire protection subarea thereof as an analysis unit, and if any one of the following conditions is met, screening the malfunction equipment and the fire protection subarea thereof from the list to update the list of the malfunction equipment and the fire protection subarea thereof, wherein the screening conditions comprise: 1) the fire-proof subarea can not generate fire; 2) the fire-proof subarea has important malfunction equipment or an important equipment switchboard, but the malfunction can not be caused when the fire disaster happens to the fire-proof subarea; 3) the fire-proof subarea has important malfunction equipment or an important equipment switchboard, but the malfunction has no influence on the nuclear safety of the power plant;
s4, performing circuit failure analysis on the updated malfunction equipment and the malfunction equipment in the list of the fire-proof subareas thereof, and classifying the circuit failure analysis according to the following three types: thermal short, short to ground, and open circuit;
s5, if the circuit failure type of the malfunction equipment is thermal short circuit, the countermeasure is to check the power-on condition of the relay for controlling the equipment to be opened or closed, and judge whether the relay causes the unexpected electric valve to be opened or closed; if the circuit failure type of the misoperation equipment is short circuit to the ground, the countermeasure is to check whether the power supply of the control circuit of the equipment is lost; if the circuit failure type of the misoperation equipment is open circuit, the countermeasure is to check the power supply condition of the power supply of the equipment and check whether the equipment state of the normally powered equipment is changed.
2. The safety processing method for the cable fire malfunction of the nuclear power plant according to claim 1, wherein the control circuit of the equipment comprises a first control branch and a second control branch which are arranged in parallel, and a control power supply for supplying power to the first control branch, a control switch for opening a first relay of the equipment and a corresponding first electric valve are arranged on the first control branch in series, and a control switch for closing a second relay of the equipment and a corresponding second electric valve are arranged on the second control branch in series;
if a thermal short circuit occurs between the first relay and the first electrically operated valve, causing an undesired opening of the electrically operated valve; if a thermal short circuit occurs between the second relay and the second electrically operated valve, it results in an undesired closing of the electrically operated valve.
3. The safety processing method for the cable fire malfunction of the nuclear power plant according to claim 1, wherein the control circuit of the equipment comprises a first control branch and a second control branch which are arranged in parallel, and a ground control power supply for supplying power to the first control branch, a control switch for opening a first relay of the equipment and a corresponding first electric valve are arranged on the first control branch in series, and a control switch for closing a second relay of the equipment and a corresponding second electric valve are arranged on the second control branch in series;
if the short circuit to the ground occurs on the main circuit on one side of the ground control power supply, the fuse of the ground control power supply is fused, and the power supply of the control circuit is lost; if a short circuit to ground occurs between the control switch of the second relay and the second electrically operated valve, the fuse of the ground control power supply is blown and the power supply of the control circuit is lost when the control switch of the second relay is closed; before the control switch of the second relay is closed, no influence is generated.
4. The safety processing method for the cable fire malfunction of the nuclear power plant according to claim 1, wherein the control circuit of the equipment comprises a first control branch and a second control branch which are arranged in parallel, and an ungrounded control power supply for supplying power to the first control branch, a control switch for opening a first relay of the equipment and a corresponding first electric valve are arranged on the first control branch in series, and a control switch for closing a second relay of the equipment and a corresponding second electric valve are arranged on the second control branch in series;
if the short circuit to the ground occurs on the main circuit at the two sides of the grounding control power supply, the fuse of the grounding control power supply is fused, and the power supply of the control circuit is lost; if a short circuit to ground occurs between the control switch of the second relay and the second electric valve and on the trunk on the side close to the second electric valve, the fuse of the ground control power supply is blown and the power supply of the control circuit is lost when the control switch of the second relay is closed; before the control switch of the second relay is closed, no influence is generated.
5. The safety processing method for the cable fire malfunction of the nuclear power plant according to claim 1, wherein the control circuit of the equipment comprises a first control branch and a second control branch which are arranged in parallel, and a control power supply for supplying power to the first control branch, a control switch for opening a first relay of the equipment and a corresponding first electric valve are arranged on the first control branch in series, and a control switch for closing a second relay of the equipment and a corresponding second electric valve are arranged on the second control branch in series;
if the open circuit occurs on the main circuit on one side of the control power supply, the operation of the equipment is interrupted; if an open circuit occurs on the first control branch, the opening of the device is affected.
6. The safety processing method for cable fire malfunction of nuclear power plant according to claim 1, wherein in step S2, the related information of the malfunction equipment is determined by referring to the system design manual, the cable path list, the cable tray and the sub-tray layout diagram related to the nuclear power plant.
7. The safety handling method for the cable fire malfunction of the nuclear power plant according to claim 1, further comprising, after step S3: and comparing the result with the fire malfunction safety analysis result of the similar power plant, and if the malfunction situation is omitted, carrying out malfunction safety analysis on the missing item again.
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