CN112016185A - Design method for commissioning mode of accident handling system of nuclear power plant - Google Patents
Design method for commissioning mode of accident handling system of nuclear power plant Download PDFInfo
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- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 80
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 35
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 14
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 6
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- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000005457 optimization Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 239000000126 substance Substances 0.000 description 17
- 238000005507 spraying Methods 0.000 description 10
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- HEMHJVSKTPXQMS-UHFFFAOYSA-M Sodium hydroxide Chemical compound [OH-].[Na+] HEMHJVSKTPXQMS-UHFFFAOYSA-M 0.000 description 3
- KGBXLFKZBHKPEV-UHFFFAOYSA-N boric acid Chemical compound OB(O)O KGBXLFKZBHKPEV-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 3
- 239000004327 boric acid Substances 0.000 description 3
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- ZCYVEMRRCGMTRW-UHFFFAOYSA-N 7553-56-2 Chemical compound [I] ZCYVEMRRCGMTRW-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 2
- 239000000654 additive Substances 0.000 description 2
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- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
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- 229910052740 iodine Inorganic materials 0.000 description 2
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- 239000007788 liquid Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 description 2
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- ZOXJGFHDIHLPTG-UHFFFAOYSA-N Boron Chemical compound [B] ZOXJGFHDIHLPTG-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F30/00—Computer-aided design [CAD]
- G06F30/20—Design optimisation, verification or simulation
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F18/00—Pattern recognition
- G06F18/20—Analysing
- G06F18/24—Classification techniques
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q10/00—Administration; Management
- G06Q10/06—Resources, workflows, human or project management; Enterprise or organisation planning; Enterprise or organisation modelling
- G06Q10/063—Operations research, analysis or management
- G06Q10/0631—Resource planning, allocation, distributing or scheduling for enterprises or organisations
- G06Q10/06315—Needs-based resource requirements planning or analysis
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
- G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
- G21D3/04—Safety arrangements
- G21D3/06—Safety arrangements responsive to faults within the plant
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
Abstract
The invention relates to a design method of a commissioning mode of an accident handling system of a nuclear power plant, which comprises the following steps: (1) classifying the commissioning modes of the accident handling system according to the requirements of system commissioning urgency and timeliness by combining accident analysis and the general principle of accident handling of the nuclear power plant; (2) designing a specific commissioning mode of the system based on the type of the commissioning mode by combining system acceptance criteria and system commissioning requirements, wherein the specific commissioning mode comprises logic combination related to automatic commissioning and working conditions and commissioning criteria corresponding to manual commissioning; (3) and verifying the commissioning mode design by combining with an acceptance criterion, and adjusting the system commissioning mode or the system design according to a verification result. The method meets the requirement of the nuclear power plant for accident handling through reliable signal design, and related design methods can be popularized to similar operation (including starting, stopping and the same) mode design of an accident handling system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the design technology of nuclear power plants, and particularly relates to a design method of a nuclear power plant accident handling system commissioning mode.
Background
On the basis of fully borrowing the concept of the absorption advanced nuclear power technology and the design and operation experience of the existing pressurized water reactor nuclear power unit in China, the most advanced three-generation nuclear power unit researched and developed adopts the accident prevention measure combining the active mode and the passive mode in the design.
The accident working conditions possibly related to the operation period of the novel nuclear power plant comprise design reference accident working conditions, design extension working conditions, serious accident working conditions and the like, a series of active and passive systems with novel designs are designed according to different accident working conditions, a system operation mode of the system has no complete design method aiming at the newly designed system, and the operation mode of the current partial system has certain design defects.
Before designing an accident handling system operation mode, a verification criterion of the system must be determined, a design mandatory or recommended criterion of the system is determined, and an operation boundary of the system is determined; meanwhile, the requirements of system commissioning (including starting, stopping and the same) need to be determined, and all various working conditions needing system commissioning under accidents need to be combed, so that the integrity and completeness of related analysis are ensured.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a design method of a nuclear power plant accident handling system commissioning mode, which meets the requirement of nuclear power plant accident handling through simple and reliable signal design.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows: a design method for a nuclear power plant accident handling system commissioning mode comprises the following steps:
(1) classifying the commissioning modes of the accident handling system according to the requirements of system commissioning urgency and timeliness by combining accident analysis and the general principle of accident handling of the nuclear power plant;
(2) designing a specific commissioning mode of the system based on the type of the commissioning mode by combining system acceptance criteria and system commissioning requirements, wherein the specific commissioning mode comprises logic combination related to automatic commissioning and working conditions and commissioning criteria corresponding to manual commissioning;
(3) and verifying the commissioning mode design by combining with an acceptance criterion, and adjusting the system commissioning mode or the system design according to a verification result.
Further, according to the design method of the operation mode of the nuclear power plant accident handling system, the operation mode in the step (1) is divided into I, II and III types, wherein the I type is as follows: emergency commissioning, class ii: automatic commissioning, class iii: the operation can be carried out manually; wherein the latest time of class I operation is less than or equal to 5min, the latest time of class II operation is less than or equal to the non-intervention time after the accident, and the latest time of class III operation is greater than the non-intervention time after the accident.
The I and II commissioning modes need to be provided with automatic commissioning signals, and the III commissioning mode mainly takes manual commissioning signals as main modes in principle and can also be provided with automatic commissioning signals.
For the III-class commissioning mode, automatic signals are set, the design of the automatic signals is as simple as possible, only the main working conditions needing to be dealt with need to be considered, and finally the signals are enveloped by the manual commissioning signals.
Further, according to the method for designing the commissioning mode of the nuclear power plant accident handling system, the logic combination design method related to automatic commissioning in the step (2) is as follows:
a) according to constraint conditions, selecting typical parameters and logics under accidents by combining design characteristics of a power plant to preliminarily combine starting signals;
b) analyzing the variation trend of the related parameters in the whole accident process, and determining the reliability of the selected related parameters by combining the commissioning time;
c) and further optimizing the commissioning signal by combining system function positioning: the system operation logic is consistent with the corresponding role in the function distribution of the whole nuclear power plant, and is effectively distinguished from other system operation signals, so that the whole power plant can be orderly corresponded under different working conditions;
d) necessary adjustment and optimization are carried out by combining the inherent design characteristics of each system;
e) and according to the general design requirements, fine adjustment is carried out on the fixed value and the automatic signal logic, and the design envelopment is ensured.
Further, according to the method for designing the operation mode of the nuclear power plant accident handling system, the typical parameters in the step a) include neutron fluence rate, unit power level, pressure, temperature, flow, radioactivity level, water chemistry related parameters, voltage, current and rotating speed.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the invention provides a design method of an accident regulation handling system commissioning mode, which can be used for guiding the design of a starting mode of an accident handling system and solving the problems that a starting signal design method is not systematic and design omission and design defects are easy to occur;
2. the invention defines the criteria of setting automatic signals and manual signals, not all systems need automatic commissioning, and the III commissioning mode can only set a manual commissioning mode or only set simple commissioning signals, thereby optimizing the design work;
3. the invention makes clear the change trend of the selection parameters of the commissioning signal to be analyzed, and avoids selecting wrong and unrepresentative parameters;
4. the invention makes clear that the commissioning signal needs to be optimized by combining with the system function positioning so as to be distinguished from other systems, thereby avoiding the cross commissioning of the systems and ensuring the mutual matching and ordered commissioning among different systems;
5. the invention particularly comprehensively considers the requirements of system, equipment protection and the like aiming at the new system requirement so as to further optimize the starting signal;
6. the invention requires to consider the general design requirements of delay signals, instrument errors and the like, thereby avoiding design omission;
7. after the final design is finished, the method requires verification criterion conformance analysis by combining a commissioning mode and accident analysis, and ensures the accuracy of a design signal;
8. by the analysis method, the starting signal of the existing system can be optimized, and the design of a new system can be guided.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a design method of a nuclear power plant accident handling system commissioning mode in an embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a prior art isolation valve control logic for a chemical dosing subsystem of a containment spray (EAS) system;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an EAS chemical dosing subsystem isolation valve control logic in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in detail below with reference to the figures and examples.
The invention provides a design method of a nuclear power plant accident handling system commissioning mode, which is characterized in that system verification criterion analysis is required before design work is carried out, the design mandatory or recommended criterion of a system is determined, and the safe operation boundary of the system is determined; meanwhile, the commissioning requirement of the system is determined, and all accident conditions (design reference accident conditions, design extension conditions, serious accident conditions and the like) needing commissioning of the system under the accident are combed so as to ensure the integrity and completeness of the related analysis.
On this basis, the design method of the system commissioning mode is shown in fig. 1 and includes the following steps:
(1) determining a shipment category
Dividing the system commissioning mode into I/II/III classes, and preliminarily determining the commissioning mode (automatic or manual) of the system; the work needs to be combined with accident analysis software to carry out design verification work and determine the latest commissioning time of the system under the most severe working condition. In the original system commissioning design process, no special analysis is generally made for commissioning urgency, but in fact, this step is very important, and has the effect of compendium of the analysis to the system commissioning signal. For example, if the commissioning time is very urgent, the corresponding commissioning mode needs to be designed as conservative as possible to ensure that the system can be commissioned quickly, and the latest commissioning time of the system needs to be determined by combining accident analysis and the like; meanwhile, the system can be put into operation in advance and can be analyzed, and the system is generally favorable for accident handling in advance aiming at the accident handling system of the nuclear power plant.
In addition, the system operation urgency and timeliness requirements are determined on the basis of the design principle by combining the general principle of nuclear power plant accident handling, such as 30min non-intervention principle or 72 h non-intervention principle.
To distinguish the urgency of commissioning, the modes of commissioning are classified as follows:
| latest time of delivery | Classification of delivery methods |
| ≤5min | Class I: emergency commissioning |
| 5min is less than or equal to the latest time of delivery and the non-intervention time after accident | Class II: need to be automatically put into operation |
| Time to no intervention after accident | Class III: can be manually put into operation |
The accident reason can be judged by personnel after the accident happens and the intervention is started to be generally required for 5min, and the related system is not required to be manually put into operation (including starting, stopping and the like) within 5min due to the consideration of the accident processing process and the pressure bearing capacity of the personnel, so that automatic signals are required to be designed in all the I-type operation modes needing to be put into operation within 5min, and the design is conservative as much as possible.
Compared with the class I operation mode, the class II operation mode is slightly loose in time limit, but still needs automatic operation and corresponding automatic operation signals based on the principle of no intervention after an accident (human errors caused by overlarge personnel pressure at the initial stage of the accident) are reduced.
For class iii commissioning, an automatic signal may not be required in principle, as the operator has already identified the cause of the accident and the required operations from the accident at that time.
(2) Determining commissioning logic
On the basis, preliminarily determining a system commissioning mode, including automatic commissioning related logic combination, manual commissioning corresponding working conditions, commissioning criteria and the like, specifically includes:
a) setting automatic signals (which can comprise a series of sub-signals) aiming at the I and II operation modes;
b) aiming at the class III commissioning mode, a manual commissioning signal is taken as a main principle, and an automatic commissioning signal (which can comprise a series of sub-signals) can be set for conservation, but the signal design is as simple as possible, all commissioning requirements are not necessarily required to be met, only the main working condition required to be responded is considered, and finally the signal is enveloped by the manual commissioning signal.
a) according to constraint conditions determined before the operation of a commissioning mode design work (for example, containment cooling and depressurization requirements are required for a containment related system to ensure the integrity of the containment), typical parameters and logics under accidents are selected to preliminarily perform starting signal combination in combination with the design characteristics of a power plant, wherein the typical parameters of the power plant comprise neutron fluence rate, unit power level, pressure, temperature, flow, radioactivity level (total gamma specific activity and the like), water chemistry related parameters (online conductivity and the like), voltage, current, rotating speed of various devices and the like;
b) analyzing the variation trend of the related commissioning parameters in the whole accident process, and determining the reliability of the selected related parameters by combining the commissioning time;
c) and further optimizing the commissioning signal by combining system function positioning: the system operation logic is consistent with the corresponding role in the function distribution of the whole nuclear power plant, and is effectively distinguished from other system operation signals, so that the whole power plant can be orderly corresponded under different working conditions;
this is very important, and can guarantee that different systems of power plant cooperate each other, and the orderly start-up to do benefit to operating mode, for this reason need distinguish the threshold value of different system operation parameters in the design, use the flow as an example, if B system is put into operation when A system is out of order, then should select A system flow to be less than or equal to Q for flow parameter Q, B systemA,minThe system is taken as one of signals of the system B operation, so that the condition that the systems A, B are operated simultaneously is avoided;
d) necessary adjustment and optimization are carried out by combining the inherent design characteristics of each system (such as the protection requirements of the system for overpressure protection, transient impact on the system caused by misoperation prevention and the like are determined, and the requirements are not necessarily suitable for all systems according to the design characteristics of the system);
e) in addition, universal design requirements such as delay signals (combining characteristics such as system response delay and the like of a process, instrument control, ventilation and the like), instrument errors (ensuring that a setting value can envelop errors in a transmission process of related parameters) and the like are also required to be considered, the setting value and automatic signal logic are finely adjusted, and the design envelopment is ensured;
(3) design verification
The check can satisfy the system acceptance criteria according to the corresponding commissioning signal, otherwise, necessary adjustment is made to the commissioning signal or the system design.
Taking a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant containment spray system (EAS) chemical dosing subsystem as an example, the current control logic is redesigned and checked by the design method.
The isolation valve control logic of the chemical dosing subsystem of the containment spray (EAS) system in the prior art is shown in fig. 2, and the isolation valve control logic of the chemical dosing subsystem of the containment spray (EAS) system redesigned by the invention is shown in fig. 3.
The object of the test of the embodiment is a containment spraying system (EAS) of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant, the system is started when a primary loop loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a secondary loop pipeline in a shell are broken under a design basis accident, boron water is sprayed into the containment to maintain the pressure and the temperature in the shell within a design range, the system is started in a system level mode according to a reactor protection system signal, and meanwhile, a chemical dosing subsystem (sodium hydroxide is added to neutralize boric acid under the LOCA, and the pH value of a pit is adjusted to be neutral so as to reduce the re-release of radioactive iodine in a medium-long period stage) is arranged and has an independent starting command. The control logic of the chemical dosing control isolation valve of the EAS system in the prior art is shown in figure 2, when a containment spraying signal sent by a reactor protection system is received, and after the radioactivity of a reactor plant is detected to be high and lasts for 5min, the dosing isolation valve is opened to suck chemical additives away by the suction force of the EAS pump so as to neutralize boric acid, 5min delay is set for the purpose of mistakenly spraying during normal operation or the intervention of personnel when a two-loop system breaks open (in this case, the valve needs to be kept in an isolation state), and meanwhile, when the liquid level of a storage tank is low, the isolation valve is automatically closed to stop chemical dosing, and meanwhile, manual opening and isolation commands are set.
Under a design benchmark accident, the containment vessel needs to meet the following acceptance criteria:
a) the highest pressure of the containment vessel does not exceed the design pressure;
b) the pressure decay of the containment must be acceptable, i.e. the containment pressure drops below 50% of the calculated maximum pressure of the accident within 24 hours after the design benchmark accident;
c) containment thermal stresses must be acceptable;
d) the radioactive dose level outside the plant is below the limit requirements specified in GB 18871-2012.
The requirement of the criterion d is only required to be met for the chemical dosing subsystem.
Incidents that require EAS activation include: the pipeline crevasses with various sizes of the primary loop and the two loop pipelines in the containment vessel are all design basis accidents, the accident needing to be added by the chemical dosing subsystem is the pipeline crevasses with various sizes of the primary loop, and the primary loop is kept in an isolated state under the secondary loop crevasse accident.
According to the method provided by the invention, the starting logic recheck is as follows:
1. the EAS system is required to be put into operation within 85 seconds at the latest in an accident, so the EAS system belongs to a class I operation mode, and an automatic signal must be set for the whole operation of the EAS system; but aiming at the chemical addition subsystem, the subsystem mainly ensures that boric acid is neutralized after LOCA, the pH value of a pit is adjusted to reduce the re-release of radioactive iodine in the middle and long-term stages of an accident (which is far beyond the non-intervention time 30min after the accident), and the effective injection of a chemical additive can still be ensured in the middle and long-term stages of the accident, so that the chemical addition subsystem is put into operation in a III type without emergency operation; the accident handling of the unit takes 30min of non-intervention time into consideration, so that the unit can be manually put into operation by an operator 30min after the accident; of course, setting the automatic signal may still be considered based on conservative considerations.
2. Determining commissioning logic
because the accident of the first loop breach and the second loop breach is mainly distinguished, the original design considers that the radioactive level of the reactor factory building is high to be used as a design input signal to distinguish the first loop breach and the second loop breach (the adoption of the second loop signal is too complex and unreliable), and the radioactive level of the reactor factory building is not influenced when the second loop breach occurs, so that the signal can be preliminarily determined to be adopted; the subsystem is put into operation when the safety spray system is started, so that the safety spray signal is used as a starting signal;
for the shutdown signal, the low liquid level in the storage tank can be used as the shutdown signal, and the shutdown signal is reasonable because the dosing is finished at the moment.
In order to prevent the corrosion of the equipment in the containment vessel caused by the mis-spraying or unnecessary dosing, a 5min dosing delay is set:
the safety spraying signal is kept to be output after being triggered, so that the safety spraying signal is effective within 5 min;
secondly, aiming at the radioactivity level of the workshop after the accident, due to the spraying effect of the safety spraying system, the radioactivity level of the workshop is rapidly reduced to be lower than the detection limit of the instrument after the EAS is started for 5min, so that the radioactivity level of the reactor workshop is selected to be invalid as a trigger signal after 5 min.
The dosing subsystem is started along with the safety spraying system, and the mutual matching and interference with other systems are not required to be considered.
Because the system is a specially-designed system, the risk of misoperation exists, the strong base added after the dosing subsystem is put into operation by mistake is seriously corroded on equipment in a reactor plant, the related risk of misoperation needs to be considered, and the current system design considers the delay of 5min so as to stop unnecessary dosing.
According to the analysis, after the delay of 5min caused by the risk of misdelivery is considered, the radioactivity of the reactor factory building can not be used as a starting signal any more, so that the chemical dosing subsystem can not be automatically put into operation according to a plan due to the original design.
Because the operation requirement of the chemical dosing subsystem of the dry spraying is not very urgent, equipment corrosion caused by operation of the dosing subsystem after misspraying needs to be prevented, the radioactivity level of a reactor plant is not representative, and the two-loop pipeline breakage is judged to be complex through two-loop parameters, so that the system is not suitable for setting related automatic starting signals, an operator guides the system according to accident rules, manual starting is carried out after comprehensive judgment of the state of a unit, only the manual starting signals are set, and misspraying is prevented, on one hand, misspraying can be completely avoided, and simultaneously, the operation of the chemical dosing subsystem can not be influenced.
3. Design verification
Recheck according to the aforementioned criterion d) is as follows:
and selecting the most harsh working condition to analyze the accident response, wherein the analysis shows that the personnel dosage outside the plant after the manual operation according to the accident regulation meets the limit requirement specified in GB 18871-2012.
The modified system commissioning signal is shown in figure 3.
It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications may be made in the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Thus, if such modifications and variations of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the present invention is intended to include such modifications and variations.
Claims (6)
1. A design method for a nuclear power plant accident handling system commissioning mode comprises the following steps:
(1) classifying the commissioning modes of the accident handling system according to the requirements of system commissioning urgency and timeliness by combining accident analysis and the general principle of accident handling of the nuclear power plant;
(2) designing a specific commissioning mode of the system based on the type of the commissioning mode by combining system acceptance criteria and system commissioning requirements, wherein the specific commissioning mode comprises logic combination related to automatic commissioning and working conditions and commissioning criteria corresponding to manual commissioning;
(3) and verifying the commissioning mode design by combining with an acceptance criterion, and adjusting the system commissioning mode or the system design according to a verification result.
2. The method for designing a commissioning mode of a nuclear power plant accident handling system according to claim 1, wherein: the operation modes in the step (1) are classified into I, II and III types: emergency commissioning, class ii: automatic commissioning, class iii: the operation can be carried out manually; wherein the latest time of class I operation is less than or equal to 5min, the latest time of class II operation is less than or equal to the non-intervention time after the accident, and the latest time of class III operation is greater than the non-intervention time after the accident.
3. The method for designing a commissioning mode of a nuclear power plant accident handling system according to claim 2, wherein: the I and II commissioning modes need to be provided with automatic commissioning signals, and the III commissioning mode mainly takes manual commissioning signals as main modes in principle and can also be provided with automatic commissioning signals.
4. The method for designing a commissioning method of a nuclear power plant accident handling system according to claim 3, wherein: for the III-class commissioning mode, automatic signals are set, the design of the automatic signals is as simple as possible, only the main working conditions needing to be dealt with need to be considered, and finally the signals are enveloped by the manual commissioning signals.
5. The method for designing a commissioning method of a nuclear power plant accident handling system according to claim 3, wherein: the logic combination design method related to automatic commissioning in the step (2) is as follows:
a) according to constraint conditions, selecting typical parameters and logics under accidents by combining design characteristics of a power plant to preliminarily combine starting signals;
b) analyzing the variation trend of the related parameters in the whole accident process, and determining the reliability of the selected related parameters by combining the commissioning time;
c) and further optimizing the commissioning signal by combining system function positioning: the system operation logic is consistent with the corresponding role in the function distribution of the whole nuclear power plant, and is effectively distinguished from other system operation signals, so that the whole power plant can be orderly corresponded under different working conditions;
d) necessary adjustment and optimization are carried out by combining the inherent design characteristics of each system;
e) and according to the general design requirements, fine adjustment is carried out on the fixed value and the automatic signal logic, and the design envelopment is ensured.
6. The method for designing a commissioning mode of a nuclear power plant accident handling system according to claim 5, wherein: typical parameters in step a) include neutron fluence rate, unit power level, pressure, temperature, flow, radioactivity level, water chemistry related parameters, voltage, current, and rotational speed.
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