CN110489982A - A kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security - Google Patents
A kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security, key generation centre KGC generate initial private key and are simultaneously sent to intelligent electric meter by hidden passageway;Intelligent electric meter verifies initial private key, and implements encryption and signature generation signature private key to the data of user, sends it to aggregation gateway, while being updated to signature private key;The signature private key received is carried out polymerization generation aggregate signature and is sent to control centre by aggregation gateway;Control centre verifies aggregate signature, after being proved to be successful, is decrypted with the private key k of public key encryption to aggregate signature and decoding obtains plaintext m.The present invention solves the plaintext transmissions such as the user power utilization information data occurred in existing smart grid, intelligent electric meter to control centre transmits data congestion and existing polymerization Encryption Algorithm in the overhead issues that occur, suitable for smart grid transmission data are encrypted and polymerize, achieve the purpose that safe and efficient transmission data.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to smart grid security technical field, more particularly to a kind of intelligence with forward security
It can electric network data polymerization and encryption method.
Background technique
Currently, the rapid development of China's economy and the network technology, demand of the China to electric system various aspects is constantly being mentioned
Height, intelligent Process are also constantly promoting, and simultaneously, the safety problem of smart grid is also increasingly paid attention to.Smart grid
It is middle there are a larger automation control management system, it is by groups such as many a control centres, user and various equipment
At.Wherein each control centre manages the power grid of a corresponding area, various equipment and user including this region.Dress
Standby various sensors and intelligent electric meter in power grid are responsible for the operating status of real-time monitoring power grid and collect user power utilization data,
And these information are submitted into control centre's processing in time.
But current most of intelligent electric meters are all to be interacted in the form of plaintext with control centre, the safety of data
Due guarantee is not obtained, the privacy information of user is easy to be leaked.On the other hand due to the intelligent electric meter quantity of user terminal
It is numerous, often it is in many-to-one relationship with control centre, when a large amount of user data pours in control centre, control centre can be given
A possibility that bringing pressure, congestion occurs will increase, it will largely effect on network performance.
Concentrated on both at home and abroad about the hot spot of smart grid in recent years how to ensure data transmission safety and how
On the problem of improving transmission network performance.To solve both of these problems, propose that most thinkings is namely based on the poly- of homomorphic cryptography
Conjunction technology, but since homomorphic cryptography will use Bilinear map, the calculation amount of algorithm greatly increases, for this problem, no two-wire
Property pair encryption aggregating algorithm be suggested, but remained unchanged in entire communication process for the key pair of digital signature, once
Key from stealing, data-privacy will be leaked.For this purpose, the aggregate signature based on Key-insulated is suggested, but this method introduces
Helper, expense increase, and equally will also result in Key Exposure.
Therefore, how a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security is those skilled in the art
The problem of member's urgent need to resolve.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, the present invention provides a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security
To achieve the goals above, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme:
A kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security, the described method comprises the following steps:
S1, key generation centre KGC select data set X, by selecting and being calculated key pair (k, K);Wherein, k is
Private key, K are public key;
S2, registration aggregation gateway and intelligent electric meter Ii, after aggregation gateway succeeds in registration, control centre is by exit passageway
Aggregation gateway load is used for the public key K of encrypting plaintext data, and after intelligent electric meter succeeds in registration, public key K is passed through peace by aggregation gateway
All channel is sent to intelligent electric meter;
S3, key generation centre KGC generate the initial private key for signature and are sent to intelligent electric meter by hidden passageway;
S4, intelligent electric meter verify initial private key, and implement encryption and signature generation signature private key to user data, are sent out
It send to aggregation gateway, while signature private key is updated;
The signature private key received is carried out polymerization generation aggregate signature and is sent to control centre by S5, aggregation gateway;
S6, control centre verify aggregate signature, after being proved to be successful, are solved with the private key k of public key encryption to aggregate signature
Close and decoding obtains plaintext m.
Preferably, detailed process is as follows by the step S1:
S1.1, key generation centre KGC select data set X, wherein data set X includes elliptic curve parameter Ep(a, b) and
Basic point G, Big prime P, prime number finite field ZP.From prime number finite field ZPMiddle random selection integer k is given birth to as private key, and according to K=kG
At public key K, key pair (k, K) is obtained;Wherein, data set X includes elliptic curve parameter Ep(a, b) and basic point G, Big prime P, element
Number finite field ZP。
S1.2, KGC select security parameter l, generate the cyclic group G that rank is Big prime q1, P G1Generation member, T is the time
Period defines three hash functions: H1:{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H2:{0,1}*×{0,1}*→Zq *, H3:{0,1}*×{0,1}*
×G1→Zq *, randomly choose s ∈ Zq *, and calculate PK=sP;KGC discloses system parameter params={ Ep(a,b),p,q,G,G1,
PK,H1,H2,H3,N};System retains master key s, and control centre saves key k.
Preferably, detailed process is as follows by the step S3:
Set I={ the I of intelligent electric meter1, I2..., In, IiSelect IDi∈{0,1}*, randomly choose initial parameter ti,o∈
Zq *, wherein H1:{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H2:{0,1}*×{0,1}*→Zq *, H3:{0,1}*×{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H1、H2
And H3For three hash functions;Calculate Ri,o=ti,oP;IiBy IDiAnd Ri,oIt is sent to KGC;KGC calculates Di,o=ti,o+sH1(IDi,
Ri,o), the initial private key D that then KGC will be digitally signed as intelligent electric meteri,oIntelligent electric meter is sent to by hidden passageway
Ii。
Preferably, detailed process is as follows by the step S4:
S4.1, the initial private key D of verifyingi,o: judge Di,oP=Ri,o+PKH1(IDi,Ri,o) whether true, it is verified if setting up
Success calculates Ri,j=ti,jP executes step S4.2, otherwise return step S3, while updating the signature private key of j-th of period,
Middle j=1,2 ..., T, ti,jFor the parameter of j-th of period;
S4.2, intelligent electric meter are by message miIt is encoded to EpA point M on (a, b), and generate a random big integer r;Its
In, message sequence m={ m1,m2,...,mk, miFor intelligent electric meter IiMessage;
S4.3, public key K encrypt point M and generate ciphertext: C1=M+rK, CII=rG, Ci,j=(CI,CII);
S4.4, random selection yi,j∈Zq *, wherein H1:{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H2:{0,1}*×{0,1}*→Zq *, H3:
{0,1}*×{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H1、H2And H3For three hash functions;By calculating Yi,j=yi,jP, vi,j=H3(IDi,mi,
Yi,j), Xi,j=yi,j+Di,jvi,j, obtain j-th of period intelligent electric meter IiTo message miSignature Si,j={ Xi,j,Yi,j};
S4.5, intelligent electric meter IiSend signature private key (Ci,j,Si,j) arrive aggregation gateway.
Preferably, detailed process is as follows by the step S5:
S5.1, aggregation gateway verify signature private key, verify equation: Xi,jP=Yi,j+(Ri,j+PKH1(IDi,Ri,j))H3
(IDi,mi,Yi,j), step S6.2 is received and performed if equation is set up, is otherwise refused, request retransmits;
Signature set S={ the S of S5.2, K intelligent electric meters1,S2..., Sk, to the signature of j period of k ammeter into
Row polymerization obtains Sj;
S5.3, the message ciphertext of the j period of k ammeter is polymerize to obtain Cj;
S5.4, aggregation gateway are by aggregate signature Sj,CjIt is sent to control centre.
Preferably, detailed process is as follows by the step S6:
S6.1, control centre verify aggregate signature, verify equation:If equation is set up, control centre receives aggregated data
And step S6.2 is executed, otherwise refuse, request retransmits;Wherein, massage set m={ m1,m2,...,mk, intelligent electric meter
Identity information set ID={ ID1,ID2,...,IDk};
S6.2, it is decrypted using private key k message cipher text M:C is calculatedI'-kCII'=M+rK-k (rK)=M;Its
In, CI' it is CIDerivative, CII' it is CIIDerivative;
S6.3, M is decoded to obtain message plaintext m.
It can be seen via above technical scheme that compared with prior art, the present disclosure provides one kind to have preceding Xiang An
The smart grid data aggregate and encryption method of full property, form the encrypted communication mechanism between multiple intelligent electric meters and control centre.
This method realizes the encryption of electricity consumption data using the close SM2 elliptic curve public key cryptographic algorithm of state, and can not use bilinearity
To in the case where, forward security theory and strong P-congruence pair is utilized, as the Different Dynamic of period updates signature private key,
The signature private key of previous period is deleted in time, to ensure that the forward security of intelligent electric meter end signature-related information, simultaneously
Greatly reduce calculation amount.In addition, aggregation gateway is added in the present invention in communication construction, the case where not using Bilinear map
Under, the ciphertext and digital signature receive to the fixed period is verified and is polymerize respectively, by the signature and ciphertext hair after polymerization
Send to control centre and handle, avoid a large amount of data import control centre and caused by congestion and network performance decline problem.
Detailed description of the invention
In order to more clearly explain the embodiment of the invention or the technical proposal in the existing technology, to embodiment or will show below
There is attached drawing needed in technical description to be briefly described, it should be apparent that, the accompanying drawings in the following description is only this
The embodiment of invention for those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts, can also basis
The attached drawing of offer obtains other attached drawings.
Fig. 1 attached drawing is holistic approach flow chart provided by the invention.
Fig. 2 attached drawing is encryption provided by the invention and signature process flow chart.
Fig. 3 attached drawing is that initial private key provided by the invention generates structure chart
Fig. 4 attached drawing is private key update mechanism process flow diagram flow chart provided by the invention.
Fig. 5 attached drawing is data aggregate process flow diagram flow chart provided by the invention.
Fig. 6 attached drawing is the building-block of logic of communications framework provided by the invention.
Specific embodiment
Following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention carries out clear, complete
Site preparation description, it is clear that described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.It is based on
Embodiment in the present invention, it is obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts every other
Embodiment shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The invention proposes a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security, this method energy benefit
The encryption of electricity consumption data is realized with the close SM2 elliptic curve public key cryptographic algorithm of state, and can be the case where not using Bilinear map
Under, be utilized that forward security is theoretical and strong P-congruence pair, with the period Different Dynamic update signature private key, delete in time
Except the signature private key of previous period, to ensure that the forward security of intelligent electric meter end signature-related information, while subtracting significantly
Calculation amount is lacked.On the other hand, aggregation gateway is added in the present invention in communication construction, in the case where not using Bilinear map,
The ciphertext received and digital signature are verified and are polymerize respectively by the fixed period, by after polymerization signature and ciphertext send
Handled to control centre, avoid a large amount of data import control centre and caused by congestion and network performance decline problem.
Referring to figs. 1 to Fig. 6, basic ideas of the invention are as follows: the user power utilization data of intelligent electric meter are by encryption and label
Aggregation gateway is sent to after name, aggregation gateway verifying signature, not by then abandoning, request is retransmitted for verifying;It is verified then
Signature received by fixed time period and ciphertext are polymerize and are sent to control centre's processing.Control centre is to receiving
Aggregate signature verified, if verifying pass through if do not abandon, request retransmit;It is decrypted and is polymerize with private key if being verified
Ciphertext, then the result after decryption is decoded up in plain text.
The embodiment of the invention discloses a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security, it is described
Method the following steps are included:
S1, key generation centre KGC select data set X, by selecting and being calculated key pair (k, K);Wherein, k is
Private key, K are public key, further, the S1 the following steps are included:
S1.1, key generation centre KGC select data set X, wherein data set X includes elliptic curve parameter Ep(a, b) and
Basic point G, Big prime P, prime number finite field ZP.From prime number finite field ZPMiddle random selection integer k is given birth to as private key, and according to K=kG
At public key K, key pair (k, K) is obtained;Wherein, data set X includes elliptic curve parameter Ep(a, b) and basic point G, Big prime P, element
Number finite field ZP。
S1.2, KGC select security parameter l, generate the cyclic group G that rank is Big prime q1, P G1Generation member, N=p1p2,
T is the time cycle, defines three hash functions: H1:{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H2:{0,1}*×{0,1}*→Zq *, H3:{0,1}*
×{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, randomly choose s ∈ Zq *, and calculate PK=sP;KGC discloses system parameter params={ Ep(a,b),
p,q,G,G1,PK,H1,H2,H3,N};System retains master key s, and control centre saves key k;Wherein p1,p2For Big prime.
S2, registration aggregation gateway and intelligent electric meter Ii, locally aggregated gateway proposes application for registration to control centre first, poly-
After closing gateway registration success, control centre passes through the public key K that exit passageway is that aggregation gateway load is used for encrypting plaintext data;This
Ground aggregation gateway can possess the permission of processing intelligent electric meter registration, after succeeding in registration to reduce the work of control centre
Amount;After intelligent electric meter succeeds in registration, public key K is sent to intelligent electric meter by safe lane by aggregation gateway.
S3, key generation centre KGC generate the initial private key for signature and are sent to intelligent electric meter by hidden passageway:
Set I={ the I of intelligent electric meter1, I2..., In, IiSelect IDi∈{0,1}*, randomly choose initial parameter ti,o∈Zq *, wherein
H1:{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H2:{0,1}*×{0,1}*→Zq *, H3:{0,1}*×{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H1、H2And H3It is three
A hash function;Calculate Ri,o=ti,oP;IiBy IDiAnd Ri,oIt is sent to KGC;KGC calculates Di,o=ti,o+sH1(IDi,Ri,o), so
The initial private key D that KGC will be digitally signed as intelligent electric meter afterwardsi,oIntelligent electric meter I is sent to by hidden passagewayi。
S4, intelligent electric meter verify initial private key, and implement encryption and signature generation signature private key to the data of user, by it
Be sent to aggregation gateway, while signature private key be updated, further, the S4 the following steps are included:
S4.1, the initial private key D of verifyingi,o, verify equation: Di,oP=Ri,o+PKH1(IDi,Ri,o), the D if equation is set upi,o
Effectively, selection receives, and executes step S4.2, otherwise refuses, return step S3;The signature private key of j-th of period is updated simultaneously, if
Di,oEffectively, then IiCalculate Ri,j=ti,jP,ti,j=ti,j-1 2ModN wherein j=1,2 ..., T, ti,jFor the ginseng of j-th of period
Number;Update the private key of j-th of period: Di,j=Di,j-1+(ti,j-ti,j-1) PK, calculating finishes deletes D immediatelyi,j-1,ti,j-1;
S4.2, intelligent electric meter are by message miIt is encoded to EpA point M on (a, b), and generate a random big integer r;Wherein
R < n, n are elliptic curve important safety parameter, the as length of encryption key, wherein message sequence m={ m1,m2,...,
mk, miFor intelligent electric meter IiMessage;
S4.3, public key K encrypt point M and generate ciphertext: C1=M+rK, CII=rG, Ci,j=(CI,CII);
S4.4, random selection yi,j∈Zq *, wherein H1:{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H2:{0,1}*×{0,1}*→Zq *, H3:
{0,1}*×{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H1、H2And H3For three hash functions;By calculating Yi,j=yi,jP, vi,j=H3(IDi,mi,
Yi,j), Xi,j=yi,j+Di,jvi,j, obtain j-th of period intelligent electric meter IiTo message miSignature Si,j={ Xi,j,Yi,j};
S4.5, intelligent electric meter IiSend signature private key (Ci,j,Si,j) arrive aggregation gateway.
The signature private key received is carried out polymerization generation aggregate signature and is sent to control centre by S5, aggregation gateway, into
One step, the S5 the following steps are included:
S5.1, aggregation gateway verifying signature, verify equation: Xi,jP=Yi,j+(Ri,j+PKH1(IDi,Ri,j))H3(IDi,mi,
Yi,j), step S6.2 is received and performed if equation is set up, is otherwise refused, request retransmits;
Signature set S={ the S of S5.2, K intelligent electric meters1,S2..., Sk, to the signature of j period of k ammeter into
Row polymerization obtains Sj:
S5.3, the message ciphertext of the j period of k ammeter is polymerize to obtain Cj:
S5.4, aggregation gateway are by aggregate signature Sj,CjIt is sent to control centre.
S6, control centre verify aggregate signature, after being proved to be successful, are solved with the private key k of public key encryption to aggregate signature
Close and decoding obtains plaintext m, further, the S6 the following steps are included:
S6.1, control centre first verify aggregate signature, in known message set m={ m1,m2,...,mk, intelligence
It can ammeter identity information set ID={ ID1,ID2,...,IDkAnd the j period aggregate signature Sj={ Xj,YjAfter, verifying etc.
Formula:If equation is set up, control centre receives aggregate number
According to and execute subsequent step S6.2, otherwise refuse, request retransmit;
S6.2, it is decrypted using private key k message cipher text M:C is calculatedI'-kCII'=M+rK-k (rK)=M;Its
In, CI' it is CIDerivative, CII' it is CIIDerivative;
S6.3, it is decoded to obtain message in plain text to obtained M.
It can be seen via above technical scheme that compared with prior art, the present invention is not the case where using bilinear map
Under, be utilized that forward security is theoretical and strong P-congruence pair, with the period Different Dynamic update signature private key, delete in time
Except the signature private key of previous period, to ensure that the forward security of intelligent electric meter end signature-related information, while subtracting significantly
Lack calculation amount, saves expense.
Further, in the transmission of intelligent electric meter data, the present invention uses the close SM2 elliptic curve public key cryptographic of state
National secret algorithm is embedded into intelligent electric meter by algorithm, is carried out using the close SM2 elliptic curve public key cryptographic algorithm of state to electricity consumption data
Encryption solves the problems, such as security threat caused by plaintext transmission in current electric network data.
Further, since the quantity of intelligent electric meter is more, with control centre's quantity in same area at many-to-one relationship,
Aggregation gateway is added in the present invention in communication construction, in the case where not using Bilinear map, the fixed period is received close
Text and digital signature verified and polymerize respectively, by after polymerization signature and ciphertext be sent to control centre processing, avoid
A large amount of data import control centre and caused by congestion and network performance decline problem.
Each embodiment in this specification is described in a progressive manner, the highlights of each of the examples are with other
The difference of embodiment, the same or similar parts in each embodiment may refer to each other.For device disclosed in embodiment
For, since it is corresponded to the methods disclosed in the examples, so being described relatively simple, related place is said referring to method part
It is bright.
The foregoing description of the disclosed embodiments enables those skilled in the art to implement or use the present invention.
Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, as defined herein
General Principle can be realized in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present invention.Therefore, of the invention
It is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, and is to fit to and the principles and novel features disclosed herein phase one
The widest scope of cause.
Claims (6)
1. a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security, which is characterized in that the method includes
Following steps:
S1, key generation centre KGC select data set X, by selecting and being calculated key pair (k, K);Wherein, k is private key,
K is public key;
S2, registration aggregation gateway and intelligent electric meter Ii, after aggregation gateway succeeds in registration, control centre is polymerization by exit passageway
Gateway load is used for the public key K, intelligent electric meter I of encrypting plaintext dataiAfter succeeding in registration, public key K is passed through safety by aggregation gateway
Channel is sent to intelligent electric meter Ii;
S3, key generation centre KGC generate the initial private key for signature and are sent to intelligent electric meter I by hidden passagewayi;
S4, intelligent electric meter IiInitial private key is verified, and encryption and signature generation signature private key are implemented to user data, is sent to
To aggregation gateway, while signature private key is updated;
The signature private key received is carried out polymerization generation aggregate signature and is sent to control centre by S5, aggregation gateway;
S6, control centre verify aggregate signature, after being proved to be successful, aggregate signature is decrypted with the private key k of public key encryption and
Decoding obtains plaintext m.
2. a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security according to claim 1, special
Sign is that detailed process is as follows by the step S1:
S1.1, key generation centre KGC select data set X, wherein data set X includes elliptic curve parameter Ep(a, b) and basic point
G, Big prime P, prime number finite field ZP.From prime number finite field ZPMiddle random selection integer k generates public affairs as private key, and according to K=kG
Key K obtains key pair (k, K);
S1.2, KGC select security parameter l, generate the cyclic group G that rank is Big prime q1, P G1Generation member, T is the time cycle,
Define three hash functions: H1:{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H2:{0,1}*×{0,1}*→Zq *, H3:{0,1}*×{0,1}*×G1→
Zq *, randomly choose s ∈ Zq *, and calculate PK=sP;KGC discloses system parameter params={ Ep(a,b),p,q,G,G1,PK,H1,
H2,H3,N};System retains master key s, and control centre saves key k.
3. a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security according to claim 1, special
Sign is that detailed process is as follows by the step S3:
Set I={ the I of intelligent electric meter1, I2..., In, intelligent electric meter IiSelect identity information IDi∈{0,1}*, random selection
Initial parameter ti,o∈Zq *, wherein H1:{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H2:{0,1}*×{0,1}*→Zq *, H3:{0,1}*×{0,1}*
×G1→Zq *, H1、H2And H3For three hash functions;Calculate Ri,o=ti,oP;Intelligent electric meter IiBy identity information IDiAnd Ri,oIt sends
To KGC;KGC calculates Di,o=ti,o+sH1(IDi,Ri,o), the initial private key that then KGC will be digitally signed as intelligent electric meter
Di,oIntelligent electric meter I is sent to by hidden passagewayi。
4. a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security according to claim 1, special
Sign is that detailed process is as follows by the step S4:
S4.1, the initial private key D of verifyingi,o: judge Di,oP=Ri,o+PKH1(IDi,Ri,o) whether true, it is proved to be successful if setting up,
Calculate Ri,j=ti,jP executes step S4.2, otherwise return step S3, while updating the signature private key of j-th of period, wherein j
=1,2 ..., T, ti,jFor the parameter of j-th of period;
S4.2, intelligent electric meter are by message miIt is encoded to EpA point M on (a, b), and generate a random big integer r;Wherein, disappear
Cease sequence m={ m1,m2,...,mk, miFor intelligent electric meter IiMessage;
S4.3, public key K encrypt point M and generate ciphertext: C1=M+rK, CII=rG, Ci,j=(CI,CII);
S4.4, random selection yi,j∈Zq *, wherein H1:{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H2:{0,1}*×{0,1}*→Zq *, H3:{0,1}*
×{0,1}*×G1→Zq *, H1、H2And H3For three hash functions;By calculating Yi,j=yi,jP, vi,j=H3(IDi,mi,Yi,j),
Xi,j=yi,j+Di,jvi,j, obtain j-th of period intelligent electric meter IiTo message miSignature Si,j={ Xi,j,Yi,j};
S4.5, intelligent electric meter IiSend signature private key (Ci,j,Si,j) arrive aggregation gateway.
5. a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security according to claim 1, special
Sign is that detailed process is as follows by the step S5:
S5.1, aggregation gateway verify signature private key, verify equation:
Xi,jP=Yi,j+(Ri,j+PKH1(IDi,Ri,j))H3(IDi,mi,Yi,j), step S6.2 is received and performed if equation is set up,
Otherwise refuse, request retransmits;
Signature set S={ the S of S5.2, K intelligent electric meters1,S2..., Sk, the signature of the j period of k ammeter is gathered
Conjunction obtains Sj;
S5.3, the message ciphertext of the j period of k ammeter is polymerize to obtain Cj;
S5.4, aggregation gateway are by aggregate signature Sj,CjIt is sent to control centre.
6. a kind of smart grid data aggregate and encryption method with forward security according to claim 1, special
Sign is that detailed process is as follows by the step S6:
S6.1, control centre verify aggregate signature, verify equation:If equation is set up, control centre receives aggregated data
And step S6.2 is executed, otherwise refuse, request retransmits;Wherein, the identity information set ID={ ID of intelligent electric meter1,
ID2,...,IDk};
S6.2, it is decrypted using private key k message cipher text M:C is calculatedI'-kCII'=M+rK-k (rK)=M;Wherein, CI’
For CIDerivative, CII' it is CIIDerivative;
S6.3, M is decoded to obtain message plaintext m.
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