CN110581757B - Privacy-protection low-voltage distribution area edge side power consumption data aggregation method - Google Patents

Privacy-protection low-voltage distribution area edge side power consumption data aggregation method Download PDF

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CN110581757B
CN110581757B CN201910740503.5A CN201910740503A CN110581757B CN 110581757 B CN110581757 B CN 110581757B CN 201910740503 A CN201910740503 A CN 201910740503A CN 110581757 B CN110581757 B CN 110581757B
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edge computing
computing node
master station
power consumption
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CN110581757A (en
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汪自翔
洪周真言
刘周斌
韩嘉佳
郭少勇
张江丰
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State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co Ltd
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co Ltd
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State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co Ltd
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
    • H04L9/3033—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters details relating to pseudo-prime or prime number generation, e.g. primality test
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/50—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wire-line communication networks, e.g. low power modes or reduced link rate
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
    • Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
    • Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
    • Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

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  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Remote Monitoring And Control Of Power-Distribution Networks (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a privacy-protecting low-voltage distribution area edge side electricity consumption data aggregation method. The existing edge data collection mode requires an edge computing node to acquire the power consumption of each user, and once the edge computing node is attacked, the power consumption data of the user can be leaked. The technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows: the method comprises the following steps that a user electricity consumption data ciphertext in an ammeter is sent to an edge computing node, the edge computing node performs algebraic operation on the ciphertext through a homomorphic encryption mechanism to collect the user electricity consumption data, and the collected data are uploaded to a master station; and the master station decrypts the gathered data by using a private key to obtain the sum of the power consumption of all the electric meters connected with the edge computing node. The invention can effectively reduce the communication traffic between the electric meter and the concentrator, and the electricity data of the user is always transmitted in a ciphertext mode in the communication process, thereby ensuring the safety of the data.

Description

Privacy-protection low-voltage distribution area edge side power consumption data aggregation method
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of data processing of electric power meters, and particularly relates to a privacy-protecting low-voltage distribution room edge side electricity consumption data aggregation method.
Background
At present, the total power consumption calculation of users in a low-voltage transformer area is mainly realized at a master station side. The electric meter data are uploaded to the main station through the concentrator, and the main station calculates the total power consumption through accumulating the power consumption of all users under the distribution area. Due to the limitation of communication bandwidth, the current data uploading period is 15 minutes at the shortest.
In order to further improve the real-time performance of load response, it is generally desirable to further shorten the period of calculating the total power consumption of the users in the low-voltage distribution room, and an edge computing node may be deployed in the low-voltage distribution room, and the edge computing node obtains the ciphertext of the data message of the power consumption of the users in the electricity meter through the local communication network. The edge computing node decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the user electricity consumption data, the total electricity consumption of the corresponding user can be obtained through summation operation, and the total electricity consumption is uploaded to the main station through the encryption channel, so that the data transmission quantity is reduced.
The existing edge data collection mode requires an edge computing node to acquire the power consumption of each user, and once the edge computing node is attacked, the power consumption data of the user can be leaked.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is to overcome the defects in the prior art, and provide a privacy-protected low-voltage distribution room edge side electricity consumption data aggregation method to effectively reduce the communication traffic between an electricity meter and a concentrator, and the electricity consumption data of a user is transmitted in a ciphertext mode all the time in the communication process to ensure the safety of the data.
Therefore, the invention adopts the following technical scheme: a low-voltage station area edge side electricity consumption data gathering method with privacy protection is characterized in that a user electricity consumption data ciphertext in an electricity meter is sent to an edge computing node, the edge computing node performs algebraic operation on the ciphertext through a homomorphic encryption mechanism to achieve gathering of the user electricity consumption data, and the gathered data are uploaded to a master station; and the master station decrypts the gathered data by using a private key to obtain the sum of the power consumption of all the electric meters connected with the edge computing node.
The invention can effectively reduce the communication traffic between the electric meter and the concentrator, and the electricity data of the user is always transmitted in a ciphertext mode in the communication process, thereby ensuring the safety of the data.
Further, the main station calculates the total power consumption of the distribution area according to the aggregated data provided by the edge computing node.
Furthermore, the trust center generates the edge computing nodes, the electric meters, the key, the public key and some public parameters of the main station, sends the public parameters and the public key to the main station through the secure channel, and sends the public parameters and the private key to each edge computing node and each electric meter.
Further, the step of the trust center generating the public parameters, the public key and the private key comprises:
1) by TsRepresenting the time interval of the electricity data uploaded by the meter, by PmaxRepresenting the maximum power consumption, P, of N meters in a blockmaxThe master station calculates the historical data and sends the historical data to the trust center through the safety channel;
2) two safety prime numbers p ═ 2p '+1 and q ═ 2q' +1 are selected, satisfying the following conditions:
a) p ', q' are also prime numbers,
b) n is pq, and n>NPmax；
3) Calculating the least common multiple of p-1 and q-1:
λ＝lcm(p-1,q-1)＝2p'q'；
4) generating N +1 randomMachine number
Figure GDA0003023474510000021
And satisfies:
Figure GDA0003023474510000022
5) selecting a hash function
Figure GDA0003023474510000023
Represents a positive integer not greater than n;
6) construct common parameters { H, Ts}, electric meter DijPrivate key of { n, rij}, edge computing node private key { n, rN+1And the master station public key n, r0λ, the common parameter { H, T }, andsand electric meter DijPrivate key of { n, rijSending the public parameters (H, T) to the ammeter through a safe channels} and edge compute node private key { n, rN+1Sending the public parameters (H, T) to the edge computing nodes through the safe channelsAnd the public key n, r0λ is sent to the master station over a secure channel.
Furthermore, the step of collecting the electricity consumption data of the platform area is as follows:
1) by xijIndicating electric meter DijIn [ kT ]s,(k+1)Ts]The electricity consumption data in the time period is compared with the data x in the following wayijAnd (3) encryption:
Figure GDA0003023474510000024
wherein, cijkIs [ kT ]s,(k+1)Ts]For x in the time periodijAn encrypted ciphertext; k represents the kth time period;
2) the ciphertext cijkSending the data to the edge computing node;
3) in [ kT ]s,(k+1)Ts]Edge compute node E in time periodiCollecting the ligation thereof to obtain NiElectricity consumption data cipher text of individual ammeter
Figure GDA0003023474510000031
And the following polymerization transformation is carried out:
Figure GDA0003023474510000032
4) edge compute node CikAnd transmitting the data to the master station through the power communication network.
Further, the steps of the master station data decryption and the total power consumption calculation are as follows:
1) the Master station uses the public key n, r0λ } pair CikThe following calculations were made:
Figure GDA0003023474510000033
2) due to the fact that
Figure GDA0003023474510000034
Denotes that n is not more than n2Is a positive integer of (a) to (b),
Figure GDA0003023474510000035
the foregoing formula is further expressed as:
Figure GDA0003023474510000036
3) due to the fact that
Figure GDA0003023474510000037
The formula is thus further expressed as:
Figure GDA0003023474510000038
4) obtained over a time period [ kTs,(k+1)Ts]Inner and edge computing node EiThe sum of the electric quantity corresponding to the connected electric meters is as follows:
Figure GDA0003023474510000039
Eiwherein, M represents the number of edge computing nodes deployed in a low-voltage platform area;
5) in a time period of [ kTs,(k+1)Ts]And the sum of the power consumption of the users under the distribution area is as follows:
Figure GDA0003023474510000041
the invention has the following advantages:
1. the edge computing node gathers the electricity consumption data and sends the gathered result to the master station, thereby effectively reducing the communication traffic;
2. the edge computing node directly gathers the user electricity consumption data ciphertext without decryption, so that the data security is guaranteed;
3. the time stamp is used in the encryption process, so that the system can resist replay attack.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a topology of a low voltage distribution grid of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a diagram of a process of collecting electricity data of an electricity meter in a low-voltage distribution area.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more clear and obvious, the present invention will be further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and detailed description.
In order to reduce the data communication traffic between the electric meter and the main station, some edge computing nodes can be deployed in the low-voltage distribution area, and the edge computing nodes upload the aggregated data to the main station. The general architecture of a low voltage distribution substation system (system for short) is shown in fig. 1. Using M to represent the number of edge computing nodes deployed in the low-voltage transformer area, using N to represent the total amount of user electric meters in the low-voltage transformer area, and using Ei(i ═ 1, 2.·, M) denotes the ith edge compute node. Edge computing node EiLower is connected with NiElectric meter, with DijRepresents connection to EiThe (th) electric meter of (1),
Figure GDA0003023474510000042
Eiand (i-1, 2.., M) aggregating the power consumption data ciphertext of the connected electric meters, performing some transformations on the ciphertext to form aggregated data on the premise of not decrypting the ciphertext, and sending the aggregated data to the master station. And the trust center generates keys of the edge computing nodes, the electric meters and the main station and some system public parameters, sends the public parameters and the public keys to the main station through the safety channel, and sends the public parameters and the private keys to each edge computing node and each electric meter.
The process of gathering electricity consumption data of electric meters in a low-voltage distribution area is shown in fig. 2, a II-type concentrator sends data in a meter box to an edge computing node, and the edge computing node gathers electricity consumption data of electric meters connected under the II-type concentrator and sends the gathered data to a master station. Using M to represent the number of edge computing nodes deployed in the low-voltage transformer area, using N to represent the total amount of user electric meters in the low-voltage transformer area, and using Ei(i ═ 1, 2.·, M) denotes the ith edge compute node. Edge computing node EiLower is connected with NiElectric meter, with DijRepresents connection to EiThe (th) electric meter of (1),
Figure GDA0003023474510000051
for a low-voltage distribution area, the step of collecting the electricity consumption data of the users is as follows:
1. trust center generates system public parameter, public key and private key
(1) By TsRepresenting the time interval of the electricity consumption data uploaded by the electricity meters, representing the total amount of the electricity meters under the district by N, and representing the total amount of the electricity meters under the district by PmaxRepresenting the maximum power consumption, P, of N meters in a blockmaxAnd the master station calculates the historical data and sends the historical data to the trust center through a secure channel.
(2) Two safety prime numbers p ═ 2p '+1 and q ═ 2q' +1 are selected to satisfy the following conditions:
(a) p ', q' are also prime numbers;
(b) n is pq, and n>NPmax。
(3) Calculating the least common multiple of p-1 and q-1:
λ＝lcm(p-1,q-1)＝2p'q' (1)
(4) generating N +1 random numbers
Figure GDA0003023474510000052
And is
Figure GDA0003023474510000053
Satisfy the requirement of
Figure GDA0003023474510000054
(5) Selecting a hash function
Figure GDA0003023474510000055
(6) Construction System common parameters { H, Ts}, electric meter DijPrivate key of { n, rij}, edge computing node private key { n, rN+1And the master station public key n, r0λ, the common parameter { H, T }, andsand electric meter DijPrivate key of { n, rijSending the public parameters (H, T) to the ammeter through a safe channels} and edge compute node private key { n, rN+1Sending the public parameters (H, T) to the edge computing nodes through the safe channelsAnd the public key n, r0λ is sent to the master station over a secure channel.
2. District power consumption data collection
(1) By xijIndicating electric meter DijIn [ kT ]s,(k+1)Ts]The electricity consumption data in the time period is compared with the data x in the following wayijAnd (3) encryption:
Figure GDA0003023474510000061
wherein, cijkIs [ kT ]s,(k+1)Ts]For x in the time periodijAnd (4) encrypted ciphertext.
(2) The ciphertext cijkAnd sending the data to the edge computing node.
(3) In [ kT ]s,(k+1)Ts]Edge compute node E in time periodiCollecting the ligation thereof to obtain NiElectricity consumption data cipher text of individual ammeter
Figure GDA0003023474510000062
And subjected to a polymerization conversion as follows
Figure GDA0003023474510000063
(4) Edge compute node CikAnd transmitting the data to the master station through the power communication network.
3. Master station data decryption and total power consumption calculation
(1) The Master station uses the public key n, r0λ } pair CikMake the following calculation
Figure GDA0003023474510000064
Figure GDA0003023474510000065
Figure GDA0003023474510000066
Figure GDA0003023474510000067
(2) Due to the fact that
Figure GDA0003023474510000068
Formula (8) can be further represented as
Figure GDA0003023474510000069
(3) Due to the fact that
Figure GDA00030234745100000610
The formula is thus further expressed as:
Figure GDA00030234745100000611
(4) can be obtained in the time period of [ kTs,(k+1)Ts]Inner and edge computing node EiThe sum of the electricity consumption corresponding to the connected electric meters is
Figure GDA0003023474510000071
(5) In a time period of [ kTs,(k+1)Ts]The sum of the electricity consumption of the users under the inner and the platform areas is
Figure GDA0003023474510000072
The above description is only for the preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, and any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope of the present invention are included in the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims (1)

1. A low-voltage station edge side electricity consumption data gathering method with privacy protection is characterized in that a user electricity consumption data ciphertext in an electricity meter is sent to an edge computing node, the edge computing node performs algebraic operation on the ciphertext through a homomorphic encryption mechanism to achieve gathering of the user electricity consumption data, and the gathered data are uploaded to a master station; the master station decrypts the converged data by using a private key to obtain the sum of the power consumption of all the electric meters connected with the edge computing node;
the trust center generates private keys, public keys and some public parameters of the edge computing nodes, the electric meters and the main station, sends the public parameters and the public keys to the main station through a safety channel, and sends the public parameters and the private keys to each edge computing node and each electric meter;
the steps of the trust center generating public parameters, public keys and private keys comprise:
1) by TsRepresenting the time interval of the electricity consumption data uploaded by the electric meter, representing the total amount of the user electric meters under the district by N, and representing the total amount of the user electric meters under the district by PmaxRepresenting the maximum power consumption, P, of N meters in a blockmaxThe master station calculates the historical data and sends the historical data to the trust center through the safety channel;
2) two safety prime numbers p ═ 2p '+1 and q ═ 2q' +1 are selected, satisfying the following conditions:
a) p ', q' are also prime numbers,
b) n is pq, and n>NPmax；
3) Calculating the least common multiple of p-1 and q-1:
λ＝lcm(p-1,q-1)＝2p'q'；
4) generating N +1 random numbers
Figure FDA0003023474500000014
And satisfies:
Figure FDA0003023474500000011
5) selecting a hash function
Figure FDA0003023474500000012
Figure FDA0003023474500000013
Represents a positive integer not greater than n;
6) construct common parameters { H, Ts}, electric meter DijPrivate key of { n, rij}, edge computing node private key { n, rN+1And the master station public key n, r0λ, the common parameter { H, T }, andsand electric meter DijPrivate key of { n, rijSending the public parameters (H, T) to an ammeter i through a safety channels} and edge compute node private key { n, rN+1Sending the public parameters (H, T) to the edge computing nodes through the safe channelsAnd the public key n, r0λ } is sent to the master station through a secure channel;
the method for collecting the electricity consumption data of the transformer area comprises the following steps:
1) by xijIndicating electric meter DijIn [ kT ]s,(k+1)Ts]The electricity consumption data in the time period is compared with the data x in the following wayijAnd (3) encryption:
Figure FDA0003023474500000028
wherein, cijkIs [ kT ]s,(k+1)Ts]For x in the time periodijAn encrypted ciphertext; k represents the kth time period;
2) the ciphertext cijkSending the data to the edge computing node;
3) in [ kT ]s,(k+1)Ts]Edge compute node E in time periodiCollecting the ligation thereof to obtain NiElectricity consumption data cipher text of individual ammeter
Figure FDA0003023474500000029
And the following polymerization transformation is carried out:
Figure FDA0003023474500000021
4) edge compute node CikSending the data to a master station through a power communication network;
the steps of the decryption of the master station data and the calculation of the total power consumption are as follows:
1) the Master station uses the public key n, r0λ } pair CikThe following calculations were made:
Figure FDA0003023474500000022
2) due to the fact that
Figure FDA0003023474500000023
Figure FDA0003023474500000024
Denotes that n is not more than n2Is a positive integer of (a) to (b),
Figure FDA0003023474500000025
the foregoing formula is further expressed as:
Figure FDA0003023474500000026
3) due to the fact that
Figure FDA0003023474500000027
The formula is thus further expressed as:
Figure FDA0003023474500000031
4) obtained over a time period [ kTs,(k+1)Ts]Inner and edge computing node EiThe sum of the electric quantity corresponding to the connected electric meters is as follows:
Figure FDA0003023474500000032
Eiwherein, M represents the number of edge computing nodes deployed in a low-voltage platform area;
5) in a time period of [ kTs,(k+1)Ts]And the sum of the power consumption of the users under the distribution area is as follows:
Figure FDA0003023474500000033
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