CN103414559B - A kind of identity identifying method of based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment - Google Patents

A kind of identity identifying method of based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN103414559B
CN103414559B CN201310188994.XA CN201310188994A CN103414559B CN 103414559 B CN103414559 B CN 103414559B CN 201310188994 A CN201310188994 A CN 201310188994A CN 103414559 B CN103414559 B CN 103414559B
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
pub
eid
hash
pki
message
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
CN201310188994.XA
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN103414559A (en
Inventor
江枚元
凌捷
柳毅
钟奇
郭圣昌
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
GuangZhou ZhongChangKangDa Information Technology Co Ltd
Guangdong University of Technology
Original Assignee
GuangZhou ZhongChangKangDa Information Technology Co Ltd
Guangdong University of Technology
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by GuangZhou ZhongChangKangDa Information Technology Co Ltd, Guangdong University of Technology filed Critical GuangZhou ZhongChangKangDa Information Technology Co Ltd
Priority to CN201310188994.XA priority Critical patent/CN103414559B/en
Publication of CN103414559A publication Critical patent/CN103414559A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN103414559B publication Critical patent/CN103414559B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Landscapes

  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses the identity identifying method based on class IBE system under a kind of cloud computing environment, including: user side obtains identity information and the password code of registration user;User side carries out systematic parameter initialization;The parameters such as log-on data and signature message are sent to cloud server terminal;Signature message is verified by cloud server terminal;The log-on message that checking receives;Cloud server terminal generates summary info according to log-on data;Obtain encrypted cipher text after summary info is carried out integrated treatment, and encrypted cipher text is sent to user side;After user side receives encrypted cipher text, it is decrypted process and checking.Present invention, avoiding the safety problem that key escrow, key distribution etc. bring, there is high reliability, and in verification process, have employed two-way signature authentication mode be authenticated, avoid the leak caused due to unilateral authentication, improve safety, and fast response time, bandwidth availability ratio is high, can be widely used in and carries out authentication under cloud computing environment.

Description

A kind of identity identifying method of based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of identity identifying method, under a kind of cloud computing environment based on The identity identifying method of class IBE system.
Background technology
Traditional IBE system the most important thing is PKG (Private Key Generator), i.e. Private key generates center, and PKG is after receiving the identity information of user, according to the identity of user Information uses master key to be that user produces the key including public private key pair accordingly, and by credible Private key is transmitted to user by channel.The identity identifying method of this pattern, private key for user is by Tripartite mechanism produces and carries out forwarding, and result in the safety of key distribution and trustship and trusts and ask Topic, thus key management becomes the most thorny issue.And under cloud computing environment, when user is led to Cross user side and cloud server terminal when carrying out data interaction, according to the authentication side of this pattern Method, need to introduce third party's trust authority, will bring huge authentication, key distribution and close The problems such as key trustship, improve the complexity of cloud computing process, also increase proof procedure simultaneously Traffic overhead, affect efficiency and the quality of cloud computing, and, the storage to key data And management also brings insecurity.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve above-mentioned technical problem, it is an object of the invention to provide a kind of cloud computing environment Under efficient, high reliability and the identity identifying method based on class IBE system of safety.
The technical solution adopted for the present invention to solve the technical problems is:
A kind of identity identifying method of based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment, including:
S1, user side obtain the identity information M of registration useridAnd password code password, And after password code is carried out Hash hash operations, it is thus achieved that hashed password password Pwd;
S2, user side carry out systematic parameter initialization, obtain registering user master key S and being System parameter T, and then generate the first PKI EIDUWith the first private key deid
S3, will registration user log-on message MkCarry out Hash hash operations, generate first close DK wanted by digests, and then coupling system parameter T and the first private key deidAfter generating signature message DK, By log-on data Mreg, the first PKI EIDU, first ciphertext summary DKsWith signature message DK It is sent to cloud server terminal;
Signature message DK is verified by S4, cloud server terminal, if being verified, then continues to hold Row step S5, otherwise terminates;
S5, to the log-on message M receivedkAfter carrying out Hash hash operations, checking obtains Whether result is equal to the first ciphertext summary DKs, the most then continue executing with step S6, otherwise tie Bundle;
S6, cloud server terminal are according to log-on data MregGenerate the first encryption parameter RUpubWith second Private key RUPE, and produce one for the identification code λ that this registration user is carried out identity, Then to the first encryption parameter RUpubAfter carrying out Hash hash operations with identification code λ, it is thus achieved that pluck Want information D;
S7, use the first encryption parameter RUpubWith the second private key RUPESummary info D is carried out Obtain the second summary ciphertext DS after encryption, and then use the first PKI EIDUClose to the second summary Literary composition DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubAfter being encrypted with identification code λ, obtain encrypted cipher text FS, And encrypted cipher text FS is sent to user side;
After S8, user side receive encrypted cipher text FS, use the first private key deidTo encrypted cipher text FS Being decrypted, reduction obtains the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubAnd identification code λ, then uses the first encryption parameter RUpubWith the first PKI EIDUTo the second summary ciphertext DS After being decrypted, obtain summary info D;
S9, user side are to the first encryption parameter RUpubHash hash operations is carried out with identification code λ After, whether the result that checking obtains is equal to summary info D, the most then certification is successful;
Described log-on message MkIncluding identity information MidWith hashed password password Pwd, described note Volumes is according to MregIncluding identity information Mid, hashed password password Pwd and systematic parameter T.
Further, described step S2, including:
S21, one feature of acquisition are the finite field Fp of prime number p, and select on finite field Fp Take field element a, b, make field element a, b meet the equation of elliptic curve E (Fp):
y3=x2+ a x+b (modp), wherein 4 a3+27·b2≠0(modp);
S22, on elliptic curve E (Fp), choose a basic point G, and be calculated basic point G Rank q, and then be calculated two q rank group G of G point respectively1And G2, G1And G2Full Be enough to lower bilinear map condition:
G1×G1→G2
S23, the rank #E (Fp) using following formula to calculate elliptic curve E (Fp) remove in the rank q of basic point G The business h obtained:
H=#E (Fp)/q
Wherein, business h meets h≤4, and #E (Fp), p, q meet following condition:
# E ( Fp ) ≠ p # p t ≠ 1 ( mod q ) p = 2 mod 3 p = 6 q - 1
In above formula, t is constant, and 1≤t < 20;
S24, generate the first random number S and meetThen S is the master key of registration user, And calculate the second encryption parameter: Ppub=S G, and then choose 4 hash functions H, Q, H1 And Q1:
H : F p 2 → { 0,1 } n ,
Q : { 0,1 } n → F p 2 ,
H1: { 0,1}n× { 0,1}n→Fq,
Q1: { 0,1}n→ { 0,1}n,
Wherein,Be finite group andN is natural number;
S25, can get systematic parameter T according to following formula and be:
T=(p, a, b, G, ppub, q, h, H, Q, H1, Q1):
Can get message space M is M={0,1} simultaneouslyn, cryptogram space C is C=G1× { 0,1}n
S26, according to identity information MidGenerate the first PKI EIDU, and then by the first PKI EIDU The point E being mapped on elliptic curve E (Fp)p, and it is calculated the first PKI deid: deid=s Ep
Further, described step S3, including:
S31, according to following formula will registration user log-on message MkCarry out Hash hash operations, raw Become the first ciphertext summary DKs:
DKs=Hash (Mk< Mid, Pwd >):
S32, choosing an integer k, k meets condition: 0 < k < n;
S33, according to following formula calculate β, if the result obtained is β=0, then return step S32, Otherwise perform step S34:
kG = ( x 1 , y 1 ) β = x 1 mod n ;
S34, according to below equation calculate ω, if the result obtained is ω=0, then return step S32, on the contrary perform step S35:
K * = k - 1 mod n ω = K * { DK s + d eid } mod n ;
S35, obtain the message DK=(β, ω) that signs, and then by log-on data Mreg, the first PKI EIDU, first ciphertext summary DKsIt is sent to cloud server terminal with signature message DK.
Further, described step S4, including:
Whether S41, the message DK that judges to sign meet following condition:
&beta; > 0 &omega; < n ,
The most then continue executing with step S42, otherwise terminate;
S42, according to following equation calculate w:
u = &omega; - 1 mod n &mu; 1 = ( DK s u ) mod n &mu; 2 = ( &beta;u ) mod n &mu; 1 G + &mu; 2 EID U = ( x 0 , y 0 ) w = x 0 mod n
S43, judge that w whether equal to β, is the most then verified, continues executing with step S5, Otherwise terminate.
Further, described step S6, including:
S61, cloud server terminal choose the second random number RcMaster as this registration user's interactive authentication After key s ', following formula is used to combine log-on data MregIn systematic parameter T generate first encryption Parameter RUpub: RUpub=Rc·G;
S62, by the first PKI EIDUThe point EID being mapped on elliptic curve E (Fp)pAfter, It is calculated the second private key RU according to following formulaPE: RUpE=Rc·EIDp
S63, cloud server terminal produce one for the mark that this registration user carries out identity Code λ, then according to following formula to the first encryption parameter RUpubHash hash is carried out with identification code λ After computing, it is thus achieved that summary info D:
D=Hash (RUpub, λ).
Further, described step S7, including:
S71, use the first encryption parameter RU according to following formulapubWith the second private key RUPETo summary letter Cease and after D is encrypted, obtain the second summary ciphertext DS:
DS=EC (D, r, RUpub,RUpE)
Wherein, r=H1(σ, D), and σ is the first random train;
S72, use the first PKI EID according to following formulaUTo the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption Parameter RUpubAfter being encrypted with identification code λ, after obtaining encrypted cipher text FS, and will encrypt close Literary composition FS is sent to user side:
FS=EC (DS, RUpub, λ, EIDU, R, Ppub)
Wherein, R=H1(π, DS, RUpub, λ), π is the second random train, PpubFor systematic parameter T In the second encryption parameter.
Further, described step S8, including:
After S81, user side receive encrypted cipher text FS, use the first private key d according to following formulaeidRight Encrypted cipher text FS is decrypted, and reduction obtains the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubWith identification code λ: (DS, RUpub, λ) and=DC (Ppub, deid, FS);
S82, use the first encryption parameter RU according to following formulapubWith the first PKI EIDUPluck second After wanting ciphertext DS to be decrypted, obtain summary info D:D=DC (RUpub, DS, EIDU)。
The invention has the beneficial effects as follows: under a kind of cloud computing environment of the present invention based on class IBE The identity identifying method of system, it is not necessary to third party's trust authority such as PKG, uses user side Direct and cloud server terminal carries out the mode of communication and carries out authentication, reduces authentication to cloud The complexity that calculating process is brought, reduces expense, it is to avoid key escrow, key distribution etc. The safety problem brought, has high reliability.And in verification process, have employed two-way signature Authentication mode is authenticated, it is to avoid the leak that causes due to unilateral authentication, improves safety, And fast response time, bandwidth availability ratio is high.
Detailed description of the invention
The invention provides the authentication based on class IBE system under a kind of cloud computing environment Method, including:
S1, user side obtain the identity information M of registration useridAnd password code password, And after password code is carried out Hash hash operations, it is thus achieved that hashed password password Pwd;
S2, user side carry out systematic parameter initialization, obtain registering user master key S and being System parameter T, and then generate the first PKI EIDUWith the first private key deid
S3, will registration user log-on message MkCarry out Hash hash operations, generate first close DK wanted by digests, and then coupling system parameter T and the first private key deidAfter generating signature message DK, By log-on data Mreg, the first PKI EIDU, first ciphertext summary DKsWith signature message DK It is sent to cloud server terminal;
Signature message DK is verified by S4, cloud server terminal, if being verified, then continues to hold Row step S5, otherwise terminates;
S5, to the log-on message M receivedkAfter carrying out Hash hash operations, checking obtains Whether result is equal to the first ciphertext summary DKs, the most then continue executing with step S6, otherwise tie Bundle;
S6, cloud server terminal are according to log-on data MregGenerate the first encryption parameter RUpubWith second Private key RUPE, and produce one for the identification code λ that this registration user is carried out identity, Then to the first encryption parameter RUpubAfter carrying out Hash hash operations with identification code λ, it is thus achieved that pluck Want information D;
S7, use the first encryption parameter RUpubWith the second private key RUPESummary info D is carried out Obtain the second summary ciphertext DS after encryption, and then use the first PKI EIDUClose to the second summary Literary composition DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubAfter being encrypted with identification code λ, obtain encrypted cipher text FS, And encrypted cipher text FS is sent to user side;
After S8, user side receive encrypted cipher text FS, use the first private key deidTo encrypted cipher text FS Being decrypted, reduction obtains the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubAnd identification code λ, then uses the first encryption parameter RUpubWith the first PKI EIDUTo the second summary ciphertext DS After being decrypted, obtain summary info D;
S9, user side are to the first encryption parameter RUpubHash hash operations is carried out with identification code λ After, whether the result that checking obtains is equal to summary info D, the most then certification is successful;
Described log-on message MkIncluding identity information MidWith hashed password password Pwd, described note Volumes is according to MregIncluding identity information Mid, hashed password password Pwd and systematic parameter T.
It is further used as preferred embodiment, described step S2, including:
S21, one feature of acquisition are the finite field Fp of prime number p, and select on finite field Fp Take field element a, b, make field element a, b meet the equation of elliptic curve E (Fp):
y3=x2+ a x+b (modp), wherein 4 a3+27·b2≠0(modp);
S22, on elliptic curve E (Fp), choose a basic point G, and be calculated basic point G Rank q, and then be calculated two q rank group G of G point respectively1And G2, G1And G2Full Be enough to lower bilinear map condition:
G1×G1→G2
S23, the rank #E (Fp) using following formula to calculate elliptic curve E (Fp) remove in the rank q of basic point G The business h obtained:
H=#E (Fp)/q
Wherein, business h meets h≤4, and #E (Fp), p, q meet following condition:
# E ( Fp ) &NotEqual; p # p t &NotEqual; 1 ( mod q ) p = 2 mod 3 p = 6 q - 1
In above formula, t is constant, and 1≤t < 20;
S24, generate the first random number S and meetThen S is the master key of registration user, And calculate the second encryption parameter: Ppub=S G, and then choose 4 hash functions H, Q, H1 And Q1:
H : F p 2 &RightArrow; { 0,1 } n ,
Q : { 0,1 } n &RightArrow; F p 2 ,
H1: { 0,1}n× { 0,1}n→Fq,
Q1: { 0,1}n→ { 0,1}n,
Wherein,Be a finite group andN is natural number;
S25, can get systematic parameter T according to following formula and be:
T=(p, a, b, G, ppub, q, h, H, Q, H1, Q1);
Can get message space M is M={0,1} simultaneouslyn, cryptogram space C is C=G1× { 0,1}n
S26, according to identity information MidGenerate the first PKI EIDU, and then by the first PKI EIDU The point E being mapped on elliptic curve E (Fp)p, and it is calculated the first PKI deid: deid=s Ep
It is further used as preferred embodiment, described step S3, including:
S31, according to following formula will registration user log-on message MkCarry out Hash hash operations, raw Become the first ciphertext summary DKs:
DKS=Hash (Mk<Mid, Pwd >);
S32, choosing an integer k, k meets condition: 0 < k < n;
S33, according to following formula calculate β, if the result obtained is β=0, then return step S32, Otherwise perform step S34:
kG = ( x 1 , y 1 ) &beta; = x 1 mod n ;
S34, according to below equation calculate ω, if the result obtained is ω=0, then return step S32, on the contrary perform step S35:
K * = k - 1 mod n &omega; = K * { DK S + d eid } mod n ;
S35, obtain the message DK=(β, ω) that signs, and then by log-on data Mreg, the first PKI EIDU, first ciphertext summary DKsIt is sent to cloud server terminal with signature message DK.
It is further used as preferred embodiment, described step S4, including:
Whether S41, the message DK that judges to sign meet following condition:
&beta; > 0 &omega; < n ,
The most then continue executing with step S42, otherwise terminate;
S42, according to following equation calculate w:
u = &omega; - 1 mod n &mu; 1 = ( DK S u ) mod n &mu; 2 = ( &beta;u ) mod n &mu; 1 G + &mu; 2 EI D U = ( x 0 , y 0 ) w = x 0 mod n
S43, judge that w whether equal to β, is the most then verified, continues executing with step S5, Otherwise terminate.
It is further used as preferred embodiment, described step S6, including:
S61, cloud server terminal choose the second random number RcMaster as this registration user's interactive authentication After key S ', following formula is used to combine log-on data MregIn systematic parameter T generate first encryption Parameter RUpub: RUpub=Rc·G;
S62, by the first PKI EIDUThe point EID being mapped on elliptic curve E (Fp)pAfter, It is calculated the second private key RU according to following formulaPE: RUpE=Rc·EIDp
S63, cloud server terminal produce one for the mark that this registration user carries out identity Code λ, then according to following formula to the first encryption parameter RUpubHash hash is carried out with identification code λ After computing, it is thus achieved that summary info D:
D=Hash (RUpub, λ).
It is further used as preferred embodiment, described step S7, including:
S71, use the first encryption parameter RU according to following formulapubWith the second private key RUPETo summary letter Cease and after D is encrypted, obtain the second summary ciphertext DS:
DS=EC (D, r, RUpub, RUpE)
Wherein, r=H1(σ, D), and σ is the first random train;
S72, use the first PKI EID according to following formulaUTo the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption Parameter RUpubAfter being encrypted with identification code λ, after obtaining encrypted cipher text FS, and will encrypt close Literary composition FS is sent to user side:
FS=EC (DS, RUpub, λ, EIDU, R, Ppub)
Wherein, R=H1(π, DS, RUpub, λ), π is the second random train, PpubFor systematic parameter T In the second encryption parameter.
It is further used as preferred embodiment, described step S8, including:
After S81, user side receive encrypted cipher text Fs, use the first private key d according to following formulaeidRight Encrypted cipher text FS is decrypted, and reduction obtains the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubWith identification code λ: (DS, RUpub, λ) and=DC (Ppub, deid, FS);
S82, use the first encryption parameter RU according to following formulapubWith the first PKI EIDUPluck second After wanting ciphertext DS to be decrypted, obtain summary info D:D=DC (RUpub, DS, EIDU)。
One specific embodiment of the present invention is as follows:
A kind of identity identifying method of based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment, including:
S1, user side obtain the identity information M of registration useridAnd password code password, And after password code is carried out Hash hash operations, it is thus achieved that hashed password password Pwd; Pwd=Hash (password).
S2, user side carry out systematic parameter initialization, obtain registering user master key S and being System parameter T, and then generate the first PKI EIDUWith the first private key deid:
S21, one feature of acquisition are the finite field Fp of prime number p, and select on finite field Fp Take field element a, b, make field element a, b meet the equation of elliptic curve E (Fp):
y3=x2+ a x+b (modp), wherein 4 a3+27·b2≠0(modp);
S22, on elliptic curve E (Fp), choose a basic point G, and be calculated basic point G Rank q, and then be calculated two q rank group G of G point respectively1And G2, G1And G2Full Be enough to lower bilinear map condition:
G1×G1→G2
G point coordinates is: G=(xG, yG);
S23, the rank #E (Fp) using following formula to calculate elliptic curve E (Fp) remove in the rank q of basic point G The business h obtained:
H=#E (Fp)/q
Wherein, business h meets h≤4, and #E (Fp), p, q meet following condition:
# E ( Fp ) &NotEqual; p # p t &NotEqual; 1 ( mod q ) p = 2 mod 3 p = 6 q - 1
In above formula, t is constant, and 1≤t < 20;
Formula p=2mod3 represents that p is equal to 2 to the result of 3 modulus, being correlated with at elliptic curve In computing, modulo operator number is placed on formula and finally locates, and the application is also adopted by this form, Such as, preceding formula 4 a3+27·b2≠ 0 (modp) represents (4 a3+27·b2) to p modulus Result is not equal to 0;
S24, generate the first random number S and meetThen S is the master key of registration user, And calculate the second encryption parameter: Ppud=S G, and then choose 4 hash functions H, Q, H1 And Q1:
H : F p 2 &RightArrow; { 0,1 } n ,
Q : { 0,1 } n &RightArrow; F p 2 ,
H1: { 0,1}n× { 0,1}n→Fq,
Q1: { 0,1}n→ { 0,1}n,
Wherein,For random number field,Be a finite group andN is nature Number;
S25, can get systematic parameter T according to following formula and be:
T=(p, a, b, G, ppub, q, h, H, Q, H1, Q1):
Can get message space M is M={0,1} simultaneouslyn, cryptogram space C is C=G1× { 0,1}n
During in message space M and cryptogram space C proof procedure, user side needs to use Between variable, be used for carrying out encryption and decryption computing, be not described in detail here;
S26, according to identity information MidGenerate the first PKI EIDU, and then by the first PKI EIDU The point E being mapped on elliptic curve E (Fp)p, and it is calculated the first PKI deid: deid=s Ep
Identity information MidIncluding the registration E-mail address of user, identification card number, phone number The attribute informations such as code, phone number, user name, directly can choose one in above attribute information Individual as the first PKI EIDU
S3, will registration user log-on message MkCarry out Hash hash operations, generate first close DK wanted by digests, and then coupling system parameter T and the first private key deidAfter generating signature message DK, By log-on data Mreg, the first PKI EIDU, first ciphertext summary DKsWith signature message DK It is sent to cloud server terminal:
S31, according to following formula will registration user log-on message MkCarry out Hash hash operations, raw Become the first ciphertext summary DKs:
DKs=Hash (Mk<Mid, Pwd >):
S32, choosing an integer k, k meets condition: 0 < k < n;
S33, according to following formula calculate β, if the result obtained is β=0, then return step S32, Otherwise perform step S34:
kG = ( x 1 , y 1 ) &beta; = x 1 mod n ;
S34, according to below equation calculate ω, if the result obtained is ω=0, then return step S32, on the contrary perform step S35:
K * = k - 1 mod n &omega; = K * { DK s + d eid } mod n ;
In above formula, K* is the intermediate variable during calculating.
S35, obtain the message DK=(β, ω) that signs, and then by log-on data Mreg, the first PKI EIDU, first ciphertext summary DKsIt is sent to cloud server terminal with signature message DK.
Signature message DK is verified by S4, cloud server terminal, if being verified, then continues to hold Row step S5, otherwise terminates:
Whether S41, the message DK that judges to sign meet following condition:
&beta; > 0 &omega; < n ,
The most then continue executing with step S42, otherwise terminate;
S42, according to following equation calculate w:
u = &omega; - 1 mod n &mu; 1 = ( DK S u ) mod n &mu; 2 = ( &beta;u ) mod n &mu; 1 G + &mu; 2 EID U = ( x 0 , y 0 ) w = x 0 mod n
In above formula, u, μ1, μ2And w is the intermediate variable of calculating process.
S43, judge that w whether equal to β, is the most then verified, continues executing with step S5, Otherwise terminate.
Here, the signature message DK that first user side is sent by cloud server terminal verifies, if It is verified, then proves that the message such as this signature message DK that user side sends belongs to this registration and uses Family, therefore continues executing with next step.
S5, to the log-on message M receivedkAfter carrying out Hash hash operations, checking obtains Whether result is equal to the first ciphertext summary Dks, the most then continue executing with step S6, otherwise tie Bundle;Here, the log-on message M of checking registration userkAfter true, cloud server terminal allows user The operations such as the access of end, if the log-on message M of checking registration userkThe most true, then refuse to use The operation requests of family end.
S6, cloud server terminal are according to log-on data MregGenerate the first encryption parameter RUpubWith second Private key RUPE, and produce one for the identification code λ that this registration user is carried out identity, Then to the first encryption parameter RUpubAfter carrying out Hash hash operations with identification code λ, it is thus achieved that pluck Want information D:
S61, cloud server terminal choose the second random number RcMaster as this registration user's interactive authentication After key S ', following formula is used to combine log-on data MregIn systematic parameter T generate first encryption Parameter RUpub: RUpub=Rc·G;
S62, by the first PKI EIDUThe point EID being mapped on elliptic curve E (Fp)pAfter, It is calculated the second private key RU according to following formulaPE: RUpE=Rc·EIDp
S63, cloud server terminal produce one for the mark that this registration user carries out identity Code λ, then according to following formula to the first encryption parameter RUpubHash hash is carried out with identification code λ After computing, it is thus achieved that summary info D:
D=Hash(RUpub, λ).
Step S4, S5 ensure that the user side operating cloud server terminal is legal.And In order to ensure that user side is not cheated by non-cloud server terminal and carries out associative operation, it is right that user side also needs Cloud server terminal is verified, as described in step S7~S9.
S7, use the first encryption parameter RUpubWith the second private key RUpESummary info D is carried out Obtain the second summary ciphertext DS after encryption, and then use the first PKI EIDUClose to the second summary Literary composition DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubAfter being encrypted with identification code λ, obtain encrypted cipher text FS, And encrypted cipher text FS is sent to user side:
S71, use the first encryption parameter RU according to following formulapubWith the second private key RUPETo summary letter Cease and after D is encrypted, obtain the second summary ciphertext DS:
DS=EC(D,r,RUpub,RUpE)
Wherein, r=H1(σ, D), and σ is the first random train;
S72, use the first PKI EID according to following formulaUTo the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption Parameter RUpubAfter being encrypted with identification code λ, after obtaining encrypted cipher text FS, and will encrypt close Literary composition FS is sent to user side:
FS=EC(DS,RUpub, λ, EIDU, R, Ppub)
Wherein, R is intermediate variable and R=H1(π, DS, RUpub, λ), π is the second random train, PpubFor the second encryption parameter in systematic parameter T, same, EC represents and is encrypted fortune Calculate, the most conventional method can be used to be encrypted, the most not the detailed calculation to cryptographic calculation Method is described.
After S8, user side receive encrypted cipher text FS, use the first private key deidTo encrypted cipher text FS Being decrypted, reduction obtains the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubAnd identification code λ, then uses the first encryption parameter RUpubWith the first PKI EIDUTo the second summary ciphertext DS After being decrypted, obtain summary info D:
After S81, user side receive encrypted cipher text FS, use the first private key d according to following formulaeidRight Encrypted cipher text FS is decrypted, and reduction obtains the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubWith identification code λ: (DS, RUpub, λ) and=DC (Ppub, deid, FS);
S82, use the first encryption parameter RU according to following formulapubWith the first PKI EIDUPluck second After wanting ciphertext DS to be decrypted, obtain summary info D:D=DC (RUpub, DS, EIDU)。DC Representative is decrypted computing, and the most conventional method can be used to be decrypted, the most not to solution The detailed algorithm of close computing is described.
S9, user side are to the first encryption parameter RUpubHash hash operations is carried out with identification code λ After, the result Hash (RU that checking obtainspub, λ) whether equal to summary info D, the most then certification Success, then demonstrate the legitimacy of cloud server terminal, it is therefore prevented that cloud server terminal identity is counterfeit.
First encryption parameter RUpubWith the second encryption parameter PpubIt is in systematic parameter T and can answer The parameter being used in encryption or decryption process.
Log-on message M described hereinkIncluding identity information MidWith hashed password password Pwd:Mk=<Mid, Pwd >, described log-on data MregIncluding identity information Mid, hash mouth Make password Pwd and systematic parameter T:Mreg=< Mid, Pwd, T >.
The present invention need not third party's trust authority such as PKG, uses user side directly and cloud clothes Business end carries out the mode of communication and carries out authentication, reduces authentication to cloud computing process band The complexity come, reduces expense, it is to avoid the safety that key escrow, key distribution etc. bring Problem.First private key deidIt is mainly used in authentication and examination & verification, is intended for user side and logs in cloud clothes Certification use during business end, after certification terminates, does not the most recycle the first private key deidOperate, no The problem that user side authority is excessive can be caused.
The present invention have employed elliptic curve in authentication procedures, discrete according to elliptic curve Property feature, this identity identifying method can be resisted and pretend to be attack.And, the present invention recognizes at user side Card and cloud server terminal verification process have employed random number, Replay Attack can well be prevented. Meanwhile, two-way signature authentication mode is make use of to be authenticated user side and cloud server terminal, user The first private key d is used during signatureeid, cloud server terminal uses the first PKI EID accordinglyUTest Card, it is ensured that the legitimacy of the user side conducted interviews.When cloud server terminal verifies the use conducted interviews After the legitimacy of family end, use the first encryption parameter RUpubCriticize and the second private key RUPETo user side The information sent is signed, the first PKI EID that recycling user side sendsUSend after encryption Being authenticated to user side, this method achieves the bidirectional safe of user side and cloud server terminal and recognizes Card, it is to avoid the leak that causes due to unilateral authentication, improves safety.
This method make use of elliptic curve in verification process, although elliptic curve cryptography meter Calculation amount is relatively large, but relative to other public key system algorithms, in the feelings that key length is equal Under condition, its safety is higher, thus under conditions of meeting same security intensity, this method meter Calculation amount is the most less.And owing to this method is provided without third party's trust authority, thus agreement is tied Structure is simple, it is not necessary to key agreement, distribution etc. operate, user side and cloud server terminal direct interaction Information, decreases and asks and the consumption that communicates of response, and communication mode makes response speed end to end Faster, network bandwidth utilization factor is higher for degree.
It is above the preferably enforcement of the present invention is illustrated, but the invention is not Being limited to described embodiment, those of ordinary skill in the art are in the premise without prejudice to spirit of the present invention The most also can make all equivalent variations or replacement, modification or the replacement of these equivalents are all contained in In the application claim limited range.

Claims (7)

1. the identity identifying method based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment, its feature exists In, including:
S1, user side obtain the identity information M of registration useridAnd password code password, And after password code is carried out Hash hash operations, it is thus achieved that hashed password password Pwd;
S2, user side carry out systematic parameter initialization, obtain registering user master key S and being System parameter T, and then generate the first PKI EIDUWith the first private key deid
S3, will registration user log-on message MkCarry out Hash hash operations, generate first close DK wanted by digests, and then coupling system parameter T and the first private key deidAfter generating signature message DK, By log-on data Mreg, the first PKI EIDU, first ciphertext summary DKsWith signature message DK It is sent to cloud server terminal;
Signature message DK is verified by S4, cloud server terminal, if being verified, then continues to hold Row step S5, otherwise terminates;
S5, to the log-on message M receivedkAfter carrying out Hash hash operations, checking obtains Whether result is equal to the first ciphertext summary DKs, the most then continue executing with step S6, otherwise tie Bundle;
S6, cloud server terminal are according to log-on data MregGenerate the first encryption parameter RUpubWith second Private key RUPE, and produce one for the identification code λ that this registration user is carried out identity, Then to the first encryption parameter RUpubAfter carrying out Hash hash operations with identification code λ, it is thus achieved that pluck Want information D;
S7, use the first encryption parameter RUpubWith the second private key RUPESummary info D is carried out Obtain the second summary ciphertext DS after encryption, and then use the first PKI EIDUClose to the second summary Literary composition DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubAfter being encrypted with identification code λ, obtain encrypted cipher text FS, And encrypted cipher text FS is sent to user side;
After S8, user side receive encrypted cipher text FS, use the first private key deidTo encrypted cipher text FS Being decrypted, reduction obtains the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubAnd identification code λ, then uses the first encryption parameter RUpubWith the first PKI EIDUTo the second summary ciphertext DS After being decrypted, obtain summary info D;
S9, user side are to the first encryption parameter RUpubHash hash operations is carried out with identification code λ After, whether the result that checking obtains is equal to summary info D, the most then certification is successful;
Described log-on message MkIncluding identity information MidWith hashed password password Pwd, described note Volumes is according to MregIncluding identity information Mid, hashed password password Pwd and systematic parameter T.
Body based on class IBE system under a kind of cloud computing environment the most according to claim 1 Identity authentication method, it is characterised in that described step S2, including:
S21, one feature of acquisition are the finite field Fp of prime number p, and select on finite field Fp Take field element a, b, make field element a, b meet the equation of elliptic curve E (Fp):
y3=x2+ a x+b (modp), wherein 4 a3+27·b2≠ 0 (modp), x, y represent respectively Abscissa and vertical coordinate;
S22, on elliptic curve E (Fp), choose a basic point G, and be calculated basic point G Rank q, and then be calculated two q rank group G of G point respectively1And G2, G1And G2Full Be enough to lower bilinear map condition:
G1×G1→G2
S23, employing following formula calculate the rank #E (Fp) the rank q divided by basic point G of elliptic curve E (Fp) The business h obtained:
H=#E (Fp)/q
Wherein, business h meets h≤4, and #E (Fp), p, q meet following condition:
# E ( F p ) &NotEqual; p # p t &NotEqual; 1 ( mod q ) p = 2 mod 3 p = 6 q - 1
In above formula, t is constant, and 1≤t < 20;
S24, generate the first random number S and meetThen S is the master key of registration user, And calculate the second encryption parameter: Ppub=S G, and then choose 4 hash functions H, Q, H1 And Q1:
H : F p 2 &RightArrow; { 0 , 1 } n ,
Q : { 0 , 1 } n &RightArrow; F p 2 ,
H1:{0,1}n×{0,1}n→Fq,
Q1:{0,1}n→{0,1}n,
Wherein,For random number field,Be a finite group andN is nature Number;
S25, can get systematic parameter T according to following formula and be:
T=(p, a, b, G, ppub,q,h,H,Q,H1,Q1);
Can get message space M is M={0,1} simultaneouslyn, cryptogram space C is C=G1×{0,1}n
S26, according to identity information MidGenerate the first PKI EIDU, and then by the first PKI EIDU The point E being mapped on elliptic curve E (Fp)p, and it is calculated the first PKI deid: deid=s Ep, wherein, s represents mapping coefficient.
Body based on class IBE system under a kind of cloud computing environment the most according to claim 2 Identity authentication method, it is characterised in that described step S3, including:
S31, according to following formula will registration user log-on message MkCarry out Hash hash operations, raw Become the first ciphertext summary DKs:
DKS=Hash (Mk<Mid,Pwd>);
S32, choosing an integer k, k meets condition: 0 < k < n;
S33, according to following formula calculate β, if the result obtained is β=0, then return step S32, Otherwise perform step S34:
k G = ( x 1 , y 1 ) &beta; = x 1 mod n ;
S34, according to below equation calculate ω, if the result obtained is ω=0, then return step S32, on the contrary perform step S35:
K * = k - 1 mod n &omega; = K * { D K S + d e i d } mod n ;
S35, obtain the message DK=(β, ω) that signs, and then by log-on data Mreg, the first PKI EIDU, first ciphertext summary DKsIt is sent to cloud server terminal with signature message DK.
Body based on class IBE system under a kind of cloud computing environment the most according to claim 3 Identity authentication method, it is characterised in that described step S4, including:
Whether S41, the message DK that judges to sign meet following condition:
&beta; > 0 &omega; < n ,
The most then continue executing with step S42, otherwise terminate;
S42, according to following equation calculate w:
u = &omega; - 1 mod n &mu; 1 = ( DK S u ) mod n &mu; 2 = ( &beta; u ) mod n &mu; 1 G + &mu; 2 EID U = ( x 0 , y 0 ) w = x 0 mod n
S43, judge that w whether equal to β, is the most then verified, continues executing with step S5, Otherwise terminate.
Body based on class IBE system under a kind of cloud computing environment the most according to claim 4 Identity authentication method, it is characterised in that described step S6, including:
S61, cloud server terminal choose the second random number RcMaster as this registration user's interactive authentication After key S', following formula is used to combine log-on data MregIn systematic parameter T generate first encryption Parameter RUpub: RUpub=Rc·G;
S62, by the first PKI EIDUThe point EID being mapped on elliptic curve E (Fp)pAfter, It is calculated the second private key RU according to following formulaPE: RUpE=Rc·EIDp
S63, cloud server terminal produce one for the mark that this registration user carries out identity Code λ, then according to following formula to the first encryption parameter RUpubHash hash is carried out with identification code λ After computing, it is thus achieved that summary info D:
D=Hash (RUpub,λ)。
Body based on class IBE system under a kind of cloud computing environment the most according to claim 5 Identity authentication method, it is characterised in that described step S7, including:
S71, use the first encryption parameter RU according to following formulapubWith the second private key RUPETo summary letter Cease and after D is encrypted, obtain the second summary ciphertext DS:
DS=EC (D, r, RUpub,RUpE)
Wherein, r=H1(σ, D), and σ is the first random train;
S72, use the first PKI EID according to following formulaUTo the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption Parameter RUpubAfter being encrypted with identification code λ, after obtaining encrypted cipher text FS, and will encrypt close Literary composition FS is sent to user side:
FS=EC (DS, RUpub,λ,EIDU,R,Ppub)
Wherein, R=H1(π,DS,RUpub, λ), π is the second random train, PpubFor systematic parameter T In the second encryption parameter, EC represent be encrypted computing.
Body based on class IBE system under a kind of cloud computing environment the most according to claim 6 Identity authentication method, it is characterised in that described step S8, including:
After S81, user side receive encrypted cipher text FS, use the first private key d according to following formulaeidRight Encrypted cipher text FS is decrypted, and reduction obtains the second summary ciphertext DS, the first encryption parameter RUpubWith identification code λ: (DS, RUpub, λ) and=DC (Ppub,deid,FS);
S82, use the first encryption parameter RU according to following formulapubWith the first PKI EIDUPluck second After wanting ciphertext DS to be decrypted, obtain summary info D:D=DC (RUpub,DS,EIDU);
DC represents and is decrypted computing.
CN201310188994.XA 2013-05-20 2013-05-20 A kind of identity identifying method of based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment Active CN103414559B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201310188994.XA CN103414559B (en) 2013-05-20 2013-05-20 A kind of identity identifying method of based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201310188994.XA CN103414559B (en) 2013-05-20 2013-05-20 A kind of identity identifying method of based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN103414559A CN103414559A (en) 2013-11-27
CN103414559B true CN103414559B (en) 2016-08-10

Family

ID=49607545

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN201310188994.XA Active CN103414559B (en) 2013-05-20 2013-05-20 A kind of identity identifying method of based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN103414559B (en)

Families Citing this family (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN105099690A (en) * 2014-05-19 2015-11-25 江苏博智软件科技有限公司 OTP and user behavior-based certification and authorization method in mobile cloud computing environment
CN104901935A (en) * 2014-09-26 2015-09-09 易兴旺 Bilateral authentication and data interaction security protection method based on CPK (Combined Public Key Cryptosystem)
CN106022081B (en) * 2016-01-21 2019-06-28 李明 A kind of card reading method of identity card card-reading terminal, identity card card-reading terminal and system
CN108540291B (en) * 2018-03-23 2020-08-04 西安电子科技大学 Identity-based data integrity verification method in cloud storage
CN110874800B (en) * 2019-11-08 2023-10-20 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 Data transfer method, device, electronic equipment and computer readable storage medium
CN111277583B (en) * 2020-01-15 2022-02-25 东方红卫星移动通信有限公司 Identity authentication method for monitoring system of mobile cloud computing
CN113472953B (en) * 2021-07-03 2022-06-21 深圳市壹通道科技有限公司 E-commerce platform privacy number voice communication method and system
CN113259136B (en) * 2021-07-07 2021-11-16 浙江宇视科技有限公司 Multi-client cooperative authentication method, device, equipment and medium for feature recognition

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102710605A (en) * 2012-05-08 2012-10-03 重庆大学 Information security management and control method under cloud manufacturing environment

Family Cites Families (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8769622B2 (en) * 2011-06-30 2014-07-01 International Business Machines Corporation Authentication and authorization methods for cloud computing security

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102710605A (en) * 2012-05-08 2012-10-03 重庆大学 Information security management and control method under cloud manufacturing environment

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
An Indentity-Based Authentication Scheme In Cloud Computing;Zhi-Hua Zhang etc;《2012 International Conference on Industrial Conrtol and Electronics Engineering》;20121231;45-49 *
一种基于类IBE系统的身份认证体系研究;杨一等;《鹭江职业大学学报》;20050331;第13卷(第1期);984-986 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN103414559A (en) 2013-11-27

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN103414559B (en) A kind of identity identifying method of based on class IBE system under cloud computing environment
CN106961336B (en) A kind of key components trustship method and system based on SM2 algorithm
CN103780618B (en) A kind of based on across the isomery territory authentication accessing mandate bill and session cipher negotiating method
CN102594558B (en) Anonymous digital certificate system and verification method of trustable computing environment
CN108809658A (en) A kind of digital signature method and system of the identity base based on SM2
CN106789042B (en) Authentication key negotiation method for user in IBC domain to access resources in PKI domain
CN103546567B (en) Without certificate cross-domain authentication method in a kind of credible cloud computing environment
CN106302406B (en) Close car networking condition method for secret protection and system are signed based on the polymerization of no certificate
CN107483212A (en) A kind of method of both sides&#39; cooperation generation digital signature
CN107852404A (en) Secret communication is mutually authenticated
CN102394749B (en) Line protection method, system, information safety equipment and application equipment for data transmission
CN111372247A (en) Terminal secure access method and terminal secure access system based on narrowband Internet of things
CN103746811B (en) Anonymous signcryption method from identity public key system to certificate public key system
CN103856477A (en) Trusted computing system, corresponding attestation method and corresponding devices
CN107733648A (en) The RSA digital signature generation method and system of a kind of identity-based
CN101938354B (en) Key distribution method based on modular exponentiation and application thereof
CN102546173B (en) Digital signature system and signature method based on certificate
CN104639315A (en) Dual-authentication method and device based on identity passwords and fingerprint identification
CN107682151A (en) A kind of GOST digital signature generation method and system
CN107483191A (en) A kind of SM2 algorithm secret keys segmentation signature system and method
CN102082790A (en) Method and device for encryption/decryption of digital signature
CN109600228A (en) The signature method and sealing system of anti-quantum calculation based on public keys pond
CN105610773A (en) Communication encryption method of electric energy meter remote meter reading
CN110519226B (en) Quantum communication server secret communication method and system based on asymmetric key pool and implicit certificate
CN108848074A (en) The information service entities cross-domain authentication method of trust value is acted on behalf of based on domain

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
C06 Publication
PB01 Publication
C10 Entry into substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
C14 Grant of patent or utility model
GR01 Patent grant