CN112054902B - High-safety asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking - Google Patents

High-safety asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking Download PDF

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CN112054902B
CN112054902B CN202010946834.7A CN202010946834A CN112054902B CN 112054902 B CN112054902 B CN 112054902B CN 202010946834 A CN202010946834 A CN 202010946834A CN 112054902 B CN112054902 B CN 112054902B
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encryption
user
private key
optical
key
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CN112054902A (en
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刘博�
忻向军
任建新
毛雅亚
赵建业
王瑞春
沈磊
吴泳峰
孙婷婷
赵立龙
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Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L27/00—Modulated-carrier systems
    • H04L27/26—Systems using multi-frequency codes
    • H04L27/2601—Multicarrier modulation systems
    • H04L27/2602—Signal structure
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
    • H04L9/302—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04Q—SELECTING
    • H04Q11/00—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems
    • H04Q11/0001—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems using optical switching
    • H04Q11/0062—Network aspects
    • H04Q11/0067—Provisions for optical access or distribution networks, e.g. Gigabit Ethernet Passive Optical Network (GE-PON), ATM-based Passive Optical Network (A-PON), PON-Ring

Abstract

The invention provides a high-safety asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking, which comprises the steps that an independent public key and a private key are generated through a user side, the public key is sent to a public network, and the private key is reserved, so that encryption keys adopted by each user are different, a signal sending end sets corresponding encryption parameters based on the number of the users, the encryption parameters are encrypted through the public key and then processed to the head of a multicarrier sequence, the parameters screen multicarrier of an OFDM system, data information of different users is modulated onto corresponding carriers, and then the information is masked by adding noise; the receiving end firstly obtains corresponding encryption parameters through a private key and then extracts corresponding multiple carriers through the parameters so as to demodulate information belonging to the receiving end, and the receiving end carries out asymmetric encryption based on an RSA algorithm and can realize independent user independent keys under the same encrypted PON system; and the secret key is generated by the user, and the private key for decryption is only known by the user, so that communication leakage is not worried about.

Description

High-safety asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of optical transmission communication, in particular to a high-safety asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking.
Background
In recent years, with the advent of the 5G era, broadband internet applications such as high-definition televisions, online games, and cloud computing have been rapidly developed, which means that communication networks require larger capacity. The optical access network is regarded as a development direction of the future access network due to the advantages of high bandwidth, low cost, flexible bandwidth allocation and the like. Among them, a Passive Optical Network (PON) is considered as one of the most promising technologies in future broadband access as a novel optical access technology for connecting a core network and a user terminal. Due to the advantages of PON widespread application support and flexible resource allocation, millions of users have gained in their increasing bandwidth. Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is used as a multi-carrier modulation access technology, and has been widely used in various high-capacity communication services due to its advantages of high spectral efficiency, dispersion tolerance, and simple equalization. Meanwhile, the OFDM-PON technology is also widely researched. However, due to the relatively simple PON structure and frequent service interaction, security in the OFDM-PON becomes a significant issue.
In the PON security problem, an optical encryption technology is considered to be a promising method for improving security from a physical layer because the optical processing technology has advantages of high speed, large transmission capacity, and abundant transmission information dimensions. In addition, because the OFDM signal has the characteristic of convenient Digital Signal Processing (DSP), the OFDM-PON can be safely processed conveniently and feasibly in the physical layer. In the scheme for improving the physical layer security, technologies such as optical steganography, exclusive-or scrambling, optical code division multiple access and the like are generally adopted, but the coherence and the time delay of the optical steganography technology at a receiving end are not suitable for OFDM signals with noise characteristics, the exclusive-or scrambling is easy to break violently, and the optical code division multiple access is also not suitable for the OFDM signals due to the high peak-to-average power ratio. Therefore, in the OFDM system, it is a security scheme that is widely studied by performing scrambling encryption on subcarriers or symbols.
Due to the high flexibility and stability of the DSP technology, the digital domain encryption technology can be effectively introduced to the optical encryption scheme through encryption modes such as time domain/frequency domain scrambling, bit exclusive OR, subcarrier permutation and the like. At present, the processing mode of encrypting the sub-carrier is generally carried out by using a chaotic encryption technology, and the chaos randomness is used for disturbing a carrier sequence, so that the encrypted information sequence has larger irrelevance with the original information sequence. Due to the characteristics of the chaotic sequence, a symmetric encryption mode is generally adopted in a scheme using chaotic encryption, so that the complexity of the encryption and decryption process calculation is reduced. In symmetric encryption, a receiving end and a transmitting end share a secret key, which obviously has a hidden security risk, and particularly in a PON, the receiving end often has a plurality of different subscriber units. Therefore, the use of asymmetric encryption in the PON is a more reliable encryption means, that is, different keys are used at the transmitting end and the receiving end, each user uses an independent private key, and the transmitting end uses a corresponding public key for unified encryption.
Disclosure of Invention
Technical problem to be solved
The invention aims to provide a high-safety asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking, which is used for asymmetrically encrypting an OFDM-PON system based on an RSA algorithm, different user units in the PON system have independent keys, a user side generates the keys and sends the keys to a public network, and different keys are used for encryption and decryption, so that the safety of user communication is greatly improved, and the method is suitable for the OFDM-PON system with multiple receiving units.
(II) technical scheme
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention provides the following technical scheme: a high-security asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking specifically comprises the following steps:
s1: mapping the data of a plurality of users into symbol data by bit data through carrierless amplitude phase modulation (CAP) respectively;
s2: generating a public key and a private key through an RSA algorithm, sending the public key to an Optical Line Terminal (OLT), and reserving the private key by a user;
s3: the symbol data enters a subcarrier encryption mapping module of the OFDM system, encryption distribution mapping of the symbol data on subcarriers is completed in the subcarrier encryption mapping module through a generated key, and an encryption process is completed;
s4: after mapping and encryption of the OFDM symbols are completed, digital time domain signals are obtained through fast inverse Fourier transform (IFFT);
s5: inserting a cyclic prefix to prevent inter-symbol interference due to channel fading;
s6: finally, converting the signal waveform into a real-time signal waveform through a digital-analog converter, and modulating the signal waveform onto an optical signal; the optical signal is sent out from an Optical Line Terminal (OLT) after passing through a circulator, and is distributed to a corresponding user unit by an Optical Distribution Node (ODN) after passing through an optical fiber link;
s7: in an Optical Network Unit (ONU), signal light enters an OFDM receiver after passing through a circulator, and is firstly subjected to photoelectric conversion to convert an optical signal into an electric signal; then, performing analog-to-digital conversion sampling, and then performing demodulation on a frequency domain after Fast Fourier Transform (FFT); in the OFDM symbol demapping unit, a user can correctly extract symbols and demap the symbols after decrypting the symbols by using a private key; and finally, processing the baseband signals through parallel-to-serial conversion to recover the original data.
Further, the step S1 specifically includes the following steps: mapping every 4 bits of binary bit streams r (k) of data of a plurality of users into a symbol through constellation mapping, wherein the symbol is mapped into 16 symbols in total, and then performing M times of upsampling on an upsampling unit according to the sampling rate of a filter after outputting a path of complex signals A (i) to obtain complex signals A (n); and separating the real part and the imaginary part of the complex signal into two paths of parallel real signals, respectively obtaining two paths of waveforms after passing through the filters, and finally combining the two paths of signals into one path of real signal through an adder unit and outputting the real signal s (t).
Further, the process of generating the public key and the private key through the RSA algorithm in step S2 specifically includes: according to RSA algorithm, two unequal prime numbers p and q are randomly selected, the product n is calculated, the length of n is the length of a secret key, generally 1024 bits (binary system) are taken, the number z of positive integers which are lower than n and have a mutual prime relation with n is calculated according to Euler function, an integer e which is mutually prime with z is randomly selected, wherein 1 is restricted to e z, and then a modular inverse element d of e relative to z is required to be calculated, namely the product of e and d is divided by the remainder of z to be 1, the mathematical expression is e x d-1=k x z, wherein k is any integer, and a public key (n, e) and a private key (n, d) can be obtained by a user terminal.
Further, the step S3 specifically includes: at an Optical Line Terminal (OLT), a plurality of encryption parameters are established according to the number of users, sufficiently large parameters are established for encryption, the parameters are encrypted through a public key, a plurality of groups of encryption sequences with elements of 01 which are sufficiently long can be obtained by carrying out binary conversion on the encrypted parameters, the encryption sequences carry out screening distribution on subcarriers, and then data are encrypted and mapped to the subcarriers for encrypted output.
Further, the Optical Line Terminal (OLT) and the Optical Network Unit (ONU) both include an OFDM transmitter and an OFDM receiver.
(III) advantageous effects
The invention carries out asymmetric encryption based on RSA algorithm, different from symmetric encryption, and can realize independent user independent keys under the same encrypted PON system; and the secret key is generated by the user, and the private key for decryption is only known by the user, so that communication leakage is not needed to be worried about, and the OFDM-PON encryption scheme is high in safety.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art that other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the overall system of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of CAP modulation according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of key generation according to the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of a subcarrier encryption mapping module according to the present invention;
fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of carrier encryption selection according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Referring to fig. 1, the present invention provides a high-security asymmetric encryption system model for OFDM-PON based on subcarrier selection masking, which mainly comprises an Optical Line Terminal (OLT), an Optical Distribution Node (ODN), and an Optical Network Unit (ONU). Both the OLT and the ONU comprise an OFDM transmitter and an OFDM receiver, and the ODN is composed of a passive optical splitter.
The work flow of the whole OFDM-PON system is as follows: firstly, mapping bit data into symbol data by carrier-free amplitude phase modulation (CAP) of data of a plurality of users; then entering a subcarrier encryption mapping module of the OFDM system, completing encryption distribution mapping of symbol data on subcarriers in the module, and completing an encryption process in the module; after mapping of the OFDM symbols is completed, a digital time domain signal is obtained through fast inverse fourier transform (IFFT), and then a cyclic prefix is inserted to prevent inter-symbol interference due to channel fading; finally, converting the real-time signal waveform into a real-time signal waveform through a digital-analog converter, and modulating the real-time signal waveform onto an optical signal; the optical signal is sent out from the OLT after passing through the circulator and is distributed to the corresponding user unit by the ODN after passing through the optical fiber link; in the ONU, signal light enters an OFDM receiver after passing through a circulator, and is firstly subjected to photoelectric conversion to convert an optical signal into an electric signal; then, performing analog-to-digital conversion sampling, and then performing demodulation on a frequency domain after Fast Fourier Transform (FFT); in the OFDM symbol demapping unit, a user can correctly extract symbols and demap the symbols after decrypting the symbols by using a private key; and finally, processing the baseband signal through parallel-to-serial conversion to recover the original data.
The specific workflow of each module is as follows:
(1) CAP mapping unit
Referring to fig. 2, the modulation process of the present invention using 16CAP as an example is as follows: the binary bit stream r (k) maps every 4 bits into one symbol through constellation mapping, the symbols are mapped into 16 symbols in total, then a path of complex signal A (i) is output, and then an up-sampling unit performs up-sampling according to the sampling rate of a filter by M times to obtain a complex signal A (n). And separating the real part and the imaginary part of the complex signal into two paths of parallel real signals, respectively obtaining two paths of waveforms after passing through the filters, and finally combining the two paths of signals into one path of real signal through an adder unit and outputting the real signal s (t).
(2) Key generation unit
Referring to fig. 3, according to the RSA algorithm, two unequal prime numbers p and q are randomly selected, the product n is calculated, the length of n is the length of the key, generally 1024 bits (binary), and then the number z of positive integers having a relatively prime relationship with n among the positive integers smaller than n is calculated according to the euler function. Randomly selecting an integer e which is prime to z, wherein 1< -e < -z, and then calculating a modular inverse element d of e relative to z, namely the remainder of dividing the product of e and d by z is 1, and mathematically expressing the remainder as e multiplied by d-1=k xz, wherein k is any integer. So far, the user end can obtain two groups of keys (n, e), (n, d), the former is sent to the OLT as a public key, and the latter is kept as a private key.
After receiving the public key (n, e), OLT sets a value Q large enough as an encryption parameter to convert Q into a two-level system sequence [ c ] 1 ,c 2 ,L c n ]The sequence is used to encrypt the original information and at the same time the parameter value Q is encrypted according to a key, the encryption being Q, the encryption principle being e.g. Q e -Q = kn, i.e. Q e Performing remainder operation on n, wherein the remainder is the encrypted q; the encryption process of P and K is the same.
(3) Subcarrier encryption mapping unit
The subcarrier encryption mapping is a core unit in the system of the present invention, data is encrypted by the unit, and the flow of the unit is shown in fig. 4.
Firstly, a user generates a public key and a private key based on an RSA algorithm, the public key is uploaded to a network terminal, and the private key is reserved. At the OLT, a plurality of encryption parameters are first established according to the number of users, here three users are taken as an example, and a sufficiently large parameter Q, P, K is established for encryption. Q, P, K is first encrypted by a public key, and the encrypted parameters are denoted as Q, P, K. By binary conversion of q, p, k, three sets of sufficiently long encryption sequences with element 01 can be obtained for encrypting the subcarriers.
Before mapping CAP symbols onto sub-carriers, we modulate the parameters q, p, k to the header of the multi-carrier, which is transmitted with the data. The multiple carriers are then grouped, first into three groups for transmitting three groups of data, respectively. Then matching the multiple carriers with the encrypted sequence, and setting the matrix of one group of carriers as f 1 ,f 2 ,L,f n ]The perturbation matrix is [ c ] 1 ,c 2 ,L c n ]Multiplying each element in the matrix to obtain a new sequence after encryption [ a ] 1 ,a 2 ,L,a n ]Wherein when c i When =1, a i ＝f i Otherwise, a i And =0. After the above processing, an encrypted subcarrier sequence [ a ] is obtained 1 ,a 2 ,L,a n ]And the term with an element of 0 in the sequence indicates that this carrier is not used. After each group of carriers are processed in the same way, all carriers are divided into a usable state and a non-usable state, CAP symbols are respectively mapped to carriers marked as usable carriers and carriers marked as non-usable carriers, and noise K is added to the carriers to be used as masks of real information. A schematic diagram of the carrier processing is shown in fig. 5. After being encrypted, the output encrypted OFDM signal can be expressed as:
Figure BDA0002675611220000061
wherein N denotes the total number of subcarriers, S i Indicating symbol information on the ith carrier, K i Representing noise information, f i Representing the carrier frequency. After information is encrypted, in order to ensure that the OFDM symbol still has an integral multiple of the period in the FFT period under a time delay condition, a cyclic prefix needs to be added to the OFDM symbol, that is, a segment of data after one OFDM symbol is copied and added to the front of the whole symbol to form a cyclic structure.
The signal is converted into a continuous electric signal after digital-to-analog conversion, and is modulated onto an optical carrier wave through an optoelectronic modulator for transmission.
(4) Receiving decryption unit
The encrypted OFDM signals enter an optical fiber link after passing through a circulator in the OLT, are distributed to corresponding ONUs according to a separator in the ODN, and enter an OFDM receiver after passing through the circulator. The demodulation process is the reverse operation of the encryption process. I.e. the perturbation matrix [ c ] is restored by the private key (n, d) 1 ,c 2 ,L c n ]And carrying out reverse operation by using the disturbance matrix, and sequentially selecting the scrambled subcarriers.
Firstly, after photoelectric conversion, optical signals are converted into electric signals, and then analog signals are converted into digital signals through analog-to-digital conversion and processed in a digital domain. And after the fast Fourier transform, carrying out demapping processing on the subcarriers. Firstly, extracting information q, p and k of a subcarrier header, and decrypting according to a private key (n and d) of a user, wherein the decryption principle is q d Q = kn, i.e. the original parameters can be calculated back from the encrypted parameters. Because each user only has one private key, only the corresponding disturbance parameter Q/P/K can be solved, the subcarrier sequence of the user is extracted from the multicarrier added with noise masking according to the disturbance parameter, and the data decision demapping is carried out on the symbols on the sequence.
In this disclosure, aspects of the present invention are described with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which a number of illustrative embodiments are shown. Embodiments of the present disclosure are not necessarily defined to include all aspects of the invention. It should be appreciated that the various concepts and embodiments described above, as well as those described in greater detail below, may be implemented in any of numerous ways, as the disclosed concepts and embodiments are not limited to any one implementation. Additionally, some aspects of the present disclosure may be used alone, or in any suitable combination with other aspects of the present disclosure.
The preferred embodiments of the invention disclosed above are intended to be illustrative only. The preferred embodiments are not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise forms disclosed. Obviously, many modifications and variations are possible in light of the above teaching. The embodiments were chosen and described in order to best explain the principles of the invention and the practical application, to thereby enable others skilled in the art to best utilize the invention. The invention is limited only by the claims and their full scope and equivalents.

Claims (4)

1. A high-security asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1: mapping the data of a plurality of users into symbol data by bit data through carrierless amplitude phase modulation (CAP) respectively;
s2: generating a public key and a private key through an RSA algorithm, sending the public key to an Optical Line Terminal (OLT), and reserving the private key by a user;
s3: the symbol data enters a subcarrier encryption mapping module of the OFDM system, encryption distribution mapping of the symbol data on subcarriers is completed in the subcarrier encryption mapping module through a generated key, and an encryption process is completed;
s4: after mapping and encryption of the OFDM symbols are completed, digital time domain signals are obtained through fast inverse Fourier transform (IFFT);
s5: inserting a cyclic prefix to prevent inter-symbol interference due to channel fading;
s6: finally, converting the real-time signal waveform into a real-time signal waveform through a digital-analog converter, and modulating the real-time signal waveform onto an optical signal; the optical signal is sent out from an Optical Line Terminal (OLT) after passing through a circulator, and is distributed to a corresponding user unit by an Optical Distribution Node (ODN) after passing through an optical fiber link;
s7: in an Optical Network Unit (ONU), signal light enters an OFDM receiver after passing through a circulator, and is firstly subjected to photoelectric conversion to convert an optical signal into an electric signal; then, performing analog-to-digital conversion sampling, and then performing demodulation on a frequency domain after Fast Fourier Transform (FFT); in an OFDM symbol demapping unit, a user can correctly extract symbols and demap the symbols after decrypting by using a private key; finally, processing the baseband signals through parallel-to-serial conversion to recover original data;
the step S3 specifically includes: at an Optical Line Terminal (OLT), establishing a plurality of encryption parameters according to the number of users, firstly encrypting the parameters through a public key, and performing binary conversion on the encrypted parameters to obtain an encryption sequence with a plurality of groups of elements of 0 and 1; matching the multi-carrier with the encryption sequence to obtain an encrypted sub-carrier sequence, wherein an item with an element of 0 in the sequence indicates that the carrier is not used; the CAP symbols are mapped onto carriers marked as usable, respectively, and the carriers marked as unused are masked with noise K as true information.
2. The high-security asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking as claimed in claim 1, wherein said step S1 specifically comprises the steps of: mapping every 4 bits of binary bit streams r (k) of data of a plurality of users into a symbol through constellation mapping, wherein the symbol is mapped into 16 symbols in total, and then performing M times of upsampling on an upsampling unit according to the sampling rate of a filter after outputting a path of complex signals A (i) to obtain complex signals A (n); and separating the real part and the imaginary part of the complex signal into two paths of parallel real signals, respectively obtaining two paths of waveforms after passing through the filters, and finally combining the two paths of signals into one path of real signal through an adder unit and outputting the real signal s (t).
3. The high-security asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking as claimed in claim 1, wherein the process of generating the public key and the private key by the RSA algorithm in step S2 specifically includes: according to RSA algorithm, two unequal prime numbers p and q are randomly selected, the product n is calculated, the length of n is the length of a secret key, 1024 bits are taken, the number z of positive integers which are in a mutual prime relation with n in the positive integers smaller than n is calculated according to Euler function, an integer e which is in a mutual prime relation with z is randomly selected, wherein 1 & lt e & gt z is required to be calculated, the modulo element d of e relative to z is required to be calculated, namely the product of e and d is divided by the remainder of z to be 1, the mathematical expression is e x d-1=k x z, k is any integer, and a public key (n, e) and a private key (n, d) can be obtained by a user side.
4. The high-security asymmetric encryption method based on subcarrier selection masking as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: the Optical Line Terminal (OLT) and the Optical Network Unit (ONU) both comprise an OFDM transmitter and an OFDM receiver.
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