CN110366184A - A kind of method and intelligent terminal identifying pseudo-base station note - Google Patents
A kind of method and intelligent terminal identifying pseudo-base station note Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN110366184A CN110366184A CN201910652424.9A CN201910652424A CN110366184A CN 110366184 A CN110366184 A CN 110366184A CN 201910652424 A CN201910652424 A CN 201910652424A CN 110366184 A CN110366184 A CN 110366184A
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- Prior art keywords
- base station
- intelligent terminal
- pseudo
- short message
- handover event
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
- H04W12/128—Anti-malware arrangements, e.g. protection against SMS fraud or mobile malware
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of method and intelligent terminal for identifying pseudo-base station note, the method for identifying pseudo-base station note is applied to intelligent terminal, and include the following steps: S1: the intelligent terminal receives short message；S2: it detects whether to dial number；S3: it when step S2 testing result is no, detects whether that base station handover event occurred in the first preset time；S4: when step S3 testing result, which is, is, determine the short message received for pseudo-base station note.After adopting the above technical scheme, effectively pseudo-base station note can be identified, it is technically simple, it is easy to accomplish.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to field of communication technology more particularly to a kind of methods and intelligent terminal for identifying pseudo-base station note.
Background technique
" pseudo-base station " equipment is when former implements the instrument of telecommunication fraud means, mainly by host and laptop group
At the gsm mobile telephone information taken centered on it, within the scope of certain radius can be searched, and arbitrarily falsely uses other people phone numbers
The refuse messages such as swindle, distribution are sent to user mobile phone by force, automobile is typically placed at or one is sent out than more covert place
It send.When pseudo-base station is run, user mobile phone signal is forced to be connected in the equipment, cannot connect to public telecommunication network, with shadow
Ring the normal use of mobile phone user.
Pseudo-base station obtains mobile phone and uses using the various signaling procedures during mobile signaling protocol monitoring system monitoring mobile communication
The current location information in family.A certain range of operator's signal is interfered with and shielded after pseudo-base station starting, can then be searched later
Rope goes out neighbouring cell-phone number, and sends short message on these numbers.The signal for shielding operator can be for 10 seconds to 20 seconds,
After the completion of short message push, other side's mobile phone can just re-search for signal.Pseudo-base station can be shown as transmission number arbitrary numbers, very
To being mailbox number and special service number.It is loaded with the vehicle of pseudo-base station, it can be to periphery user's bulk SMS.
The harm of pseudo-base station is huge, is shown according to related report, and the pseudo-base station fraud text message of China's Mainland 70.2% is pretended to be
Operator induces user to click malice network address.
For the identification of pseudo-base station refuse messages and Precautions, in the prior art, is usually accessing pseudo-base station and receiving
Differentiated after short message by passive mode, the most common passive discriminant approach is that parameter determining method and feature judge among these
Method, wherein passing through LAC ID (the location area code got for parameter determining method
Identification, Location Area Code mark) information and cell ID (cell ID) information and attached base station before LAC ID
Information and cell id information compare and judge whether it is pseudo-base station, to judge refuse messages；Or pass through comparison short message service
Central number, to judge refuse messages.For feature determining method, after receiving short message, judge in short message content whether include
Sensitive information, to judge refuse messages；Or by way of whether reporting identical content information in the same area, to judge
Refuse messages.
The base station parameter and number of short message service center parameter that parameter determining method compares in passive method of discrimination at present, are easy
It is solved by constructing with identical parameter mode is now netted, simulation completely is configured in pseudo-base station and now nets base station and short message service
After the parameter information of central number, such method will be unable to carry out accurate judgement to the refuse messages that pseudo-base station issues.Quilt at present
Feature determining method in dynamic method of discrimination, for sensitive information judgment mode, can by sensitive information hidingization that will have, replace
The mode of generationization bypasses, and at this time such method will be invalid；Or for whether reporting identical content information in the same area
Judgment mode, short message normal for system broadcasts class, it may appear that misrecognition situation.Prior art is usually technically
It is complex, and be easy to evade.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop a kind of method and intelligent terminal that can simply, effectively identify pseudo-base station note.
Summary of the invention
In order to overcome the above technical defects, the purpose of the present invention is to provide one kind can simply, effectively identify pseudo-base station
The method and intelligent terminal of short message.
The invention discloses a kind of methods for identifying pseudo-base station note, are applied to intelligent terminal, include the following steps:
S1: the intelligent terminal receives short message；
S2: it detects whether to dial number；
S3: it when step S2 testing result is no, detects whether that base station handover event occurred in the first preset time；
S4: when step S3 testing result, which is, is, determine the short message received for pseudo-base station note.
Preferably, further include following steps before the step S1:
Detect the intelligent terminal is occurring whether receive short message in the second preset time after the handover event of base station；
If testing result is yes, progress step S2.
Preferably, whether the detection intelligent terminal is occurring to connect in the second preset time after the handover event of base station
Further include following steps after receiving short message:
If detecting the intelligent terminal occurring to receive short message in the second preset time after the handover event of base station and sending out
Whether the base station of the access after raw base station handover event is GSM network base station, if testing result is yes, progress step S4.
Preferably, further include following steps after the step S3:
If base station handover event occurred in the first preset time, the intelligent terminal is detected whether when third is preset
It is interior that base station handover event occurs again, if testing result is yes, progress step S4.
Preferably, further include following steps before the step S1:
Whether the SIM card for judging intelligent terminal is usim card；
When it is no for determining result, step S1 is carried out.
Preferably, further comprise before the step S1:
Judge whether intelligent terminal supports GSM network standard；
When determining result is to be, step S1 is carried out.
Preferably, further comprise after the step S4:
The pseudo-base station note is marked；
Detect whether the behavior of operation label short message；
When the test results is yes, prompting message is issued.
Preferably, further comprise after the step S1:
Whether the sender number for detecting short message is strange number；
If testing result is yes, progress step S2.
Preferably, further comprise after the step S4:
The sender number of the short message is added in blacklist, so that the intelligent terminal no longer receives number hair
Short message and/or calling out.
The invention also discloses a kind of intelligent terminal, including memory, processor and storage in the memory and
It is configured as the computer program executed by the processor, the processor is realized above-mentioned when executing the computer program
Method.
After above-mentioned technical proposal, compared with prior art, have the advantages that
1. pseudo-base station note can be identified effectively.
2. technically simple, it is easy to accomplish.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the flow chart that the method for pseudo-base station note is identified in one embodiment of the invention.
Specific embodiment
Below in conjunction with attached drawing, the advantages of the present invention are further explained with specific embodiment.
It is only to be not intended to be limiting the disclosure merely for for the purpose of describing particular embodiments in the term that the disclosure uses.
The "an" of the singular used in disclosure and the accompanying claims book, " described " and "the" are also intended to including majority
Form, unless the context clearly indicates other meaning.It is also understood that term "and/or" used herein refers to and wraps
It may be combined containing one or more associated any or all of project listed.
It will be appreciated that though various information, but this may be described using term first, second, third, etc. in the disclosure
A little information should not necessarily be limited by these terms.These terms are only used to for same type of information being distinguished from each other out.For example, not departing from
In the case where disclosure range, the first information can also be referred to as the second information, and similarly, the second information can also be referred to as
One information.Depending on context, word as used in this " if " can be construed to " ... when " or " when ...
When " or " in response to determination ".
In the description of the present invention, unless otherwise specified and limited, it should be noted that term " installation ", " connected ",
" connection " shall be understood in a broad sense, for example, it may be mechanical connection or electrical connection, the connection being also possible to inside two elements can
, can also indirectly connected through an intermediary, for the ordinary skill in the art to be to be connected directly, it can basis
Concrete condition understands the concrete meaning of above-mentioned term.
In subsequent description, it is only using the suffix for indicating such as " module ", " component " or " unit " of element
Be conducive to explanation of the invention, itself there is no specific meanings.Therefore, " module " can mixedly make with " component "
With.
Technical solution of the present invention for ease of understanding is first illustrated the Attack Theory of pseudo-base station.
The attack of pseudo-base station generally comprises 4 steps:
1, it monitors and pretends
The person of casting the first stone will use an engineering mobile phone, obtain operator under current environment the network information (including LAC,
Cell ID, frequency point, field strength etc.).
After the information for obtaining legitimate network, attacker can by the relative parameters setting of pseudo-base station at legitimate base station one
Sample.In this way, just completing the camouflage of oneself at last.
2, mobile phone is sucked
Then, attacker tunes up the transmission power of pseudo-base station.When signal power is sufficiently large, user mobile phone is just by " suction "
Past --- mobile phone requests (Location Update) so that oneself to enter new position area, then trigger position updates,
It is connected into pseudo-base station.
After pseudo-base station receives the position updating request of user mobile phone, mark request is issued to user mobile phone, obtains user hand
The TMSI (interim identity) of machine, IMSI (CUSTOMER ID), there are also IMEI (EIC equipment identification codes).When user mobile phone submits information
After pseudo-base station, pseudo-base station will not really give subscription authentication.Pseudo-base station directly determines user " legal ".Like this, pseudo-base station
Complete the abduction to user mobile phone.
3, short message is sent
Pseudo-base station first judges the IMSI of user, if not sending out " false short message " before this IMSI, pseudo-base station is just
It can issue " false short message ", addresser is set as its desired any number, such as 95555 or 12315 etc..If this IMSI
It has out-tricked before, that is with regard to directly in next step.
4, mobile phone is kicked out of
Pseudo-base station can modify LAC (position area) information for updating oneself, and broadcast.User mobile phone finds LAC variation, then
Launch position updates again.Pseudo-base station if it is determined that the IMSI of mobile phone has out-tricked, then, refusal accesses again.At this time
User mobile phone meeting gravity treatment, accesses normal legitimate base station.Certainly, pseudo-base station is often in moving condition.If the letter of pseudo-base station
User mobile phone number is no longer covered, user mobile phone also can normally access legitimate base station.
User has found that mobile phone connects pseudo-base station in order to prevent, while in order to send junk information to more users.Pseudo- base
The time for kidnapping mobile phone stand usually for 10 seconds by 20 seconds.Mobile phone is sucked, short message is sent, kicks out of the step of mobile phone and usually exist
It is completed in 10 seconds to 20 seconds.
Method of the invention is applied to intelligent terminal, and the intelligent terminal is the user that can receive short message He make a phone call
Equipment.Smart phone such as used by a user, the smart phone can realize the embodiment of the present invention by way of installing APP
The method of the identification pseudo-base station note of offer.
Method of the invention is based on Android platform, it is preferable that is based on MTK6580_8.1 platform, by software, i.e. APP is real
It is existing.In some embodiments, method of the invention can also be applied to ios platform.
It is the flow chart that the method for pseudo-base station note is identified in one embodiment of the invention referring to attached drawing 1.
The method of the identification pseudo-base station note of the present embodiment includes the following steps:
S1: the intelligent terminal receives short message.
Since technical solution of the present invention is for identifying pseudo-base station note, it is therefore desirable to be received in intelligent terminal short
Believe Shi Jinhang.
S2: it detects whether to dial number.
By the Attack Theory of pseudo-base station it is found that when the intelligent terminal of user receives pseudo-base station note, the intelligence is eventually
End is usually also connected with pseudo-base station.It is known that being that can not breathe out or access phone when the mobile phone of user accesses pseudo-base station
's.And if at this time user access be normal legal base station, generally indicate that network is unimpeded at this time when receiving short message, can
To breathe out or access phone.According to this, we can be dialed number, to sentence when receiving short message by detecting whether
It is disconnected that whether be currently accessed be pseudo-base station.
Specifically, the permission that intelligent terminal is made a phone call is obtained, is made a phone call outward.Preferably, operator can be called
Number, because Service Dialing Numbers are free.
If can put through at this time, illustrate to access at this time is the base station of normal legal, not pseudo-base station, then returns to step
Rapid S1.If can not put through at this time, it is likely to pseudo-base station.
When detecting cannot dial number, step S3 is carried out.
S3: it detects whether that base station handover event occurred in the first preset time.
It, can be by tuning up transmitting function by above-mentioned pseudo-base station Attack Theory it is found that pseudo-base station is in the step of sucking mobile phone
The mode of rate attracts user to be connected into pseudo-base station.In this process, the base station of the intelligent terminal access of user can be by normal legal
Base station is switched to pseudo-base station, that is, base station handover event can occur in this process for intelligent terminal.
For pseudo-base station, by intelligent terminals such as instantaneous high-power wireless electricity transmitting forcible occupying mobile phones, when maintenance
Between it is usually shorter, within this time, mobile phone into its overlay area sends the refuse messages of advertisement or the content containing swindle.It is a kind of
Common situation is that pseudo-base station equipment is placed in automobile by user, drives slowly to travel or vehicle is parked in specific region, complete
It is left after being sent at short message.
Therefore, first detect whether that base station handover event occurs, by NeighboringCellInfo.getCid () and
NeighboringCellInfo.getLac () obtains Cell ID and LAC in base station information, and (they can be with unique identification one
A base station).When Cell ID and LAC change, determine that intelligent terminal has accessed new base station, that is, base station switching has occurred
Event.
Further, it detects whether that base station handover event occurred in the first preset time, i.e. detection cannot transfer to electricity
Base station handover event whether occurred in the first preset time before words.In some embodiments, it is also possible to detect receive it is short
Base station handover event whether occurred in the first preset time before letter.Since the time that pseudo-base station kidnaps mobile phone is usually holding
It is 10 seconds to 20 seconds continuous, it is therefore preferred that first preset time can be set to 20 seconds.By detecting base station handover event
Whether the time of generation is in 20 seconds before detection cannot dial number, so that it may know whether to send out in the first preset time
Gave birth to base station handover event.
When the testing result of step S3, which is, is, that is, detects and base station handover event occurred in the first preset time
When, carry out step S4.
S4: determine the short message received for pseudo-base station note.
When the testing result of step S3, which is, is, then illustrate that intelligent terminal at this time accesses after base station handover event occurs
Base station is most likely pseudo-base station, then, the short message received in step S1 then can be determined that as pseudo-base station note.
In another embodiment of the invention, further include following steps before the step S1:
Detect the intelligent terminal is occurring whether receive short message in the second preset time after the handover event of base station.
Because user has found that mobile phone connects pseudo-base station to the user of pseudo-base station in order to prevent, while in order to more users
Send junk information.After pseudo-base station kidnaps mobile phone, i.e., after attraction intelligent terminal is switched to pseudo-base station by the normal base station of connection, lead to
Often short message is sent in 10 seconds to 20 seconds.Therefore detect the intelligent terminal occur second after the handover event of base station it is default when
It is interior whether to receive short message, second preset time, it is preferable that can be set to 15 seconds.If testing result be it is yes, that is, examine
It measures the intelligent terminal occurring to receive short message in the second preset time after the handover event of base station, then receives short message very
It may be pseudo-base station note, carry out step S2 and subsequent step, further confirm that.
Further, the detection intelligent terminal occur in the second preset time after the handover event of base station whether
Further include following steps after receiving short message:
If detecting the intelligent terminal occurring to receive short message in the second preset time after the handover event of base station and sending out
Whether the base station of the access after raw base station handover event is GSM network base station, if testing result is yes, progress step S4.
Since GSM network is a unidirectional authenticated network.Network can identify that intelligent terminal is legal, but intelligence
Terminal can not identify that network is legal.So intelligent terminal can not effective protection oneself information.When user's intelligence
Terminal accesses pseudo-base station, and after submission information is to pseudo-base station, pseudo-base station will not really give subscription authentication.Pseudo-base station can directly determine
User " legal ", to kidnap user mobile phone.It is had the drawback that just because of GSM network, so pseudo-base station is attacked
It is all to be carried out under GSM network.Therefore, after base station handover event has occurred, need to judge the base station of intelligent terminal access
It whether is GSM network base station, if so, being possible to access pseudo-base station, if not, it is possible to determine that access is normal Base Station.
Specifically, judge
TelephonyManager tm=(TelephonyManager) getSystemService
(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE)；
Tm.getPhoneType () is if be equal to TelephonyManager.PHONE_TYPE_GSM；
The base station for then determining access of the intelligent terminal after base station handover event occurs is GSM network base station.
If the base station for detecting access of the intelligent terminal after base station handover event occurs is GSM network base station, walked
Rapid S4 determines the short message received for pseudo-base station note.In some embodiments, if detecting, base station switching is occurring for intelligent terminal
The base station of access after event is GSM network, carries out step S2~S4, receives whether short message is that pseudo-base station is short to further determine
Letter.
In another embodiment of the invention, the step S3 further comprises detecting the intelligent terminal base is occurring
Whether the stand base station of the access after handover event is GSM network base station.I.e. in step s3, it on the one hand detects whether pre- first
If base station handover event occurred in the time, access of the intelligent terminal after base station handover event occurs on the other hand is detected
Base station whether be GSM network base station.Base station handover event occurred in the first preset time detecting, and detects generation
In the case that the base station of access after the handover event of base station is GSM network base station, step S4 is carried out, determines the short message received for puppet
Base station short message.
In another embodiment of the invention, further include following steps after the step S3:
If base station handover event occurred in the first preset time, the intelligent terminal is detected whether when third is preset
It is interior that base station handover event occurs again, if testing result is yes, progress step S4.
User has found that mobile phone connects pseudo-base station in order to prevent, while in order to send junk information to more users.Pseudo- base
After abduction mobile phone of standing has sent refuse messages, it will usually kick out of mobile phone in a short time, mobile phone can be switched back by connection pseudo-base station
The base station of normal legal.Or pseudo-base station is flowing, when its signal no longer covers mobile phone, mobile phone can also be accessed again just
The base station of Chang Hefa.This step is exactly to detect to the process.
Specifically, pass through NeighboringCellInfo.getCid () and NeighboringCellInfo.getLac
() obtains Cell ID and LAC in base station information.Judge Cell ID and LAC whether after detecting and cannot dial number
It changes in third preset time.If it is, determining that base station handover event occurs again in third preset time.It is described
Third preset time can be to be preset as 20S preferably.The third preset time be detect it is pre- after cannot dialing number
If the time.In some embodiments, the third preset time may be after first time base station switches or after receiving short message
Preset time.
When detecting that in third preset time base station handover event occurs again for the intelligent terminal, step is carried out
S4 determines the short message received for pseudo-base station note.
In another embodiment of the invention, further comprise after the step S4:
The pseudo-base station note is marked；Detect whether the behavior of operation label short message；When testing result is yes
When, issue prompting message.
In the present embodiment, after determining the short message received for pseudo-base station note, the pseudo-base station note is marked,
And the behavior whether user has operation label short message is detected, such as the short message of point opening of bid note, alternatively, the short message of forwarding label.When
When detecting the behavior of operation label short message, prompting message is issued the user with.Preferably, prompting letter is issued in a manner of pop-up
Breath, for example, showing in pop-up, the doubtful short message is fraud text message, is please handled with caution.
In another embodiment of the invention, further comprise after the step S1:
Whether the sender number for detecting short message is strange number；If testing result is yes, progress step S2.
Specifically, the number information in the available address list of intelligent terminal, and detect short message sender number whether
Belong to directory number, when the sender number of short message is not belonging to the number in address list, is determined as strange number, and carry out
Step S2 and subsequent step.This step can exclude the erroneous judgement that the short message that number is sent in address list may cause, and be promoted pseudo-
The accuracy of base station short message identification.
In another embodiment of the invention, further comprise after the step S4:
The sender number of the short message is added in blacklist, so that the intelligent terminal no longer receives number hair
Short message and/or calling out.
By executing this step, it can be received again by the short message of same pseudo-base station to avoid intelligent terminal, ensure that intelligent end
The safety at end.
In another embodiment of the invention, further comprise before the step S1:
Whether the SIM card for detecting intelligent terminal is usim card, when testing result is no, carries out step S1.
USIM is the abbreviation of Universal Subscriber Identity Module (Global Subscriber identification card).USIM
In addition to it can support to apply, usim card also upgrades algorithm in terms of safety card, and increases card to network more
Authentication function.Since usim card supports bi-directional authentification, mobile phone (USIM) is allowed to carry out legitimacy certification, this way to network
It efficiently solves SIM card only to support unidirectionally to authenticate, does not support the security breaches of bi-directional authentification, effective solution pseudo-base station,
The harassing and wrecking of information leakage and refuse messages.
It therefore, can be without subsequent step, in the SIM card of intelligent terminal when the SIM card of intelligent terminal is usim card
When non-usim card, subsequent step is carried out.
Specifically, started in Android file EFDIR comprising AID value with A0 00 00 00 87 10 02
Record, then otherwise it is common SIM cards that explanation, which is usim card,.
In another embodiment of the invention, further comprise before the step S1:
Whether detection intelligent terminal supports GSM network standard, when the test results is yes, carries out step S1.
Because pseudo-base station attack is carried out under GSM network, only intelligent terminal supports GSM network standard to be possible to
It is attacked by pseudo-base station.
In another embodiment of the invention, further comprise before the step S1:
Whether detection operator supports GSM network standard, when the test results is yes, carries out step S1.
Due in China, the China Mobile in 2G epoch and China Unicom be all using gsm communication technology, and China Telecom
2G use not GSM.Therefore it can increase the detection to network operator before carrying out pseudo-base station note detection.
The invention also discloses a kind of intelligent terminal, including memory, processor and storage in the memory and
It is configured as the computer program executed by the processor, the processor is realized above-mentioned when executing the computer program
Method.
Processor is to include one or more processing core.By running or executing the computer being stored in memory
The data that program (including: instruction, program, code set or instruction set etc.) and calling are stored in memory execute intelligence eventually
The various functions and processing data at end.Optionally, processor can use Digital Signal Processing (Digital Signal
Processing, DSP), field programmable gate array (Field-Programmable Gate Array, FPGA), programmable patrol
At least one of array (Programmable Logic Array, PLA) example, in hardware is collected to realize.During processor can integrate
Central processor (Central Processing Unit, CPU), image processor (Graphics Processing Unit,
) and the combination of one or more of modem etc. GPU.
Memory may include random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), also may include read-only storage
Device (Read-Only Memory).Optionally, memory includes non-transient computer-readable medium (non-transitory
computer-readable storage medium).Memory can be used for storing computer program (include: instruction, program,
Code, code set or instruction set etc.).
It should be noted that the embodiment of the present invention has preferable implementation, and not the present invention is made any type of
Limitation, any one skilled in the art change or are modified to possibly also with the technology contents of the disclosure above equivalent effective
Embodiment, as long as without departing from the content of technical solution of the present invention, it is to the above embodiments according to the technical essence of the invention
Any modification or equivalent variations and modification, all of which are still within the scope of the technical scheme of the invention.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of method for identifying pseudo-base station note, is applied to intelligent terminal, which comprises the steps of:
S1: the intelligent terminal receives short message；
S2: it detects whether to dial number；
S3: it when step S2 testing result is no, detects whether that base station handover event occurred in the first preset time；
S4: when step S3 testing result, which is, is, determine the short message received for pseudo-base station note.
2. method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that
Further include following steps before the step S1:
Detect the intelligent terminal is occurring whether receive short message in the second preset time after the handover event of base station；
If testing result is yes, progress step S2.
3. method according to claim 2, which is characterized in that
The detection intelligent terminal occur whether to receive in the second preset time after the handover event of base station short message it
Afterwards, further include following steps:
If detecting the intelligent terminal occurring to receive short message in the second preset time after the handover event of base station and base occurring
Whether the stand base station of the access after handover event is GSM network base station, if testing result be it is yes, carry out step S4.
4. method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that
Further include following steps after the step S3:
If base station handover event occurred in the first preset time, the intelligent terminal is detected whether in third preset time
Base station handover event occurs again, if testing result is yes, progress step S4.
5. method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that
Further comprise before the step S1:
Whether the SIM card for detecting intelligent terminal is usim card；
When testing result is no, step S1 is carried out.
6. the method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that
Further comprise before the step S1:
Whether detection intelligent terminal supports GSM network standard；
When the test results is yes, step S1 is carried out.
7. the method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that
Further comprise after the step S4:
The pseudo-base station note is marked；
Detect whether the behavior of operation label short message；
When the test results is yes, prompting message is issued.
8. the method as described in any one of claim 1-7, which is characterized in that
Further comprise after the step S1:
Whether the sender number for detecting short message is strange number；
If testing result is yes, progress step S2.
9. the method as described in any one of claim 1-7, which is characterized in that
Further comprise after the step S4:
The sender number of the short message is added in blacklist, so that the intelligent terminal no longer receives number sending
Short message and/or calling.
10. a kind of intelligent terminal, which is characterized in that including memory, processor and store in the memory and matched
It is set to the computer program executed by the processor, which is characterized in that the processor executes real when the computer program
Now method as claimed in any one of claims 1-9 wherein.
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Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN111885610A (en) * | 2020-07-08 | 2020-11-03 | 深圳传音控股股份有限公司 | Pseudo base station identification processing method, mobile terminal and storage medium |
| CN115002779A (en) * | 2022-07-29 | 2022-09-02 | 杭州宇链科技有限公司 | Pseudo base station prevention and control method and system based on block chain and security chip |
-
2019
- 2019-07-19 CN CN201910652424.9A patent/CN110366184A/en active Pending
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN111885610A (en) * | 2020-07-08 | 2020-11-03 | 深圳传音控股股份有限公司 | Pseudo base station identification processing method, mobile terminal and storage medium |
| CN111885610B (en) * | 2020-07-08 | 2023-06-06 | 深圳传音控股股份有限公司 | Pseudo base station identification processing method, mobile terminal and storage medium |
| CN115002779A (en) * | 2022-07-29 | 2022-09-02 | 杭州宇链科技有限公司 | Pseudo base station prevention and control method and system based on block chain and security chip |
| CN115002779B (en) * | 2022-07-29 | 2022-11-22 | 杭州宇链科技有限公司 | Pseudo base station prevention and control method and system based on block chain and security chip |
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