CN106789042B - Authentication key agreement method for users in the IBC domain to access resources in the PKI domain - Google Patents

Abstract

A kind of authentication key negotiation method that the user in the IBC domain visits the resource in the PKI domain, its main operation step is: A, application visit: the user of IBC domain sends the request of the resource of accessing PKI domain to the authentication server of this domain, IBC domain The authentication server authenticates the legitimacy of the user's identity and forwards the user's access request to the authentication server in the PKI domain; B. Generates an access authorization ticket and sends it; C. Two-way identity authentication and negotiation of the session key: the session key is authenticated by the session key D. Re-authentication: When the user part of the session key exceeds its life cycle, but the authentication server part of the session key is still in its life cycle, if the IBC domain If the user still needs to access the resources of the PKI domain, fast re-authentication can be performed; E, the session is terminated. The method can effectively realize authentication key negotiation for users in the IBC domain to access resources in the PKI domain, consumes less resources and has high security.

Description

Authentication key agreement method for users in the IBC domain to access resources in the PKI domain

technical field

The invention belongs to the technical field of cross-heterogeneous domain authentication and key agreement in information communication.

Background technique

For various applications in a distributed network environment, such as virtual enterprises, instant messaging systems, etc., users and the information resources they want to access are often in different trust domains. Different trust domains may be based on different cryptosystems, such as Kerberos-based cryptosystems, PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)-based cryptosystems, and IBC (Identity-Based Cryptography)-based cryptosystems. The authentication key agreement method between homogeneous domains has been researched a lot, and has been standardized and widely used. There are also many researches on the authentication key agreement method used between two domains of PKI and Kerberos. However, the authentication key agreement method when users in the IBC domain access resources in the PKI domain is rarely studied. In application scenarios such as virtual enterprises and agile manufacturing under a distributed network, there are many application requirements for users in the IBC domain to access resources in the PKI domain.

The existing documents for authentication key agreement when users in the IBC domain access resources in the PKI domain are only:

Document 1 "Cross-Domain Authorization of Heterogeneous Domains" (Meng Xin, Hu Liang, Chu Jianfeng, et al. Cross-domain Authorization of Heterogeneous Trust Domains[J]. Journal of Jilin University Science Edition, 2010,48(1):89 -93.) Relying on the mutual trust and interconnection system between PKI homogeneous domains, identity mapping and cross-domain authorization are used to realize trusted interconnection between IBC and PKI domains. However, a large number of certificates are used many times in this document. The certificates will consume a lot of resources in the process of transmission and storage, which is inconsistent with the original intention of people to design the IBC cryptographic system; the way of identity mapping is not direct, and it is feasible in real applications. Sex is not high. And this document only uses identity mapping and trust transfer to realize the idea of authentication. There is no specific solution process, and it can only be regarded as a new idea of cross-domain authorization rather than a solution that can be directly realized.

Contents of the invention

The purpose of the present invention is to provide an authentication key negotiation method for users in the IBC domain to access resources in the PKI domain. The method can effectively realize the authentication key negotiation for users in the IBC domain to access resources in the PKI domain. It consumes less resources and is safe. high sex.

The technical scheme that the present invention realizes its object of the invention adopted is, a kind of user in the IBC domain visits the authentication key negotiation method of the resource in the PKI domain, and its operation steps are:

A. Apply for access

The user U in the IBC domain sends a request to the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to access the resource S in the PKI domain, and the authentication server TA in the IBC domain authenticates the legality of the identity of the user U in the IBC domain; if the authentication fails, go to the step E; Otherwise, forward the access request of the user U of the IBC domain to the PKI domain authentication server CA, and send the public key PK _CA of the PKI domain authentication server CA to the user U;

B. Generate an access authorization ticket and send it

The PKI domain authentication server CA performs identity authentication on the IBC domain authentication server TA, and if the authentication fails, skip to step E; otherwise, the PKI domain authentication server CA generates a session key K for user U in the IBC domain to access resource S in the PKI domain The authentication server part K 1 of the IBC domain authentication server part K ₁ , and encrypts and generates the corresponding access authorization ticket Ticket ₁ ; at the same time, the identity ID _U of the user U of the IBC domain in the access request sent by the PKI domain authentication server CA through the IBC domain authentication server TA, Calculate the public key Q _U of user U in the IBC domain;

The PKI domain authentication server CA uses its own private key SK _CA to sign the public key PK _S of the resource S in the PKI domain, the authentication server part K ₁ of the session key K, and the access authorization ticket Ticket ₁ to obtain the signed message M _sign , and then Use the public key Q _U of the user U in the IBC domain to encrypt the signed message M _sign , obtain the encrypted message M _A2CA->U , and send it to the user U in the IBC domain;

C. Two-way authentication and negotiation of session keys

C1. The user U in the IBC domain uses its own private key S _U to decrypt the encrypted message M _A2CA->U sent by the PKI domain authentication server CA, and obtains the public key PK _S and session key K of the resource S in the PKI domain. Part K ₁ and access authorization ticket Ticket ₁ , and then use the public key PK _CA of the PKI domain authentication server CA to verify the validity of the signature, if the verification fails, then jump to step E; otherwise, user U in the IBC domain generates a session key The user part K _{2 of the key K, and fill the first bit of the user part K 2 of} the session key K so that it has the same number of digits as the authentication server part K ₁ of the session key K, and then authenticate the session key K _The server part K1 and the filled user part _K2 perform XOR processing to obtain a complete session key K;

C2. The user U in the IBC domain uses the public key PK _S of the resource S in the PKI domain to encrypt the user part K ₂ of the session key K to obtain the user ciphertext Sk ₂ ; Encrypt the identity ID _S of the resource S to obtain the identity ciphertext S-ID; then send the user ciphertext Sk ₂ and the identity ciphertext S-ID together with the access authorization ticket Ticket ₁ in step B to the PKI domain the resource S;

C3. The resource S in the PKI domain decrypts the received user ciphertext Sk ₂ with its own private key SK _S , and obtains the user part K ₂ ' of the session key K' at the resource end; decrypts and extracts the access authorization ticket Ticket ₁ , and obtains The authentication server part K ₁ ' of the resource-side session key K'; then fill the first place of the user part K ₂ ' of the resource-side session key K', so that it is identical to the authentication server part K of the resource-side session key K' ₁ ' have the same number of digits, and then perform XOR processing on the authentication server part K ₁ ' of the resource _- side session key K' and the filled user part K2' to obtain the complete resource-side session key K'; The terminal session key K' decrypts the received identity ciphertext S-ID, thereby obtaining the extracted identity IDS' of the resource S in the PKI domain, and verifies the extracted identity IDS' and the identity ID _S of the resource S in the PKI domain , if the two are inconsistent, then jump to step E; otherwise, the resource S in the PKI domain uses the resource-side session key K' to encrypt its identity ID _S , and obtain the resource-side identity ciphertext of the resource S in the PKI domain M _A3S->U , and send it to user U in the IBC domain;

C4. The user U in the IBC domain uses the session key K to decrypt the received resource identity ciphertext M _A3S->U , obtains the user identity IDS" of the resource S in the PKI domain, and verifies the resources in the PKI domain If the verification of the validity of S’s client identity IDS” fails, skip to step E; otherwise, the authentication key negotiation between the user U in the IBC domain and the resource S in the PKI domain is completed, and the user U in the IBC domain utilizes the session The key K securely accesses the resource S of the PKI domain;

D. Re-authentication

When the authentication server part K ₁ of the session key K exceeds its life cycle, if the user U of the IBC domain no longer accesses the resource S of the PKI domain, then jump to step E; if the user U of the IBC domain still needs to access the PKI domain resource S, jump to step A;

When the user part K2 of the session key K _exceeds its life cycle, but the authentication server part K1 _of the session key K is still in its life cycle, if the user U of the IBC domain no longer accesses the resource S of the PKI domain, then Skip to step E; if the user U in the IBC domain still needs to access the resource S in the PKI domain, then jump to step A or perform fast re-authentication;

E. Terminate the session.

Compared with prior art, the beneficial effect of the present invention is:

1. The present invention provides a cross-heterogeneous domain authentication key agreement method when users in the IBC domain access resources in the PKI domain, so that users in the IBC domain can safely access resources in the PKI domain.

2. The IBC domain authentication server sends the public key of the PKI domain authentication server to the users in the domain, which can ensure that the validity of the message sent by the subsequent PKI domain authentication server can be successfully verified. At the same time, the user does not need to store the certificate of the PKI domain authentication server, which reduces the Consumption of system resources.

3. The session key is obtained by exclusive OR processing of the authentication server part and the user part of the session key. Compared with the session key generated by the authentication server alone, its security is greatly improved, and the increased resource consumption is less .

Further, the user U of the IBC domain described in the A step of the present invention sends a request to the authentication server TA of the IBC domain to access the resource S of the PKI domain. The specific method is:

The user U in the IBC domain selects a random integer r ₁ , r ₁ ∈ Z _q ; where Z _q represents the set of all integers smaller than q, and q is a prime number exceeding 32 bits; then the random integer r ₁ is combined with the system The public key P pub of the public key P _pub performs the point multiplication operation based on the elliptic curve to obtain the public key point parameter R ₃ , and then performs bilinear pairing mapping between the public key point parameter R ₃ and the public key Q _TA of the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to obtain the mapping point Parameters R ₁ , R ₁ = e(R ₃ , Q _TA ), where e() represents bilinear pairing mapping; at the same time, the random integer r ₁ and the generator P of the elliptic curve perform point multiplication operations based on the elliptic curve Obtain the generating element point parameter R ₂ ; do a hash operation on the mapping point parameter R ₁ to obtain the hash value H(R ₁ ) of the mapping point parameter, and obtain the hash value inverse of the mapping point parameter by inverting the obtained hash value element H(R ₁ ) ^-1 , and then do dot multiplication between the hash value inverse element H(R ₁ ) ^-1 of the mapping point parameter and the private key S _U of user U in the IBC domain to obtain the temporary identity Tid _U of the user; The identity information plaintext segment m ₁ , m _{1 =} { _{ID U ,} ID _S , _{T 1} }, then use the public key Q _TA of the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to perform an encryption operation based on the identity algorithm on the identity information plaintext segment m ₁ , and obtain the identity information ciphertext segment c ₁ , c ₁ = IBE{ID _U , ID _S ,T ₁ }Q _TA , where IBE{…}Q _TA means to use the public key Q _TA of the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to perform encryption operations based on identity algorithms;

Subsequently, the user U in the IBC domain composes the user's temporary identity Tid _U , the generated element point parameter R ₂ and the identity information ciphertext segment c ₁ to form a request message M _A1 , M _A1 =Tid _U , R ₂ , c ₁ ; Sent to the authentication server TA of the IBC domain.

In this way, using the random number and the system public key of the IBC domain, and the generator of the elliptic curve, the temporary identity of the user is constructed through dot multiplication, bilinear pairing mapping and hashing, which is difficult to crack and forge, and can be transmitted in plain text. It not only reduces the amount of communication and calculation, but also ensures the security of information transmission; and the temporary identity realizes the anonymity of user identity and prevents malicious entities from tracking users.

Further, the specific way that the IBC domain authentication server TA described in the A step of the present invention authenticates the identity legality of the user U of the IBC domain is:

The authentication server TA in the IBC domain performs bilinear pairwise mapping on the generated element point parameter R ₂ in the request message _MA1 received and the private key S _TA of the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to recalculate the mapping point parameter R ₁ , R ₁ = e(R ₂ , S _TA ); and then perform hash operation on the recalculated mapping point parameter R ₁ to obtain the hash value H(R ₁ ) of the mapping point parameter, and then perform elliptic curve-based Dot multiplication operation to get the hash value generation element point parameter R ₄ , and then do bilinear mapping between it and the received temporary identity Tid _U of the user U in the IBC domain, and obtain the user U in the IBC domain The retrieval number Ind _U of the authentication server TA, Ind _U =e(Tid _U , R ₄ ); obtain the user U of the IBC domain by the retrieval number Ind _U and store the identity ID _U ' of the authentication server TA end in the IBC domain; Utilize the private key S _TA of the authentication server TA _of the IBC domain to decrypt the identity information ciphertext segment c1 in the request message _MA1 , and obtain the identity ID _U of the IBC domain user in the identity information plaintext segment m1 _; T ₁ is fresh, and the identity ID _U ' of the user U of the IBC domain stored in the authentication server TA of the IBC domain is consistent with the identity ID _U of the user U _of the IBC domain in the identity information plain text segment m1, then the identity legality authentication is passed; Otherwise, the authentication fails;

In this way, when the IBC domain authentication server verifies the user's identity, it obtains the user by doing dot multiplication, bilinear pairwise mapping and hash operation on the temporary identity, generating element point parameters, private key of the IBC domain authentication server and the generating element of the elliptic curve. The index value of the IBC domain authentication server is compared with the traditional identity-based signature algorithm to verify the legality of the user's identity, which greatly reduces the amount of calculation and does not affect security.

Further, in the A step of the present invention, the authentication server TA of the IBC domain sends the public key PK _CA practice of the PKI domain authentication server CA to the user U of the IBC domain:

The public key PK _CA of the PKI domain authentication server CA, the identity ID _CA and the time stamp T ₃ when sending the message are signed and encrypted to form a public key ciphertext c ₂ , and then the public key ciphertext c ₂ is sent to PKI domain authentication server CA.

In this way, the IBC domain authentication server sends the public key ciphertext containing the public key of the PKI domain authentication server to the users in the domain, which can ensure the validity of the message sent by the subsequent PKI domain authentication server. At the same time, the user does not need to store the PKI domain authentication server certificates, reducing the consumption of system resources.

Further, the number of digits of the authentication server part K1 _of the session key K in the B step of the present invention is 128 bits; in the described C1 step, the user U of the IBC domain generates the length of the user part _K2 of the session key K for 80 bits.

In this way, the 80-bit user part is used for padding and the 128-bit authentication server part is XORed to obtain the session key. Compared with the session key obtained only by the 128-bit authentication server part, the life cycle of the key is shorter, and the session The security of the key is guaranteed, and at the same time, the increased communication traffic is minimal.

Further, the specific practice of fast re-authentication in the D step of the present invention is:

The user U in the IBC domain generates the user part K ₂ ″ of the re-authentication session key K ″, and fills the first bit of the user part K ₂ ″ of the re-authentication session key K ″ so that it is identical to the re-authentication session key K ″ The number of digits of the authentication server part K ₁ is the same, and then the authentication server part K ₁ of the re-authentication session key K ″ and the filled user part K ₂ ″ are XOR-processed to obtain the complete re-authentication session key K ″; Then, jump to step C2.

In this way, when the user part of the session key exceeds its life cycle, but the authentication server part of the session key is still in its life cycle; if the user in the IBC domain still needs to access the resources of the PKI domain, fast re-authentication can be performed, and There is no need to re-do the operations of applying for access and generating and distributing access authorization tickets, and on the premise of ensuring access security, the number of method interactions, communication volume, and calculation volume are greatly reduced.

The present invention will be further described in detail below in combination with specific embodiments.

Detailed ways

Example

An authentication key agreement method for a user in an IBC domain to access resources in a PKI domain, the operation steps of which are:

A. Apply for access

The user U in the IBC domain sends a request to the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to access the resource S in the PKI domain, and the authentication server TA in the IBC domain authenticates the legality of the identity of the user U in the IBC domain; if the authentication fails, go to the step E; Otherwise, forward the access request of the user U of the IBC domain to the PKI domain authentication server CA, and send the public key PK _CA of the PKI domain authentication server CA to the user U;

B. Generate an access authorization ticket and send it

The PKI domain authentication server CA performs identity authentication on the IBC domain authentication server TA, and if the authentication fails, skip to step E; otherwise, the PKI domain authentication server CA generates a session key K for user U in the IBC domain to access resource S in the PKI domain The authentication server part K 1 of the IBC domain authentication server part K ₁ , and encrypts and generates the corresponding access authorization ticket Ticket ₁ ; at the same time, the identity ID _U of the user U of the IBC domain in the access request sent by the PKI domain authentication server CA through the IBC domain authentication server TA, Calculate the public key Q _U of user U in the IBC domain;

The PKI domain authentication server CA uses its own private key SK _CA to sign the public key PK _S of the resource S in the PKI domain, the authentication server part K ₁ of the session key K, and the access authorization ticket Ticket ₁ to obtain the signed message M _sign , and then Use the public key Q _U of the user U in the IBC domain to encrypt the signed message M _sign , obtain the encrypted message M _A2CA->U , and send it to the user U in the IBC domain;

C. Two-way authentication and negotiation of session keys

C1. The user U in the IBC domain uses its own private key S _U to decrypt the encrypted message M _A2CA->U sent by the PKI domain authentication server CA, and obtains the public key PK _S and session key K of the resource S in the PKI domain. Part K ₁ and access authorization ticket Ticket ₁ , and then use the public key PK _CA of the PKI domain authentication server CA to verify the validity of the signature, if the verification fails, then jump to step E; otherwise, user U in the IBC domain generates a session key The user part K _{2 of the key K, and fill the first bit of the user part K 2 of} the session key K so that it has the same number of digits as the authentication server part K ₁ of the session key K, and then authenticate the session key K _The server part K1 and the filled user part _K2 perform XOR processing to obtain a complete session key K;

C2. The user U in the IBC domain uses the public key PK _S of the resource S in the PKI domain to encrypt the user part K ₂ of the session key K to obtain the user ciphertext Sk ₂ ; Encrypt the identity ID _S of the resource S to obtain the identity ciphertext S-ID; then send the user ciphertext Sk ₂ and the identity ciphertext S-ID together with the access authorization ticket Ticket ₁ in step B to the PKI domain the resource S;

C3. The resource S in the PKI domain decrypts the received user ciphertext Sk ₂ with its own private key SK _S , and obtains the user part K ₂ ' of the session key K' at the resource end; decrypts and extracts the access authorization ticket Ticket ₁ , and obtains The authentication server part K ₁ ' of the resource-side session key K'; then fill the first place of the user part K ₂ ' of the resource-side session key K', so that it is identical to the authentication server part K of the resource-side session key K' ₁ ' have the same number of digits, and then perform XOR processing on the authentication server part K ₁ ' of the resource _- side session key K' and the filled user part K2' to obtain the complete resource-side session key K'; The terminal session key K' decrypts the received identity ciphertext S-ID, thereby obtaining the extracted identity IDS' of the resource S in the PKI domain, and verifies the extracted identity IDS' and the identity ID _S of the resource S in the PKI domain , if the two are inconsistent, then jump to step E; otherwise, the resource S in the PKI domain uses the resource-side session key K' to encrypt its identity ID _S , and obtain the resource-side identity ciphertext of the resource S in the PKI domain M _A3S->U , and send it to user U in the IBC domain;

C4. The user U in the IBC domain uses the session key K to decrypt the received resource identity ciphertext M _A3S->U , obtains the user identity IDS" of the resource S in the PKI domain, and verifies the resources in the PKI domain If the verification of the validity of S’s client identity IDS” fails, skip to step E; otherwise, the authentication key negotiation between the user U in the IBC domain and the resource S in the PKI domain is completed, and the user U in the IBC domain utilizes the session The key K securely accesses the resource S of the PKI domain;

D. Re-authentication

When the authentication server part K ₁ of the session key K exceeds its life cycle, if the user U in the IBC domain no longer accesses the resource S in the PKI domain, then jump to step E; if the user U in the IBC domain still needs to access the PKI domain resource S, jump to step A;

When the user part K ₂ of the session key K exceeds its life cycle, but the authentication server part K ₁ of the session key K is still in its life cycle; if the user U of the IBC domain no longer accesses the resource S of the PKI domain, Then jump to step E; if the user U in the IBC domain still needs to access the resource S in the PKI domain, then jump to step A or perform fast re-authentication;

E. Terminate the session.

In step A of this example, the user U in the IBC domain sends a request to the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to access the resource S in the PKI domain:

The user U in the IBC domain selects a random integer r ₁ , r ₁ ∈ Z _q ; where Z _q represents the set of all integers smaller than q, and q is a prime number exceeding 32 bits; then the random integer r ₁ is combined with the system The public key P pub of the public key P _pub performs the point multiplication operation based on the elliptic curve to obtain the public key point parameter R ₃ , and then performs bilinear pairing mapping between the public key point parameter R ₃ and the public key Q _TA of the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to obtain the mapping point Parameters R ₁ , R ₁ = e(R ₃ , Q _TA ), where e() represents bilinear pairing mapping; at the same time, the random integer r ₁ and the generator P of the elliptic curve perform point multiplication operations based on the elliptic curve Obtain the generating element point parameter R ₂ ; do a hash operation on the mapping point parameter R ₁ to obtain the hash value H(R ₁ ) of the mapping point parameter, and obtain the hash value inverse of the mapping point parameter by inverting the obtained hash value element H(R ₁ ) ^-1 , and then do dot multiplication between the hash value inverse element H(R ₁ ) ^-1 of the mapping point parameter and the private key S _U of user U in the IBC domain to obtain the temporary identity Tid _U of the user; The identity information plaintext segment m ₁ , m _{1 =} { _{ID U ,} ID _S , _{T 1} }, then use the public key Q _TA of the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to perform an encryption operation based on the identity algorithm on the identity information plaintext segment m ₁ , and obtain the identity information ciphertext segment c ₁ , c ₁ = IBE{ID _U , ID _S ,T ₁ }Q _TA , where IBE{…}Q _TA means to use the public key Q _TA of the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to perform encryption operations based on identity algorithms;

Subsequently, the user U in the IBC domain composes the user's temporary identity Tid _U , the generated element point parameter R ₂ and the identity information ciphertext segment c ₁ to form a request message M _A1 , M _A1 =Tid _U , R ₂ , c ₁ ; Sent to the authentication server TA of the IBC domain;

The specific method for the IBC domain authentication server TA in step A of this example to authenticate the legality of the identity of the user U in the IBC domain that sends the request is as follows:

The authentication server TA in the IBC domain performs bilinear pairwise mapping on the generated element point parameter R ₂ in the request message _MA1 received and the private key S _TA of the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to recalculate the mapping point parameter R ₁ , R ₁ = e(R ₂ , S _TA ); and then perform hash operation on the recalculated mapping point parameter R ₁ to obtain the hash value H(R ₁ ) of the mapping point parameter, and then perform elliptic curve-based Dot multiplication operation to get the hash value generation element point parameter R ₄ , and then do bilinear mapping between it and the received temporary identity Tid _U of the user U in the IBC domain, and obtain the user U in the IBC domain The retrieval number Ind _U of the authentication server TA, Ind _U =e(Tid _U , R ₄ ); obtain the identity ID _U of the user U of the IBC domain stored in the authentication server TA end of the IBC domain through the retrieval number Ind _U ; then Utilize the private key S _TA of the authentication server TA _of the IBC domain to decrypt the identity information ciphertext segment c1 in the request message _MA1 , and obtain the identity ID _U of the IBC domain user in the identity information plaintext segment m1 _; T ₁ is fresh, and the identity ID' _U of the user U of the IBC domain stored in the authentication server TA of the IBC domain is consistent with the identity ID _U of the user U of the IBC domain in the plain text segment m1 _of the identity information, then the identity legality authentication is passed; Otherwise, the authentication fails;

In step A of this example, the authentication server TA of the IBC domain sends the public key PK of the PKI domain authentication server CA to the user U of the IBC domain. The _CA method is as follows:

The public key PK _CA of the PKI domain authentication server CA, the identity ID _CA and the time stamp T ₃ when sending the message are signed and encrypted to form a public key ciphertext c ₂ , and then the public key ciphertext c ₂ is sent to PKI domain authentication server CA.

In the B step of this example, the authentication server part K1 of the session key K has 128 digits _; in the _C1 step of this example, the user U of the IBC domain generates the user part K2 of the session key K, and the length is 80 bit.

The specific method of fast re-authentication in step D of this example is:

The user U in the IBC domain generates the user part K ₂ ″ of the re-authentication session key K ″, and fills the first bit of the user part K ₂ ″ of the re-authentication session key K ″ so that it is identical to the re-authentication session key K ″ The number of digits of the authentication server part K ₁ is the same, and then the authentication server part K ₁ of the re-authentication session key K ″ and the filled user part K ₂ ″ are XOR-processed to obtain the complete re-authentication session key K ″; Then, jump to step C2.

Claims (5)

1. An authentication key negotiation method for a user in an IBC domain to access resources in a PKI domain comprises the following operation steps:

A. application access

A user U of the IBC domain sends a request for accessing a resource S of the PKI domain to an authentication server TA of the IBC domain, and the identity legitimacy of the user U of the IBC domain is authenticated by the IBC domain authentication server TA; if the authentication is not passed, jumping to the step E; otherwise, forwarding the access request of the user U of the IBC domain to a PKI domain authentication server CA, and sending the public key PK of the PKI domain authentication server CA to the user U_CA；

B. Generating and sending access authorization ticket

The PKI domain authentication server CA performs identity authentication on the IBC domain authentication server TA, and if the authentication fails, the step E is skipped; otherwise, the PKI domain authentication server CA generates an authentication server part K of a session key K for accessing the resources S in the PKI domain by the user U of the IBC domain₁And encrypts and generates a corresponding access authorization Ticket₁(ii) a Meanwhile, the PKI domain authentication server CA sends the identity ID of the user U of the IBC domain in the access request through the IBC domain authentication server TA_UCalculating the public key Q of the user U in the IBC domain_U；

PKI domain authentication server CA utilizes its own private key SK_CAPublic key PK for resources S in PKI domain_SAuthentication server part K of a session key K₁And access authorization Ticket₁Performing signature processing to obtain a signed message M_signAnd then the public key Q of the user U of the IBC domain is utilized_UFor signed message M_signEncrypting to obtain an encrypted message M_A2CA->UAnd sending the user U to the IBC domain;

C. bidirectional identity authentication and negotiation session key

C1, user U of IBC domain utilizes self private key S_UFor the encrypted message M sent by the PKI domain authentication server CA_A2CA->UDecrypting to obtain the public key PK of the resource S in the PKI domain_SAuthentication server part K of a session key K₁And access authorization Ticket₁Reuse the public key PK of the PKI domain authentication server CA_CAVerifying the validity of the signature, and if the verification fails, jumping to the step E; otherwise, the user U of the IBC domain generates the user part K of the session key K₂And a user part K of the session key K₂Padding the first place to make it and the authentication server part K of the session key K₁Is the same, and then the authentication server part K for the session key K₁And a filled user part K₂Carrying out XOR processing to obtain a complete session key K;

c2, user U of IBC domain reusing public key PK of resource S in PKI domain_SFor the user part K of the session key K₂Encrypting to obtain user ciphertext S-k₂(ii) a At the same time, the ID of the resource S in the PKI domain is identified by the session key K_SEncrypting to obtain an identity identification ciphertext S-ID; then the user cipher text S-k is processed₂And identity identification ciphertext S-ID together with access authorization Ticket Ticket in step B₁Together sent to the resource S in the PKI domain;

c3, resource S in PKI domain uses its own private key SK_SFor received user cipher text S-k₂Decrypting to obtain the user part K of the resource end session key K₂' of a compound of formula I; ticket for authorizing access₁Decrypting and extracting to obtain the authentication server part K of the resource terminal session key K₁' of a compound of formula I; then the user part K of the resource end session key K' is divided into two parts₂The first place is filled with the authentication server part K of the resource side session key K₁'the number of bits is the same, and then the authentication server part K of the resource side session key K' is applied₁' and the populated user part K₂Performing XOR processing to obtain a complete resource end session key K'; then, the received identity identification ciphertext S-ID is decrypted by using the resource-side session key K', so that the PKI is obtainedThe ID of the resource S in the domain is extracted, and the ID of the resource S in the PKI domain and the ID of the resource S in the domain are extracted_SB, verifying, and if the two are not consistent, skipping to the step E; otherwise, the resource S in the PKI domain uses the resource end session key K' to identify the ID_SEncrypting to obtain a resource end identity identification ciphertext M of the resource S in the PKI domain_A3S->UAnd sending the user U to the IBC domain;

c4, IBC domain user U uses session key K to identify cipher text M for received resource end identity_A3S->UDecrypting to obtain a user side identity IDS 'of the resource S in the PKI domain, verifying the validity of the user side identity IDS' of the resource S in the PKI domain, and jumping to the step E if the verification fails; otherwise, the user U of the IBC domain completes the authentication key negotiation with the resource S of the PKI domain, and the user U of the IBC domain utilizes the session key K to safely access the resource S of the PKI domain;

D. re-authentication

Authentication server part K when session key K₁When the life cycle of the user U exceeds the life cycle of the user U, if the user U of the IBC domain does not access the resource S of the PKI domain any more, jumping to the step E; if the user U of the IBC domain still needs to access the resource S of the PKI domain, jumping to the step A;

when the user part K of the session key K₂Authentication server part K beyond its life cycle, but for the session key K₁Still in the life cycle, if the user U of the IBC domain does not access the resource S of the PKI domain any more, jumping to the step E; if the user U of the IBC domain still needs to access the resource S of the PKI domain, skipping to the step A or carrying out quick re-authentication;

the specific method of the quick re-authentication is as follows: user U in IBC domain generates user part K of re-authentication session key K ″₂And will re-authenticate the user part K of the session key K ″₂"fill-in first place with authentication server part K re-authenticating session key K₁Is the same, and then re-authenticates the authentication server portion K of the session key K ″₁And a filled user part K₂Performing XOR processing to obtain a complete re-authentication session key K'; then jump toC2;

E. the session is aborted.

2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein in step a, the user U in the IBC domain sends a request to the authentication server TA in the IBC domain to access the resource S in the PKI domain, specifically:

user U of IBC domain selects random integer r₁，r₁∈Z_q(ii) a In the formula, Z_qRepresents a set of all integers smaller than q, q being a prime number exceeding 32 bits of binary bits; then random integer r₁With the public key P of the system_pubCarrying out point multiplication operation based on elliptic curve to obtain public key point parameter R₃Then the public key point parameter R is used₃Public key Q of authentication server TA with IBC domain_TAMapping bilinear pairings to obtain mapping point parameters R₁，R₁＝e(R₃，Q_TA) Where e () represents a bilinear pairwise map; at the same time, a random integer r₁Then, the elliptic curve generating element P is subjected to point multiplication operation based on the elliptic curve to obtain a generating element point parameter R₂(ii) a Mapping point parameter R₁Performing hash operation to obtain hash value of mapping point parameter, and performing hash operation on the obtained hash value H (R) of mapping point parameter₁) Obtaining the hash value inverse H (R) of the mapping point parameter by the inversion operation₁)^-1Then, the hash value of the mapping point parameter is inverted to H (R)₁)^-1Private key S of user U with IBC domain_UObtaining the temporary identity Tid of the user by performing dot product operation_U(ii) a Identify ID of user U of IBC domain_UIdentity ID of a resource S of a PKI domain_SAnd timestamp T at the time of message issuance₁Form identity information plaintext segment m₁,m₁＝{ID_U,ID_S,T₁And then, a public key Q of an authentication server TA of the IBC domain is utilized_TAFor identity information plaintext segment m₁Carrying out encryption operation based on identity algorithm to obtain identity information encrypted segment c₁，c₁＝IBE{ID_U,ID_S,T₁}Q_TAWherein IBE { … } Q_TAPublic key Q representing an authentication server TA utilizing IBC domains_TACarrying out encryption operation based on an identity algorithm;

subsequently, the user U of the IBC domain assigns the temporary identity Tid of the user_UGenerating a meta-point parameter R₂And identity information ciphertext section c₁Composing request messages M_A1，M_A1＝Tid_U,R₂,c₁(ii) a And sends it to the authentication server TA of the IBC domain.

3. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein in step a, the specific way for the IBC domain authentication server TA to authenticate the validity of the identity of the user U of the requesting IBC domain is:

IBC domain authentication server TA will receive the request message M_A1Generating meta-point parameter R in (1)₂And private key S of authentication server TA of IBC domain_TADoing bilinear mapping to recalculate mapping point parameter R₁，R₁＝e(R₂,S_TA) (ii) a Then the recalculated mapping point parameter R is repeated₁Performing hash operation to obtain hash value H (R) of mapping point parameter₁) Then, the point multiplication operation based on the elliptic curve is carried out with the generating element P of the elliptic curve to obtain a hash value generating element point parameter R₄Then, the user U temporary identity Tid of the IBC domain is received_UCarrying out bilinear pairwise mapping to obtain a retrieval number Ind of a user U of the IBC domain in an authentication server TA of the IBC domain_U，Ind_U＝e(Tid_U,R₄) (ii) a By said search number Ind_UObtaining the identity of the user U of the IBC domain stored in the TA end of the authentication server of the IBC domain

ID_U'; private key S of authentication server TA of IBC domain is reused_TAFor request message M_A1Identity information encrypted segment c in₁Carrying out decryption operation to obtain the identity information plaintext segment m₁Identity ID of IBC domain user in (1)_U(ii) a If the time stamp T₁Fresh and user U of IBC Domain stores identity ID of authentication Server TA of IBC Domain_U' and identity information declarationSegment m₁Identity ID of user U of IBC domain in (1)_UIf the identity is consistent with the identity, the identity validity authentication is passed; otherwise, the authentication is not passed.

4. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the authentication server TA of the IBC domain in step a sends the public key PK of the PKI domain authentication server CA to the user U of the IBC domain_CAThe specific method comprises the following steps:

public key PK of PKI domain authentication server CA_CAID, ID_CAAnd a time stamp T at the time of sending the message₃Signing and encrypting together to form a public key ciphertext c₂Then, the public key cryptograph c is used₂Sent to the PKI domain authentication server CA.

5. The authenticated key agreement method for users in IBC domain to access resources in PKI domain as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the authentication server part K of the session key K in the step B₁The number of bits of (2) is 128 bits; in the step C1, the user U in the IBC domain generates the user part K of the session key K₂Is 80 bits in length.