CN110827067A - Day-ahead market clearing method and device with demand side bidding, and computer equipment - Google Patents

Day-ahead market clearing method and device with demand side bidding, and computer equipment Download PDF

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CN110827067A
CN110827067A CN201911023668.7A CN201911023668A CN110827067A CN 110827067 A CN110827067 A CN 110827067A CN 201911023668 A CN201911023668 A CN 201911023668A CN 110827067 A CN110827067 A CN 110827067A
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顾慧杰
周华锋
彭超逸
许丹莉
朱文
赵文猛
梁彦杰
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China Southern Power Grid Co Ltd
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Abstract

The application relates to a method and a device for clearing a day-ahead market with a demand side bidding, a computer device and a storage medium. The method comprises the following steps: pre-establishing a day-ahead market clearing model containing demand side bidding; wherein the day-ahead market clearing model comprises an objective function and a constraint condition which aim at maximizing social welfare; when the real power generation cost declared by the conventional unit and the real power utilization benefit declared by the large user on the demand side, the day-ahead market clearing model achieves the goal of maximizing social welfare.

Description

Day-ahead market clearing method and device with demand side bidding, and computer equipment
Technical Field
The present application relates to the field of power scheduling, and in particular, to a method for clearing a day-ahead market including a demand side bidding, a device for clearing a day-ahead market including a demand side bidding, a computer device, and a storage medium.
Background
As early as the nineties of the last century, many power markets abroad have achieved a shift from regulated monopolies to market competition. Among them, node Marginal Price (LMP) is introduced into power markets represented by the united states PJM power market, texas, california, new york, and new england. Under the node marginal electricity price mechanism, each market member declares respective quotation, and a system operator (ISO) makes market clearing decisions according to the quotation of the market member. Between 1990 and 2001, the united kingdom has imposed a consolidated power market. The power generation party bids to generate the market clearing price, the demand party can only passively accept the price, and the demand side does not participate in the market pricing process. Such a market is deficient and does not achieve a load-side response to the market.
Most literature on the large-scale bilateral electricity market assumes the convexity of the cost of electricity generation; in a large amount of literature on behavior analysis of generator agents in the large-scale electricity market, generator sets are assumed to be priced or some numerical methods aiming at solving game theory balance, but most of the documents lack consideration of demand side load flexibility.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above, there is a need to provide a method for clearing a day-ahead market including a demand-side bid, a device for clearing a day-ahead market including a demand-side bid, a computer apparatus and a computer readable storage medium for solving the problems of the conventional market bidding mechanism, i.e., LMP mechanism, that is, the problem of the loss of economic efficiency due to the fact that a generator set and a large user on the demand side exert market force to maximize their own benefits and destroy market order.
A method for clearing a day-ahead market with a demand side bidding, comprising the following steps:
pre-establishing a day-ahead market clearing model containing demand side bidding; wherein the day-ahead market clearing model comprises an objective function and a constraint condition which aim at maximizing social welfare;
when the real power generation cost declared by the conventional unit and the real power utilization benefit declared by the large user on the demand side, the day-ahead market clearing model achieves the goal of maximizing social welfare.
Preferably, the first and second electrodes are formed of a metal,
the objective function is:
the constraint conditions include:
supply and demand balance constraint: S.T are provided.
And (3) power transmission line capacity constraint:
Figure BDA0002248013840000023
and (3) output restraint of the generator set:
Figure BDA0002248013840000025
the electricity purchasing constraint of large users on the demand side is as follows:
Figure BDA0002248013840000026
wherein n represents a node included in the power system; i represents the ith node; g is a generator set participating in market bidding; d is a large user set on the demand side;
Figure BDA0002248013840000027
the active output of the generator set k at the node k is obtained;
Figure BDA0002248013840000028
the power purchasing power of a large user j at a demand side of a node j is obtained;
Figure BDA0002248013840000029
the required power of the large user j on the demand side is
Figure BDA00022480138400000210
Electricity utilization efficiency;
Figure BDA00022480138400000211
k for the generator set
Figure BDA00022480138400000212
The cost of electricity generation; fliA power generation transfer distribution factor of the node i to the power transmission line l;
Figure BDA00022480138400000213
the output of the generator set at the node i;
Figure BDA00022480138400000214
the electricity purchasing quantity of a large user on a demand side is obtained;
Figure BDA00022480138400000215
is the transmission capacity of line l;
Figure BDA00022480138400000216
the upper limit of the output of the generator set;
Figure BDA00022480138400000217
the power purchase upper limit of the large user on the demand side.
Preferably, under the LMP mechanism, the lagrangian function for optimizing the market-ahead clearing model is:
Figure BDA00022480138400000218
under the LMP mechanism, node price of node iGrid (C)Comprises the following steps:
according to the node price
Figure BDA0002248013840000031
System operator pays for generator set k at node k
Figure BDA0002248013840000032
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002248013840000033
according to the node price
Figure BDA0002248013840000034
The cost paid to the system operator by the large user j on the demand side at the node j
Figure BDA0002248013840000035
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002248013840000036
suppose that
Figure BDA0002248013840000037
For the best solution of the model to be presented in the future, under the VCG mechanism, the system operator pays the cost of the generator set k at the node k
Figure BDA0002248013840000038
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002248013840000039
at VCGUnder the mechanism, a large user j on a demand side at a node j pays the cost of a system operator
Figure BDA00022480138400000310
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA00022480138400000311
wherein λ is1Lagrange multipliers that are supply and demand balance constraints;
Figure BDA00022480138400000312
and
Figure BDA00022480138400000313
lagrange multipliers which are power transmission line capacity constraints;
Figure BDA00022480138400000314
social welfare for all members when participating in the system market;
Figure BDA00022480138400000315
social welfare for a new system market that does not include genset k;
Figure BDA00022480138400000316
is a social benefit of a new system market that does not contain demand side large users j.
Preferably, for the generator set k, assuming that all loads declare real electricity utilization benefit, the electricity generation cost is declared when other generator sets declare electricity generation cost
Figure BDA00022480138400000317
Then, the generator set k declares the false power generation cost if it is
Figure BDA00022480138400000318
The payment obtained is then:
Figure BDA00022480138400000319
wherein the content of the first and second substances,reporting power generation cost for other generator sets
Figure BDA00022480138400000325
Meanwhile, the markets of other generator sets output clear power;
Figure BDA00022480138400000321
the total output clear power of all the generator sets of the system is obtained;k declares false power generation cost for generator set
Figure BDA00022480138400000322
The market clearing power in time;
if the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckThen the payment obtained is:
Figure BDA00022480138400000323
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00022480138400000324
k-declared real power generation cost c of representing generator setkThe market clearing power in time;
for any generator set, the generator set k reports the false generation cost
Figure BDA0002248013840000041
In time, the net profit is:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002248013840000043
is not coveredTotal generator set cost for the new system market containing generator set k;declaring false power generation cost for generator set k when the system comprises the generator set k
Figure BDA0002248013840000045
Market clearing costs for other generator sets (i.e., generator sets other than k) in the market.
When the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckIn time, the net profit is:
Figure BDA0002248013840000046
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002248013840000047
declaring a true power generation cost c for a generator set k when the system includes the generator set kkMarket clearing costs for other generator sets;
in the calculation formula of the net profit, the first term at the right end of the equation is irrelevant to the power generation cost declared by the generator set k; while
Figure BDA0002248013840000048
And
Figure BDA0002248013840000049
declaring the true generating cost c for the generator set k respectivelykAnd other generator sets report the cost of power generation
Figure BDA00022480138400000410
The system of time is the best plan of clearing, so there are:
Figure BDA00022480138400000411
therefore, the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckThe obtained net profit is not less than the net profit of the virtual time report and is alsoNamely:
when the generator set k declares the real power generation cost, the excitation compatibility of the generator set;
as for the individual rationality of the generator set,
Figure BDA00022480138400000413
equivalent to adding in the clear model of all generator sets
Figure BDA00022480138400000414
A constraint condition; therefore, the feasible range of the optimization of the output model is reduced, and the objective function value is not less than that of all generator sets participating in the output of the market at the day-ahead, so that:
preferably, for the large user j on the demand side, assuming that all the generator sets report the real power generation cost, when the large users on the other demand sides report the power utilization benefit
Figure BDA00022480138400000416
In time, if a large user j on the demand side reports false electricity utilization benefit
Figure BDA00022480138400000417
The payment that needs to be given is:
Figure BDA00022480138400000418
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002248013840000051
reporting power utilization benefits for other large users on other demand sides of system
Figure BDA0002248013840000052
The market clearing power of other large users on the demand side is released;the total clearing power of all large users on the demand side of the system is obtained;
Figure BDA0002248013840000054
false reporting of electricity utilization benefits for large user j on demand sideThe market clearing power in time;
if the large user j on the demand side reports the real electricity utilization benefit bjThen the payment that needs to be given is:
Figure BDA0002248013840000056
wherein the content of the first and second substances,the large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit bjThe market clearing power in time;
for any large user on the demand side, the aim is to maximize the net benefit of the user, namely, the electricity utilization benefit of the large user on the demand side is subtracted by the payment amount required by the large user on the demand side, so that the large user j on the demand side reports the electricity utilization benefit in a false modeThe net benefits are:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00022480138400000510
when the system comprises a large user j at the demand side, the large user j at the demand side reports the electricity utilization efficiency in a false mode
Figure BDA00022480138400000511
The market of other large users on the demand side produces clear electricity utilization benefits;
Figure BDA00022480138400000512
the total electricity utilization benefit of the demand side large users of the new system market which does not contain the demand side large users j is obtained;
when a large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit bjThe net benefits are:
Figure BDA00022480138400000513
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00022480138400000514
when the system comprises a large user j at the demand side, the large user j at the demand side declares the real electricity utilization benefit bjThe market of other demand side large users except j produces clear electricity utilization benefits;
in the calculation formula of the net benefit, the last term at the right end of the equation is irrelevant to the electricity utilization benefit reported by the large user j at the demand side; while
Figure BDA00022480138400000515
Andrespectively declaring real electricity utilization benefits b for large users j on demand sidejOther large users on demand side report the power utilization benefit
Figure BDA00022480138400000517
The system of time is the best plan of clearing, so there are:
Figure BDA00022480138400000518
therefore, the large user j at the demand side reports the real electricity utilization benefit bjThe net benefit obtained in time is not less than the benefit of reporting false electricity utilization
Figure BDA00022480138400000519
The net benefits of (a), namely:
Figure BDA00022480138400000520
when the large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit, the incentive compatibility of the large user on the demand side;
for the individuality of the large users on the demand side,
Figure BDA0002248013840000061
equivalent to the addition of the clearing model with the participation of large users on all demand sidesConstraint conditions, therefore, the clear model optimization feasible domain is reduced, the objective function value is not less than that of all large users on the demand side participating in the market clearing in the day, and therefore:
Figure BDA0002248013840000063
preferably, the generator set declares a real power generation cost quotation, the demand side large user declares a real power utilization benefit, and the social welfare is maximized, wherein the social welfare maximization target is automatically met by a day-ahead market clearing model when the generator set and the demand side large user declare the real power generation cost and the power utilization benefit under the condition that the generator set and the demand side large user meet incentive compatibility and individuality.
A day-ahead market dispensing apparatus including a demand side bidding, comprising:
the model establishing module is used for pre-establishing a day-ahead market clearing model containing the bidding of the demand side; wherein the day-ahead market clearing model comprises an objective function and a constraint condition which aim at maximizing social welfare;
and the clearing module is used for enabling the day-ahead market clearing model to achieve the goal of maximizing social welfare when the real power generation cost declared by the conventional unit and the real power utilization benefit declared by a large user on the demand side.
Preferably, the first and second electrodes are formed of a metal,
the objective function is:
Figure BDA0002248013840000064
the constraint conditions include:
supply and demand balance constraint: S.T are provided.
Figure BDA0002248013840000065
And (3) power transmission line capacity constraint:
Figure BDA0002248013840000066
Figure BDA0002248013840000067
and (3) output restraint of the generator set:
Figure BDA0002248013840000068
the electricity purchasing constraint of large users on the demand side is as follows:
wherein n represents a node included in the power system; i represents the ith node; g is a generator set participating in market bidding; d is a large user set on the demand side;
Figure BDA00022480138400000610
the active output of the generator set k at the node k is obtained;
Figure BDA00022480138400000611
the power purchasing power of a large user j at a demand side of a node j is obtained;
Figure BDA00022480138400000612
the required power of the large user j on the demand side is
Figure BDA0002248013840000071
Electricity utilization efficiency;
Figure BDA0002248013840000072
k for the generator set
Figure BDA0002248013840000073
The cost of electricity generation; fliA power generation transfer distribution factor of the node i to the power transmission line l;
Figure BDA0002248013840000074
the output of the generator set at the node i;the electricity purchasing quantity of a large user on a demand side is obtained;
Figure BDA0002248013840000076
is the transmission capacity of line l;
Figure BDA0002248013840000077
the upper limit of the output of the generator set;
Figure BDA0002248013840000078
the power purchase upper limit of the large user on the demand side.
A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, the processor implementing the following steps when executing the computer program:
pre-establishing a day-ahead market clearing model containing demand side bidding; wherein the day-ahead market clearing model comprises an objective function and a constraint condition which aim at maximizing social welfare;
when the real power generation cost declared by the conventional unit and the real power utilization benefit declared by the large user on the demand side, the day-ahead market clearing model achieves the goal of maximizing social welfare.
A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored which, when executed by a processor, carries out the steps of:
pre-establishing a day-ahead market clearing model containing demand side bidding; wherein the day-ahead market clearing model comprises an objective function and a constraint condition which aim at maximizing social welfare;
when the real power generation cost declared by the conventional unit and the real power utilization benefit declared by the large user on the demand side, the day-ahead market clearing model achieves the goal of maximizing social welfare.
According to the day-ahead market clearing method, the day-ahead market clearing device, the computer equipment and the computer readable storage medium containing the demand side bidding, the day-ahead market clearing model achieves the goal of maximizing social welfare when the real power generation cost declared by the conventional unit and the real power utilization benefit declared by the large user on the demand side are established in advance.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart diagram illustrating a method for listing a market at a day-ahead location with a demand side bid, according to one embodiment;
FIG. 2 is a modified IEEE14 node system of an embodiment;
FIG. 3 is a table diagram of a genset of an embodiment;
FIG. 4 is a table diagram of a demand side large user of one embodiment;
FIG. 5 is a tabular illustration of output, system payments, and net profits for a generator set declaring true power generation costs according to an embodiment;
6-7 are graphs illustrating net profit levels for a generator set reporting different power generation cost factors, according to one embodiment;
FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of power purchase, payment to the system, and net power usage benefits for a large demand side user reporting real power usage benefits, according to an embodiment;
9-10 are schematic diagrams of net electricity usage benefit levels when different electricity usage benefit factors are declared by a large consumer on the demand side for one embodiment;
FIG. 11 is a block diagram of a day-ahead market clearing apparatus with a demand side bid, according to one embodiment;
FIG. 12 is an internal block diagram of a computer device of an embodiment.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more apparent, the present application is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present application and are not intended to limit the present application.
In one embodiment, as shown in fig. 1, a flow diagram of a method for a day-ahead market clearing with a demand side bidding is provided, wherein the application can be, but is not limited to, various personal computers, laptops, smartphones, tablets, and portable wearable devices. The method may specifically comprise the steps of:
step S110, pre-establishing a day-ahead market clearing model containing bidding of a demand side; wherein the day-ahead market clearing model comprises an objective function and a constraint condition which aim at maximizing social welfare;
and step S120, when the real power generation cost declared by the conventional unit and the real power utilization benefit declared by the large user on the demand side, the day-ahead market clearing model achieves the goal of maximizing social welfare.
The utility model provides a day-ahead market of containing demand side bidding goes out clear model specifically includes:
an objective function:
constraint conditions are as follows:
1) supply and demand balance constraint:
S.T.
Figure BDA0002248013840000082
2) and (3) power transmission line capacity constraint:
Figure BDA0002248013840000091
Figure BDA0002248013840000092
3) and (3) output restraint of the generator set:
Figure BDA0002248013840000093
4) the electricity purchasing constraint of large users on the demand side is as follows:
Figure BDA0002248013840000094
under the LMP mechanism, the Lagrangian function of the optimization problem is expressed by the following equations (1) to (6):
Figure BDA0002248013840000095
under LMP mechanism, node price of node iComprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002248013840000097
based on the node price shown in equation (8), the system operator pays the cost of the generator set k at node kComprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002248013840000099
according to the node price shown in the formula (8), the large user j at the demand side of the node j pays the cost of the system operator
Figure BDA00022480138400000910
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA00022480138400000911
suppose that
Figure BDA00022480138400000912
The method is the optimal solution for the model equations (1) - (6). Under the VCG mechanism, the system operator pays the cost of the generator set k at the node k
Figure BDA00022480138400000913
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA00022480138400000914
under the VCG mechanism, the large user j at the demand side of the node j pays the cost of the system operator
Figure BDA00022480138400000915
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA00022480138400000916
the model comprises n nodes, m lines, G and D respectively represent a generator set participating in market bidding and a demand side large user set;
Figure BDA00022480138400000917
is the active power output of the generator set k at the node k,
Figure BDA00022480138400000918
the power purchasing power of a large user j at a demand side of a node j is obtained;
Figure BDA00022480138400000919
the required power of the large user j on the demand side is
Figure BDA0002248013840000101
The electricity utilization benefit in the time is that,
Figure BDA0002248013840000102
k for the generator set
Figure BDA0002248013840000103
The cost of electricity generation; fliA power generation transfer distribution factor of the node i to the power transmission line l;
Figure BDA0002248013840000104
andrespectively representing the output of the generator set at the node i and the electricity purchasing quantity of a large user at a demand side;
Figure BDA0002248013840000106
is the transmission capacity of line l;
Figure BDA0002248013840000107
is the upper limit of the output of the generator set,
Figure BDA0002248013840000108
the electricity purchasing upper limit of a large user on the demand side is reached; lambda [ alpha ]1The lagrange multiplier of constraint equation (2),
Figure BDA0002248013840000109
lagrange multipliers which are constraint conditional expressions (3) and (4);
Figure BDA00022480138400001010
for the social welfare of all members when they participate in the system market,social welfare for a new system market that does not include genset k;
Figure BDA00022480138400001012
is a social benefit of a new system market that does not contain demand side large users j.
Equations (1) -12 represent, in the conventional sense, the current spot market clearing model, the existing LMP clearing mechanism model, and the VCG mechanism model.
In order to more clearly describe the embodiments of the present application, the following description will be made with reference to fig. 2 to 10.
(one) adopt IEEE14 node system of fig. 2 modification, there are: 5 generator sets respectively positioned at 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8 nodes; the parameters of 3 large demand side users located at nodes 9, 13 and 14, the generator set and the large demand side users are shown in the tables shown in fig. 3 and 4. For the generator set k, assuming that all loads report real power utilization benefit, when other generator sets report power generation cost
Figure BDA00022480138400001013
In time, the generator set k can choose whether to declare the true cost of power generation. If it declares false power generation cost
Figure BDA00022480138400001014
The payment obtained is then:
Figure BDA00022480138400001015
wherein the content of the first and second substances,declaring for other generator sets of the system
Figure BDA00022480138400001017
When the power generation cost is low, the market of other generator sets produces clear power;
Figure BDA00022480138400001018
the total output clear power of all the generator sets of the system is obtained;
Figure BDA00022480138400001019
k declares false power generation cost for generator set
Figure BDA00022480138400001020
Market of timeAnd (4) clearing power.
If the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckThen the payment obtained is:
Figure BDA00022480138400001021
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00022480138400001022
k-declared real power generation cost c of representing generator setkThe market in time gives up power.
For any generating set, the goal is to maximize its own net profit, i.e., the payment made by the generating set minus the generating cost of the set itself. Therefore, the generating set k reports the generating cost in a false way
Figure BDA00022480138400001023
In time, the net profit is:
Figure BDA00022480138400001024
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002248013840000111
total genset cost for new system markets that do not include genset k;
Figure BDA0002248013840000112
when the system comprises a generator set k, the generator set k reports the power generation cost in a false mode
Figure BDA0002248013840000113
Market clearing costs for other generator sets (i.e., generator sets other than k) in the market.
When the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckIn time, the net profit is:
Figure BDA0002248013840000114
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002248013840000115
declaring a true power generation cost c for a generator set k when the system includes the generator set kkMarket clearing costs for other generator sets (i.e., generator sets other than k) on the market. For the above equations (15) and (16), the first term at the right end of the equation is independent of the power generation cost declared by the generator set k; while
Figure BDA0002248013840000116
And
Figure BDA0002248013840000117
Figure BDA0002248013840000118
declaring the true generating cost c for the generator set k respectivelykAnd other generator sets report the cost of power generation
Figure BDA0002248013840000119
The system of time is the best plan of clearing, so there are:
Figure BDA00022480138400001110
therefore, the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckThe net profit obtained is not less than the net profit of the virtual strike, that is:
Figure BDA00022480138400001111
based on the result of equation (18), the generator set k will declare the true cost of power generation, which is the excitation compatibility of the generator set. For the individual rationality of the generator set, according to equation (16),
Figure BDA00022480138400001112
equivalently setting the power generation value of the generator set k to be 0 in the cleaning model in which all the generator sets participate, namely adding the power generation values in the cleaning models of the formulas (1) to (6)
Figure BDA00022480138400001113
A constraint condition. Therefore, the feasible range of the optimization of the output model is reduced, and the objective function value is not less than that of the output of all the generator sets participating in the market at the day-ahead. Thus:
Figure BDA00022480138400001114
the table shown in fig. 5 is the output, system payment and net profit for the modified IEEE14 node system when the generator set declares the true cost of power generation. Fig. 6-7 illustrate net profit levels for a generator set reporting different power generation cost factors.
(II) for the large user j at the demand side, assuming that all the generator sets report the real power generation cost, and reporting the power utilization benefit when the large users at other demand sides
Figure BDA00022480138400001115
And then, the large user j on the demand side can select whether to declare the real power utilization benefit. If it reports false electricity utilization benefit
Figure BDA00022480138400001116
The payment that needs to be given is:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002248013840000121
reporting power utilization benefits for other large users on other demand sides of systemThe market clearing power of other large users on the demand side is released;the total clearing power of all large users on the demand side of the system is obtained;
Figure BDA0002248013840000124
false reporting of electricity utilization benefits for large user j on demand side
Figure BDA0002248013840000125
The market in time gives up power.
If the large user j on the demand side reports the real electricity utilization benefit bjThen the payment that needs to be given is:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,the large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit bjThe market in time gives up power.
For any demand side large user, the aim is to maximize the net benefit of the user, namely the electricity utilization benefit of the demand side large user is subtracted by the payment amount required to be given by the demand side large user. Therefore, the large user j on the demand side reports the electricity utilization efficiency in a false modeThe net benefits are:
Figure BDA0002248013840000129
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00022480138400001210
when the system comprises a large user j at the demand side, the large user j at the demand side reports the electricity utilization efficiency in a false mode
Figure BDA00022480138400001211
The market clearing electricity benefits of other large demand side users (namely large demand side users except j) in the market;
Figure BDA00022480138400001212
is notAnd the total electricity utilization benefit of the demand side large users of the new system market comprising the demand side large users j.
When a large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit bjIn time, the net electricity utilization benefit is:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00022480138400001214
when the system comprises a large user j at the demand side, the large user j at the demand side declares the real electricity utilization benefit bjAnd the market clearing electricity benefits of other demand side large users (namely demand side large users except j) in the market are obtained. For the above equations (21) and (22), the last term at the right end of the equation is irrelevant to the electricity utilization benefit reported by the large user j at the demand side; while
Figure BDA00022480138400001215
And
Figure BDA00022480138400001216
respectively declaring real electricity utilization benefits b for large users j on demand sidejOther large users on demand side report the power utilization benefit
Figure BDA00022480138400001217
The system of time is the best plan of clearing, so there are:
Figure BDA00022480138400001218
therefore, the large user j at the demand side reports the real electricity utilization benefit bjThe net benefit obtained by the time is not less than the net benefit of the virtual time report, namely:
Figure BDA0002248013840000131
based on the result of the formula (25), the demand side big user j reports the real electricity utilization benefit, namely, the demand side big user is the incentive compatibilityAnd (4) sex. For the individuality of the large user on the demand side, according to equation (23),
Figure BDA0002248013840000132
equivalently setting the electricity purchasing value of the demand side large user j to be 0 in the clearing model in which all the demand side large users participate, namely adding the electricity purchasing values in the clearing models of the formulas (1) to (6)
Figure BDA0002248013840000133
A constraint condition. Therefore, the optimization feasible domain of the clearing model is reduced, and the objective function value is not less than that of all large users on the demand side participating in the clearing of the market in the day-ahead. Thus:
Figure BDA0002248013840000134
fig. 8 shows a table of the power purchase amount, the payment to the system, and the net power utilization efficiency when the large consumer on the demand side declares the actual power utilization efficiency in the modified IEEE14 node system. Fig. 9 and 10 show net electricity usage benefit levels for demand-side large users reporting different electricity usage benefit factors.
And (III) under the condition that the generator set and the large user at the demand side meet the excitation compatibility and the individual rationality, the generator set and the large user at the demand side voluntarily participate in the system market in the day ahead, and the real power generation cost and the power utilization benefit are declared. Therefore, the social welfare maximization is automatically satisfied by the above (one) and (two).
It should be understood that, although the steps in the flowchart of fig. 1 are shown in order as indicated by the arrows, the steps are not necessarily performed in order as indicated by the arrows. The steps are not performed in the exact order shown and described, and may be performed in other orders, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Moreover, at least a portion of the steps in fig. 1 may include multiple sub-steps or multiple stages that are not necessarily performed at the same time, but may be performed at different times, and the order of performance of the sub-steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but may be performed in turn or alternately with other steps or at least a portion of the sub-steps or stages of other steps.
In one embodiment, as shown in FIG. 11, there is provided a day-ahead market clearing apparatus including a demand side bid, comprising:
the model establishing module 210 is used for establishing a day-ahead market clearing model containing bidding of a demand side in advance; wherein the day-ahead market clearing model comprises an objective function and a constraint condition which aim at maximizing social welfare;
the clearing module 220 is used for enabling the day-ahead market clearing model to achieve the goal of maximizing social welfare when the real power generation cost declared by the conventional unit and the real power utilization benefit declared by a large user on the demand side.
Preferably, the objective function is:
Figure BDA0002248013840000141
the constraint conditions include:
supply and demand balance constraint: S.T are provided.
Figure BDA0002248013840000142
And (3) power transmission line capacity constraint:
Figure BDA0002248013840000143
Figure BDA0002248013840000144
and (3) output restraint of the generator set:
Figure BDA0002248013840000145
the electricity purchasing constraint of large users on the demand side is as follows:
wherein n represents a node included in the power system; i represents the ith node; g is a generator set participating in market bidding(ii) a D is a large user set on the demand side;
Figure BDA0002248013840000147
the active output of the generator set k at the node k is obtained;
Figure BDA0002248013840000148
the power purchasing power of a large user j at a demand side of a node j is obtained;
Figure BDA0002248013840000149
the required power of the large user j on the demand side is
Figure BDA00022480138400001410
Electricity utilization efficiency;
Figure BDA00022480138400001411
k for the generator set
Figure BDA00022480138400001412
The cost of electricity generation; fliA power generation transfer distribution factor of the node i to the power transmission line l;
Figure BDA00022480138400001413
the output of the generator set at the node i;the electricity purchasing quantity of a large user on a demand side is obtained;
Figure BDA00022480138400001415
is the transmission capacity of line l;
Figure BDA00022480138400001416
the upper limit of the output of the generator set;the power purchase upper limit of the large user on the demand side.
Preferably, under the LMP mechanism, the lagrangian function for optimizing the market-ahead clearing model is:
Figure BDA00022480138400001418
under LMP mechanism, node price of node i
Figure BDA00022480138400001419
Comprises the following steps:
according to the node price
Figure BDA00022480138400001421
System operator pays for generator set k at node k
Figure BDA00022480138400001422
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002248013840000151
according to the node price
Figure BDA0002248013840000152
The cost paid to the system operator by the large user j on the demand side at the node j
Figure BDA0002248013840000153
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002248013840000154
suppose that
Figure BDA0002248013840000155
For the best solution of the model to be presented in the future, under the VCG mechanism, the system operator pays the cost of the generator set k at the node k
Figure BDA0002248013840000156
Comprises the following steps:
under the VCG mechanism, the large user j at the demand side of the node j pays the cost of the system operator
Figure BDA0002248013840000158
Comprises the following steps:
Figure BDA0002248013840000159
wherein λ is1Lagrange multipliers that are supply and demand balance constraints;and
Figure BDA00022480138400001511
lagrange multipliers which are power transmission line capacity constraints;social welfare for all members when participating in the system market;social welfare for a new system market that does not include genset k;
Figure BDA00022480138400001514
is a social benefit of a new system market that does not contain demand side large users j.
Preferably, for the generator set k, assuming that all loads declare real electricity utilization benefit, the electricity generation cost is declared when other generator sets declare electricity generation costThen, the generator set k declares the false power generation cost if it is
Figure BDA00022480138400001516
The payment obtained is then:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00022480138400001518
reporting power generation cost for other generator sets
Figure BDA00022480138400001519
Meanwhile, the markets of other generator sets output clear power;the total output clear power of all the generator sets of the system is obtained;
Figure BDA00022480138400001521
k declares false power generation cost for generator set
Figure BDA00022480138400001522
The market clearing power in time;
if the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckThen the payment obtained is:
Figure BDA00022480138400001523
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00022480138400001524
k-declared real power generation cost c of representing generator setkThe market clearing power in time;
for any generator set, the generator set k reports the false generation cost
Figure BDA00022480138400001525
In time, the net profit is:
Figure BDA00022480138400001526
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002248013840000162
total genset cost for new system markets that do not include genset k;
Figure BDA0002248013840000163
declaring false power generation cost for generator set k when the system comprises the generator set k
Figure BDA0002248013840000164
Market clearing costs for other generator sets (i.e., generator sets other than k) in the market.
When the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckIn time, the net profit is:
Figure BDA0002248013840000165
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002248013840000166
declaring a true power generation cost c for a generator set k when the system includes the generator set kkMarket clearing costs for other generator sets;
in the calculation formula of the net profit, the first term at the right end of the equation is irrelevant to the power generation cost declared by the generator set k; while
Figure BDA0002248013840000167
And
Figure BDA0002248013840000168
declaring the true generating cost c for the generator set k respectivelykAnd other generator sets report the cost of power generation
Figure BDA0002248013840000169
The system of time is the best plan of clearing, so there are:
Figure BDA00022480138400001610
therefore, the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckThe net profit obtained is not less than the net profit of the virtual strike, that is:
Figure BDA00022480138400001611
when the generator set k declares the real power generation cost, the excitation compatibility of the generator set;
as for the individual rationality of the generator set,equivalent to adding in the clear model of all generator sets
Figure BDA00022480138400001613
A constraint condition; therefore, the feasible range of the optimization of the output model is reduced, and the objective function value is not less than that of all generator sets participating in the output of the market at the day-ahead, so that:
Figure BDA00022480138400001614
preferably, for the large user j on the demand side, assuming that all the generator sets report the real power generation cost, when the large users on the other demand sides report the power utilization benefit
Figure BDA00022480138400001615
In time, if a large user j on the demand side reports false electricity utilization benefitThe payment that needs to be given is:
Figure BDA00022480138400001617
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00022480138400001618
reporting power utilization benefits for other large users on other demand sides of system
Figure BDA00022480138400001619
The market clearing power of other large users on the demand side is released;
Figure BDA00022480138400001620
the total clearing power of all large users on the demand side of the system is obtained;
Figure BDA00022480138400001621
false reporting of electricity utilization benefits for large user j on demand side
Figure BDA0002248013840000171
The market clearing power in time;
if the large user j on the demand side reports the real electricity utilization benefit bjThen the payment that needs to be given is:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002248013840000173
the large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit bjThe market clearing power in time;
for any large user on the demand side, the aim is to maximize the net benefit of the user, namely, the electricity utilization benefit of the large user on the demand side is subtracted by the payment amount required by the large user on the demand side, so that the large user j on the demand side reports the electricity utilization benefit in a false mode
Figure BDA0002248013840000174
The net benefits are:
Figure BDA0002248013840000175
wherein the content of the first and second substances,when the system comprises a large user j at the demand side, the large user j at the demand side reports the electricity utilization efficiency in a false mode
Figure BDA0002248013840000177
The market of other large users on the demand side produces clear electricity utilization benefits;
Figure BDA0002248013840000178
the total electricity utilization benefit of the demand side large users of the new system market which does not contain the demand side large users j is obtained;
when a large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit bjThe net benefits are:
Figure BDA0002248013840000179
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00022480138400001710
when the system comprises a large user j at the demand side, the large user j at the demand side declares the real electricity utilization benefit bjThe market of other demand side large users except j produces clear electricity utilization benefits;
in the calculation formula of the net benefit, the last term at the right end of the equation is irrelevant to the electricity utilization benefit reported by the large user j at the demand side; whileAnd
Figure BDA00022480138400001712
respectively declaring real electricity utilization benefits b for large users j on demand sidejOther large users on demand side report the power utilization benefit
Figure BDA00022480138400001713
System optimal time outThe plan is clear, so:
Figure BDA00022480138400001714
therefore, the large user j at the demand side reports the real electricity utilization benefit bjThe net benefit obtained in time is not less than the benefit of reporting false electricity utilization
Figure BDA00022480138400001715
The net benefits of (a), namely:
Figure BDA00022480138400001716
when the large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit, the incentive compatibility of the large user on the demand side;
for the individuality of the large users on the demand side,
Figure BDA00022480138400001717
equivalent to the addition of the clearing model with the participation of large users on all demand sides
Figure BDA0002248013840000181
Constraint conditions, therefore, the clear model optimization feasible domain is reduced, the objective function value is not less than that of all large users on the demand side participating in the market clearing in the day, and therefore:
Figure BDA0002248013840000182
preferably, the generator set declares a real power generation cost quotation, the demand side large user declares a real power utilization benefit, and the social welfare is maximized, wherein the social welfare maximization target is automatically met by a day-ahead market clearing model when the generator set and the demand side large user declare the real power generation cost and the power utilization benefit under the condition that the generator set and the demand side large user meet incentive compatibility and individuality.
For the specific limitations of the apparatus, reference may be made to the limitations of the method described above, which are not described in detail herein. The various modules in the above-described apparatus may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, and combinations thereof. The modules can be embedded in a hardware form or independent from a processor in the computer device, and can also be stored in a memory in the computer device in a software form, so that the processor can call and execute operations corresponding to the modules.
The apparatus provided above may be used to perform the method provided in any of the embodiments above, with corresponding functions and benefits.
In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, which may be a terminal, and its internal structure diagram may be as shown in fig. 12. The computer device includes a processor, a memory, a network interface, a display screen, and an input device connected by a system bus. Wherein the processor of the computer device is configured to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device comprises a nonvolatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of an operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The network interface of the computer device is used for communicating with an external terminal through a network connection. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement a method of indoor positioning of an air sensor. The display screen of the computer equipment can be a liquid crystal display screen or an electronic ink display screen, and the input device of the computer equipment can be a touch layer covered on the display screen, a key, a track ball or a touch pad arranged on the shell of the computer equipment, an external keyboard, a touch pad or a mouse and the like.
Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the architecture shown in fig. 12 is merely a block diagram of some of the structures associated with the disclosed aspects and is not intended to limit the computing devices to which the disclosed aspects apply, as particular computing devices may include more or less components than those shown, or may combine certain components, or have a different arrangement of components.
In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, comprising a memory having a computer program stored therein and a processor implementing the above method when executing the computer program.
In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, which when executed by a processor implements the above-described method.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or part of the processes of the methods of the embodiments described above can be implemented by hardware instructions of a computer program, which can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, can include the processes of the embodiments of the methods described above. Any reference to memory, storage, database, or other medium used in the embodiments provided herein may include non-volatile and/or volatile memory, among others. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), Programmable ROM (PROM), Electrically Programmable ROM (EPROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can include Random Access Memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in a variety of forms such as Static RAM (SRAM), Dynamic RAM (DRAM), Synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), Double Data Rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), Enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), Synchronous Link DRAM (SLDRAM), Rambus Direct RAM (RDRAM), direct bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM).
The technical features of the above embodiments can be arbitrarily combined, and for the sake of brevity, all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are not described, but should be considered as the scope of the present specification as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
The above-mentioned embodiments only express several embodiments of the present application, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but not construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that, for a person skilled in the art, several variations and modifications can be made without departing from the concept of the present application, which falls within the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present patent shall be subject to the appended claims.

Claims (10)

1. A method for clearing a day-ahead market containing a demand side bidding is characterized by comprising the following steps:
pre-establishing a day-ahead market clearing model containing demand side bidding; wherein the day-ahead market clearing model comprises an objective function and a constraint condition which aim at maximizing social welfare;
when the real power generation cost declared by the conventional unit and the real power utilization benefit declared by the large user on the demand side, the day-ahead market clearing model achieves the goal of maximizing social welfare.
2. The method of claim 1,
the objective function is:
Figure FDA0002248013830000011
the constraint conditions include:
supply and demand balance constraint:
Figure FDA0002248013830000012
and (3) power transmission line capacity constraint:
Figure FDA0002248013830000013
and (3) output restraint of the generator set:
Figure FDA0002248013830000015
the electricity purchasing constraint of large users on the demand side is as follows:
Figure FDA0002248013830000016
wherein n represents a node included in the power system; i represents the ith node; g is a generator set participating in market bidding; d is a large user set on the demand side;
Figure FDA0002248013830000017
the active output of the generator set k at the node k is obtained;
Figure FDA0002248013830000018
the power purchasing power of a large user j at a demand side of a node j is obtained;
Figure FDA0002248013830000019
the required power of the large user j on the demand side is
Figure FDA00022480138300000110
Electricity utilization efficiency;
Figure FDA00022480138300000111
k for the generator set
Figure FDA00022480138300000112
The cost of electricity generation; fliA power generation transfer distribution factor of the node i to the power transmission line l;
Figure FDA00022480138300000113
the output of the generator set at the node i;
Figure FDA00022480138300000114
the electricity purchasing quantity of a large user on a demand side is obtained;
Figure FDA00022480138300000115
is the transmission capacity of line l;
Figure FDA00022480138300000116
the upper limit of the output of the generator set;the power purchase upper limit of the large user on the demand side.
3. The method as claimed in claim 2, wherein under the LMP mechanism, the lagrangian function for optimizing the market-ahead clearing model is:
Figure FDA0002248013830000021
under LMP mechanism, node price of node i
Figure FDA0002248013830000022
Comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002248013830000023
according to the node price
Figure FDA0002248013830000024
System operator pays for generator set k at node k
Figure FDA0002248013830000025
Comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002248013830000026
according to the node price
Figure FDA0002248013830000027
The cost paid to the system operator by the large user j on the demand side at the node j
Figure FDA0002248013830000028
Comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA0002248013830000029
suppose that
Figure FDA00022480138300000210
For the best solution of the model to be presented in the future, under the VCG mechanism, the system operator pays the cost of the generator set k at the node k
Figure FDA00022480138300000211
Comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA00022480138300000212
under the VCG mechanism, the large user j at the demand side of the node j pays the cost of the system operator
Figure FDA00022480138300000213
Comprises the following steps:
Figure FDA00022480138300000214
wherein λ is1Lagrange multipliers that are supply and demand balance constraints;
Figure FDA00022480138300000215
and
Figure FDA00022480138300000216
lagrange multipliers which are power transmission line capacity constraints;
Figure FDA00022480138300000217
social welfare for all members when participating in the system market;
Figure FDA00022480138300000218
social welfare for a new system market that does not include genset k;
Figure FDA00022480138300000219
is a social benefit of a new system market that does not contain demand side large users j.
4. A method according to claim 3, wherein for genset k, assuming all loads are reporting true electricity usage benefits, the cost of electricity generation is reported when other gensets are reporting electricity generation costs
Figure FDA00022480138300000220
Then, the generator set k declares the false power generation cost if it is
Figure FDA00022480138300000221
The payment obtained is then:
Figure FDA00022480138300000222
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0002248013830000031
reporting power generation cost for other generator sets
Figure FDA0002248013830000032
Meanwhile, the markets of other generator sets output clear power;
Figure FDA0002248013830000033
the total output clear power of all the generator sets of the system is obtained;
Figure FDA0002248013830000034
k declares false power generation cost for generator set
Figure FDA0002248013830000035
The market clearing power in time;
if the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckThen the payment obtained is:
Figure FDA0002248013830000036
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0002248013830000037
k-declared real power generation cost c of representing generator setkThe market clearing power in time;
for any generator set, the generator set k reports the false generation cost
Figure FDA0002248013830000038
In time, the net profit is:
Figure FDA0002248013830000039
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA00022480138300000310
total genset cost for new system markets that do not include genset k;
Figure FDA00022480138300000311
declaring false power generation cost for generator set k when the system comprises the generator set k
Figure FDA00022480138300000312
Market clearing costs for other generator sets (i.e., generator sets other than k) in the market;
when the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckIn time, the net profit is:
Figure FDA00022480138300000313
wherein the content of the first and second substances,declaring a true power generation cost c for a generator set k when the system includes the generator set kkMarket clearing costs for other generator sets;
in the calculation formula of the net profit, the first term at the right end of the equation is irrelevant to the power generation cost declared by the generator set k; whileAnd
Figure FDA00022480138300000316
declaring the true generating cost c for the generator set k respectivelykAnd other generator sets report the cost of power generationThe system of time is the best plan of clearing, so there are:
Figure FDA00022480138300000318
therefore, the generator set k declares the real power generation cost ckThe net profit obtained is not less than the net profit of the virtual strike, that is:
when the generator set k declares the real power generation cost, the excitation compatibility of the generator set;
as for the individual rationality of the generator set,
Figure FDA00022480138300000320
equivalent to adding in the clear model of all generator sets
Figure FDA00022480138300000321
A constraint condition; therefore, the optimization of the output model is feasibleThe domain is reduced, the objective function value is not less than the objective function value of all generator sets participating in the market clearing in the day, therefore:
5. the method of claim 4, wherein for the large demand side user j, assuming that all generator sets claim the true cost of power generation, the other large demand side users claim the benefit of power utilization
Figure FDA0002248013830000042
In time, if a large user j on the demand side reports false electricity utilization benefitThe payment that needs to be given is:
Figure FDA0002248013830000044
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0002248013830000045
reporting power utilization benefits for other large users on other demand sides of system
Figure FDA0002248013830000046
The market clearing power of other large users on the demand side is released;
Figure FDA0002248013830000047
the total clearing power of all large users on the demand side of the system is obtained;false reporting of electricity utilization benefits for large user j on demand side
Figure FDA0002248013830000049
The market clearing power in time;
if the large user j on the demand side reports the real electricity utilization benefit bjThen the payment that needs to be given is:
Figure FDA00022480138300000410
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA00022480138300000411
the large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit bjThe market clearing power in time;
for any large user on the demand side, the aim is to maximize the net benefit of the user, namely, the electricity utilization benefit of the large user on the demand side is subtracted by the payment amount required by the large user on the demand side, so that the large user j on the demand side reports the electricity utilization benefit in a false mode
Figure FDA00022480138300000412
The net benefits are:
Figure FDA00022480138300000413
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA00022480138300000414
when the system comprises a large user j at the demand side, the large user j at the demand side reports the electricity utilization efficiency in a false mode
Figure FDA00022480138300000415
The market of other large users on the demand side produces clear electricity utilization benefits;the total electricity utilization benefit of the demand side large users of the new system market which does not contain the demand side large users j is obtained;
when a large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit bjThe net benefits are:
Figure FDA00022480138300000417
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA00022480138300000418
when the system comprises a large user j at the demand side, the large user j at the demand side declares the real electricity utilization benefit bjThe market of other demand side large users except j produces clear electricity utilization benefits;
in the calculation formula of the net benefit, the last term at the right end of the equation is irrelevant to the electricity utilization benefit reported by the large user j at the demand side; whileAnd
Figure FDA00022480138300000420
respectively declaring real electricity utilization benefits b for large users j on demand sidejOther large users on demand side report the power utilization benefit
Figure FDA0002248013830000051
The system of time is the best plan of clearing, so there are:
therefore, the large user j at the demand side reports the real electricity utilization benefit bjThe net benefit obtained in time is not less than the benefit of reporting false electricity utilization
Figure FDA0002248013830000053
The net benefits of (a), namely:
Figure FDA0002248013830000054
when the large user j on the demand side declares the real power utilization benefit, the incentive compatibility of the large user on the demand side;
for the individuality of the large users on the demand side,
Figure FDA0002248013830000055
equivalent to the addition of the clearing model with the participation of large users on all demand sides
Figure FDA0002248013830000056
Constraint conditions, therefore, the clear model optimization feasible domain is reduced, the objective function value is not less than that of all large users on the demand side participating in the market clearing in the day, and therefore:
Figure FDA0002248013830000057
6. the method of claim 5, wherein the generating set declares a real power generation cost quotation, the demand side large user declares a real power utilization benefit, and the social welfare is maximized, and the social welfare maximization target is automatically met by a day-ahead market clearing model when the generating set and the demand side large user declare the real power generation cost and the power utilization benefit under the condition that the generating set and the demand side large user meet incentive compatibility and individuality.
7. A day-ahead market dispensing apparatus including a demand side bidding, comprising:
the model establishing module is used for pre-establishing a day-ahead market clearing model containing the bidding of the demand side; wherein the day-ahead market clearing model comprises an objective function and a constraint condition which aim at maximizing social welfare;
and the clearing module is used for enabling the day-ahead market clearing model to achieve the goal of maximizing social welfare when the real power generation cost declared by the conventional unit and the real power utilization benefit declared by a large user on the demand side.
8. The apparatus of claim 7,
the objective function is:
Figure FDA0002248013830000058
the constraint conditions include:
supply and demand balance constraint:
Figure FDA0002248013830000059
and (3) power transmission line capacity constraint:
Figure FDA00022480138300000510
Figure FDA0002248013830000061
and (3) output restraint of the generator set:
the electricity purchasing constraint of large users on the demand side is as follows:
wherein n represents a node included in the power system; i represents the ith node; g is a generator set participating in market bidding; d is a large user set on the demand side;
Figure FDA0002248013830000064
the active output of the generator set k at the node k is obtained;
Figure FDA0002248013830000065
the power purchasing power of a large user j at a demand side of a node j is obtained;
Figure FDA0002248013830000066
the required power of the large user j on the demand side is
Figure FDA0002248013830000067
Electricity utilization efficiency;
Figure FDA0002248013830000068
k for the generator set
Figure FDA0002248013830000069
The cost of electricity generation; fliA power generation transfer distribution factor of the node i to the power transmission line l;
Figure FDA00022480138300000610
the output of the generator set at the node i;
Figure FDA00022480138300000611
the electricity purchasing quantity of a large user on a demand side is obtained;
Figure FDA00022480138300000612
is the transmission capacity of line l;
Figure FDA00022480138300000613
the upper limit of the output of the generator set;
Figure FDA00022480138300000614
the power purchase upper limit of the large user on the demand side.
9. A computer apparatus comprising a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, wherein the processor when executing the computer program implements the steps of the method for a day-ahead market clearing with a demand side bid of any one of claims 1 to 6.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the method for the daily market clearing with a demand side bid according to any one of claims 1 to 6.
CN201911023668.7A 2019-10-25 2019-10-25 Day-ahead market clearing method and device with demand side bidding, and computer equipment Pending CN110827067A (en)

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