CN111366950A - Comprehensive detection method and system for satellite navigation suppression type interference and deception interference - Google Patents
Comprehensive detection method and system for satellite navigation suppression type interference and deception interference Download PDFInfo
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- CN111366950A CN111366950A CN202010481040.8A CN202010481040A CN111366950A CN 111366950 A CN111366950 A CN 111366950A CN 202010481040 A CN202010481040 A CN 202010481040A CN 111366950 A CN111366950 A CN 111366950A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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Abstract
The invention provides a comprehensive detection method and a comprehensive detection system for satellite navigation suppression type interference and deception interference. The method comprises the steps of S1, acquiring radio frequency signals and each scanning angle of a satellite navigation frequency band; s2, converting the radio frequency signal into a digital signal, and carrying out frequency domain analysis on the signal to obtain signal frequency spectrums in different incoming wave directions; s3, comparing the signal spectrum after frequency domain analysis with the normal satellite navigation signal spectrum, and if the difference value of the frequency spectrums is larger than a set threshold value, pressing type interference exists; s4, receiving satellite navigation signals in real time, and outputting visible satellite lists and satellite parameters; s5, rapidly capturing signals received by the narrow beam scanning type antenna; s6, comparing the satellite angle captured by the narrow beam scanning type antenna with the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna, and if the satellite angle captured by the narrow beam scanning type antenna is not consistent with the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna, deception interference exists; and S7, determining the position of the interference source. The invention can effectively detect the traditional suppression type interference and the deception interference and organically integrate the detection of different interferences.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of navigation, in particular to a method and a system for comprehensively detecting satellite navigation suppression type interference and deception interference.
Background
The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) has Global coverage, all-weather high-precision Navigation, positioning and time service functions, the independently constructed and independently operated Beidou Satellite Navigation System in China is formally operated in 2012, the System provides position and time service functions for China and surrounding areas, and the Beidou third System is planned to be completed before and after 2020, so that the Global coverage and application are realized. No matter the Beidou navigation system, the GPS in the United states or the GLONASS in Russia, the global satellite navigation system is widely applied to national defense, economy and daily life and becomes an important space-time reference in modern social life.
With the development of satellite navigation system construction and service capability of various countries, related products are widely applied to the fields of intelligent transportation, marine fishery, hydrological monitoring, weather forecast, geographic information mapping, communication time system, power scheduling, emergency search and the like, gradually permeate into the aspects of human social production and human life, and inject new vitality for global economy and social development. However, various vulnerability problems commonly exist in various satellite navigation systems in the world, such as system integrity problems, intentional or unintentional interference or deceptive signals existing in a use environment, and the like, and the problems directly cause the satellite positioning precision to be reduced, even deviation and false positioning navigation and time service information occur, and further serious safety problems occur in carriers such as unmanned aircrafts, unmanned automobiles and the like.
The traditional suppression type interference detection technology can detect the traditional suppression type interference such as narrow-band interference, broadband interference and the like by combining the spectrum analysis and the signal modulation mode estimation with the narrow-beam scanning technology. However, the deceptive signal is the same as the normal satellite navigation signal in a debugging mode, and spread spectrum modulation is also adopted, so that the signal spectrum is close to background noise, and the deceptive signal is difficult to detect through the difference of the spectrum amplitude. Thus, detection of spoofed interference and position estimation still plague the use of satellite navigation in high reliability scenarios.
Chinese patent 2019103737455 discloses a comprehensive detection method, system and device for satellite navigation suppression type interference and spoofing interference based on prior information, which detects interference by comparing whether the positions or speeds of two receiving antennas are consistent, and the implicit assumption is that the solution of the positions or speeds of two antennas after spoofing is the same, and meanwhile, the technology has the following problems: 1. the deception jamming is identified by utilizing two or more satellite navigation receivers, and whether the traditional suppression jamming exists cannot be detected and identified; 2. this technique does not have the capability to spoof the interference source location estimate.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a comprehensive detection method and a comprehensive detection system for satellite navigation compression type interference and deception interference, which are used for overcoming the defects in the prior art.
In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
a comprehensive detection method for satellite navigation suppression type interference and deception interference comprises the following steps:
s1, acquiring radio frequency signals of a satellite navigation frequency band and each scanning angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna in real time through at least one narrow beam scanning type antenna;
s2, converting the radio frequency signal of the satellite navigation frequency band acquired by the narrow beam scanning type antenna into a digital signal, storing the digital signal and a corresponding scanning angle, and simultaneously carrying out frequency domain analysis on the data signal to acquire signal frequency spectrums in different incoming wave directions;
s3, comparing the signal frequency spectrum after frequency domain analysis with a normal satellite navigation signal frequency spectrum, and if the difference value between the signal frequency spectrum after frequency domain analysis and the normal satellite navigation signal frequency spectrum is larger than a set threshold value, judging that the suppression type interference exists;
s4, receiving satellite navigation signals in real time through at least one omnidirectional antenna, and outputting a visible satellite list and corresponding satellite parameters;
s5, rapidly capturing signals received by the narrow beam scanning type antenna according to the visible satellite list, and recording the maximum correlation peak and the corresponding scanning satellite angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna when capturing is successful;
s6, comparing the scanning satellite angle captured by the narrow beam scanning type antenna with the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna, and if the two are not consistent, then deception jamming exists;
and S7, when the suppression type interference and/or the deception interference are detected, according to the position of the narrow beam scanning type antenna and the corresponding scanning angle, the position of the interference source is determined through multiple times of position changing detection of a single set of equipment or multiple sets of equipment detection.
Further, when the jamming and/or the deception jamming are/is detected, the method further comprises the step of filtering the detection result.
Further, the satellite navigation frequency band in step S1 is a combination of one or more frequency points in the satellite navigation frequency band.
Further, the normal satellite navigation signal spectrum in step S3 includes at least one of a center frequency point in the satellite navigation signal, a spread spectrum system mode, and a typical signal level specified by the GNSS interface control file.
Further, the visible satellite parameters output in step S4 at least include a pitch angle, an azimuth angle, a carrier-to-noise ratio and a satellite number of the satellite.
Further, the visible satellite parameters output in step S4 further include pseudo range, doppler or position information of the satellite.
Further, the satellite angle in the step S6 is a pitch angle or an azimuth angle of the satellite.
Further, if the installation distance between the narrow beam scanning type antenna and the omnidirectional antenna is smaller than or equal to a set distance, the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna is equal to the satellite angle output by the omnidirectional antenna, and if the installation distance between the narrow beam scanning type antenna and the omnidirectional antenna is greater than the set distance, the equivalent satellite angle is obtained after the satellite angle output by the omnidirectional antenna is subjected to coordinate conversion.
The invention also provides a system for realizing the comprehensive detection method of the satellite navigation suppression type interference and the deception interference, which comprises the following steps:
the narrow beam scanning type antenna is used for acquiring radio frequency signals of a satellite navigation frequency band and each scanning angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna in real time;
the comprehensive detection equipment is used for converting radio frequency signals of a satellite navigation frequency band acquired by the narrow-beam scanning type antenna into digital signals, storing the digital signals and corresponding scanning angles, simultaneously performing frequency domain analysis on the data signals to acquire signal frequency spectrums in different incoming wave directions, and comparing the signal frequency spectrums after the frequency domain analysis with a normal satellite navigation signal frequency spectrum to judge whether suppression type interference exists or not;
at least one omnidirectional antenna for receiving satellite navigation signals in real time;
the comprehensive detection device is used for rapidly capturing signals received by the narrow-beam scanning type antenna according to the visible satellite list, recording a maximum correlation peak and a scanning angle of the corresponding narrow-beam scanning type antenna when the capturing is successful, judging whether deception interference exists or not by comparing the satellite angle captured by the narrow-beam scanning type antenna with an equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna, and when the suppression type interference and/or the deception interference is detected, converting the position detection or detecting by multiple sets of equipment for multiple times through a single set of equipment according to the position of the narrow-beam scanning type antenna and the corresponding scanning angle to determine the position of an interference source.
Further, the integrated detection apparatus includes:
the signal conversion module is used for converting the radio frequency signal of the satellite navigation frequency band acquired by the narrow beam scanning type antenna into a digital signal and storing the digital signal and a corresponding scanning angle;
the frequency domain analysis module is used for carrying out frequency domain analysis on the data signals converted by the signal conversion module so as to obtain signal frequency spectrums in different incoming wave directions;
the suppression interference judging module is used for judging whether suppression interference exists or not by using the signal frequency spectrum analyzed by the frequency domain analyzing module and the normal satellite navigation signal frequency spectrum;
the acquisition module is used for rapidly acquiring signals received by the narrow beam scanning type antenna according to a visible satellite list output by the satellite navigation receiving equipment and recording a maximum correlation peak and a corresponding scanning angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna when the acquisition is successful;
the deception interference judging module is used for judging whether deception interference exists or not by comparing the satellite angle captured by the narrow beam scanning type antenna with the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna;
and the positioning module is used for determining the position of an interference source through multiple position changing detection of a single set of equipment or detection of multiple sets of equipment according to the position of the narrow beam scanning type antenna and the corresponding scanning angle when the suppression type interference and/or the deception interference are detected.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the advantages that: the comprehensive detection method and the comprehensive detection system for satellite navigation suppression type interference and deception interference can effectively detect the traditional suppression type interference and deception interference, can realize the estimation of the position of the interference source, organically integrates the detection of different interferences, have simple realization form, and are beneficial to the engineering practice and the application of satellite navigation interference detection.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a method for detecting satellite navigation suppressed jamming and spoofing jamming in an integrated manner according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of an integrated detection system for satellite navigation suppressed jamming and spoofing jamming provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an integrated detection device in accordance with one embodiment.
Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of the location of the source of the interference source in one embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs; the terminology used in the description of the application herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the application; the terms "including" and "having," and any variations thereof, in the description and claims of this application and the description of the above figures are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. The terms "first," "second," and the like in the description and claims of this application or in the above-described drawings are used for distinguishing between different objects and not for describing a particular order.
Reference herein to "an embodiment" means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment can be included in at least one embodiment of the application. The appearances of the phrase in various places in the specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment, nor are separate or alternative embodiments mutually exclusive of other embodiments. It is explicitly and implicitly understood by one skilled in the art that the embodiments described herein can be combined with other embodiments.
In order to make the technical solutions better understood by those skilled in the art, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1, an embodiment of the present application provides a method for comprehensively detecting satellite navigation suppressing interference and spoofing interference, including:
step S1: and acquiring radio frequency signals of a satellite navigation frequency band and each scanning angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna in real time through at least one narrow beam scanning type antenna.
The narrow beam scanning antenna has at least one of 360-degree omni-directional scanning and 90-degree elevation scanning functions, and the narrow beam scanning antenna includes an electronic compass device capable of obtaining each scanning angle of the narrow beam scanning antenna, so that the narrow beam scanning antenna outputs radio frequency signals and information of each scanning angle to the integrated detection device 20.
The mounting carrier of the narrow beam scanning type antenna can be fixed or movable; the position information of the narrow beam scanning type antenna can be provided by a mounting carrier, and can also be fixedly mounted relative to the position of the omnidirectional antenna. Therefore, the scheme of the application can be suitable for static scene application and can also be suitable for dynamic scene application.
The narrow beam scanning type antenna is realized in any one or more combinations of mechanical scanning, array antenna electronic scanning and multi-beam scanning.
The satellite navigation frequency band is a combination of one or more frequency points in the satellite navigation frequency band, for example, 1150 MHz-1610 MHz is selected in the embodiment of the application.
Step S2: converting radio frequency signals of a satellite navigation frequency band acquired by the narrow beam scanning type antenna into digital signals, storing the digital signals and corresponding scanning angles, and simultaneously carrying out frequency domain analysis on the data signals to acquire signal frequency spectrums in different incoming wave directions.
Wherein the parameters of the signal spectrum comprise at least one of a power spectral density function, a frequency spectrum, a short-time Fourier transform, and a wavelet analysis result.
Step S3: and comparing the signal spectrum after the frequency domain analysis with the normal satellite navigation signal spectrum, and if the difference value between the signal spectrum after the frequency domain analysis and the normal satellite navigation signal spectrum is greater than a set threshold value, judging that the suppression type interference exists.
The normal satellite navigation signal frequency spectrum comprises at least one of a central frequency point in the satellite navigation signal, a spread spectrum system mode and a typical signal level specified by a GNSS interface control file.
The suppressed interference includes at least one of Continuous Wave (CW), AM, FM, impulse, narrowband, and wideband interference.
Step S4: and receiving satellite navigation signals in real time through at least one omnidirectional antenna, and outputting a visible satellite list and corresponding satellite parameters.
Specifically, the omnidirectional antenna signal is received through acquisition, tracking, demodulation, measurement and other processing, and the output visible satellite parameter information at least comprises a pitch angle, an azimuth angle, a carrier-to-noise ratio and a satellite number of the satellite, and also can output information such as pseudo range, Doppler, position and the like.
Step S5: and rapidly capturing signals received by the narrow-beam scanning antenna according to the visible satellite list, and recording the maximum correlation peak and the scanning angle of the corresponding narrow-beam scanning antenna when the capturing is successful.
The fast acquisition can also further utilize pseudo range, Doppler and position in the satellite information to reduce the search range and improve the fast acquisition speed.
Step S6: by comparing the satellite angle captured by the narrow beam scanning antenna with the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna, if the two are not consistent, deception jamming exists.
The equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna is a satellite angle obtained by considering the relative position correction of the narrow beam scanning antenna and the omnidirectional antenna.
Specifically, if the installation distance between the narrow beam scanning antenna and the omnidirectional antenna is less than or equal to a set distance (10 meters is selected as the set distance in this embodiment), the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna is equal to the satellite angle output by the omnidirectional antenna (that is, the positions of the narrow beam scanning antenna and the omnidirectional antenna can be regarded as the same position), and if the installation distance between the narrow beam scanning antenna and the omnidirectional antenna is greater than the set distance (10 meters is selected as the set distance in this embodiment), the satellite angle output by the omnidirectional antenna is subjected to coordinate conversion (according to the relative position of the narrow beam antenna to the omnidirectional antenna, the geographic coordinate or geocentric earth-fixed coordinate of the narrow beam antenna is calculated, and the satellite angle output by the narrow beam antenna including the pitch angle and the azimuth angle can be calculated by combining the satellite position), so as to obtain the equivalent satellite angle (that the satellite angle output by the narrow beam scanning antenna and the omnidirectional antenna has a difference between the Iso).
In this step, the satellite angle to be compared may be selected from the azimuth or elevation of the satellite. And if the selected comparison parameter is the azimuth angle of the satellite, judging whether the deception interference exists by comparing the satellite azimuth angle captured by the narrow beam scanning antenna with the satellite azimuth angle output by the omnidirectional antenna. If the comparison parameter selected for deception jamming detection is the pitch angle of the satellite, whether deception jamming exists is judged by comparing the consistency of the satellite pitch angle captured by the narrow beam scanning antenna and the satellite pitch angle output by the omnidirectional antenna.
When the azimuth angle is selected as the compared satellite angle, when the distance between the omnidirectional antenna and the narrow beam scanning type antenna is short (less than 10 meters), and if the difference value of the azimuth angle of the omnidirectional antenna and the azimuth angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna reaches an azimuth angle error threshold value, satellite navigation deception interference is judged to exist.
When the azimuth angle is selected as the compared satellite angle, when the distance between the omnidirectional antenna and the narrow beam scanning type antenna is far (more than 10 meters), the equivalent azimuth angle of the omnidirectional antenna is obtained by combining the positions of the two antennas, and if the difference value of the equivalent azimuth angle of the omnidirectional antenna and the azimuth angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna reaches an azimuth angle error threshold value, satellite navigation deception interference is judged to exist.
When the pitch angle is selected as the compared satellite angle, when the distance between the omnidirectional antenna and the narrow beam scanning antenna is short (less than 10 meters), and if the difference value between the pitch angle of the omnidirectional antenna and the pitch angle of the narrow beam scanning antenna reaches a pitch angle error threshold value, satellite navigation deception interference is judged to exist.
When the pitch angle is selected as the compared satellite angle, when the distance between the omnidirectional antenna and the narrow beam scanning type antenna is far (more than 10 meters), the equivalent pitch angle of the omnidirectional antenna is obtained by combining the positions of the omnidirectional antenna and the narrow beam scanning type antenna, and if the difference value between the equivalent pitch angle of the omnidirectional antenna and the pitch angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna reaches a pitch angle error threshold value, satellite navigation deception interference is judged to exist.
Step S7: and when the suppression type interference and/or the deception interference are detected, the position of the interference source is determined by multiple position changing detection of a single set of equipment or multiple sets of equipment detection according to the position of the narrow beam scanning type antenna and the corresponding scanning angle.
In some embodiments, a plurality of sets of systems may be used to achieve fast positioning of the interference source, and a wired or wireless network is connected to the integrated detection device 20 in the plurality of sets of systems to achieve multi-point azimuth convergence positioning, so as to estimate the position of the interference source more quickly (the implementation principle is shown in fig. 4).
Preferably, when the jamming and/or spoofing jamming is detected, filtering processing is further performed on the detection result to increase the reliability of the detection result, and the filtering processing may adopt any possible filtering algorithm.
Specifically, after the comprehensive detection result of whether the satellite navigation signal deception jamming exists is obtained, the system equipment can be further moved, and reliability of the detection result and positioning accuracy of the jamming source are improved by increasing diversity point location detection of the space.
Referring to fig. 2, an embodiment of the present application further provides a system for implementing the above method for comprehensively detecting satellite navigation suppressed jamming and spoofing jamming, including: at least one narrow beam scanning type antenna 10 for acquiring radio frequency signals of a satellite navigation frequency band and each scanning angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna in real time; the comprehensive detection device 20 is configured to convert a radio frequency signal of a satellite navigation frequency band acquired by the narrow beam scanning antenna into a digital signal, store the digital signal and a corresponding scanning angle, perform frequency domain analysis on the data signal to acquire signal frequency spectrums in different incoming wave directions, and compare the signal frequency spectrums after the frequency domain analysis with a normal satellite navigation signal frequency spectrum to determine whether suppression interference exists; at least one omnidirectional antenna 30 for receiving satellite navigation signals in real time; the satellite navigation receiving device 40 is configured to process a satellite navigation signal received by the omnidirectional antenna to output a visible satellite list and corresponding satellite parameters, the comprehensive detection device further performs fast acquisition on a signal received by the narrow-beam scanning antenna according to the visible satellite list, records a maximum correlation peak and a scanning angle of the corresponding narrow-beam scanning antenna when the acquisition is successful, judges whether deception interference exists by comparing a satellite angle acquired by the narrow-beam scanning antenna with an equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna, and determines the position of an interference source by performing position change detection or detection by multiple sets of devices according to the position of the narrow-beam scanning antenna and the corresponding scanning angle when suppression interference and/or deception interference is detected.
In some embodiments, the integrated detection device 20 may have more than two narrow-beam scanning antennas 10, in which case, each narrow-beam scanning antenna may be connected to one integrated detection device 20, or more than two narrow-beam scanning antennas 10 may be connected to the same integrated detection device 20. The multiple sets of equipment narrow-beam scanning type antennas and the comprehensive detection equipment are interconnected and communicated, the space range of interference signal detection is enlarged, and the detection time is shortened.
The omnidirectional antenna 30 and the satellite navigation receiving device 40 are virtual machines, and provide visible satellite information of the position where the narrow beam scanning antenna is located through a wired or wireless network, so that the cost is reduced.
Referring to fig. 3, the integrated detecting apparatus 20 according to the embodiment of the present application includes: the signal conversion module 201 is configured to convert a radio frequency signal of a satellite navigation frequency band acquired by the narrow beam scanning antenna into a digital signal and store the digital signal and a corresponding scanning angle; the frequency domain analysis module 202 is configured to perform frequency domain analysis on the data signal converted by the signal conversion module to obtain signal frequency spectrums in different incoming wave directions; the suppression interference judging module 203 is configured to judge whether suppression interference exists or not by using the signal spectrum analyzed by the frequency domain analyzing module and the normal satellite navigation signal spectrum; the acquisition module 204 is configured to perform fast acquisition on a signal received by the narrow beam scanning antenna according to a visible satellite list output by the satellite navigation receiving device, and record a maximum correlation peak and a corresponding scanning angle of the narrow beam scanning antenna when the acquisition is successful; a spoofing interference judging module 205, configured to judge whether spoofing interference exists by comparing the satellite angle captured by the narrow beam scanning antenna with the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna; and the positioning module 206 is configured to, when jamming interference and/or spoofing interference is detected, determine the location of the interference source by performing multiple position detection changes for a single set of equipment or multiple sets of equipment detection according to the location of the narrow-beam scanning antenna and the corresponding scanning angle.
The comprehensive detection method and the comprehensive detection system for satellite navigation suppression type interference and deception interference can effectively detect the traditional suppression type interference and deception interference, can realize the estimation of the position of the interference source, organically integrates the detection of different interferences, have simple realization form, and are beneficial to the engineering practice and the application of satellite navigation interference detection.
It is to be understood that the above-described embodiments are merely illustrative of some, but not restrictive, of the broad invention, and that the appended drawings illustrate preferred embodiments of the invention and do not limit the scope of the invention. This application is capable of embodiments in many different forms and is provided for the purpose of enabling a thorough understanding of the disclosure of the application. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be apparent to one skilled in the art that the present application may be practiced without modification or with equivalents of some of the features described in the foregoing embodiments. All equivalent structures made by using the contents of the specification and the drawings of the present application are directly or indirectly applied to other related technical fields and are within the protection scope of the present application.
Claims (10)
1. A comprehensive detection method for satellite navigation suppression type interference and deception interference is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, acquiring radio frequency signals of a satellite navigation frequency band and each scanning angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna in real time through at least one narrow beam scanning type antenna;
s2, converting the radio frequency signal of the satellite navigation frequency band acquired by the narrow beam scanning type antenna into a digital signal, storing the digital signal and a corresponding scanning angle, and simultaneously carrying out frequency domain analysis on the data signal to acquire signal frequency spectrums in different incoming wave directions;
s3, comparing the signal frequency spectrum after frequency domain analysis with a normal satellite navigation signal frequency spectrum, and if the difference value between the signal frequency spectrum after frequency domain analysis and the normal satellite navigation signal frequency spectrum is larger than a set threshold value, judging that the suppression type interference exists;
s4, receiving satellite navigation signals in real time through at least one omnidirectional antenna, and outputting a visible satellite list and corresponding satellite parameters;
s5, rapidly capturing signals received by the narrow beam scanning type antenna according to the visible satellite list, and recording the maximum correlation peak and the corresponding scanning satellite angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna when capturing is successful;
s6, comparing the scanning satellite angle captured by the narrow beam scanning type antenna with the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna, and if the two are not consistent, then deception jamming exists;
and S7, when the suppression type interference and/or the deception interference are detected, according to the position of the narrow beam scanning type antenna and the corresponding scanning angle, the position of the interference source is determined through multiple times of position changing detection of a single set of equipment or multiple sets of equipment detection.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises the steps of: when the suppressing interference and/or the deception interference are/is detected, the method further comprises the step of filtering the detection result.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises the steps of: the satellite navigation frequency band in step S1 is a combination of one or more frequency points in the satellite navigation frequency band.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises the steps of: the normal satellite navigation signal spectrum in step S3 includes at least one of a center frequency point in the satellite navigation signal, a spread spectrum system, and a typical signal level specified by a GNSS interface control file.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises the steps of: the visible satellite parameters output in step S4 at least include the pitch angle, azimuth angle, carrier-to-noise ratio, and satellite number of the satellite.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the method comprises the steps of: the visible satellite parameters output in step S4 further include pseudo range, doppler or position information of the satellite.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises the steps of: the satellite angle in the step S6 is a pitch angle or an azimuth angle of the satellite.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the method comprises the steps of: if the installation distance between the narrow beam scanning type antenna and the omnidirectional antenna is smaller than or equal to a set distance, the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna is equal to the satellite angle output by the omnidirectional antenna, and if the installation distance between the narrow beam scanning type antenna and the omnidirectional antenna is larger than the set distance, the equivalent satellite angle is obtained after the output satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna is subjected to coordinate conversion.
9. A system for implementing the method for detecting satellite navigation suppressing jamming and spoofing jamming comprehensively according to any one of claims 1 to 8, comprising:
the narrow beam scanning type antenna is used for acquiring radio frequency signals of a satellite navigation frequency band and each scanning angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna in real time;
the comprehensive detection equipment is used for converting radio frequency signals of a satellite navigation frequency band acquired by the narrow-beam scanning type antenna into digital signals, storing the digital signals and corresponding scanning angles, simultaneously performing frequency domain analysis on the data signals to acquire signal frequency spectrums in different incoming wave directions, and comparing the signal frequency spectrums after the frequency domain analysis with a normal satellite navigation signal frequency spectrum to judge whether suppression type interference exists or not;
at least one omnidirectional antenna for receiving satellite navigation signals in real time;
the comprehensive detection device is used for rapidly capturing signals received by the narrow-beam scanning type antenna according to the visible satellite list, recording a maximum correlation peak and a scanning angle of the corresponding narrow-beam scanning type antenna when the capturing is successful, judging whether deception interference exists or not by comparing the satellite angle captured by the narrow-beam scanning type antenna with an equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna, and when the suppression type interference and/or the deception interference is detected, converting the position detection or detecting by multiple sets of equipment for multiple times through a single set of equipment according to the position of the narrow-beam scanning type antenna and the corresponding scanning angle to determine the position of an interference source.
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the integrated detecting device comprises:
the signal conversion module is used for converting the radio frequency signal of the satellite navigation frequency band acquired by the narrow beam scanning type antenna into a digital signal and storing the digital signal and a corresponding scanning angle;
the frequency domain analysis module is used for carrying out frequency domain analysis on the data signals converted by the signal conversion module so as to obtain signal frequency spectrums in different incoming wave directions;
the suppression interference judging module is used for judging whether suppression interference exists or not by using the signal frequency spectrum analyzed by the frequency domain analyzing module and the normal satellite navigation signal frequency spectrum;
the acquisition module is used for rapidly acquiring signals received by the narrow beam scanning type antenna according to a visible satellite list output by the satellite navigation receiving equipment and recording a maximum correlation peak and a corresponding scanning angle of the narrow beam scanning type antenna when the acquisition is successful;
the deception interference judging module is used for judging whether deception interference exists or not by comparing the satellite angle captured by the narrow beam scanning type antenna with the equivalent satellite angle of the omnidirectional antenna;
and the positioning module is used for determining the position of an interference source through multiple position changing detection of a single set of equipment or detection of multiple sets of equipment according to the position of the narrow beam scanning type antenna and the corresponding scanning angle when the suppression type interference and/or the deception interference are detected.
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| CN113655502A (en) * | 2021-09-27 | 2021-11-16 | 北京东方波泰无线电频谱技术研究所 | Deception GNSS interference signal direction finding and positioning method and system |
| CN113740883A (en) * | 2021-09-06 | 2021-12-03 | 阳光学院 | Satellite navigation interference direction-finding system and method based on multi-face phased array |
| CN114390432A (en) * | 2022-01-14 | 2022-04-22 | 中国人民解放军61096部队 | Interference source positioning method and device |
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| CN111968412A (en) * | 2020-08-24 | 2020-11-20 | 福建工程学院 | Space GNSS-based position updating and guiding method and system thereof |
| CN112083447A (en) * | 2020-08-26 | 2020-12-15 | 清华大学 | Method and device for positioning navigation deception source |
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| WO2022126559A1 (en) * | 2020-12-17 | 2022-06-23 | 深圳市大疆创新科技有限公司 | Target detection method and device, platform, and computer-readable storage medium |
| CN112731462A (en) * | 2021-03-30 | 2021-04-30 | 长沙北斗产业安全技术研究院有限公司 | Positioning method and system of navigation deception jamming source |
| CN113740883A (en) * | 2021-09-06 | 2021-12-03 | 阳光学院 | Satellite navigation interference direction-finding system and method based on multi-face phased array |
| CN113655502A (en) * | 2021-09-27 | 2021-11-16 | 北京东方波泰无线电频谱技术研究所 | Deception GNSS interference signal direction finding and positioning method and system |
| CN114390432A (en) * | 2022-01-14 | 2022-04-22 | 中国人民解放军61096部队 | Interference source positioning method and device |
| GB2621176A (en) * | 2022-08-05 | 2024-02-07 | Ordnance Survey Ltd | Detecting jamming in OSNET using machine learning |
| CN115015973A (en) * | 2022-08-09 | 2022-09-06 | 龙旗电子(惠州)有限公司 | GPS interference detection method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN115951374A (en) * | 2023-03-13 | 2023-04-11 | 钛玛科（北京）工业科技有限公司 | Signal interference suppression method |
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