CN112235108B - 802.1X-based EAP-TLS authentication system - Google Patents
802.1X-based EAP-TLS authentication system Download PDFInfo
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1458—Denial of Service
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
- H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
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Abstract
An EAP-TLS authentication system based on 802.1X comprises a client module, an access point module and a server module; the client and the server respectively sign the certificate and the random number, and the client, the access point and the server respectively decrypt the signature and perform mutual authentication, so that the validity of an authentication entity is ensured, and man-in-the-middle attack is effectively resisted; the client verifies the legitimacy of the server certificate, uses the server public key for verifying the legitimacy to carry out RSA asymmetric encryption on the identity of the client, and sends the bound identity and the certificate to an authenticator together, thereby effectively preventing identity attack; and an AES symmetric encryption mechanism is used for encrypting the EAP-Success, so that an attacker is prevented from directly intercepting an EAP-Success response packet, and DoS attack is effectively resisted.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of computer information security, and particularly relates to an EAP-TLS authentication system based on 802.1X.
Background
With the development of network technology, network security is of great importance. At present, an EAP-TLS Authentication system based on 802.1X is most widely applied, and mutual Authentication between a Client (Client), an Access Point (Access Point), and a Server (Server) is implemented, where an EAP protocol is used between the Client and the Access Point, a message is encapsulated In an eapol (EAP over lan) format, and an radius (remote Authentication Dial In User service) protocol is used between the Access Point and the Server. However, while providing authentication services, the EAP-TLS authentication method also has many security problems, such as: man-in-the-middle attacks, identity attacks, DoS attacks, and the like cause authentication failure among the client, the access point, and the server.
Therefore, the important research on the EAP-TLS extended authentication method takes improving the security of the current EAP-TLS authentication scheme as a basic starting point, analyzes the security problem of the current mainstream EAP-TLS authentication scheme, and has important significance on the current EAP-TLS protocol.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects in the existing authentication method, the invention aims to provide an EAP-TLS authentication system based on 802.1X, which is used for solving the security problem existing in the existing mainstream EAP-TLS authentication scheme.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention provides the following technical scheme:
an EAP-TLS authentication system based on 802.1X comprises a client module 1, an access point module 2 and a server module 3;
the client module 1 comprises a client request module 11 and a client response module 12, wherein:
a client request module 11 for generating a random number P, using a shared secret K between the client and the access point C,AP Encrypting the random number P, and sending EAP start, time stamp t and AES encrypted packet to the access point
Generating EAP identity Response packet EAP-Response/IDC, Client Hello, Client certificate, ECDSA signature private key sprk C Encrypting the Client certificate, the timestamp t and the random number Q, simultaneously encrypting the Client certificate, the timestamp t and the random number N, and sending an RSA encryption packet to the access point
(EAP-Response/IDC | | | Client hello), Client certificate, ECDSA signature
(Client certificate Q t), ECDSA signature
(Client certificate N t) and a timestamp t, wherein the Client hello comprises a TLS version number TLS version, a session ID, a Client random number, a Client supported encryption algorithm cipher unit and a shared secret key K between the Client and the server C,S The Client certificate comprises version, serial number, signature algorithm signature, issuer, validity period, user subject, ECDSA signature public key, spur C And RSA encrypted public key puk C (ii) a Generating a Client finished flag bit Client finished label and a changed password detail change cipher spc, generating a main key by using a Client random number and a server random number, generating a Client finished message packet by adopting a hash algorithm, and sending the Client finished message packet, the changed password detail change cipher spc, a timestamp t and the Client finished flag bit Client finished label to an access point;
a client response module 12, configured to verify the legitimacy of the server and the access point; verifying the integrity of the server-to-client message;
the access point module 2 includes an access point request module 21 and an access point response module 22, wherein:
an access point request module 21 for generating a random number M using a shared secret K between the access point and the server AP,S Encrypting random numbers P and M, and sending EAP starting packet EAP start, time stamp t and AES encryption packet to server
(P | | M); generating a random number Q using a shared secret key K between a client and a server C,AP Encrypting the random number Q and the random number N, and sending an EAP identity Request packet EAP-Request/ID to the client i Server hello, AES encrypted packets
(Q | | N), server certificate and ECDSA signature packet
(server certificate P T) and a timestamp t; sending RSA encrypted packets to a server
(EAP-Response/IDC | | | Client hello), Client certificate, ECDSA signature packet
(client certificate N t) and a timestamp t; sending a server completion message packet server Finished, a changed password detail change cipher spc, a timestamp t and a server completion flag bit server Finished label to a client;
access point response module 22 for decrypting
(P) and storing the random number P; the access point verifies the validity of the server; the access point verifies the validity of the client; receiving server completion message packet server sent by serverFinished, change password details change cipher spc, t and server finish marker position server Finished label; receiving a Client finished message packet, a change password detail cipher spc, a timestamp t and a Client finished flag bit Client finished label sent by a Client;
the server module 3 includes a server request module 31 and a server response module 32, wherein:
a server Request module 31 for generating a random number N, EAP identity Request packet EAP-Request/ID i Server hello, server certificate using shared secret key K AP,S Encrypting the random number N, ECDSA signature private key sprk S Encrypting the server certificate, the timestamp t and the random number M, simultaneously encrypting the server certificate, the timestamp t and the random number P, and sending an EAP identity Request packet EAP-Request/ID to an access point i Server hello, AES symmetric encrypted packet
(N), server certificate, ECDSA signature
(server certificate P T) and ECDSA signatures
(server certificate M | | t) and time stamp t, wherein server hello includes TLS version number TLS version, session ID, server random number and server supported encryption algorithm cipher sub, and server certificate includes version, serial number, signature algorithm signaturhm, issuer, validity, user subject, signature public key suk S And an encrypted public key puk S (ii) a Generating a server finish flag bit server finished label and changing password details change cipher spc, enabling the Client random number and the server random number to generate a master key of a server finish message packet server finish, and adoptingThe Hash algorithm generates a server completion message packet server Finished, and sends the server completion message packet server Finished, the password detail change cipher spc, the timestamp t and the server completion flag bit server Finished label to the access point;
server response module 32 for decryption
(P M) and storing random numbers P and M; and verifying the legality of the client and the access point.
The client response module 12 is used for verifying the legitimacy of the server and the access point; verifying the integrity of the server-to-client message specifically as follows: decryption
(Q | | N), obtaining a random number Q and a random number N, and then obtaining a signature public key suk from a server certificate S Using a spuk S Decrypting ECDSA signatures
(server certificate P | | | t) obtaining a server certificate, a timestamp t and a random number P, comparing the timestamp t, if the server certificate and the server certificate sent by the access point are consistent, if the server certificate and the server certificate server are consistent, the client successfully verifies the server, meanwhile, the random number P is compared with the random number P generated by the client, and if the server certificate and the server certificate server are consistent, the client successfully verifies the access point; generating a master key by using a Client random number and a server random number, calculating a server completion message packet server finish, comparing the server finish message packet with the server finish message sent by the access point, and if the server finish message packet is consistent with the server finish message sent by the access point, the message sent by the server to the Client is complete; sharing a secret key K using AES C,S Decryption
(EAP-success), get EAP-success response packet, the authentication process is over.
The describedAccess point response module 22 for decrypting
(P) and storing the random number P; the access point verifies the validity of the server; the access point verifies the validity of the client, specifically: using a shared secret key K AP,S Decrypting to obtain and store the random number N, and then obtaining a signature public key spuk from the server certificate S Using a spuk S Decrypting ECDSA signatures
(server certificate M t) obtaining a server certificate, a timestamp t and a random number M, comparing the timestamp t, if the timestamp t is consistent, then comparing the random number M with the random number M generated by the access point, and if the timestamp t is consistent, the access point successfully verifying the server; using the signature public key spuk in the Client certificate C Decrypting the ECDSA signature
The Client certificate, the timestamp t and the random number Q are obtained (the Client certificate, the timestamp t and the random number Q are obtained), the timestamp t is compared, if the timestamp t is consistent, the random number Q is compared with the random number Q generated by the access point, and if the timestamp t is consistent, the access point successfully verifies the Client.
The server response module 32 verifies the validity of the client and the access point, specifically: using the private signature key prk S Decrypting ECDSA signatures
(EAP-Response/IDC | | | Client hello) obtaining EAP identity Response packet EAP-Response/ID C And Client hello, using the public signature key spuk in the Client certificate C Decrypting the signature to obtain a Client certificate, a timestamp t and a random number N, comparing the timestamp t, if the timestamp t is consistent, then comparing the Client certificate with the Client certificate directly sent by the access point, if the timestamp t is consistent, the server verifies that the Client succeeds, and meanwhile, the server randomly verifies that the Client certificate is successfulAnd comparing the number N with the random number N generated by the server, and if the number N is consistent with the random number N generated by the server, successfully verifying the access point by the server.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
1. the invention adopts an ECDSA signature mechanism, the client and the server respectively carry out signature on the certificate and the random number, and the client, the access point and the server respectively carry out decryption signature and mutual authentication, thereby ensuring the validity of the authentication entity and effectively resisting man-in-the-middle attacks.
2. The server signs the self certificate by using an ECDSA signature mechanism, the client verifies the legality of the server certificate, the server public key for verifying the legality is used for carrying out RSA asymmetric encryption on the self identity, and the bound identity and the certificate are sent to the authenticator together, so that identity attack is effectively prevented.
3. The server encrypts the EAP-Success by using an AES symmetric encryption mechanism, prevents an attacker from directly intercepting the EAP-Success response packet, and effectively resists DoS attack.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the overall system framework of the present invention.
In the figure: 1. the system comprises a client module 2, an access point module 3, a server module 11, a client request module 12, a client response module 21, an access point request module 22, an access point response module 31, a server request module 32 and a server response module.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in further detail below with reference to the figures and the specific embodiments.
Referring to fig. 1: the EAP-TLS authentication system based on 802.1X comprises a client module 1, an access point module 2 and a server module 3.
The client module 1 comprises a client request module 11 and a client response module 12, wherein:
a client request module 11 for generating a random number P, using a shared secret K between the client and the access point C,AP Encrypting the random number P, sending EAP start, timestamp to the access pointt and AES encrypted packets
(P); generating EAP identity Response packet EAP-Response/IDC, Client Hello, Client certificate, ECDSA signature private key sprk C Encrypting the Client certificate, the timestamp t and the random number Q, simultaneously encrypting the Client certificate, the timestamp t and the random number N, and sending an RSA encryption packet to the access point
(EAP-Response/IDC | | | Client hello), Client certificate, ECDSA signature
(Client certificate Q t), ECDSA signature
(Client certificate | | N | | | t) and a timestamp t, wherein the Client hello comprises a TLS version number TLS version, a session ID, a Client random number, a Client supported encryption algorithm cipher unit and an AES shared key K between the Client and the server C,S The Client certificate comprises version, serial number, signature algorithm signature, issuer, validity period, user subject, ECDSA signature public key, spur C And RSA encrypted public key puk C (ii) a Generating a Client finished flag bit Client finished label and a changed password detail change cipher spc, generating a main key by using a Client random number and a server random number, generating a Client finished message packet by adopting a hash algorithm, and sending the Client finished message packet, the changed password detail change cipher spc, a timestamp t and the Client finished flag bit Client finished label to an access point;
client response module 12 for decryption
(Q | | N), obtaining a random number Q and a random number N, and then obtaining a signature public key suk from a server certificate S Using a spuk S Decrypting ECDSA signatures
(server certificate P | | | t) obtaining a server certificate, a timestamp t and a random number P, comparing the timestamp t, if the server certificate and the server certificate sent by the access point are consistent, if the server certificate and the server certificate server are consistent, the client successfully verifies the server, meanwhile, the random number P is compared with the random number P generated by the client, and if the server certificate and the server certificate server are consistent, the client successfully verifies the access point; generating a master key by using a Client random number and a server random number, calculating a server completion message packet server finish, comparing the server finish message packet with the server finish message sent by the access point, and if the server finish message packet is consistent with the server finish message sent by the access point, the message sent by the server to the Client is complete; sharing secret key KC using AES ,S Decryption
(EAP-success), get EAP-success response packet, the authentication process is over.
The access point module 2 includes an access point request module 21 and an access point response module 22, wherein:
an access point request module 21 for generating a random number M using a shared secret K between the access point and the server AP,S Encrypting random numbers P and M, and sending EAP starting packet EAP start, time stamp t and AES encryption packet to server
(P | | M); generating a random number Q using a shared secret key K between a client and a server C,AP Encrypting the random number Q and the random number N, and sending an EAP identity Request packet EAP-Request/ID to the client i Server hello, AES encrypted packets
(Q | | N), server certificate and ECDSA signature packet
(server certificate P T) and a timestamp t; sending RSA encrypted packets to a server
(EAP-Response/IDC | | | Client hello), Client certificate, ECDSA signature packet
(client certificate N t) and a timestamp t; sending a server completion message packet server Finished, a changed password detail change cipher spc, a timestamp t and a server completion flag bit server Finished label to a client; sending to the client
(EAP-success) and a timestamp t;
access point response module 22 for decrypting
(P) and storing the random number P; using a shared secret key K AP,S Decrypting to obtain and store the random number N, and then obtaining a signature public key spuk from a server certificate S Using a spuk S Decrypting ECDSA signatures
(server certificate M t) obtaining a server certificate, a timestamp t and a random number M, comparing the timestamp t, if the timestamp t is consistent, then comparing the random number M with the random number M generated by the access point, and if the timestamp t is consistent, the access point successfully verifying the server; using the public signature key spuk in the Client certificate C Decrypting the ECDSA signature
(Client certificateI Q I T) to obtain a Client certificate, a timestamp t and a random number Q, comparing the timestamp t, if the timestamp t is consistent, then comparing the random number Q with the random number Q generated by the access point, and if the timestamp t is consistent, the access point successfully verifies the Client; receiving a server completion message packet server Finished, a changed password detail change cipher spc, a timestamp t and a server completion flag bit server Finished label sent by a server; receiving a Client finished message packet, a change password detail cipher spc, a timestamp t and a Client finished flag bit Client finished label sent by a Client; receiving
(EAP-success) and a timestamp t;
the server module 3 includes a server request module and a server response module, wherein:
a server Request module 31 for generating a random number N, EAP identity Request packet EAP-Request/ID i Server hello, server certificate using shared secret key K AP,S Encrypting the random number N, ECDSA signature private key sprk S Encrypting the server certificate, the timestamp t and the random number M, simultaneously encrypting the server certificate, the timestamp t and the random number P, and sending an EAP identity Request packet EAP-Request/ID to an access point i Server hello, AES symmetric encrypted packet
(N), server certificate, ECDSA signature
(server certificate P T) and ECDSA signatures
(server certificate M | | t) and a timestamp t, wherein the server hello comprises a TLS version number TLS version, a session ID, a server random number and a server-supported encryption algorithm cipher suit, and a server certhe tifect contains version, serial number, signature algorithm, issuer, validity period, user subject, signature public key, spur S And an encrypted public key puk S (ii) a Generating a server completion flag bit server refined label and changing password details change cipher spc, enabling a Client random number and a server random number to generate a master key of the server completion message packet server, generating a server completion message packet server refined by adopting a hash algorithm, and sending the server completion message packet server Finished, changing the password details change cipher spc, a timestamp t and the server completion flag bit server refined label to an access point; generating EAP success response packet EAP-success, using shared secret key KC in client hello packet ,S Performing AES encryption and sending to the access point
(EAP-success) and a timestamp t;
server response module 32 for decryption
(P M) and storing random numbers P and M; using the private signature key prk S Decrypting ECDSA signatures
(EAP-Response/IDC | | | Client hello) obtaining EAP identity Response packet EAP-Response/ID C And Client hello, using the public signature key spuk in the Client certificate C Decrypting the signature to obtain a Client certificate, a timestamp t and a random number N, comparing the timestamp t, if the Client certificate and the random number are consistent, then comparing the Client certificate and the Client certificate directly sent by the access point, if the Client certificate and the Client certificate are consistent, successfully verifying the Client by the server, and simultaneously comparing the random number N with the random number N generated by the server, if the Client certificate and the random number are consistent, successfully verifying the access point by the server.
Finally, it should be noted that: although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that modifications may be made to the embodiments or portions thereof without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.
Claims (4)
1. An EAP-TLS authentication system based on 802.1X comprises a client module 1, an access point module 2 and a server module 3; it is characterized in that the preparation method is characterized in that,
the client module 1 comprises a client request module 11 and a client response module 12, wherein:
a client request module 11 for generating a random number P, using a shared secret K between the client and the access point C,AP Encrypting the random number P, and sending EAP start, time stamp t and AES encrypted packet to the access point
Generating EAP identity Response packet EAP-Response/IDC, Client Hello, Client certificate, ECDSA signature private key sprk C Encrypting the Client certificate, the timestamp t and the random number Q, simultaneously encrypting the Client certificate, the timestamp t and the random number N, and sending an RSA encryption packet to the access point
Client certificate, ECDSA signature
ECDSA signatures
And a time stamp t, wherein the Client hello comprises a TLS version number TLS version, a session ID, a Client random number, and a Client supported encryption algorithmLegal cipher unit and shared key K between client and server C,S The Client certificate comprises version, serial number, signature algorithm signature, issuer, validity period, user subject, ECDSA signature public key, spur C And RSA encrypted public key puk C (ii) a Generating a Client finished flag bit Client finished label and a changed password detail change cipher spc, generating a main key by using a Client random number and a server random number, generating a Client finished message packet by adopting a hash algorithm, and sending the Client finished message packet, the changed password detail change cipher spc, a timestamp t and the Client finished flag bit Client finished label to an access point;
a client response module 12, configured to verify the legitimacy of the server and the access point; verifying the integrity of the server-to-client message;
the access point module 2 includes an access point request module 21 and an access point response module 22, wherein:
an access point request module 21 for generating a random number M using a shared secret K between the access point and the server AP,S Encrypting random numbers P and M, and sending EAP starting packet EAP start, time stamp t and AES encryption packet to server
Generating a random number Q using a shared secret key K between a client and a server C,AP Encrypting the random number Q and the random number N, and sending an EAP identity Request packet EAP-Request/ID to the client i Server hello, AES encrypted packets
Server certificate and ECDSA signature packet
And a timestamp t; sending RSA encrypted packets to a server
Client certificate, ECDSA signature packet
And a timestamp t; sending a server completion message packet server Finished, a changed password detail change cipher spc, a timestamp t and a server completion flag bit server Finished label to a client;
access point response module 22 for decrypting
And stores the random number P; the access point verifies the validity of the server; the access point verifies the validity of the client; receiving a server completion message packet server Finished, a password detail change cipher spc, a t and a server completion flag bit server Finished label sent by a server; receiving a Client finished message packet, a change password detail cipher spc, a timestamp t and a Client finished flag bit Client finished label sent by a Client;
the server module 3 includes a server request module 31 and a server response module 32, wherein:
a server Request module 31 for generating a random number N, EAP identity Request packet EAP-Request/ID i And server hello, using shared secret key K AP,S Encrypting the random number N, ECDSA signature private key sprk S Encrypting the server certificate, the timestamp t and the random number M, simultaneously encrypting the server certificate, the timestamp t and the random number P, and sending an EAP identity Request packet EAP-Request/ID to an access point i Server hello, AES symmetric encrypted packet
Server certificate, ECDSA signature
And ECDSA signatures
And a timestamp t, wherein the server hello comprises a TLS version number TLS version, a session ID, a server random number and a server supported encryption algorithm cipher sub, and the server certificate comprises a version, a serial number, a signature algorithm, an issuer, a validity period, a user subject, a signature public key, a S And an encrypted public key puk S (ii) a Generating a server completion flag bit server refined label and changing password details change cipher spc, enabling a Client random number and a server random number to generate a master key of the server completion message packet server, generating a server completion message packet server refined by adopting a hash algorithm, and sending the server completion message packet server Finished, changing the password details change cipher spc, a timestamp t and the server completion flag bit server refined label to an access point;
server response module 32 for decryption
And storing random numbers P and M; and verifying the legality of the client and the access point.
2. An 802.1X based EAP-TLS authentication system according to claim 1,
the client response module 12 is used for verifying the legitimacy of the server and the access point; verifying the integrity of the server-to-client message specifically as follows: decryption
Obtaining a random number Q and a random number N, and then obtaining a signature public key spuk from a server certificate S Using a spuk S Decrypting ECDSA signatures
Obtaining a server certificate, a timestamp t and a random number P, comparing the timestamp t, if the server certificate is consistent with the timestamp t, comparing the server certificate with the server certificate sent by the access point, if the server certificate is consistent with the server certificate, successfully verifying the server by the client, and simultaneously comparing the random number P with the random number P generated by the client, if the server certificate is consistent with the server certificate, successfully verifying the access point by the client; generating a master key by using a Client random number and a server random number, calculating a server completion message packet server finish, comparing the server finish message packet with the server finish message sent by the access point, and if the server finish message packet is consistent with the server finish message sent by the access point, the message sent by the server to the Client is complete; sharing a secret key K using AES C,S Decryption
And obtaining an EAP-success response packet, and finishing the authentication process.
3. An 802.1X based EAP-TLS authentication system according to claim 1,
the access point response module 22 is used for decrypting
And stores the random number P; the access point verifies the validity of the server; the access point verifies the validity of the client, specifically: using a shared secret key K AP,S Decrypting to obtain and store the random number N, and then obtaining a signature public key spuk from a server certificate S Using a spuk S Decrypting ECDSA signatures
Obtaining a server certificate, a timestamp t and a random number M, comparing the timestamp t, if the timestamp t is consistent, then comparing the random number M with the random number M generated by the access point, and if the timestamp t is consistent, the access point successfully verifies the server; using the public signature key spuk in the Client certificate C Decrypting ECDSA labelName (name)
And obtaining a Client certificate, a timestamp t and a random number Q, comparing the timestamp t, if the timestamp t is consistent, then comparing the random number Q with the random number Q generated by the access point, and if the timestamp t is consistent, the access point successfully verifies the Client.
4. An 802.1X based EAP-TLS authentication system according to claim 1,
the server response module 32 verifies the validity of the client and the access point, specifically: using the private signature key sprk S Decrypting ECDSA signatures
Obtaining EAP identity Response packet EAP-Response/ID C And Client hello, using the public signature key spuk in the Client certificate C Decrypting the signature to obtain a Client certificate, a timestamp t and a random number N, comparing the timestamp t, if the Client certificate and the Client certificate are consistent, then comparing the Client certificate and the Client certificate directly sent by the access point, if the Client certificate and the Client certificate are consistent, the server successfully verifies the Client, meanwhile, comparing the random number N with the random number N generated by the server, and if the Client certificate and the Client certificate are consistent, the server successfully verifies the access point.
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