CN111669317A - Cross-domain secure communication transmission system and method based on hidden network routing - Google Patents

Cross-domain secure communication transmission system and method based on hidden network routing Download PDF

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CN111669317A
CN111669317A CN202010476205.2A CN202010476205A CN111669317A CN 111669317 A CN111669317 A CN 111669317A CN 202010476205 A CN202010476205 A CN 202010476205A CN 111669317 A CN111669317 A CN 111669317A
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cross
service
public network
data
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CN111669317B (en
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李泽民
詹晋川
芦伟
张晋
郑江泳
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Shenzhen Forward Industrial Co Ltd
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00Data switching networks
    • H04L12/66Arrangements for connecting between networks having differing types of switching systems, e.g. gateways
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

The invention provides a cross-domain secure communication transmission system and a method based on hidden network routing, which comprises a plurality of gateway devices and a plurality of public network servers in communication connection with the gateway devices; the gateway devices are used for processing content semantic conversion, data encryption and selection of hidden transmission paths of cross-domain service data, and are deployed at network boundary outlets of different information service domains; and the public network servers are used for bearing the transmission transfer service of the cross-domain service based on the hidden network routing in the public network, and are deployed in the existing cross-domain public network. The method and the device can effectively hide cross-domain data communication targets, hide data behaviors, avoid man-in-the-middle analysis and can plan communication nodes, realize services among different information domains, hide transmission nodes, convert data semantics and security algorithms of communication among nodes in the public network transmission process, and therefore guarantee safe transmission of cross-domain data under the existing network environment.

Description

Cross-domain secure communication transmission system and method based on hidden network routing
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of communication, and particularly relates to a cross-domain secure communication transmission system and method based on hidden network routing.
Background
Under the large background of big data, 5G and military and civil integration industries, the information industry is developed rapidly by service integration with higher and higher informatization degree in the economic society. Originally, mutually independent service information can provide more convenient, intelligent and humanized services for people through information fusion, thereby meeting the increasing diversified demands. And the corresponding information fusion tends to introduce communication security risks brought by data fusion communication.
The existing network communication safety is mainly ensured by three aspects, namely environment safety, data safety and behavior safety in sequence. Under the environment of the existing infrastructure, the environmental security can be guaranteed, so how to guarantee the communication security on this basis needs to consider how to strengthen the data security and behavior security under the existing communication security system, and the existing network data communication security field is concentrated on several categories: the system comprises a firewall, a gatekeeper, a bastion machine, a gateway and the like, but the main communication safety devices have the problems of technical principle disclosure, interception by a man in the middle, traceable source, data statistics and the like. With the increasing economic benefit of digital industry information, the method inevitably brings greater temptation to some illegal practitioners, and thus brings greater challenges to network information transmission. Therefore, a cross-domain secure communication transmission method separated from the existing secure communication system is needed, so as to deal with increasingly severe data security and behavior security under the network secure communication environment.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects in the prior art, the invention provides the cross-domain secure communication transmission system and method based on the hidden network routing, which can realize the security algorithm of hiding transmission nodes, converting data semantics and communicating between nodes of the service between different information domains in the public network transmission process.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
this scheme provides a cross-domain secure communication transmission system based on way is sought to darknet, includes: the system comprises a plurality of gateway devices and a plurality of public network servers in communication connection with the gateway devices;
the gateway devices are used for processing content semantic conversion, data encryption and selection of hidden transmission paths of cross-domain service data, and are deployed at network boundary outlets of different information service domains;
the public network servers are used for bearing the transmission transfer service of the cross-domain service in the public network based on the hidden network routing, and the public network servers are deployed in the existing cross-domain public network.
Based on the system, the invention also provides a cross-domain secure communication transmission method based on hidden network routing, which comprises the following steps:
s1, carrying out service configuration on the gateway equipment, and notifying the service capability provided by the gateway equipment to the outside by configuring a public network server neighbor;
s2, configuring the up and down neighbor relation to the public network server, performing neighbor bidirectional authentication ad hoc network, and learning the neighbor service ability and notifying the neighbor of the service ability;
s3, acquiring the cross-domain service data in the local domain by the gateway equipment, and judging whether the service capability of other service domains exists according to the cross-domain service data in the local domain, if so, entering the step S4, otherwise, discarding the cross-domain service data in the local domain, and repeating the step S3;
s4, performing communication encryption, semantic conversion and encapsulation processing on the cross-domain service data in the local domain, and forwarding the cross-domain service data to the public network server;
s5, stripping a semantic conversion protocol header, and decrypting by using a certificate obtained by neighbor authentication in the public network server to obtain actual cross-domain service data;
s6, judging whether the type of the equipment for receiving the actual cross-domain service data is a public network server, if so, entering the step S7, otherwise, the type of the equipment for receiving the actual cross-domain service data is a gateway equipment, forwarding the actual cross-domain service data in the local domain, and completing the cross-domain safe communication transmission based on the hidden network routing;
and S7, judging whether the neighbor service capability is matched, if so, returning to the step S4, otherwise, discarding the actual cross-domain service data, and finishing the cross-domain safe communication transmission based on the hidden network routing.
Further, the service of neighbor learning and external advertisement in step S1 includes: providing the service IP, the service type, and the device's own IP.
Still further, the step S2 includes the steps of:
s201, configuring an uplink and downlink neighbor relation for a public network server, and performing neighbor bidirectional authentication ad hoc network;
s202, learning the service capability of the opposite side from the neighbor by using the public network server, and converting the learned service capability into the self service capability;
s203, notifying the neighbor of the self service capability.
Still further, the step S3 includes the steps of:
s301, acquiring cross-domain service data in the local domain by gateway equipment, and analyzing a target IP and a service type of the cross-domain communication service data in the local domain;
s302, comparing the analyzed target IP and the service type with the external service support learned by the gateway equipment from the neighborhood;
s303, judging whether the service capability of other service domains exists according to the comparison result, if so, entering the step S4, otherwise, discarding the cross-domain service data in the domain, and repeating the step S3.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
(1) the servers deployed in the public network are seen as common servers by network managers and users, but from the perspective of public network management maintenance and service protection, the servers are transparent to attackers and have better disguise;
(2) the communication between cross-domain services is not the point-to-point communication of a service main body any more, but is realized by adopting a mode of landing step by step and protecting step by step, thereby effectively realizing the effect of hiding the real purpose of data transmission and well avoiding the source tracing attack mode existing in the network;
(3) in the invention, the data encryption and semantic conversion mode is adopted in the transmission of the integral type of the service, so that an attacker cannot identify the real service type of the cross-network data, effectively hides the cross-domain service behavior purpose, and cannot perform content analysis and behavior analysis on the data;
(4) in the invention, a set of service-based routing forwarding mechanism based on the existing network routing is established through the gateway equipment and the public network server, so that the gateway equipment has better concealment and safety.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a system deployment networking diagram of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a flow chart of cross-domain data communication transmission in the present embodiment.
Fig. 4 is a flowchart of establishing neighbors and learning of neighbor ability in this embodiment.
Fig. 5 is a flowchart of establishing a neighbor relation in this embodiment.
Fig. 6 is a transmission flow chart of cross-domain secure communication for hidden network routing in the present embodiment.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present invention is provided to facilitate the understanding of the present invention by those skilled in the art, but it should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the scope of the embodiments, and it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined and defined in the appended claims, and all matters produced by the invention using the inventive concept are protected.
Example 1
As shown in fig. 1, the present invention provides a cross-domain secure communication transmission system based on hidden network routing, which includes: the gateway equipment comprises a plurality of gateway equipment and a plurality of public network servers which are in communication connection with the gateway equipment; the gateway devices are used for processing content semantic conversion, data encryption and selecting a hidden transmission path of cross-domain service data, so that the safety of the data in the public network transmission process is ensured, and the gateway devices are deployed at network boundary outlets of different information service domains; the public network servers are used for bearing the transmission transfer service of the cross-domain service based on the hidden network route finding in the public network, the public network servers are deployed in the existing cross-domain public network, the hidden servers are configured in a neighbor mode, so that the servers in the public network are automatically networked, and the form of the public network security hidden service platform is matched with that of the public network.
Example 2
As shown in fig. 2 to fig. 3, the present invention further provides a cross-domain secure communication transmission method based on darknet routing, which includes the following steps:
s1, carrying out service configuration on the gateway equipment, and notifying the service capability provided by the gateway equipment to the outside by configuring a public network server neighbor;
s2, configuring the up and down neighbor relation to the public network server, making the neighbor two-way authentication self-organizing network, learning the neighbor service ability and announcing the neighbor service ability, the realization method is as follows:
s201, configuring an uplink and downlink neighbor relation for a public network server, and performing neighbor bidirectional authentication ad hoc network;
s202, learning the service capability of the opposite side from the neighbor by using the public network server, and converting the learned service capability into the self service capability;
s203, notifying the neighbor of the self service capability;
s3, the gateway device obtains the cross-domain service data in the domain, and judges whether there is service ability of other service domains according to the cross-domain service data in the domain, if yes, the step S4 is entered, otherwise, the cross-domain service data in the domain is discarded, and the step S3 is repeated, the implementation method is as follows:
s301, acquiring cross-domain service data in the local domain by gateway equipment, and analyzing a target IP and a service type of the cross-domain communication service data in the local domain;
s302, comparing the analyzed target IP and the service type with the external service support learned by the gateway equipment from the neighborhood;
s303, judging whether the service capability of other service domains exists according to the comparison result, if so, entering the step S4, otherwise, discarding the cross-domain service data in the domain, and repeating the step S3;
s4, performing communication encryption, semantic conversion and encapsulation processing on the cross-domain service data in the local domain, and forwarding the cross-domain service data to the public network server;
s5, stripping a semantic conversion protocol header, and decrypting by using a certificate obtained by neighbor authentication in the public network server to obtain actual cross-domain service data;
s6, judging whether the type of the equipment for receiving the actual cross-domain service data is a public network server, if so, entering the step S7, otherwise, the type of the equipment for receiving the actual cross-domain service data is a gateway equipment, forwarding the actual cross-domain service data in the local domain, and completing the cross-domain safe communication transmission based on the hidden network routing;
and S7, judging whether the neighbor service capability is matched, if so, returning to the step S4, otherwise, discarding the actual cross-domain service data, and finishing the cross-domain secure communication transmission based on the hidden network routing.
In this embodiment, the gateway device indicates, through service configuration, an IP address and a service type of the local domain service provided by the gateway device, and then notifies, through configuration of a public network server neighbor, the service capability provided by the gateway device. As shown in fig. 4, the public network server performs neighbor bidirectional authentication ad hoc network by configuring uplink and downlink neighbors, in the ad hoc network process, the public network server learns the service capability of the opposite side only from the neighbors, and converts the learned service capability into the self capability to be notified to other neighbors, and in the process of performing cross-domain service ad hoc network with the public network server, the services learned and notified to the outside by the neighbors mainly include: and providing main behavior parameters such as service IP, service type, self IP of the equipment and the like.
In this embodiment, as shown in fig. 5, after the gateway device and the public network server configure the service neighborhood, the gateway device and the public network server perform bidirectional ad hoc network authentication with their respective neighboring devices to establish their respective neighboring trusted relationships. After the neighbor relation is established, the self ability of the neighbor is announced outwards, the neighbor learns the service ability provided by the neighbor, and the public network server learns the information of the whole network through the two-to-two announcement between the neighbors.
In this embodiment, as shown in fig. 6, after the gateway device and the public network server complete neighbor establishment and learn the service capability of the service, the gateway device and the public network server have the capability of providing the cross-domain secure communication service. After receiving the cross-domain communication service data in the local domain, the gateway device judges whether other service domains provide the service by analyzing the target IP (dstIP) and the service type (protocol + port number) of the cross-domain data and comparing the external service supporting capacity learned by the gateway device from the neighbor. And if the gateway equipment does not learn the external service support of the service, directly discarding the cross-domain communication service data. If the external support of the service is learned, the whole data entity is subjected to communication encryption based on the certificate, the service data is subjected to semantic conversion, and the data is converted into other protocols according to the configuration, such as: and the https protocol is used for hiding the service type. After data encryption and semantic conversion are performed, the data are forwarded, and the forwarding destination is a neighbor device capable of providing the actual service type, such as a public network server. After receiving the data, the public network server strips the semantic conversion protocol header by judging the communication source of the data, decrypts the data entity through the certificate obtained by neighbor authentication, and locally obtains the actual cross-domain service data content. After obtaining the actual cross-domain service data, the public network server also compares the service providing capability of the neighbor, data encryption and semantic conversion, and sends the encrypted and transferred data to the next neighbor after the whole data package is completed.
In this embodiment, after another gateway receives the data, the entire cross-domain data content is already sent from the border gateway at the service source to the target border gateway, and the target border gateway obtains the real cross-domain data through semantic stripping and data decryption, and performs actual target forwarding on the cross-domain data in the local domain.
According to the invention, a set of service-based routing forwarding mechanism based on the existing network routing is established through the gateway equipment and the public network server, so that the technology of hiding a cross-domain data communication target, hiding data behaviors, avoiding man-in-the-middle analysis and planning communication nodes can be effectively realized, the services among different information domains are realized, and the security algorithms of transmitting nodes, converting data semantics and inter-node communication are hidden in the public network transmission process, thereby ensuring the safe transmission of cross-domain data in the existing network environment.

Claims (5)

1. A cross-domain secure communication transmission system based on hidden network routing is characterized by comprising: the system comprises a plurality of gateway devices and a plurality of public network servers in communication connection with the gateway devices;
the gateway devices are used for processing content semantic conversion, data encryption and selection of hidden transmission paths of cross-domain service data, and are deployed at network boundary outlets of different information service domains;
the public network servers are used for bearing the transmission transfer service of the cross-domain service in the public network based on the hidden network routing, and the public network servers are deployed in the existing cross-domain public network.
2. A cross-domain secure communication transmission method based on hidden network routing is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, carrying out service configuration on the gateway equipment, and notifying the service capability provided by the gateway equipment to the outside by configuring a public network server neighbor;
s2, configuring the up and down neighbor relation to the public network server, performing neighbor bidirectional authentication ad hoc network, and learning the neighbor service ability and notifying the neighbor of the service ability;
s3, acquiring the cross-domain service data in the local domain by the gateway equipment, and judging whether the service capability of other service domains exists according to the cross-domain service data in the local domain, if so, entering the step S4, otherwise, discarding the cross-domain service data in the local domain, and repeating the step S3;
s4, performing communication encryption, semantic conversion and encapsulation processing on the cross-domain service data in the local domain, and forwarding the cross-domain service data to the public network server;
s5, stripping a semantic conversion protocol header, and decrypting by using a certificate obtained by neighbor authentication in the public network server to obtain actual cross-domain service data;
s6, judging whether the type of the equipment for receiving the actual cross-domain service data is a public network server, if so, entering the step S7, otherwise, the type of the equipment for receiving the actual cross-domain service data is a gateway equipment, forwarding the actual cross-domain service data in the local domain, and completing the cross-domain secure communication transmission based on the hidden network routing;
and S7, judging whether the neighbor service capability is matched, if so, returning to the step S4, otherwise, discarding the actual cross-domain service data, and finishing the cross-domain safe communication transmission based on the hidden network routing.
3. The transportation method of cross-domain secure communication based on darknet routing according to claim 2, wherein the neighbor learning and external advertisement service in the step S1 comprises: providing the service IP, the service type, and the device's own IP.
4. The transportation method of cross-domain secure communication based on darknet routing according to claim 2, wherein said step S2 comprises the following steps:
s201, configuring an uplink and downlink neighbor relation for a public network server, and performing neighbor bidirectional authentication ad hoc network;
s202, learning the service capability of the opposite side from the neighbor by using the public network server, and converting the learned service capability into the self service capability;
s203, notifying the neighbor of the self service capability.
5. The transportation method of cross-domain secure communication based on darknet routing according to claim 2, wherein said step S3 comprises the following steps:
s301, acquiring cross-domain service data in the local domain by gateway equipment, and analyzing a target IP and a service type of the cross-domain communication service data in the local domain;
s302, comparing the analyzed target IP and the service type with the external service support learned by the gateway equipment from the neighborhood;
s303, judging whether the service capability of other service domains exists according to the comparison result, if so, entering the step S4, otherwise, discarding the cross-domain service data in the domain, and repeating the step S3.
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CN112235193A (en) * 2020-10-12 2021-01-15 南威软件股份有限公司 Data transmission method, device, equipment and medium based on cross-network multi-level routing
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