CN111784426A - Cloud storage resource transaction method based on intelligent contract - Google Patents

Cloud storage resource transaction method based on intelligent contract Download PDF

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CN111784426A
CN111784426A CN201910287318.5A CN201910287318A CN111784426A CN 111784426 A CN111784426 A CN 111784426A CN 201910287318 A CN201910287318 A CN 201910287318A CN 111784426 A CN111784426 A CN 111784426A
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providers
quotation
provider
auction
demander
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顾永跟
吴小红
陶杰
候顶顶
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Huzhou University
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00Commerce
    • G06Q30/06Buying, selling or leasing transactions
    • G06Q30/0601Electronic shopping [e-shopping]
    • G06Q30/0605Supply or demand aggregation
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/12Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic shopping systems
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00Commerce
    • G06Q30/06Buying, selling or leasing transactions
    • G06Q30/0601Electronic shopping [e-shopping]
    • G06Q30/0611Request for offers or quotes
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00Commerce
    • G06Q30/06Buying, selling or leasing transactions
    • G06Q30/08Auctions

Abstract

A cloud storage resource transaction method based on an intelligent contract. The method comprises the following steps: the demander release requirements and deadlines for different transaction phases; step 2: the provider submits quotation information with a quotation encrypted random character string; and step 3: determining whether the number of providers participating in the auction exceeds the number required by the demander, disclosing sealed bids, and settling the auction and the transaction; and 4, step 4: adding incentive compatibility mechanism rules to enable the providers to truly report the storage cost of the providers and disclose the quotation information of the providers; and 5: and judging whether the deadline is reached, entering an auction stage, finally paying the reward of the bidding provider, and transferring the money to the address of the provider by the demander through the blockchain. The method realizes the minimization of the cost of the demander for purchasing the cloud storage resources and improves the utilization rate of social resources.

Description

Cloud storage resource transaction method based on intelligent contract
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of computer cloud storage, in particular to a cloud storage resource transaction method based on an intelligent contract.
Technical Field
With the continuous development of internet technology and storage technology, the storage mode of cloud storage is noticed by a plurality of researchers and enterprise units. The cloud storage has the main characteristics of high reliability, availability, expandability and the like, and attracts more and more users to use the cloud storage as a data storage mode. It is currently stored on many public cloud Storage platforms, such as Google Storage, Amazon S3, Microsoft Azure, RackSpace CloudFiles, etc. In our cloud storage resource procurement system, the demander is asked to make his request to the provider, and the provider submits quote information according to this request if he meets the demander's request and can provide storage resources. From the perspective of the demander, his goal is to select a set of providers from these providers to which to store data, and the cost of providing resources by this set of providers is minimal, with the greater the availability of cloud storage resources the better. The whole process is realized by a well-defined programming language and can be executed on a blockchain network. After the storage resources of the provider are sold, the provider needs to provide necessary storage services, which mainly include storage and network bandwidth, so that the normal access of the data by the demander can be ensured.
However, these cloud storage platforms and applications have many problems, such as single point of failure, proxy locking, and data leakage. Therefore, a multi-cloud storage system has been proposed. Henry c.h.chen et al at NCCloud: a Network-Coding-Based Storage System in a Cloud-of-Cloud provides a proxy-Based Storage System with multi-Cloud Storage and fault tolerance improvement, which not only can keep the same fault tolerance and data redundancy of the original Storage Based on erasure code technology, but also can reduce the data repair time. Thus, there is less expense cost due to the data transfer.
However, based on the storage strategy of erasure code technology, how to select cloud storage providers and safely execute transactions is a very important issue. Cloud storage resource trading mechanisms have been studied, but these mechanisms do not take into account the feature of avoiding centralized trading in distributed storage. These studies still adopt a centralized resource transaction mode, which results in higher transaction fee, single point of failure, information disclosure, and the like.
The Vickrey-Clarke _ Groves (VCG) mechanism is a widely studied currency-accompanied mechanism. This mechanism makes use of a more restrictive environment, a quasi-linear environment, in which case any social selection function is not idiosyncratic and the mechanism can be perfectly decomposed into configuration rules and payment rules. In addition, the efficiency property after the transaction is over can be broken down into two properties: one is the configuration efficiency; the other is the payment rule nature or what is called the strict budget balance nature. Thus, the VCG mechanism satisfies the goal expectations that can be met because the behavior of the participants meets the configuration efficiency and the dominance policy incentives are consistent.
Thus, the VCG mechanism can be summarized as the following two rules:
suppose v1,v2,...,vnRepresenting an evaluation of the goods by the buyer; a represents one policy selectable by the buyer and a represents a set of selectable policies.
Rule 1: configuration rules
Figure BSA0000181650590000021
Rule 2: payment rules
Figure BSA0000181650590000022
Wherein h isi:V-i→ R is an arbitrary function.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is as follows: the cloud storage resource trading method based on the intelligent contract minimizes the cost of a demander for purchasing the cloud storage resources, maximizes social welfare and improves the utilization rate of the social resources.
The cloud storage resource transaction method based on the intelligent contract specifically comprises the following specific steps:
step 1: the demander issues the demand, demand information { num, ScapacityThe total volume that the requester needs to purchase is num × ScapacityNum is the number of providers and ScapacityIs the data block capacity; setting parameters (num, k) of erasure codes, where num representsThe number of providers, k, indicates that the demander wants to divide the data of the demander into k blocks;
step 2: sealing the quote, if the provider meets the requirement of the demander, N is the number of providers participating in the auction, and N is {1, 2.., N }; sealed quotation b of storage resources that a provider needs to submitiIs represented by B, B ═ B1,b2,...,bn) (ii) a Cost set for all providers C ═ C1,c2,...,cn);
And step 3: determining that the auction transaction is deemed successful when the number of providers participating in the auction exceeds the number num required by the requester; otherwise, the cloud storage purchase transaction issued by the demander is invalid;
and 4, step 4: adding incentive compatibility mechanism rules to enable the providers to truly report the storage cost of the providers and disclose the quotation information of the providers; finally, the providers which are independent from each other and do not influence each other for bidding are X ═ X1,x2,...,xn}; the incentive compatibility mechanism rules are as follows:
rule 1: an allocation function that minimizes social costs can be implemented:
Figure BSA0000181650590000031
rule 2: suppose Xa=f(ci,c-i),Xb=f(c-i);
Payment function p for provider iiComprises the following steps:
Figure BSA0000181650590000032
wherein X isa={xj| j ∈ N } represents the optimal allocation, Xb={xjI j ∈ N, j ≠ i } provides that i is the best allocation in the absence
Figure BSA0000181650590000033
Is the minimum social cost for provider i not participating in the auction;
Figure BSA0000181650590000034
is in the distribution policy XaNext, the social total cost of other auction-participating providers except for provider i;
and 5: the providers who bid are paid a reward.
As a preference: in order to avoid the conflict of the demands of different demanders, the release demand of step 1 includes: the current auction state comprises the current time t and the cut-off time t of the auction stagebidPublic quote deadline trevAuction deadline tend
As a preference: the quotation information of the storage resource required to be submitted by the provider also comprises a random character string, and the random character string is encrypted by SHA-3.
As a preference: the provider submits the quotation and the random character string again before the expiration time of the public sealed quotation, verifies whether the quotation information is consistent with the quotation in the sealed quotation stage, if the quotation information is consistent with the quotation in the sealed quotation stage, the quotation information submitted by the provider is considered legal and effective, and if the quotation information is not consistent with the quotation in the sealed quotation stage, the provider does not participate in distribution and can not obtain a reward.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: by using the auction mode containing the incentive compatibility mechanism rule, the cost of purchasing the cloud storage resources by the demanders is minimized, the social welfare is maximized, and the utilization rate of the social resources is improved. Meanwhile, distributed cloud storage resource transaction is realized by using the technical characteristics of the block chain.
Drawings
FIG. 1: cloud storage resource transaction models.
FIG. 2 is a drawing: erasure code storage strategy diagram.
FIG. 3: a transaction flow diagram based on a smart contract.
FIG. 4 is a drawing: simulation results of the total cost of the demander.
Detailed Description
From fig. 1 we can see that the transaction model is roughly divided into 3 topic parts. First, it is required toThe winner 100, the demander 100, publishes the demand information in the auction network 300, and then the provider 200 submits a bid according to the demander information, and the winner needs to provide the storage service and get a reward. The demander is unaware of the provider's submitted bid information prior to the auction, and after the auction is over, the demander selects a set of cloud storage providers from the bids. The second topic section is the blockchain 400 section. It is an auction algorithm and implemented in a turing-ready programming language and can be executed over a blockchain network. The miners 500 are responsible for recording the past executed transactions to the blockchain and confirming the new blocks through the consensus algorithm, and the miners who participate in the accounting can obtain transaction fees, and the safety of the blockchain is guaranteed by the work of the miners. The third part is provider 200. After the demander issues a request on the auction network, the provider obtains the information issued by the demander through the auction network and decides whether to participate in the auction. If the provider meets the requirements of the demander, i.e. can voluntarily participate in the auction, the provider needs to submit the quote b of his storage resourcei. Both the demander and the provider can access and query the transaction situation of the cloud storage resource in the blockchain.
The erasure code storage strategy diagram shown in fig. 2: erasure codes are known as a way of data protection. It is to divide a complete data into a plurality of small blocks and to extend or encode redundant data blocks. As mentioned before, if the erasure code parameter is (n, k), it means that a data is divided into n blocks, where n > k, and any k data sub-blocks can reconstruct a complete data. Erasure code ratio of one data
Figure BSA0000181650590000051
Reflecting the data block rate of the recovered original data. As shown in fig. 2, the original data is divided into 4 sub-blocks A, B, C, D, and stored in 4 different cloud storage providers, and any 3 sub-blocks of provider 1 are restored to the original data although the data block is damaged in the transmission. The 4-block data has a redundant data block generated by another 3 data blocks using an erasure coding algorithm. The data storage mode based on the erasure code algorithm can tolerate the failures of n-k cloud providers at the same time. Therefore, in the data access process, even if n-k cloud providers are down, the downloading of data from the erasure code storage system by users is not influenced.
Assuming that the cloud storage resources are based on an erasure code storage strategy, the work is to design a reverse auction mode based on a VCG mechanism to select different cloud storage providers.
Step 1: the demander issues the demand, demand information { num, ScapacityThe total volume that the requester needs to purchase is num × ScapacityNum is the number of providers and ScapacityIs the data block capacity; and setting parameters (num, k) of erasure codes, wherein num represents the number of providers, and k represents that a demander wants to divide own data into k blocks.
Step 2: sealing the quote, if the provider meets the requirement of the demander, N is the number of providers participating in the auction, and N is {1, 2.., N }; sealed quotation b of storage resources that a provider needs to submitiIs represented by B, B ═ B1,b2,...,bn) (ii) a Cost set for all providers C ═ C1,c2,...,cn)。
And step 3: it is determined that the auction transaction is deemed successful when the number of providers participating in the auction exceeds the number num required by the requester. Otherwise, the cloud storage purchase transaction issued by the demander is invalid. In the auction mechanism, if any provider i reports its own true cost to maximize its utility regardless of the type of other provider reports, we call this auction mechanism incentive compatible. Formally, assume biIs the actual cost of provider i with respect to storage resources, given cost type b of other providers-iWe can get:
ui(f(bi,b-i),bi)≥ui(f(b′i,b-i),bi)
and 4, step 4: adding incentive compatibility mechanism rules so as to provideThe people really report the storage cost of the people and disclose the quotation information of the providers; finally, the providers which are independent from each other and do not influence each other for bidding are X ═ X1,x2,...,xn}; the incentive compatibility mechanism rules are as follows:
rule 1: an allocation function that minimizes social costs can be implemented:
Figure BSA0000181650590000061
rule 2: suppose Xa=f(ci,c-i),Xb=f(c-i);
Payment function p for provider iiComprises the following steps:
Figure BSA0000181650590000062
wherein X isa={xj| j ∈ N } represents the optimal allocation, Xb={xjI j ∈ N, j ≠ i } provides that i is the best allocation in the absence
Figure BSA0000181650590000063
Is the minimum social cost for provider i not participating in the auction;
Figure BSA0000181650590000064
is in the distribution policy XaNext, the social total cost of other providers participating in the auction is removed from provider i.
And 5: the providers who bid are paid a reward.
The first rule implies that the allocation rule for the reverse auction of the VCG achieves a minimization of social costs. In the second rule, XaIs an allocation that minimizes social costs, XbIs an allocation that minimizes social costs beyond provider i's surprise. Thus, the provider i's payment function means social cost savings due to his participation in the auction. The reverse auction for VCGs is satisfactory for incentive compatibility, with a certification process similar to that of the VCG mechanism.
The blockchain technology is introduced into the competition environment, and a distributed cloud storage resource transaction method is implemented. In the blockchain, we divide the whole process into 4 functions to program, thereby realizing the steps.
Function 1 issues a demand: the demander issues a transaction demand. t denotes the current time, tbidIndicating the cut-off time, t, of the auction periodrevDenotes the public offer deadline, tendIndicating the auction cutoff time. To avoid conflicting needs of different requesters, we use the current auction state to contain the above information.
Function 2 sealed auction: in a sealed auction, the sealed bid includes not only bid information but also a random string. The random string is used for encrypting the quotation information and preventing leakage to other providers. SHA-3 is an algorithm of an encryption function that encrypts the offer.
Function 3 discloses a sealing quote: the provider submits the quotation and the random character string again before the expiration time of the public sealed quotation, the intelligent contract verifies whether the quotation information is consistent with the quotation in the sealed quotation stage, if the quotation information is consistent with the quotation in the sealed quotation stage, the quotation information submitted by the provider is considered legal and effective, and if the quotation information is not consistent with the quotation in the sealed quotation stage, the provider is considered illegal to quote, so that the provider does not participate in distribution and can. And distributing and paying the valid quotation according to the distribution rule and the payment rule of the VCG auction.
Function 4 pays a reward: the non-allocated providers are not compensated and the winning bidder will receive the compensation paid by the demander.
In order to facilitate deployment of our intelligent contracts, we build an Etherhouse test environment. Etherhouse (ethernet in english) is an open-source, intelligent contract-enabled, public blockchain platform that provides decentralized ethernet Virtual machines (ethernet Virtual machines) through its private cryptocurrency ethernet (Ether) to handle point-to-point contracts. The test environment was as follows: ubuntu 16.4 x86 — 64 operating system, the GETH version is the stable version 1.82. Meanwhile, in order to facilitate the deployment of intelligent contracts, an Etherhouse wallet is installed. Through a series of complex installation processes, the intelligent contracts written by the users are finally deployed on the private chain of the Ethern. In the test, we tested 5 sets of demand data, and we exemplified one of the transactions for analysis due to page limitations.
From table 1 we can get the sealed quote information and the distribution of different providers. For example, provider 1's sealed offer is "6.41 edf," meaning 6.41 is its offer, "edf" is its random string, and the other sealed offers and data disclosing the sealed offers are in this format. From this table we can also get additional information, such as provider 7 disclosing that the sealing offer is 3.43, but his sealing offer is 1.00, so the system would consider provider 7 to be an illegal offer and not to be distributed. The provider 5 is also considered as illegal quotation because the quotation can not be timely quoted within the deadline of the open and sealed quotation stage, so that the resource consumption of the platform is reduced, the efficiency of subsequent transactions is improved, the supply and demand quantity is optimized, and the problem that a demander encounters a false provider is solved.
TABLE 1 quote information and distribution results
Figure BSA0000181650590000081
As shown in fig. 3: designing a transaction flow based on an intelligent contract: since the auction of the VCG mechanism is a sealed auction process, we roughly divide it into 4 parts in the implementation process of the designed intelligent contract, namely, release demand 1, sealed bid 2, open sealed bid and auction 3, and transaction settlement 4. Corresponding to the transaction flow, from left to right, there is a requester who issues a transaction request 10 first. The resource trading needs are issued by the demanders and the deadlines for the different trading phases, mainly the deadlines 20 of sealed quotes, and the supplier submitted quote information 21 must be submitted before the deadlines 20. The quote information is also provided with a random string of quote encryption, which is set by the supplier himself, thus ensuring the sealing of the quote of the supplier, this stage is called the sealed quote stage 2, and then the open sealed quote and auction stage 3 is entered, in this stage it is first judged if the deadline time is reached 30. If the expiration time is not reached, a determination is made as to whether the provider's provided real quote is consistent with the sealed quote 32, and if not, it may be resubmitted until time 30, and if so, the quote queue and the deal price are updated 33. For the provider of the true reported price and the encrypted string, it will be considered a valid quote and will obtain the transaction price according to the VCG's allocation rules. Finally, the transaction settlement 4 stage is entered, and as the providers obtain the transaction price, the demander will transfer money to the provider's address through the blockchain, and perform the payment 40.
FIG. 4 shows: demander cost in sample testing, in a simulation experiment, we tested 5 sets of transaction data, 5 demanders each issued cloud storage procurement requirements, and 20 providers each participated in the auction. When the smart contract is deployed onto the blockchain, the smart contract will automatically execute and all premise assumptions hold.
We assume that the quote submitted by each provider follows [ bmin,bmax]In the uniform distribution of (c), we choose bmin=1,b max10. As test data, budget limits B for the demanderslimitIs obtained by random requirements. In our system, one copy of data is stored in multiple copies using erasure code storage techniques, so the budget limits us to taking multiples of the maximum quote. In the full backup, one data file simultaneously stores three backup files, and when one data file is unavailable, the other data file is replaced in time, so that normal access of a user to the files is ensured. The information issued by the demander comprises BlimitK and ScapacityIn addition, the cut-off times of the different stages are set. To facilitate testing, we set the deadlines of each of the requesters to be the same at different stages in the simulation. In the test herein, the deadlines set by the demanders at different stages are the same, and only after one demander completes a resource purchase, can another provider initiate another resource purchase transaction. In the sealed auction phase, we set a 5min cut-off time, which is the time when the provider seals the bid, and the time is counted from when the demander releases the demand informationThen (c) is performed. The expiration time of 5-10min is the open sealed quotation phase, in which the provider submits the quotation information again, and missing the phase is regarded as an invalid quotation. And the payment settlement stage is 10-12min, settlement is carried out according to the payment rule of the VCG mechanism, and the execution of the intelligent contract is automatically carried out.
According to the above process, we completed 5 sets of transaction experiments. In the experiments, two quotations of a certain provider in a sealed quotation stage and an open sealed quotation stage are inconsistent, or random character strings are inconsistent, and the like, under the conditions, because of the addition of an incentive compatibility mechanism rule, the providers have the opportunity to correct the real quotation before the deadline time, and finally obtain mutually independent and mutually unaffected targets, so that the operation of a black box is avoided.
We also compared the cost of consumption with MATLAB simulation results, observing the total cost spent purchasing resources for different transactions and the number of providers purchased, the simulation results are consistent, which indicates that our proposed auction mechanism algorithm is correct. In addition, each provider can participate or leave at any time during the auction, thus not affecting the overall transaction process.

Claims (4)

1. The cloud storage resource transaction method based on the intelligent contract comprises the following specific steps:
step 1: the demander issues the demand, demand information { num, ScapacityThe total volume that the requester needs to purchase is num × ScapacityNum is the number of providers and ScapacityIs the data block capacity; setting parameters (num, k) of erasure codes, wherein num represents the number of providers, and k represents that a demander hopes to divide own data into k blocks;
step 2: sealing the quote, if the provider meets the requirement of the demander, N is the number of providers participating in the auction, and N is {1, 2.., N }; sealed quotation b of storage resources that a provider needs to submitiIs represented by B, B ═ B1,b2,...,bn) (ii) a Cost set for all providers C ═ C1,c2,...,cn);
And step 3: determining that the auction transaction is deemed successful when the number of providers participating in the auction exceeds the number num required by the requester; otherwise, the cloud storage purchase transaction issued by the demander is invalid;
and 4, step 4: in the stage of disclosing quotation, incentive compatibility mechanism rules are added, so that providers really report the storage cost of the providers and disclose quotation information of the providers; finally, the providers which are independent from each other and do not influence each other for bidding are X ═ X1,x2,...,xn}; the incentive compatibility mechanism rules are as follows:
rule 1: an allocation function that minimizes social costs can be implemented:
Figure FSA0000181650580000011
rule 2: suppose Xa=f(ci,c-i),Xb=f(c-i);
Payment function p for provider iiComprises the following steps:
Figure FSA0000181650580000012
wherein Xa={xj| j ∈ N } represents the optimal allocation, Xb={xjI j ∈ N, j ≠ i } provides that i is the best allocation in the absence
Figure FSA0000181650580000013
Is the minimum social cost for provider i not participating in the auction;
Figure FSA0000181650580000014
is in the distribution policy XaNext, the social total cost of other auction-participating providers except for provider i;
and 5: the providers who bid are paid a reward.
2. A cloud based on smart contracts according to claim 1A storage resource transaction method, characterized by: in order to avoid the conflict of the demands of different demanders, the release demand of step 1 includes: the current auction state comprises the current time t and the cut-off time t of the auction stagebidPublic quote deadline trevAuction deadline tend
3. The smart contract-based cloud storage resource transaction method according to claim 1, wherein: the quotation information of the storage resource required to be submitted by the provider also comprises a random character string, and the random character string is encrypted by SHA-3.
4. The smart contract-based cloud storage resource transaction method according to claim 1 or 3, wherein: the provider submits the quotation and the random character string again before the expiration time of the public sealed quotation, verifies whether the quotation information is consistent with the quotation in the sealed quotation stage, if the quotation information is consistent with the quotation in the sealed quotation stage, the quotation information submitted by the provider is considered legal and effective, and if the quotation information is not consistent with the quotation in the sealed quotation stage, the provider does not participate in distribution and can not obtain a reward.
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Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN111967995A (en) * 2020-10-20 2020-11-20 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 Intelligent contract creating method and device
CN112309163A (en) * 2020-10-27 2021-02-02 上海工程技术大学 Shared parking space reservation system based on bidding mechanism
CN112700241A (en) * 2020-12-28 2021-04-23 南京理工大学 Block chain resource relation matching method based on bilateral auction algorithm

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN111967995A (en) * 2020-10-20 2020-11-20 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 Intelligent contract creating method and device
CN112309163A (en) * 2020-10-27 2021-02-02 上海工程技术大学 Shared parking space reservation system based on bidding mechanism
CN112700241A (en) * 2020-12-28 2021-04-23 南京理工大学 Block chain resource relation matching method based on bilateral auction algorithm

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