CN110704339B - Data destruction method, device, equipment and medium - Google Patents
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- G06F21/78—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data
- G06F21/79—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data in semiconductor storage media, e.g. directly-addressable memories
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- G06F3/00—Input arrangements for transferring data to be processed into a form capable of being handled by the computer; Output arrangements for transferring data from processing unit to output unit, e.g. interface arrangements
- G06F3/06—Digital input from, or digital output to, record carriers, e.g. RAID, emulated record carriers or networked record carriers
- G06F3/0601—Interfaces specially adapted for storage systems
- G06F3/0602—Interfaces specially adapted for storage systems specifically adapted to achieve a particular effect
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Abstract
The application discloses a data destruction method, a data destruction device, equipment and a medium, which relate to the technical field of data storage, and the method comprises the following steps: judging whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system or not; if the target storage system is not the credible storage system, judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip; and if the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction. Therefore, after the target storage system is automatically detected to be an untrusted system and the flash memory chip of the solid state disk is a secret-related flash memory chip, the secret-related flash memory chip is powered on in a self-destruction power supply mode, the secret-related flash memory chip is rapidly damaged in a high-voltage mode, data destruction can be automatically, rapidly, efficiently and thoroughly achieved, and data physical destruction can still be achieved under the condition that the target storage system is powered off or the solid state disk is plugged.
Description
Technical Field
The present application relates to the field of data storage technologies, and in particular, to a data destruction method, apparatus, device, and medium.
Background
The Solid State Drive (SSD) uses Nand Flash memory (Nand Flash) as a storage medium, has the advantages of high IOPS (Input/Output Operations Per Second), high bandwidth, high shock resistance, wide working environment adaptability, and the like, and is widely used in various industries such as commerce, industry, and the like. Meanwhile, the modern society has higher and higher requirements on information security, and the storage device is required to support high-level characteristics such as trusted starting, data encryption and data destruction. As shown in fig. 1, the logic structure of a common solid state disk includes hardware such as a controller, a Nand Flash Memory (Nand Flash), a host interface, a Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM) power supply, a clock, and an FTL module running on the controller.
In the prior art, data in a Nand flash memory is mainly subjected to Block Erase (Block Erase) through firmware of a solid state disk, so that data destruction is realized. However, when data destruction is implemented in this way, the storage system in a normal operating state must actively initiate an erase command to the solid state disk to implement data destruction. The larger the storage capacity of the solid state disk is, the longer the whole disk erasing time is, the problems of untimely data destruction and low destruction efficiency exist, in addition, in the erasing process, if the solid state disk is plugged or the power of a storage system is lost, the data destruction operation cannot be completed, after the Nand flash memory is taken out of the solid state disk, effective data can be recovered from the Nand flash memory through other methods, and the data destruction is not thorough.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, an object of the present application is to provide a data destruction method, apparatus, device, and medium, which can automatically, quickly, efficiently, and thoroughly implement data destruction, and can still implement physical data destruction when a target storage system is powered off or a solid state disk is plugged. The specific scheme is as follows:
in a first aspect, the present application discloses a data destruction method applied to a solid state disk, including:
judging whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system or not;
if the target storage system is not the credible storage system, judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip;
and if the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction.
Optionally, the determining whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system includes:
when a target storage system which normally works is inserted, detecting whether a security certificate of the target storage system meets a preset requirement;
if the security certificate of the target storage system meets the preset requirement, judging that the target storage system is a trusted storage system, and setting a corresponding local first zone bit to be a first preset value;
and if the security certificate of the target storage system does not meet the preset requirement, judging that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system, and setting the corresponding local first zone bit to be a second preset value.
Optionally, the determining whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system includes:
when the target storage system is unplugged or the target storage system is powered off, detecting whether the first zone bit is the first preset value or not;
if the first flag bit is the first preset value, the target storage system is judged to be a trusted storage system;
and if the first flag bit is the second preset value, judging that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system.
Optionally, the determining whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip includes:
judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret flash memory chip or not by detecting whether the local second zone bit is a third preset value or not;
if the second zone bit is a third preset value, the self flash memory chip is judged to be a secret-related flash memory chip;
and if the second zone bit is not the third preset value, judging that the flash memory chip per se is a non-secret-related flash memory chip.
Optionally, before determining whether the flash memory chip itself is a secret-related flash memory chip by detecting whether the local second flag bit is a third preset value, the method further includes:
determining the numerical value of a local second zone bit in a manual setting mode;
or, the value of the local second zone bit is determined by monitoring the sensitivity of the self-stored data.
Optionally, after determining whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip, the method further includes:
and when a target storage system which normally works is inserted and the target storage system is an untrusted system, if the flash memory chip is judged to be a non-secret-involved flash memory chip, the read-write operation is forbidden.
Optionally, after determining whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip, the method further includes:
and when the target storage system is unplugged from the target storage system or the target storage system is powered off and the target storage system is an untrusted system, if the flash memory chip is judged to be a non-secret-involved flash memory chip, the power is normally shut down.
Optionally, the step of supplying power to the secret-related flash memory chip in a self-destruction power supply mode to implement physical data destruction includes:
and a Nand power supply module is used for supplying 12V voltage to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction.
In a second aspect, the present application discloses a data destruction apparatus, comprising:
the system credibility judging module is used for judging whether the target storage system is a credible storage system or not;
the secret-related judging module is used for judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip or not when the judging result of the system credibility judging module is negative;
and the self-destruction power supply module is used for supplying power to the secret-related flash memory chip by adopting a self-destruction power supply mode when the judgment result of the secret-related judgment module is yes so as to realize physical data destruction.
In a third aspect, the present application discloses a data destruction device, comprising:
a memory and a processor;
wherein the memory is used for storing a computer program;
the processor is configured to execute the computer program to implement the data destruction method disclosed above.
In a fourth aspect, the present application discloses a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the data destruction method disclosed above.
Therefore, whether a target storage system is a trusted storage system or not is judged firstly, if the target storage system is not the trusted storage system, whether a flash memory chip of the target storage system is a secret-related flash memory chip or not is judged, and if the flash memory chip is the secret-related flash memory chip, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical destruction of data. Therefore, after the target storage system is automatically detected to be an untrusted system and the flash memory chip of the solid state disk is a secret-related flash memory chip, the secret-related flash memory chip is powered on in a self-destruction power supply mode, the secret-related flash memory chip is rapidly damaged in a high-voltage mode, data destruction can be automatically, rapidly, efficiently and thoroughly achieved, and data physical destruction can still be achieved under the condition that the target storage system is powered off or the solid state disk is plugged.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings needed to be used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only embodiments of the present application, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the provided drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a logic structure diagram of a conventional solid state disk disclosed in the present application;
fig. 2 is a flowchart of a data destruction method disclosed in the present application;
fig. 3 is a logic structure diagram of a solid state disk disclosed in the present application;
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of a specific data destruction method disclosed herein;
FIG. 5 is a flow chart of a specific data destruction method disclosed herein;
fig. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a data destruction apparatus disclosed in the present application;
fig. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of a data destruction apparatus disclosed in the present application.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present application.
At present, data destruction of a solid state disk is mainly realized by performing Block Erase (Block Erase) on data in a Nand flash memory of the solid state disk through firmware of the solid state disk. However, when data destruction is implemented in this way, the storage system in a normal operating state must actively initiate an erase command to the solid state disk to implement data destruction. The larger the storage capacity of the solid state disk is, the longer the whole disk erasing time is, the problems of untimely data destruction and low destruction efficiency exist, in addition, in the erasing process, if the solid state disk is plugged or the power of a storage system is lost, the data destruction operation cannot be completed, after the Nand flash memory is taken out of the solid state disk, effective data can be recovered from the Nand flash memory through other methods, and the data destruction is not thorough.
The embodiment of the application discloses a data destruction method, which is applied to a solid state disk and is shown in fig. 2, and the method comprises the following steps:
step S11: it is determined whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system.
It is understood that the storage system is a storage system connected with a solid state disk, and the target storage system includes, but is not limited to, a computer. When a target storage system which normally works is inserted, whether the security certificate of the target storage system meets a preset requirement or not is automatically detected, so that whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system or not is judged, and a corresponding numerical value of a zone bit is obtained. When the target storage system is unplugged from the target storage system or the target storage system is powered off, whether the target storage system is a credible storage system is judged by utilizing the numerical value of the corresponding zone bit obtained when the target storage system in a normal working state is plugged.
Step S12: and if the target storage system is not the credible storage system, judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip.
In this embodiment, the target storage system is not a trusted storage system, and it may be specifically understood that a security certificate of the target storage system does not meet the requirement of the solid state disk firmware, and there may be a risk in storing data of the solid state disk through the target storage system.
In this embodiment, if the target storage system is a trusted system, the flash memory chip is powered by a normal working voltage, and a normal working process is performed to perform normal data exchange with the target storage system. For example, a voltage of 2.5V or 1.8V is used to supply power to the flash memory chip, so as to enter a normal working flow and perform normal data exchange with the target storage system.
Step S13: and if the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction.
It is understood that the secret-related flash memory chip is a flash memory chip that stores data with a sensitivity exceeding a preset sensitivity threshold. And when the target storage system is an untrusted storage system and the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip, so that the secret-related flash memory chip is destroyed due to high voltage, and physical data destruction is realized. The voltage value provided by the self-destruction power supply mode is larger than the maximum withstand voltage value of the secret-related flash memory chip.
In the embodiment, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction, so that the data can be rapidly destroyed, the data destruction efficiency is improved, and the data can be more thoroughly destroyed. When the data is destroyed by using the prior art, along with the fact that the capacity of the solid state disk is larger and larger, the time for erasing the data is longer and longer, the total erasing time of the 1.6TB solid state disk is estimated to exceed 30S, if the power failure occurs in 30S, the erasing operation is stopped, and after the Nand flash memory is taken down from the solid state disk, the effective data can be recovered from the Nand flash memory by other methods. In the embodiment, the Nand flash memory chip damaged by high voltage only needs mS time, and after the Nand flash memory chip is physically damaged, the Nand flash memory chip cannot be repaired, data destruction is more thorough, and the condition that information leakage is caused by data recovery cannot occur.
In this embodiment, a logical structure diagram of the solid state disk can be shown in fig. 3. The solid state disk comprises hardware such as a controller, a Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), a Nand Flash memory (Nand Flash), a power supply, a standby power supply, a clock, a Nand power supply, a host interface and the like, and further comprises an FTL module running on the controller. The FTL module comprises trusted detection, an interface protocol, input/output management (IO management), a trimming instruction (TRIM), a Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID), Garbage Collection/Wear Leveling (GC/WL), Nand management, an FCC interface and upgrade/smart management. The host interface may include Non-Volatile Memory host controller interface specification (NVMe), Serial Advanced Technology Attachment (SATA), Serial Attached small computer system interface (SAS). The controller is configured to control each part of the solid state disk to execute a corresponding program, so as to implement the data destruction method disclosed in this embodiment and the following embodiments. And the Nand power supply is used for transforming the voltage discharged by the standby power supply to the Nand flash memory, so that physical data destruction is realized. The trusted detection is used for detecting whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system.
Therefore, whether a target storage system is a trusted storage system or not is judged firstly, if the target storage system is not the trusted storage system, whether a flash memory chip of the target storage system is a secret-related flash memory chip or not is judged, and if the flash memory chip is the secret-related flash memory chip, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical destruction of data. Therefore, after the target storage system is automatically detected to be an untrusted system and the flash memory chip of the solid state disk is a secret-related flash memory chip, the secret-related flash memory chip is powered on in a self-destruction power supply mode, the secret-related flash memory chip is rapidly damaged in a high-voltage mode, data destruction can be automatically, rapidly, efficiently and thoroughly achieved, and data physical destruction can still be achieved under the condition that the target storage system is powered off or the solid state disk is plugged.
Referring to fig. 4, an embodiment of the present application discloses a specific data destruction method applied to a solid state disk, where the method includes:
step S21: when a target storage system which normally works is inserted, whether a safety certificate of the target storage system meets a preset requirement is detected.
It can be understood that, when a target storage system in normal operation is inserted, the solid state disk interacts with the target storage system to obtain a security certificate of the target storage system, and detects whether the security certificate meets the requirement of the firmware of the solid state disk, so as to determine whether the target storage system is a trusted system.
Step S22: and if the security certificate of the target storage system does not meet the preset requirement, judging that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system, and setting the corresponding local first zone bit to be a second preset value.
In this embodiment, if the security certificate of the target storage system does not meet the requirement of the firmware of the solid state disk, it is determined that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system, and the corresponding local first flag bit is set to the second preset value.
Correspondingly, in this embodiment, if the security certificate of the target storage system meets the preset requirement, it is determined that the target storage system is a trusted storage system, and the corresponding local first flag bit is set to the first preset value. That is, if the security certificate of the target storage system meets the requirement of the firmware of the solid state disk, it is determined that the target storage system is a trusted storage system, and the corresponding local first flag bit is set to a first preset value.
In this embodiment, the first preset value and the second preset value may be represented by any one of a binary system, an octal system, and a hexadecimal system, and the first preset value is not equal to the second preset value. The first zone bit is registered in a register of the solid state disk and separated from a target storage system, so that when the solid state disk is pulled out of the target storage system or the target storage system is powered off, the first zone bit can still be utilized to realize physical data destruction.
Step S23: and judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret flash memory chip or not by detecting whether the local second zone bit is a third preset value or not.
In this embodiment, before determining whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip by detecting whether the local second flag bit is a third preset value, the method further includes: the value of the local second flag bit is determined.
In a first specific embodiment, the determining a value of the local second flag bit may specifically include: and determining the value of the local second zone bit in a manual setting mode. Specifically, it can be understood that the user manually sets the value of the local second flag bit according to the importance and sensitivity of the data stored in the solid state disk. And if the importance and the sensitivity reach the secret standard of the user, setting the value of the second zone bit as a third preset value.
In another specific embodiment, the determining the value of the local second flag bit may specifically include: and determining the value of the local second zone bit by monitoring the sensitivity of the self-stored data. Specifically, it may be understood that the solid state disk firmware automatically detects the sensitivity of the data stored in the solid state disk itself, and compares the sensitivity with a preset sensitivity threshold to determine the value of the local second flag bit. And if the sensitivity is greater than or equal to a preset sensitivity threshold value, setting the numerical value of the second zone bit to be a third preset value.
It is understood that the third preset value can be represented by any one of binary, octal and hexadecimal. And the second zone bit is also registered in a register of the solid state disk.
Step S24: and if the second zone bit is a third preset value, judging that the flash memory chip per se is a secret flash memory chip.
Correspondingly, in this embodiment, if the second flag bit is not the third preset value, it is determined that the flash memory chip is a non-secret-involved flash memory chip.
Step S25: and a Nand power supply module is used for supplying 12V voltage to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction.
In this embodiment, when it is detected that the target storage system is an untrusted system and the flash memory chip of the solid state disk is a secret-related flash memory chip, the Nand power supply module boosts the voltage emitted by the standby power module to 12V and supplies the 12V voltage to the secret-related flash memory chip, so that the secret-related flash memory chip is damaged due to high voltage, and physical data destruction is realized. The Nand power supply module and the standby power module are both positioned on the solid state disk, so that physical data destruction can be realized when the solid state disk is pulled out of the target storage system or the target storage system is powered off.
In addition, in this embodiment, if the target storage system is an untrusted system but the flash memory chip of the solid state disk is a non-secret-involved chip, the solid state disk is prohibited from performing the read-write operation.
Referring to fig. 5, an embodiment of the present application discloses a specific data destruction method applied to a solid state disk, where the method includes:
step S31: and when the target storage system is unplugged or the target storage system is powered off, detecting whether the first zone bit is the first preset value.
It can be understood that, when a target storage system in normal operation is inserted, the firmware of the solid state disk may determine whether the target storage system is a trusted system, and set the local first flag bit to the first preset value when the target storage system is the trusted storage system, and set the local first flag bit to the second preset value when the target storage system is the untrusted storage system. Therefore, when the target storage system is unplugged from the target storage system or the target storage system is powered off, whether the first zone bit is the first preset value or not is directly detected, and whether the target storage system is a trusted system or not can be judged.
Step S32: and if the first flag bit is the second preset value, judging that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system.
It can be understood that the value of the first flag bit is a first preset value or a second preset value. And if the first flag bit is not the first preset value, determining that the target storage system is an untrusted system, that is, if the first flag bit is the second preset value, determining that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system.
Step S33: and judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret flash memory chip or not by detecting whether the local second zone bit is a third preset value or not.
Step S34: and if the second zone bit is a third preset value, judging that the flash memory chip per se is a secret flash memory chip.
Step S35: and a Nand power supply module is used for supplying 12V voltage to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction.
In this embodiment, when it is detected that the target storage system is an untrusted system and the flash memory chip of the solid state disk is a secret-related flash memory chip, the Nand power supply module boosts the voltage emitted by the standby power module to 12V and supplies the 12V voltage to the secret-related flash memory chip, so that the secret-related flash memory chip is damaged due to high voltage, and physical data destruction is realized.
In addition, in this embodiment, if the target storage system is a trusted system, or if the target storage system is an untrusted system but the flash memory chip of the solid state disk is a non-secret-involved chip, the solid state disk is powered off normally. Specifically, if the target storage system is an untrusted system but the flash memory chip of the solid state disk is a non-secret-related chip, the standby power module supplies power to the non-secret-related flash memory chip in a normal working power supply mode, and supports a Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) to completely write data into the non-secret-related flash memory.
The specific processes of step S33 and step S34 may refer to the corresponding contents disclosed in the foregoing embodiments, and are not described herein again.
Referring to fig. 6, an embodiment of the present application discloses a data destruction device, including:
the system credibility judging module 11 is used for judging whether the target storage system is a credible storage system;
the secret-related judging module 12 is used for judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip or not when the judging result of the system credibility judging module is negative;
and the self-destruction power supply module 13 is used for supplying power to the secret-related flash memory chip by adopting a self-destruction power supply mode when the judgment result of the secret-related judgment module is yes, so as to realize physical data destruction.
Therefore, whether a target storage system is a trusted storage system or not is judged firstly, if the target storage system is not the trusted storage system, whether a flash memory chip of the target storage system is a secret-related flash memory chip or not is judged, and if the flash memory chip is the secret-related flash memory chip, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical destruction of data. Therefore, after the target storage system is automatically detected to be an untrusted system and the flash memory chip of the solid state disk is a secret-related flash memory chip, the secret-related flash memory chip is powered on in a self-destruction power supply mode, the secret-related flash memory chip is rapidly damaged in a high-voltage mode, data destruction can be automatically, rapidly, efficiently and thoroughly achieved, and data physical destruction can still be achieved under the condition that the target storage system is powered off or the solid state disk is plugged.
Further, referring to fig. 7, an embodiment of the present application further discloses a data destruction device, including: a processor 21 and a memory 22.
Wherein the memory 22 is used for storing a computer program; the processor 21 is configured to execute the computer program to implement the data destruction method disclosed in the foregoing embodiment.
For the specific process of the data destruction method, reference may be made to corresponding contents disclosed in the foregoing embodiments, and details are not repeated here.
Further, an embodiment of the present application also discloses a computer readable storage medium for storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the following steps:
judging whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system or not; if the target storage system is not the credible storage system, judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip; and if the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction.
Therefore, whether a target storage system is a trusted storage system or not is judged firstly, if the target storage system is not the trusted storage system, whether a flash memory chip of the target storage system is a secret-related flash memory chip or not is judged, and if the flash memory chip is the secret-related flash memory chip, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical destruction of data. Therefore, after the target storage system is automatically detected to be an untrusted system and the flash memory chip of the solid state disk is a secret-related flash memory chip, the secret-related flash memory chip is powered on in a self-destruction power supply mode, the secret-related flash memory chip is rapidly damaged in a high-voltage mode, data destruction can be automatically, rapidly, efficiently and thoroughly achieved, and data physical destruction can still be achieved under the condition that the target storage system is powered off or the solid state disk is plugged.
In this embodiment, when the computer subprogram stored in the computer-readable storage medium is executed by the processor, the following steps may be specifically implemented: when a target storage system which normally works is inserted, detecting whether a security certificate of the target storage system meets a preset requirement; if the security certificate of the target storage system meets the preset requirement, judging that the target storage system is a trusted storage system, and setting a corresponding local first zone bit to be a first preset value; and if the security certificate of the target storage system does not meet the preset requirement, judging that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system, and setting the corresponding local first zone bit to be a second preset value.
In this embodiment, when the computer subprogram stored in the computer-readable storage medium is executed by the processor, the following steps may be specifically implemented: when the target storage system is unplugged or the target storage system is powered off, detecting whether the first zone bit is the first preset value or not; if the first flag bit is the first preset value, the target storage system is judged to be a trusted storage system; and if the first flag bit is the second preset value, judging that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system.
In this embodiment, when the computer subprogram stored in the computer-readable storage medium is executed by the processor, the following steps may be specifically implemented: judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret flash memory chip or not by detecting whether the local second zone bit is a third preset value or not; if the second zone bit is a third preset value, the self flash memory chip is judged to be a secret-related flash memory chip; and if the second zone bit is not the third preset value, judging that the flash memory chip per se is a non-secret-related flash memory chip.
In this embodiment, when the computer subprogram stored in the computer-readable storage medium is executed by the processor, the following steps may be specifically implemented: and determining the value of the local second zone bit in a manual setting mode.
In this embodiment, when the computer subprogram stored in the computer-readable storage medium is executed by the processor, the following steps may be specifically implemented: and determining the value of the local second zone bit by monitoring the sensitivity of the self-stored data.
In this embodiment, when the computer subprogram stored in the computer-readable storage medium is executed by the processor, the following steps may be specifically implemented: and when a target storage system which normally works is inserted and the target storage system is an untrusted system, if the flash memory chip is judged to be a non-secret-involved flash memory chip, the read-write operation is forbidden.
In this embodiment, when the computer subprogram stored in the computer-readable storage medium is executed by the processor, the following steps may be specifically implemented: and when the target storage system is unplugged from the target storage system or the target storage system is powered off and the target storage system is an untrusted system, if the flash memory chip is judged to be a non-secret-involved flash memory chip, the power is normally shut down.
In this embodiment, when the computer subprogram stored in the computer-readable storage medium is executed by the processor, the following steps may be specifically implemented: and a Nand power supply module is used for supplying 12V voltage to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction.
The embodiments are described in a progressive manner, each embodiment focuses on differences from other embodiments, and the same or similar parts among the embodiments are referred to each other. The device disclosed by the embodiment corresponds to the method disclosed by the embodiment, so that the description is simple, and the relevant points can be referred to the method part for description.
The steps of a method or algorithm described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by a processor, or in a combination of the two. A software module may reside in Random Access Memory (RAM), memory, Read Only Memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
Finally, it is further noted that, herein, relational terms such as first and second, and the like may be used solely to distinguish one entity or action from another entity or action without necessarily requiring or implying any actual such relationship or order between such entities or actions. Also, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of other elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising an … …" does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises the element.
The above detailed description is given to a data destruction method, apparatus, device, and medium provided by the present application, and a specific example is applied in the present application to explain the principle and the implementation of the present application, and the description of the above embodiment is only used to help understand the method and the core idea of the present application; meanwhile, for a person skilled in the art, according to the idea of the present application, there may be variations in the specific embodiments and the application scope, and in summary, the content of the present specification should not be construed as a limitation to the present application.
Claims (10)
1. A data destruction method is applied to a solid state disk and comprises the following steps:
judging whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system or not; the judging whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system comprises the steps of detecting whether a security certificate of the target storage system meets a preset requirement when the target storage system which normally works is inserted; if the security certificate of the target storage system meets the preset requirement, judging that the target storage system is a trusted storage system, and setting a corresponding local first zone bit to be a first preset value; if the security certificate of the target storage system does not meet the preset requirement, judging that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system, and setting a corresponding local first zone bit to be a second preset value;
if the target storage system is not the credible storage system, judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip;
and if the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip, a self-destruction power supply mode is adopted to supply power to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction.
2. The data destruction method according to claim 1, wherein the determining whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system comprises:
when the target storage system is unplugged or the target storage system is powered off, detecting whether the first zone bit is the first preset value or not;
if the first flag bit is the first preset value, the target storage system is judged to be a trusted storage system;
and if the first flag bit is the second preset value, judging that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system.
3. The data destruction method according to claim 1, wherein the determining whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip comprises:
judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret flash memory chip or not by detecting whether the local second zone bit is a third preset value or not;
if the second zone bit is a third preset value, the self flash memory chip is judged to be a secret-related flash memory chip;
and if the second zone bit is not the third preset value, judging that the flash memory chip per se is a non-secret-related flash memory chip.
4. The data destruction method according to claim 3, wherein before determining whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip by detecting whether the local second flag bit is a third preset value, the method further comprises:
determining the value of the local second zone bit in a manual setting mode;
or, the value of the local second flag bit is determined by monitoring the sensitivity of the self-stored data.
5. The data destruction method according to claim 1, wherein after determining whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip, the method further comprises:
and when a target storage system which normally works is inserted and the target storage system is an untrusted system, if the flash memory chip is judged to be a non-secret-involved flash memory chip, the read-write operation is forbidden.
6. The data destruction method according to claim 1, wherein after determining whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip, the method further comprises:
and when the target storage system is unplugged from the target storage system or the target storage system is powered off and the target storage system is an untrusted system, if the flash memory chip is judged to be a non-secret-involved flash memory chip, the power is normally shut down.
7. The data destruction method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the physically destroying data by supplying power to the secret-related flash memory chip in a self-destruction power supply mode comprises:
and a Nand power supply module is used for supplying 12V voltage to the secret-related flash memory chip so as to realize physical data destruction.
8. A data destruction device, comprising:
the system credibility judging module is used for judging whether the target storage system is a credible storage system or not; the judging whether the target storage system is a trusted storage system comprises the steps of detecting whether a security certificate of the target storage system meets a preset requirement when the target storage system which normally works is inserted; if the security certificate of the target storage system meets the preset requirement, judging that the target storage system is a trusted storage system, and setting a corresponding local first zone bit to be a first preset value; if the security certificate of the target storage system does not meet the preset requirement, judging that the target storage system is an untrusted storage system, and setting a corresponding local first zone bit to be a second preset value;
the secret-related judging module is used for judging whether the flash memory chip is a secret-related flash memory chip or not when the judging result of the system credibility judging module is negative;
and the self-destruction power supply module is used for supplying power to the secret-related flash memory chip by adopting a self-destruction power supply mode when the judgment result of the secret-related judgment module is yes so as to realize physical data destruction.
9. A data destruction device comprising:
a memory and a processor;
wherein the memory is used for storing a computer program;
the processor is configured to execute the computer program to implement the data destruction method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
10. A computer-readable storage medium holding a computer program, wherein the computer program when executed by a processor implements a data destruction method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
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| CN203204604U (en) * | 2013-02-04 | 2013-09-18 | 中晟国计科技有限公司 | Solid state disk based on three data destruction technologies |
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