CN108777650A - A kind of Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node - Google Patents
A kind of Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node Download PDFInfo
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- CN108777650A CN108777650A CN201810588709.6A CN201810588709A CN108777650A CN 108777650 A CN108777650 A CN 108777650A CN 201810588709 A CN201810588709 A CN 201810588709A CN 108777650 A CN108777650 A CN 108777650A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/10—Active monitoring, e.g. heartbeat, ping or trace-route
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
- H04L63/0421—Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node, wherein including：Step 1：Dispose controlled Tor relay nodes；Step 2：Stream watermark information is added to flow before entrance guard, the intercepted traffic between client and entrance guard is associated the flow of the flow and outflow Tor networks that enter Tor networks, carries out the relationship maps of client and server；Step 3：It controls client and downloads current all online transistroute information from LIST SERVER, and entrance guard node, intermediate node and the Egress node that a certain client may select are judged according to Ingress node selection strategy, the request initiated in node set is guarded if it find that existing to entrance in the request that client is initiated, then carries out once judging to determine whether the destination address of connection request is controlled node；If it was found that request target is not controlled node, repeat to send reset message to client, until client has selected controlled node；Step 4：Control whole routing link；Step 5：Flowing water print identification, determines communication association relationship.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to field of information security technology, and in particular to Anonymizing networks track source tracing method.
Background technology
With the rapid development of Internet, it is each that network has been dissolved into military affairs, politics, economy, society, daily life etc.
A field.While facilitating people to live, data are shown, the caseload for being implemented crime using computer network is risen in apparent
Trend, means of crime tend to intelligent, specialized, hiddenization.The appearance can effectively protect internet user's of Anonymizing networks
Individual privacy, but be similarly the hiding live network address implementation network crime of offender and provide convenience.
Anonymizing networks of the TOR as a mainstream, user volume are more than 10,000,000.Common TOR connections will generally pass through three
A node：Ingress node, intermediate node, Egress node.Client randomly selects an Ingress node by local agent first,
Ingress node selects intermediate node at random, and intermediate node randomly selects Egress node.Due to only having Ingress node to know user's
The address of server is known in address, only Egress node.Each node does not know complete information flow, to ensure communication
Anonymity.
The connection difference of darknet is connected with general T or nets, increases an important node congregation node, congregation node is not
The address for knowing client and service belongs to a relay node, to ensure that the anonymity of both sides.
It to be completed by 7 steps by TOR connections darknet：
Server selection is introduced a little, by introducing information of the point to LIST SERVER service, and establishes Tor circuits,
Point is introduced in this way does not know server specific address.
The public key of oneself and the information for introducing point are combined into descriptor by server issuing web site, and database section is arrived in storage
Point on.So far, darknet server builds completion.
After client obtains the network address of server by certain means, database node is needed to obtain server description
Symbol.And a node is randomly choosed as congregation node.
Client is established with congregation node and is connected after obtaining descriptor, which is the outlet section of Tor networks
Point, therefore the address of client is not known.
Client has randomly choosed the node of introducing specified by server by the description information of acquisition, and client carries clothes
The public key encryption information of business device is communicated with point is introduced.
It introduces after node receives request and encryption information is transmitted to server, server is with learning congregation node after being decrypted
Location.
Client is established by congregation node with server and is connected.
There is modulation to trace to the source and trace to the source two classes based on infiltration for tracing to the source mainly for Tor networks at present, modulation, which is traced to the source, to be referred generally to
Mark is added in transmitting flow using stream digital watermark, correspondence is determined by the watermark information at entrance and exit.Base
In infiltration trace to the source be entered by the way of penetration attack either control Tor networks in node participate in or destroy communication
Process, to confirm that the relevance of communication, existing method are required to attacker control user and select one or more controlled
Node.
Invention content
The present invention proposes a kind of method that user can be improved and selects controlled node probability, is saved based on controlled relaying to realize
The Anonymizing networks of point are traced to the source.
A kind of Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node of the present invention, wherein including：Step 1：It disposes controlled
Tor relay nodes；Step 2：Stream watermark information is added to flow before entrance guard, is intercepted between client and entrance guard
Flow is associated the flow of the flow and outflow Tor networks that enter Tor networks, and progress client is associated with server
Mapping；Step 3：It controls client and downloads current all online transistroute information from LIST SERVER, and according to Ingress node
Selection strategy judges entrance guard node, intermediate node and the Egress node that a certain client may select, if it find that objective
Exist to entrance in the request that family end is initiated and guard the request initiated in node set, then carries out once judging to determine that connection is asked
Whether the destination address asked is controlled node；If it was found that request target is not controlled node, repeat to send reset to client
Message, until client has selected controlled node；Step 4：Control whole routing link；Step 5：Flowing water print identification, determines logical
Believe incidence relation.
One embodiment of the Anonymizing networks source tracing method according to the present invention based on controlled node, wherein in controlled Tor
Include after node：Controlled access ports guard node and controlled intermediate node.
One embodiment of the Anonymizing networks source tracing method according to the present invention based on controlled node, wherein controlled access ports are kept
Defend node be stable node, and the mean down time be spaced in the median at interval of all active node mean down times with
On, bandwidth value is more than all bandwidth medians.
One embodiment of the Anonymizing networks source tracing method according to the present invention based on controlled node, wherein pass through in step 3
Network Sniffing carries out sniff to the connection request that client is initiated.
One embodiment of the Anonymizing networks source tracing method according to the present invention based on controlled node, wherein if being sent out in step 3
Existing request target is not controlled node, attacker can then be sent to client camouflage TCP reset packets or by fire wall to
Tor clients send TCP reset messages so that the communication of client and request target disconnects, until client selected it is controlled
Otherwise node repeats to send TCP reset messages.
One embodiment of the Anonymizing networks source tracing method according to the present invention based on controlled node, wherein step 4：Specifically
Including：Judge whether next-hop is controlled node, if not controlled node, then repeats to send reset message to client, directly
Controlled node has been selected to client, if controlled node is Egress node, has jumped to step 5, no person repeats step 4.
One embodiment of the Anonymizing networks source tracing method according to the present invention based on controlled node, wherein step 5 includes：
After reaching Egress node, attacker intercepts and captures and analyzes to rate of discharge, determines stream watermark information and entrance guard section
Watermark at point is matched, and is determined communication initiator and is communicated the correspondence between recipient.
The present invention redirects the problem of being unable to control at random for the routing of Tor networks, it is proposed that a kind of chainlink control method passes through
Node failure is forged, to make client constantly reselect routing, until choosing controlled node, theoretically by constantly forging
Next-hop node can realize the control to whole communication link.To realize being associated with for user and target, node can be guarded in entrance
Before, label is identified to communication data labeling, then the last one node of entire Tor links using stream digital watermark, completes to use
Family is associated with target, realizes that tracking is traced to the source.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 show the Anonymizing networks based on controlled node and traces to the source flow chart；
Fig. 2 show flowing water print technical schematic diagram；
Fig. 3 show entrance guard node control schematic diagram；
Fig. 4 show link control principle drawing.
Specific implementation mode
To keep the purpose of the present invention, content and advantage clearer, with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples, to the present invention's
Specific implementation mode is described in further detail.
Fig. 1 show the flow chart of the Anonymizing networks source tracing method the present invention is based on controlled node, as shown in Figure 1, this hair
A kind of bright Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node includes：
Step 1：Attacker disposes controlled Tor relay nodes, specifically includes：
Step 1.1：It disposes controlled access ports and guards node；
Entrance guards node as first node in entire Tor Anonymizing networks, security relationship to whole communication
The safety of link and the concealment of client.In order to allow client that controlled entrance is selected to guard node, need to keep node same
When meet 2 conditions, node first is stable node, i.e. node needs for presence, and the mean down time of node
It is spaced in the median at interval of all active node mean down times or more；Secondly entrance guard node needs higher band
Width, bandwidth value is more than all bandwidth medians；
Step 1.2：Dispose controlled intermediate node；
In Tor networks, the selection of intermediate node considers two factors of bandwidth and normal operation duration simultaneously, considers simultaneously
To anonymity, any two node is not in the same 255.255.0.0 subnets in Tor networks, therefore carries out the step
To select the node of high bandwidth, uptime length, the selected probability of such controlled node relatively high when operation；
Fig. 2 show flowing water print technical schematic diagram, as shown in Fig. 2, step 2：Flowing water is added to flow before entrance guard
Official seal ceases；
The main method of the step is the intercepted traffic between client and entrance guard, uses direct sequence spreading frequency side
Method interferes data to influence the speed of data transmission and the time interval of data packet in physical layer, that is, forms one section
It is inconspicuous to carry out marked traffic for noise code.The purpose for carrying out the step is will be to entering the flow of Tor networks and flowing out Tor
The flow of network is associated, and realizes the relationship maps of client and server；
Fig. 3 show entrance guard node control schematic diagram, as shown in figure 3, step 3：Control client selection it is controlled enter
Mouth guard node, specifically includes：
Step 3.1：Attacker takes the operation as client, and current all online relayings are downloaded from LIST SERVER
Routing iinformation, and entrance guard node, the intermediate node that a certain client may select are judged according to Ingress node selection strategy
And Egress node.Attacker carries out sniff by network Sniffer Technique to the connection request that client is initiated, if it find that objective
Exist to entrance in the request that family end is initiated and guard the request initiated in node set, then carries out once judging to determine that connection is asked
Whether the destination address asked is controlled node (intermediate node and Ingress node and Egress node)；
Step 3.2：If it was found that request target is not controlled node, the TCP that attacker can send camouflage to client is multiple
Position packet sends TCP reset messages by fire wall to Tor clients so that and the communication of client and request target disconnects,
Until client has selected controlled node, otherwise repeat to send TCP reset messages.
Fig. 4 show link control principle drawing, as shown in figure 4, step 4：Whole routing link is controlled, is specifically included：
After completing step 3, attacker does not just know that the user of connection Tor networks, and knows the next-hop routing of user
Address.Attacker continues to execute the operation of step 3.2, and it is controlled node to make next-hop, if controlled node is Egress node,
Step 5 is jumped to, no person repeats step 4；
Step 5：Flowing water print identification, determines communication association relationship；
After reaching Egress node, attacker intercepts and captures rate of discharge, analyzes, and determines stream watermark information and entrance
Watermark at guard node is matched, so that it is determined that the correspondence between communication initiator and communication recipient, reaches double
To the purpose traced to the source.
The present invention so that user can not be with by the analysis to Tor network path selection principles in the way of penetration attack
Normal Tor nodes communication, to the controlled node that selection is disposed in advance, this method can efficiently control communication link, coordinate flowing water
Print technology realizes Anonymizing networks Source Tracing.
The principle of this method is：User is to be selected according to relaying weighting bandwidth when selecting Tor Ingress nodes.In order to subtract
Few threat to user, Tor introduce entrance and guard, under default mode of operation, when starting Ingress node strategy, and Tor client
End will obtain 3 guard nodes at random, and store into hard disk, when one or more guard node is unavailable, visitor
Family end is substituted new guard node is reselected.Therefore consider to carry out deception to client or guard node is implemented
Attack is so that client can not select legal guard node, to realize the control to link.
Guard node needs to meet 2 conditions, 1) node is that stable (node is online, and failure time interval is in active section
More than the median of point)；2) bandwidth of node is improved under the premise of stabilization.
The present invention redirects the problem of being unable to control at random for the routing of Tor networks, it is proposed that a kind of chainlink control method passes through
Node failure is forged, to make client constantly reselect routing, until choosing controlled node, theoretically by constantly forging
Next-hop node can realize the control to whole communication link.To realize being associated with for user and target, node can be guarded in entrance
Before, label is identified to communication data labeling, then the last one node of entire Tor links using stream digital watermark, completes to use
Family is associated with target, realizes that tracking is traced to the source.
The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, it is noted that for the ordinary skill people of the art
For member, without departing from the technical principles of the invention, several improvement and deformations can also be made, these improvement and deformations
Also it should be regarded as protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. a kind of Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node, which is characterized in that including：
Step 1：Dispose controlled Tor relay nodes；
Step 2：Stream watermark information is added to flow before entrance guard, the intercepted traffic between client and entrance guard is right
The flow of flow and outflow Tor networks into Tor networks is associated, and carries out the relationship maps of client and server；
Step 3：It controls client and downloads current all online transistroute information from LIST SERVER, and selected according to Ingress node
It selects strategy and judges entrance guard node, intermediate node and Egress node that a certain client may select, if it find that client
It holds to exist to entrance in the request initiated and guards the request initiated in node set, then carry out once judging to determine connection request
Destination address whether be controlled node；If it was found that request target is not controlled node, repeat to send to reset to client to disappear
Breath, until client has selected controlled node；
Step 4：Control whole routing link；
Step 5：Flowing water print identification, determines communication association relationship.
2. the Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that in controlled Tor
Include after node：Controlled access ports guard node and controlled intermediate node.
3. the Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that controlled access ports are guarded
Node is stable node, and the mean down time be spaced in the median at interval of all active node mean down times with
On, bandwidth value is more than all bandwidth medians.
4. the Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that pass through in step 3
Network Sniffing carries out sniff to the connection request that client is initiated.
5. the Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that if being sent out in step 3
Existing request target is not controlled node, attacker can then be sent to client camouflage TCP reset packets or by fire wall to
Tor clients send TCP reset messages so that the communication of client and request target disconnects, until client selected it is controlled
Otherwise node repeats to send TCP reset messages.
6. the Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that step 4：Specific packet
It includes：Judge whether next-hop is controlled node, if not controlled node, then repeats to send reset message to client, until
Client has selected controlled node, if controlled node is Egress node, jumps to step 5, no person repeats step 4.
7. the Anonymizing networks source tracing method based on controlled node as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that step 5 includes：?
After reaching Egress node, attacker intercepts and captures and analyzes to rate of discharge, determines that stream watermark information and entrance guard node
The watermark at place is matched, and is determined communication initiator and is communicated the correspondence between recipient.
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| CN111669317A (en) * | 2020-05-29 | 2020-09-15 | 深圳市风云实业有限公司 | Cross-domain secure communication transmission system and method based on hidden network routing |
| CN111711597A (en) * | 2020-04-16 | 2020-09-25 | 武汉大学 | Tor dark network user tracing method and system based on time slot stream watermark |
| CN112019502A (en) * | 2020-07-20 | 2020-12-01 | 北京邮电大学 | Anonymous protection method for user nodes of ring guard network and electronic equipment |
| CN113888170A (en) * | 2021-10-28 | 2022-01-04 | 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 | Address tracing method, device and equipment |
| CN113938299A (en) * | 2021-10-12 | 2022-01-14 | 北京哈工创新计算机网络与信息安全技术研究中心 | Transaction tracing method for hidden service node of bit currency |
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| CN113938299A (en) * | 2021-10-12 | 2022-01-14 | 北京哈工创新计算机网络与信息安全技术研究中心 | Transaction tracing method for hidden service node of bit currency |
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| CN114143073A (en) * | 2021-11-29 | 2022-03-04 | 北京中睿天下信息技术有限公司 | Content distribution IP (Internet protocol) hiding method and system based on dynamic agent chain |
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| CN115242515A (en) * | 2022-07-25 | 2022-10-25 | 上海交通大学 | Tor anonymous communication both-party identity correlation system based on watermark |
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Application publication date: 20181109 |