CN112673663B - Pseudo base station processing method, device, mobile terminal and storage medium - Google Patents
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Abstract
Description
技术领域Technical field
本申请涉及移动终端技术领域,更具体地,涉及一种伪基站处理方法、装置、移动终端以及存储介质。The present application relates to the technical field of mobile terminals, and more specifically, to a pseudo base station processing method, device, mobile terminal and storage medium.
背景技术Background technique
“伪基站”即假基站,伪基站一般由主机和笔记本电脑组成,通过短信群发器、短信发信机等相关设备能够搜取以其为中心、一定半径范围内的手机卡信息,利用移动通信的缺陷,通过伪装成运营商的基站,冒用他人手机号码强行向用户手机发送诈骗、广告推销等短信息。"Pseudo base station" is a fake base station. The pseudo base station is generally composed of a host and a laptop. Through SMS mass senders, SMS senders and other related equipment, it can search for mobile phone card information within a certain radius centered on it, and use mobile communications to By pretending to be the operator's base station, it uses other people's mobile phone numbers to forcefully send short messages such as fraud and advertising promotions to users' mobile phones.
发明内容Contents of the invention
鉴于上述问题,本申请提出了一种伪基站处理方法、装置、移动终端以及存储介质,以解决上述问题。In view of the above problems, this application proposes a pseudo base station processing method, device, mobile terminal and storage medium to solve the above problems.
第一方面,本申请实施例提供了一种伪基站处理方法,应用于移动终端,所述方法包括:当检测到所述移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与所述伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站;在所述移动终端成功接入所述目标基站时,发出报警信息;控制所述移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。In a first aspect, embodiments of the present application provide a pseudo base station processing method, applied to a mobile terminal. The method includes: when detecting that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, disconnecting from the pseudo base station and Try to access the target base station; when the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, send an alarm message; control the mobile terminal to log off the network and enter flight mode.
第二方面,本申请实施例提供了一种伪基站处理装置,应用于移动终端,所述装置包括:断开模块,用于当检测到所述移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与所述伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站;报警模块,用于在所述移动终端成功接入所述目标基站时,发出报警信息;控制模块,用于控制所述移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。In the second aspect, embodiments of the present application provide a pseudo base station processing device, which is applied to a mobile terminal. The device includes: a disconnection module, configured to disconnect from the mobile terminal when it is detected that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station. Describe the connection of the pseudo base station and try to access the target base station; the alarm module is used to send an alarm message when the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station; the control module is used to control the mobile terminal to log off the network and enter flight mode .
第三方面,本申请实施例提供了一种移动终端,包括:存储器;一个或多个处理器,与所述存储器耦接;一个或多个程序,其中,所述一个或多个应用程序被存储在所述存储器中并被配置为由所述一个或多个处理器执行,所述一个或多个程序配置用于执行上述方法。In a third aspect, embodiments of the present application provide a mobile terminal, including: a memory; one or more processors coupled to the memory; and one or more programs, wherein the one or more application programs are Stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the one or more processors, the one or more programs are configured to perform the above method.
第四方面,本申请实施例提供了一种计算机可读取存储介质,所述计算机可读取存储介质中存储有程序代码,所述程序代码可被处理器调用执行上述方法。In a fourth aspect, embodiments of the present application provide a computer-readable storage medium, the computer-readable storage medium stores program code, and the program code can be called by a processor to execute the above method.
本申请实施例提供的伪基站处理方法、装置、移动终端以及存储介质,当检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与该伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站,在移动终端成功接入该目标基站时,发出报警信息,控制移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式,从而通过在检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开移动终端与伪基站的连接并连接目标基站发送报警信息,并在发送报警信息之后注销网络进行飞行模式,以降低伪基站对移动终端的攻击几率,提升移动终端的信息安全性。The pseudo base station processing method, device, mobile terminal and storage medium provided by the embodiments of the present application, when detecting that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, disconnects from the pseudo base station and attempts to access the target base station. When the mobile terminal successfully connects When entering the target base station, an alarm message is issued, and the mobile terminal is controlled to log out of the network and enter flight mode, thereby disconnecting the mobile terminal from the pseudo base station and connecting to the target base station to send an alarm message when detecting that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, and After sending the alarm information, log off the network and enter flight mode to reduce the probability of attacks by pseudo base stations on the mobile terminal and improve the information security of the mobile terminal.
附图说明Description of drawings
为了更清楚地说明本申请实施例中的技术方案,下面将对实施例描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍,显而易见地,下面描述中的附图仅仅是本申请的一些实施例,对于本领域技术人员来讲,在不付出创造性劳动的前提下,还可以根据这些附图获得其它的附图。In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the drawings needed to be used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can also be obtained based on these drawings without exerting creative efforts.
图1示出了本申请实施例提供的一种移动通信网络的系统架构示意图;Figure 1 shows a schematic system architecture diagram of a mobile communication network provided by an embodiment of the present application;
图2示出了本申请实施例提供的另一种移动通信网络的系统架构示意图;Figure 2 shows a schematic system architecture diagram of another mobile communication network provided by an embodiment of the present application;
图3示出了本申请一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图;Figure 3 shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by an embodiment of the present application;
图4示出了本申请又一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图;Figure 4 shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by yet another embodiment of the present application;
图5示出了本申请再一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图;Figure 5 shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by yet another embodiment of the present application;
图6示出了本申请另一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图;Figure 6 shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by another embodiment of the present application;
图7示出了本申请的图6所示的伪基站处理方法的步骤S420的流程示意图;Figure 7 shows a schematic flow chart of step S420 of the pseudo base station processing method shown in Figure 6 of the present application;
图8示出了本申请又再一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图;Figure 8 shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by yet another embodiment of the present application;
图9示出了本申请的图8所示的伪基站处理方法的步骤S520的流程示意图;Figure 9 shows a schematic flow chart of step S520 of the pseudo base station processing method shown in Figure 8 of this application;
图10示出了本申请又另一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图;Figure 10 shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by yet another embodiment of the present application;
图11示出了本申请实施例提供的伪基站处理装置的模块框图;Figure 11 shows a module block diagram of a pseudo base station processing device provided by an embodiment of the present application;
图12示出了本申请实施例用于执行根据本申请实施例的伪基站处理方法的电子设备的框图;Figure 12 shows a block diagram of an electronic device used to perform a pseudo base station processing method according to an embodiment of the present application;
图13示出了本申请实施例的用于保存或者携带实现根据本申请实施例的伪基站处理方法的程序代码的存储单元。Figure 13 shows a storage unit used to save or carry the program code for implementing the pseudo base station processing method according to the embodiment of the present application.
具体实施方式Detailed ways
为了使本技术领域的人员更好地理解本申请方案,下面将结合本申请实施例中的附图,对本申请实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述。In order to enable those in the technical field to better understand the solution of the present application, the technical solution in the embodiment of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiment of the present application.
随着移动通信技术的长足发展,移动通信已经经历了2G、3G以及4G等多个版本的发展。而不论是早期2G时代的GSM(Global System for Mobile Communication)移动通信系统或者CDMA(Code Division Multiple Access)通信系统,还是到了后面4G时代的LTE(long term evolution,长期演进)系统架构,基站都是比较重要的一个通信设备。With the rapid development of mobile communication technology, mobile communication has experienced the development of multiple versions such as 2G, 3G and 4G. Whether it is the GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication) mobile communication system or CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) communication system in the early 2G era, or the LTE (long term evolution, long term evolution) system architecture in the later 4G era, base stations are A relatively important communication device.
例如,如图1所示的2G移动通信系统架构示意图。BTS基站99(Base StationController)作为移动通信通络的接入设备与基站控制器98连接,然后基站控制器98再与移动交换中心97连接,而移动交换中心97还会与公共交换电话网络96等连接。再例如图2所示的4G移动通信系统架构示意图。eNB基站95与MME(Mobility Management Entity),即移动管理节点94连接,而MME与服务网关93连接,服务网关93再与分组数据网关92连接,分组数据网关92与分组数据网络91连接。可以从图1和图2看出,在移动通信系统中,基站作为直接与移动终端建立连接的设备,在整个系统架构中有着比较重要的地位。基站,一般是指“公用移动通信基站”,其作用主要用于给手机、平板电脑等移动终端提供信号。而随着通信技术的发展,发明人发现出现了伪基站。For example, the 2G mobile communication system architecture diagram is shown in Figure 1. The BTS base station 99 (Base StationController) serves as the access device of the mobile communication network and is connected to the base station controller 98, and then the base station controller 98 is connected to the mobile switching center 97, and the mobile switching center 97 will also be connected to the public switched telephone network 96, etc. connect. Another example is the 4G mobile communication system architecture diagram shown in Figure 2. The eNB base station 95 is connected to the MME (Mobility Management Entity), that is, the mobility management node 94, and the MME is connected to the service gateway 93. The service gateway 93 is connected to the packet data gateway 92, and the packet data gateway 92 is connected to the packet data network 91. It can be seen from Figures 1 and 2 that in the mobile communication system, the base station, as a device that directly establishes a connection with the mobile terminal, plays an important role in the entire system architecture. Base stations generally refer to "public mobile communication base stations", which are mainly used to provide signals to mobile terminals such as mobile phones and tablet computers. With the development of communication technology, the inventor discovered that pseudo base stations appeared.
伪基站即假基站,是移动通信网络之外的非法基站,伪基站一般由主机和笔记本电脑组成,通过短信群发器、短信发信机等相关设备能够搜取以其为中心、一定半径范围内的手机卡信息,利用2G移动通信的缺陷,通过伪装成运营商的基站,冒用他人手机号码强行向用户手机发送诈骗、广告推销等短信息。Pseudo base stations are illegal base stations outside the mobile communication network. Pseudo base stations are generally composed of hosts and laptops. They can be searched within a certain radius centered on it through SMS group senders, SMS senders and other related equipment. Mobile phone card information, taking advantage of the flaws of 2G mobile communications, pretending to be the operator's base station, pretending to use other people's mobile phone numbers to forcefully send short messages such as fraud and advertising promotions to users' mobile phones.
伪基站设备运行时,移动终端发送的无线信号被强制连接到该设备上,导致移动终端无法正常使用运营商提供的服务,移动终端一般会暂时脱网8~12秒后恢复正常,部分移动终端则必须开关机才能重新入网。此外,它还会导致移动终端用户频繁地更新位置,使得该区域的无线网络资源紧张并出现网络拥塞现象,影响用户的正常通信。When the pseudo base station equipment is running, the wireless signal sent by the mobile terminal is forcibly connected to the equipment, causing the mobile terminal to be unable to use the services provided by the operator normally. The mobile terminal will generally be temporarily disconnected from the network for 8 to 12 seconds and then return to normal. Some mobile terminals You must power on and off to reconnect to the network. In addition, it will also cause mobile terminal users to frequently update their locations, which will strain wireless network resources in the area and cause network congestion, affecting users' normal communications.
针对上述问题,发明人经过长期的研究,并提出了本申请实施例提供的伪基站处理方法、装置、移动终端以及存储介质,通过在移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与伪基站的连接并连接目标基站发送报警信息,并在发送报警信息之后注销网络进行飞行模式,以降低伪基站对移动终端的攻击几率,提升移动终端的信息安全性。In response to the above problems, the inventor has conducted long-term research and proposed a pseudo base station processing method, device, mobile terminal and storage medium provided in the embodiments of the present application. When the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, the connection with the pseudo base station is disconnected. And connect to the target base station to send alarm information, and after sending the alarm information, log out of the network and enter flight mode to reduce the probability of attacks by pseudo base stations on mobile terminals and improve the information security of mobile terminals.
实施例Example
请参阅图3,图3示出了本申请一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图,所述伪基站处理方法用于通过在移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与伪基站的连接并连接目标基站发送报警信息,并在发送报警信息之后注销网络进行飞行模式,以降低伪基站对移动终端的攻击几率,提升移动终端的信息安全性。在具体的实施例中,所述伪基站处理方法应用于如图11所示的伪基站处理装置200以及配置有所述伪基站处理装置200的移动终端100(图12),下面将以移动终端为例,说明本实施例的具体流程,当然,可以理解的,本实施例所应用的移动终端可以为智能手机、平板电脑、穿戴式电子设备等,在此不做具体的限定。下面将针对图3所示的流程进行详细的阐述,所述伪基站处理方法具体可以包括以下步骤:Please refer to Figure 3. Figure 3 shows a schematic flow chart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by an embodiment of the present application. The pseudo base station processing method is used to disconnect the mobile terminal from the pseudo base station when it is attacked by the pseudo base station. And connect to the target base station to send alarm information, and after sending the alarm information, log out of the network and enter flight mode to reduce the probability of attacks by pseudo base stations on mobile terminals and improve the information security of mobile terminals. In a specific embodiment, the pseudo base station processing method is applied to the pseudo base station processing device 200 as shown in Figure 11 and the mobile terminal 100 (Figure 12) configured with the pseudo base station processing device 200. In the following, the mobile terminal An example is used to describe the specific process of this embodiment. Of course, it can be understood that the mobile terminal applied in this embodiment can be a smart phone, a tablet computer, a wearable electronic device, etc., and is not specifically limited here. The process shown in Figure 3 will be described in detail below. The pseudo base station processing method may specifically include the following steps:
步骤S110:当检测到所述移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与所述伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站。Step S110: When detecting that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, disconnect the mobile terminal from the pseudo base station and try to access the target base station.
通常,网络空中接口用于实现移动终端和移动通信网络的基站之间的信息交互,并且网络空中接口上的信息由各种逻辑信道承载。其中,逻辑信道分为业务信道(TCH,Traffic Channel)和控制信道(CCH,Control Channel)两大类,其中,TCH主要在网络和移动终端间的传送业务,如语音、数据等;CCH是用于传送信令信息和短的分组数据的信道,CCH中广播信道(BCH,Broadcast Channel)用于通过广播的方式传输信息,在BCH中的广播控制信道(BCCH,Broadcast Control Channel)用于基站向移动终端广播公用的信息,例如系统消息等。因此,移动终端可以通过监测基站的广播信息的方式对基站进行探测,并根据探测的结果在基站注册。Generally, the network air interface is used to realize information interaction between the mobile terminal and the base station of the mobile communication network, and the information on the network air interface is carried by various logical channels. Among them, logical channels are divided into two categories: traffic channel (TCH, Traffic Channel) and control channel (CCH, Control Channel). Among them, TCH is mainly used to transmit services between the network and mobile terminals, such as voice, data, etc.; CCH is used A channel for transmitting signaling information and short packet data. The Broadcast Channel (BCH) in CCH is used to transmit information by broadcasting. The Broadcast Control Channel (BCCH) in BCH is used by the base station to transmit information to the base station. The mobile terminal broadcasts public information, such as system messages, etc. Therefore, the mobile terminal can detect the base station by monitoring the broadcast information of the base station, and register with the base station according to the detection result.
但是,移动终端所探测到的基站可能包括伪基站,因此,移动终端可能在伪基站进行注册而被伪基站攻击。因此,作为一种方式,可以对移动终端所注册的基站是否为伪基站进行判断,例如,所述移动终端可以获取基站的广播信息,并从该广播信息中提取该基站的标识信息,通过该标识信息判断该基站是否为伪基站。具体地,标识信息可以包括基站所对应的基站小区的小区位置区(TAC,tracking area)、位置区码(LAC,location area code)、小区标示(CID,cell identity)等,因此,作为一种方式,移动终端在探测到新的基站时,可以计算该基站所对应的基站小区的TAC/LAC/CID与移动终端最近成功注册过的基站小区的TAC/LAC/CID之间的差值,如果该差值大于设定门限,则可以确定该移动终端所探测到的基站为伪基站。However, the base station detected by the mobile terminal may include a pseudo base station. Therefore, the mobile terminal may register with the pseudo base station and be attacked by the pseudo base station. Therefore, as a way, it can be determined whether the base station registered by the mobile terminal is a pseudo base station. For example, the mobile terminal can obtain the broadcast information of the base station and extract the identification information of the base station from the broadcast information. The identification information determines whether the base station is a pseudo base station. Specifically, the identification information may include the cell location area (TAC, tracking area), location area code (LAC, location area code), cell identity (CID, cell identity), etc. of the base station cell corresponding to the base station. Therefore, as a method, when the mobile terminal detects a new base station, it can calculate the difference between the TAC/LAC/CID of the base station cell corresponding to the base station and the TAC/LAC/CID of the base station cell that the mobile terminal has recently successfully registered. If If the difference is greater than the set threshold, it can be determined that the base station detected by the mobile terminal is a pseudo base station.
在本实施例中,当确定该移动终端所探测到的基站为伪基站时,可以对所述移动终端是否被该伪基站攻击进行监测,作为一种方式,对移动终端是否被伪基站攻击的监测方式可以包括实时监测、间隔预定时长监测或用户自行设置的检测方式等,在此不做限定。其中,当检测到移动终端被该伪基站攻击时,则移动终端作为响应对伪基站攻击进行处理,作为一种方式,可以断开与该伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站。具体地,当移动终端被伪基站攻击时,表征该伪基站已获取用户的imsi、tmsi等通信信息秘钥,可以用另一部移动终端顶替该移动终端和运营商的网络进行交互,接收验证短信等,继而盗刷账户资金,因此,为了保护移动终端用户的财产安全,该移动终端可以断开与所述伪基站的连接,并尝试接入目标基站以正常用网,一方面可以避免伪基站的攻击,另一方面正常用网后可以发出报警信息。In this embodiment, when it is determined that the base station detected by the mobile terminal is a pseudo base station, whether the mobile terminal is attacked by the pseudo base station can be monitored. As a way, whether the mobile terminal is attacked by the pseudo base station can be monitored. Monitoring methods may include real-time monitoring, predetermined interval monitoring, or user-set detection methods, etc., which are not limited here. When it is detected that the mobile terminal is attacked by the pseudo base station, the mobile terminal responds to the pseudo base station attack. As a way, the mobile terminal can disconnect from the pseudo base station and try to access the target base station. Specifically, when a mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, it means that the pseudo base station has obtained the user's IMSI, TMSI and other communication information keys, and another mobile terminal can be used to replace the mobile terminal to interact with the operator's network and receive verification. SMS, etc., and then steal account funds. Therefore, in order to protect the property safety of mobile terminal users, the mobile terminal can disconnect from the pseudo base station and try to access the target base station to use the network normally. On the one hand, it can avoid pseudo base stations. Attacks on the base station, on the other hand, can send out alarm messages after normal use of the network.
步骤S120:在所述移动终端成功接入所述目标基站时,发出报警信息。Step S120: When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, send an alarm message.
作为一种方式,移动终端在断开与所述伪基站的连接后,可以重新探测其周围的基站,并根据探测结果选择基站进行注册,可以理解的,移动终端重新注册的基站可能是伪基站,也可能不是伪基站,因此,移动终端可以对探测到的基站,或注册到的基站是否为伪基站进行检测,当检测到所探测到的或所注册的基站不是伪基站时,可以确定该移动终端成功接入目标基站,也就是说,当移动终端与某基站连接后可以正常用网,则表征所述移动终端成功接入目标基站。As a way, after the mobile terminal disconnects from the pseudo base station, it can re-detect the base stations around it, and select a base station for registration according to the detection results. It is understandable that the base station to which the mobile terminal re-registers may be a pseudo base station. , may not be a pseudo base station. Therefore, the mobile terminal can detect whether the detected base station or the registered base station is a pseudo base station. When it is detected that the detected or registered base station is not a pseudo base station, it can determine whether the base station is a pseudo base station. If the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, that is to say, when the mobile terminal is connected to a certain base station and can use the network normally, it means that the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station.
进一步地,在移动终端成功接入目标基站时,表征移动终端可以正常用网,则移动终端可以向公安机关发出报警信息,以通过报警信息告知公安机关该伪基站的攻击时间、攻击地点、攻击方式以及其他特征信息等,以便公安机关根据移动终端的报警信息除掉伪基站,报账移动终端用户的信息安全。其中,该报警信息可以包括报警电话和/或报警短信。Furthermore, when the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, indicating that the mobile terminal can use the network normally, the mobile terminal can send an alarm message to the public security agency to inform the public security agency of the attack time, attack location, and attack time of the pseudo base station through the alarm message. method and other characteristic information, etc., so that the public security organs can remove fake base stations based on the alarm information of mobile terminals and report the information security of mobile terminal users. The alarm information may include an alarm phone number and/or an alarm text message.
作为一种实施方式,在移动终端成功接入目标基站时,该移动终端可以自动生成报警信息,例如,自动编辑报警短信或者自动跳转至报警电话拨打界面,然后发出询问信息,以询问用户是否发出该报警信息,可以理解的,当检测到指示确认发出该报警信息的操作时,则所述移动终端作为响应将所述报警信息发送至公安机构;当检测到指示确认不发出该报警信息的操作时,则所述移动终端作为响应删除所述报警信息。As an implementation manner, when the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, the mobile terminal can automatically generate alarm information, for example, automatically edit the alarm text message or automatically jump to the alarm phone dialing interface, and then send a query message to ask the user whether To issue the alarm information, it can be understood that when an operation indicating confirmation of issuing the alarm information is detected, the mobile terminal will send the alarm information to the public security agency in response; when an operation indicating confirmation not to issue the alarm information is detected, the mobile terminal During operation, the mobile terminal deletes the alarm information in response.
步骤S130:控制所述移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。Step S130: Control the mobile terminal to log out of the network and enter airplane mode.
具体地,由于移动终端所在的区域存在伪基站,且伪基站一般是通过2G网络或3G网络对移动终端进行攻击,因此,移动终端在该区域内用网的过程中随时都有再次被伪基站攻击的可能性,因此,为了避免移动终端再次被伪基站攻击,可以控制移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式,从而可以避免伪基站通过2G网络或3G网络攻击该移动终端,提升移动终端的信息安全性。Specifically, since there are pseudo base stations in the area where the mobile terminal is located, and the pseudo base stations generally attack the mobile terminal through the 2G network or 3G network, the mobile terminal may be attacked by the pseudo base station again at any time while using the network in the area. Therefore, in order to prevent the mobile terminal from being attacked by the pseudo base station again, the mobile terminal can be controlled to log off the network and enter flight mode, thereby preventing the pseudo base station from attacking the mobile terminal through the 2G network or 3G network and improving the information security of the mobile terminal. .
本申请一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法,当检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与该伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站,在移动终端成功接入该目标基站时,发出报警信息,控制移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式,从而通过在检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开移动终端与伪基站的连接并连接目标基站发送报警信息,并在发送报警信息之后注销网络进行飞行模式,以降低伪基站对移动终端的攻击几率,提升移动终端的信息安全性。The pseudo base station processing method provided by an embodiment of the present application, when detecting that a mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, disconnects from the pseudo base station and attempts to access the target base station. When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, it sends Alarm information, control the mobile terminal to log off the network and enter flight mode, thereby disconnecting the mobile terminal from the pseudo base station and connecting to the target base station to send alarm information when detecting that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, and then log off the network after sending the alarm information Enter flight mode to reduce the probability of attacks by pseudo base stations on mobile terminals and improve the information security of mobile terminals.
请参阅图4,图4示出了本申请又一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图。下面将针对图4所示的流程进行详细的阐述,所示伪基站处理方法具体可以包括以下步骤:Please refer to Figure 4. Figure 4 shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by yet another embodiment of the present application. The process shown in Figure 4 will be described in detail below. The pseudo base station processing method shown may specifically include the following steps:
步骤S210:当检测到所述移动终端被伪基站攻击时,获取所述伪基站的特征参数。Step S210: When it is detected that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, obtain the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station.
在本实施例中,在确定移动终端被伪基站攻击时,可以获取该伪基站的特征参数,其中,该特征参数可以包括位置区标识(TAI,Tracking Area Identity)、绝对视频信道号(EARFCN,eutra absolute radio frequency channel number)、物理单元标识(PCI,physical cell identity)以及小区身份(CID,cell identity)中的至少一种,当然,所述伪基站所对应的特征参数还可以包括其他参数,在此不再赘述。可以理解的,所述特征参数可以用来对伪基站进行标识,其中,一个特征参数可以对应多个基站,因此,当某个基站的特征参数和该伪基站的特征参数一致时,可以认为该某个基站也是伪基站。In this embodiment, when it is determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station can be obtained, where the characteristic parameters can include a tracking area identifier (TAI), an absolute video channel number (EARFCN, eutra absolute radio frequency channel number), physical cell identity (PCI, physical cell identity) and cell identity (CID, cell identity). Of course, the characteristic parameters corresponding to the pseudo base station may also include other parameters, I won’t go into details here. It can be understood that the characteristic parameters can be used to identify pseudo base stations, where one characteristic parameter can correspond to multiple base stations. Therefore, when the characteristic parameters of a certain base station are consistent with the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station, it can be considered that the characteristic parameter is consistent with the characteristic parameter of the pseudo base station. A certain base station is also a pseudo base station.
步骤S220:禁止所述移动终端接入所述特征参数所对应的基站。Step S220: Prohibit the mobile terminal from accessing the base station corresponding to the characteristic parameter.
可以理解的,由于该特征参数所对应的基站可能是伪基站,因此,为了降低甚至避免移动终端接入伪基站并被伪基站攻击的可能性,可以禁止该移动终端接入该特征参数所对应的所有基站。也就是说,移动终端可以获取所探测到的所有基站所对应的特征参数,然后将探测到的基站的特征参数与所述伪基站的特征参数进行对比,以判断探测到的基站的特征参数与伪基站的特征参数是否一致,可以理解的,当探测到的基站的特征参数与伪基站的特征参数一致时,确定该移动终端探测到的基站可能为伪基站,则禁止移动终端接入该基站;当探测到的基站的特征参数与伪基站的特征参数不一致时,确定该移动终端探测到的基站不是伪基站或是伪基站的几率较低,则允许移动终端接入该基站。It can be understood that since the base station corresponding to the characteristic parameter may be a pseudo base station, in order to reduce or even avoid the possibility of the mobile terminal accessing the pseudo base station and being attacked by the pseudo base station, the mobile terminal may be prohibited from accessing the base station corresponding to the characteristic parameter. of all base stations. That is to say, the mobile terminal can obtain the characteristic parameters corresponding to all detected base stations, and then compare the characteristic parameters of the detected base stations with the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station to determine whether the characteristic parameters of the detected base stations are the same as those of the pseudo base stations. Whether the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station are consistent, it is understandable that when the characteristic parameters of the detected base station are consistent with the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station, it is determined that the base station detected by the mobile terminal may be a pseudo base station, and the mobile terminal is prohibited from accessing the base station. ; When the characteristic parameters of the detected base station are inconsistent with the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station, it is determined that the base station detected by the mobile terminal is not a pseudo base station or the probability of the pseudo base station is low, and the mobile terminal is allowed to access the base station.
步骤S230:尝试接入除所述特征参数以外的其他特征参数所对应的目标基站。Step S230: Try to access the target base station corresponding to other characteristic parameters except the characteristic parameters.
进一步地,对移动终端所探测到的基站进行分析获取每个基站的特征参数,并从中获取特征参数与伪基站的特征参数一致的基站,然后尝试接入所探测到的基站中除特征参数与伪基站的特征参数一致的基站以外的,其他特征参数所对应的目标基站,降低移动终端接入伪基站的可能性。Further, the base stations detected by the mobile terminal are analyzed to obtain the characteristic parameters of each base station, and a base station whose characteristic parameters are consistent with the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station is obtained, and then attempts to access the detected base station except that the characteristic parameters are consistent with those of the pseudo base station. In addition to the base stations with consistent characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station, target base stations corresponding to other characteristic parameters reduce the possibility of mobile terminals accessing the pseudo base station.
例如,假设伪基站的特征参数为N1,且所述移动终端所探测到的基站包括基站A1、基站A2、基站A3以及基站A4,基站A1的特征参数为N1,基站A2的特征参数为N2,基站A3的特征参数为N1,基站A4的特征参数为N3。那么,可以确定基站A1和基站A3的特征参数与伪基站的特征参数一致,则该基站A1和基站A3也可能为伪基站,同时,可以确定基站A2和基站A4的特征参数与伪基站的特征参数不一致,则该基站A2和基站A4不是伪基站或者有较低几率是伪基站,因此,可以控制移动终端尝试接入基站A2或基站A4,降低移动终端接入伪基站的可能性。For example, assume that the characteristic parameter of the pseudo base station is N1, and the base stations detected by the mobile terminal include base station A1, base station A2, base station A3 and base station A4, the characteristic parameter of base station A1 is N1, and the characteristic parameter of base station A2 is N2, The characteristic parameter of base station A3 is N1, and the characteristic parameter of base station A4 is N3. Then, it can be determined that the characteristic parameters of base station A1 and base station A3 are consistent with the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station, and then the base station A1 and base station A3 may also be pseudo base stations. At the same time, it can be determined that the characteristic parameters of base station A2 and base station A4 are consistent with the characteristics of the pseudo base station. If the parameters are inconsistent, the base station A2 and the base station A4 are not pseudo base stations or have a low probability of being pseudo base stations. Therefore, the mobile terminal can be controlled to try to access the base station A2 or the base station A4, thereby reducing the possibility of the mobile terminal accessing the pseudo base station.
步骤S240:在所述移动终端成功接入所述目标基站时,发出包括所述伪基站的特征参数的报警信息。Step S240: When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, send alarm information including characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station.
作为一种方式,移动终端发出的报警信息可以包括伪基站的特征参数,例如,位置区标识(TAI,Tracking Area Identity)、绝对视频信道号(EARFCN,eutra absolute radiofrequency channel number)、物理单元标识(PCI,physical cell identity)以及小区身份(CID,cell identity)中的至少一种,以方便公安机关快速定位该伪基站,进行及时处理。As a way, the alarm information sent by the mobile terminal may include the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station, such as the location area identification (TAI, Tracking Area Identity), the absolute video channel number (EARFCN, eutra absolute radiofrequency channel number), the physical unit identification ( At least one of PCI, physical cell identity) and cell identity (CID, cell identity) to facilitate the public security agency to quickly locate the pseudo base station and handle it in a timely manner.
步骤S250:控制所述移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。Step S250: Control the mobile terminal to log out of the network and enter airplane mode.
作为一种实施方式,在控制移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式后,移动终端可以记录伪基站所对应的特征参数、伪基站的攻击时间、移动终端的报警信息中的至少一种,然后基于伪基站所对应的特征参数、伪基站的攻击时间、移动终端的报警信息生成提示信息通过移动终端输出,其中,所述提示信息可以通过显示在移动终端的方式输出、可以通过移动终端语音播报的方式输出等,在此不做限定。As an implementation manner, after controlling the mobile terminal to log off the network and enter flight mode, the mobile terminal can record at least one of the characteristic parameters corresponding to the pseudo base station, the attack time of the pseudo base station, and the alarm information of the mobile terminal, and then based on the pseudo base station The corresponding characteristic parameters, the attack time of the pseudo base station, and the alarm information generation prompt information of the mobile terminal are output through the mobile terminal, wherein the prompt information can be output by displaying it on the mobile terminal or outputting it by voice broadcasting by the mobile terminal. etc., no limitation is made here.
步骤S260:检测所述移动终端进入所述飞行模式的时长。Step S260: Detect the duration for which the mobile terminal enters the flight mode.
在本实施例中,在控制移动终端进入飞行模式后,开始对移动终端进入飞行模式的时长进行监测并记录,其中,监测的方式可以包括实时监测、间隔预定时长监测、或者根据用户自行设置的时间间隔监测,可选的,为了提升监测获取的时长的准确性,可以采用实时监测的方式。In this embodiment, after the mobile terminal is controlled to enter the flight mode, the duration of the mobile terminal entering the flight mode is monitored and recorded. The monitoring method may include real-time monitoring, predetermined time interval monitoring, or based on the user's setting. Time interval monitoring is optional. In order to improve the accuracy of the monitoring duration, real-time monitoring can be used.
步骤S270:判断所述时长是否大于预设时长。Step S270: Determine whether the duration is greater than the preset duration.
作为一种方式,所述移动终端设置预设时长,用于作为移动终端进入飞行模式的时长的判断依据,可以理解的,该预设时长可以由移动终端预先存储在本地,也可以是在判断时再进行设置,在此不做限定。其中,该预设时长可以由移动终端自动配置,可以由移动终端所对应的用户手动设置,也可以由移动终端连接的服务器配置后发送至移动终端,在此不做限定。进一步地,在获取所述移动终端进入飞行模式的时长后,将该时长与预设时长进行比较,以判断该时长是否大于预设时长。As a method, the mobile terminal sets a preset duration, which is used as a basis for judging the duration of the mobile terminal entering the flight mode. It can be understood that the preset duration can be stored locally by the mobile terminal in advance, or it can be determined during the judgment. Set it again when necessary, and there is no limit here. The preset duration can be automatically configured by the mobile terminal, can be manually set by the user corresponding to the mobile terminal, or can be configured by a server connected to the mobile terminal and then sent to the mobile terminal, which is not limited here. Further, after obtaining the duration for the mobile terminal to enter the flight mode, the duration is compared with the preset duration to determine whether the duration is greater than the preset duration.
步骤S280:当所述时长大于所述预设时长时,控制所述移动终端退出所述飞行模式并接入网络。Step S280: When the duration is greater than the preset duration, control the mobile terminal to exit the airplane mode and access the network.
可以理解的,当该时长大于预设时长时,可以认为该伪基站已经被处理或者移动终端已经在该时长内离开伪基站所在的区域,因此,可以控制移动终端退出飞行模式并正常接入网络,以保证移动终端的正常用网。It can be understood that when the duration is longer than the preset duration, it can be considered that the pseudo base station has been processed or the mobile terminal has left the area where the pseudo base station is located within the duration. Therefore, the mobile terminal can be controlled to exit the flight mode and access the network normally. , to ensure the normal use of the mobile terminal.
作为另一种方式,可以先获取移动终端进入飞行模式时的位置信息,并检测该移动终端在进入飞行模式后的位置信息,将移动终端进入飞行模式后的位置信息和进入飞行模式时的位置信息进行比较,以获得该移动终端在进入飞行模式后的位置信息和进入飞行模式时的位置信息之间的差值,然后将该差值与预先设置的预设差值进行比较,其中,当该差值大于预设差值时,表征该移动终端在进入飞行模式后已经移出该伪基站所覆盖的范围,则可以控制移动终端退出飞行模式并接入网络;当该差值不大于预设差值时,表征该移动终端在进入飞行模式后没有移动或没有移出该伪基站所覆盖的范围,则控制移动终端保持飞行模式,避免再次被伪基站攻击。As another method, you can first obtain the location information of the mobile terminal when it enters the flight mode, detect the location information of the mobile terminal after it enters the flight mode, and combine the location information of the mobile terminal after it enters the flight mode and the position of the mobile terminal when it enters the flight mode. The information is compared to obtain the difference between the position information of the mobile terminal after entering flight mode and the position information when entering flight mode, and then the difference is compared with the preset difference value set in advance, where, when When the difference is greater than the preset difference, it means that the mobile terminal has moved out of the range covered by the pseudo base station after entering flight mode, and the mobile terminal can be controlled to exit flight mode and access the network; when the difference is not greater than the preset The difference indicates that the mobile terminal has not moved or moved out of the range covered by the pseudo base station after entering the flight mode, and the mobile terminal is controlled to maintain the flight mode to avoid being attacked by the pseudo base station again.
本申请又一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法,当检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,获取该伪基站的特征参数,禁止移动终端接入该特征参数所对应的基站,尝试接入除该特征参数以外的其他特征参数所对应的目标基站,在移动终端成功接入该目标基站时,发出包括该特征参数的报警信息,控制移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式,检测移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式的时长,判断该时长是否大于预设时长,当该时长大于预设时长时,控制移动终端退出该飞行模式并接入网络。相较于图3所示的伪基站处理方法,本实施例通过禁止伪基站的特征参数所对应基站的方式,降低移动终端接入伪基站的几率,并通过在移动终端进入飞行模式的时长大于预设时长时,退出飞行模式并接入网络,以保证移动终端的正常用网。Another embodiment of the present application provides a pseudo base station processing method. When it is detected that a mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station are obtained, the mobile terminal is prohibited from accessing the base station corresponding to the characteristic parameter, and attempts to access the base station other than the pseudo base station. The target base station corresponding to characteristic parameters other than the characteristic parameters, when the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, sends an alarm message including the characteristic parameters, controls the mobile terminal to log off the network and enters flight mode, and detects that the mobile terminal logs off the network and enters flight mode. time length, and determine whether the time length is greater than the preset time length. When the time length is greater than the preset time length, control the mobile terminal to exit the airplane mode and access the network. Compared with the pseudo base station processing method shown in Figure 3, this embodiment reduces the probability of the mobile terminal accessing the pseudo base station by prohibiting the base station corresponding to the characteristic parameter of the pseudo base station, and by prohibiting the mobile terminal from entering flight mode for longer than When the preset time is reached, exit airplane mode and access the network to ensure normal network use of the mobile terminal.
请参阅图5,图5示出了本申请再一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图。下面将针对图5所示的流程进行详细的阐述,所示伪基站处理方法具体可以包括以下步骤:Please refer to FIG. 5 , which shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by yet another embodiment of the present application. The process shown in Figure 5 will be described in detail below. The pseudo base station processing method shown may specifically include the following steps:
步骤S310:当检测到所述移动终端被伪基站攻击时,禁止所述移动终端接入2G网络和3G网络。Step S310: When it is detected that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, the mobile terminal is prohibited from accessing the 2G network and the 3G network.
通常,伪基站是利用2G网络或3G网络的技术缺陷,通过伪装成运营商的基站,冒用他人手机号码强行向用户手机发送诈骗、广告推销等短信。在本实施例中,当检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,表征该移动终端当前处于接入2G网络或3G网络的状态,因此,为了解除伪基站对移动终端的攻击,可以禁止移动终端接入2G网络和3G网络,从而禁止了伪基站利用2G网络或3G网络的技术缺陷攻击移动终端的方式,避免移动终端在伪基站上注册。Usually, fake base stations take advantage of the technical flaws of the 2G network or 3G network to pretend to be the operator's base station and use other people's mobile phone numbers to forcefully send fraud, advertising and other text messages to users' mobile phones. In this embodiment, when it is detected that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, it indicates that the mobile terminal is currently in a state of accessing the 2G network or 3G network. Therefore, in order to eliminate the attack of the pseudo base station on the mobile terminal, the mobile terminal can be prohibited from accessing the 2G network or 3G network. into the 2G network and 3G network, thereby prohibiting pseudo base stations from using the technical flaws of the 2G network or 3G network to attack mobile terminals, and preventing mobile terminals from registering on the pseudo base stations.
步骤S320:尝试接入4G网络进入VOLTE模式。Step S320: Try to access the 4G network and enter VOLTE mode.
进一步地,由于大多数非法分子所采用的伪基站都是2G网络和3G网络,而4G网络仅有极少的伪基站采用,例如,安全监控系统所采用的伪基站是4G网络,但是,这种伪基站用于对移动终端进行安全监控,不会给移动终端用户造成财产损失,因此,作为一种方式,在禁止移动终端接入2G网络和3G网络后,可以将移动终端设置为连接4G网络进入VOLTE模式,其中,VOLTE即Voice overLTE,是基于IMS的语音业务。它是一种IP数据传输技术,无需2G网络/3G网络,全部业务承载于4G网络上,可以实现数据与语音业务在同一网络下的统一。具体地,在指定时长内,移动终端一直处于连接4G网络的状态且不允许切换到连接2G网络和3G网络的状态,因此,可以避免非法分子所采用的伪基站通过2G网络或3G网络攻击移动终端,并同时允许移动终端正常上网。Furthermore, since most of the pseudo base stations used by illegal elements are 2G and 3G networks, and only a few pseudo base stations are used in 4G networks, for example, the pseudo base stations used by security monitoring systems are 4G networks, but this This kind of pseudo base station is used for security monitoring of mobile terminals and will not cause property losses to mobile terminal users. Therefore, as a way, after prohibiting mobile terminals from accessing 2G networks and 3G networks, the mobile terminals can be set to connect to 4G The network enters VOLTE mode, where VOLTE stands for Voice over LTE and is an IMS-based voice service. It is an IP data transmission technology that does not require a 2G network/3G network. All services are carried on the 4G network, which can realize the unification of data and voice services under the same network. Specifically, within a specified period of time, the mobile terminal is always connected to the 4G network and is not allowed to switch to the state of connecting to the 2G network and 3G network. Therefore, it is possible to prevent pseudo base stations used by criminals from attacking mobile phones through the 2G network or 3G network. terminal, and at the same time allow mobile terminals to access the Internet normally.
其中,需要说明的是,所述移动终端还可以进入IMS模式,其中,IMS模式包括VOLTE模式、VOWIFI模式、甚至VO5G模式等,在此不做限定。It should be noted that the mobile terminal can also enter the IMS mode, where the IMS mode includes VOLTE mode, VOWIFI mode, even VO5G mode, etc., and is not limited here.
步骤S330:在所述移动终端成功接入所述目标基站时,发出报警信息。Step S330: When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, send an alarm message.
进一步地,当确定移动终端成功接入4G网络时,可以认为该移动终端成功接入目标基站,则移动终端作为响应发出报警信息。Further, when it is determined that the mobile terminal successfully accesses the 4G network, it can be considered that the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, and the mobile terminal sends an alarm message in response.
步骤S340:控制所述移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。Step S340: Control the mobile terminal to log out of the network and enter airplane mode.
步骤S350:检测所述移动终端进入所述飞行模式的时长。Step S350: Detect the duration for which the mobile terminal enters the flight mode.
步骤S360:判断所述时长是否大于预设时长。Step S360: Determine whether the duration is greater than the preset duration.
步骤S370:当所述时长大于所述预设时长时,控制所述移动终端退出所述飞行模式并接入网络。Step S370: When the duration is greater than the preset duration, control the mobile terminal to exit the airplane mode and access the network.
本申请再一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法,当检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,禁止移动终端接入2G网络和3G网络,尝试接入4G网络进入VOLTE模式,在移动终端成功接入目标基站时,发出报警信息,控制移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式,检测移动终端进入飞行模式的时长,判断该时长是否大于预设时长,当该时长大于预设时长时,控制移动终端退出飞行模式并接入网络。相较于图3所示的伪基站处理方法,本实施例通过禁止移动终端进入2G网络和3G网络,并尝试接入4G网络,降低移动终端接入伪基站的几率,并通过在移动终端进入飞行模式的时长大于预设时长时,退出飞行模式并接入网络,以保证移动终端的正常用网。Another embodiment of the present application provides a pseudo base station processing method. When detecting that a mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, the mobile terminal is prohibited from accessing the 2G network and the 3G network, and attempts to access the 4G network to enter the VOLTE mode. After the mobile terminal successfully accesses When the target base station is targeted, an alarm message is issued, the mobile terminal is controlled to log off the network and enter flight mode, the duration of the mobile terminal entering flight mode is detected, and whether the duration is greater than the preset duration is determined. When the duration is greater than the preset duration, the mobile terminal is controlled to exit flight mode. and access the network. Compared with the pseudo base station processing method shown in Figure 3, this embodiment reduces the probability of the mobile terminal accessing the pseudo base station by prohibiting the mobile terminal from entering the 2G network and 3G network and trying to access the 4G network. When the flight mode duration is longer than the preset duration, exit the flight mode and access the network to ensure normal network use of the mobile terminal.
请参阅图6,图6示出了本申请另一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图。下面将针对图6所示的流程进行详细的阐述,所示伪基站处理方法具体可以包括以下步骤:Please refer to FIG. 6 , which shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by another embodiment of the present application. The process shown in Figure 6 will be described in detail below. The pseudo base station processing method shown may specifically include the following steps:
步骤S410:监测所述移动终端的网络连接状态。Step S410: Monitor the network connection status of the mobile terminal.
在本实施例中,首先对移动终端的网络连接状态进行监测,可以理解的,移动终端的网络连接状态可以包括处于连接状态和没有处于连接状态,其中,没有处于连接状态包括非连接状态和连接中状态。作为一种方式,可以通过哦查看移动终端的状态值的方式来判断移动终端是否处于网络连接状态,具体地,在一个实施方式中,当移动终端处于网络连接状态时,移动终端可以生成第一状态值,当移动终端处于非网络连接状态时,移动终端可以生成第二状态值,从而可以通过监测第一状态值和第二状态值的方式来监测移动终端的网络连接状态。In this embodiment, the network connection status of the mobile terminal is first monitored. It can be understood that the network connection status of the mobile terminal may include a connected state and a non-connected state, where the non-connected state includes a non-connected state and a connected state. medium state. As a way, you can determine whether the mobile terminal is in the network connection state by checking the status value of the mobile terminal. Specifically, in one embodiment, when the mobile terminal is in the network connection state, the mobile terminal can generate the first Status value: When the mobile terminal is in a non-network connection state, the mobile terminal can generate a second status value, so that the network connection status of the mobile terminal can be monitored by monitoring the first status value and the second status value.
另外,在确定移动终端处于网络连接状态后,还可以对移动终端连接的网络的变化进行监测,例如,对移动终端是否掉网进行监测、对移动终端是否从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区进行监测、对移动终端是否从原小区掉到新小区进行监测等,在此不做限定。In addition, after it is determined that the mobile terminal is in a network connection state, changes in the network to which the mobile terminal is connected can also be monitored, for example, monitoring whether the mobile terminal drops from the network, and whether the mobile terminal drops from a resident cell to a non-resident cell. Monitoring, monitoring whether the mobile terminal falls from the original cell to the new cell, etc. are not limited here.
步骤S420:当所述移动终端从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区且接收到目标短信时,确定所述移动终端被伪基站攻击。Step S420: When the mobile terminal drops from a resident cell to a non-resident cell and receives the target text message, it is determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station.
当监测到移动终端从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区时,对移动终端是否接收到短信进行检测,其中,若移动终端在从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区且接收到短信时,对该短信进行识别,以判断该短信是否为目标短信,在本实施例中,当该短信是目标短信时,可以确定该移动终端被伪基站攻击,当该短信不是目标短信时,可以确定该移动终端没有被伪基站攻击。When it is detected that the mobile terminal falls from the resident cell to the non-resident cell, whether the mobile terminal receives the text message is detected. Wherein, if the mobile terminal falls from the resident cell to the non-resident cell and receives the text message, the text message is Recognition is performed to determine whether the text message is a target text message. In this embodiment, when the text message is a target text message, it can be determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station. When the text message is not a target text message, it can be determined that the mobile terminal is not attacked by a pseudo base station. Attacked by fake base station.
作为一种实施方式,当移动终端从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区且接收到短信时,对该短信的短信内容进行分词得到多个分词结果,然后判断该多个分词结果中是否包括目标关键词,其中,当多个分词结果中包括目标关键词时,可以确定该移动终端接收的短信为目标短信。在本实施例中,该目标关键词可以包括账号登录、密码修改、验证码以及转账中的至少一种。例如,所述短信内容为“您于**年**月**目申请了手机号码注册,验证码是000000”,那么,作为一种方式,对所述短信内容进行分词可以得到“您”、“于”、“**年**月**目”、“申请了”、“手机”、“号码”、“注册”、“验证码”、“是”、“000000”,然后将分词结果与预先存储的目标关键词进行对比,以判断该分词结果中是否包含有目标关键词,可以理解的,由于分词结果中包含关键词“验证码”,因此,可以确定该短信内容包括目标关键词,即确定所述异地终端接收到目标短信,也就是说,移动终端被伪基站攻击。As an implementation manner, when a mobile terminal drops from a resident cell to a non-resident cell and receives a text message, it performs word segmentation on the content of the text message to obtain multiple word segmentation results, and then determines whether the multiple word segmentation results include the target key. word, wherein when multiple word segmentation results include the target keyword, it can be determined that the text message received by the mobile terminal is the target text message. In this embodiment, the target keyword may include at least one of account login, password modification, verification code, and transfer. For example, the text message content is "You applied for mobile phone number registration on **year**month**, and the verification code is 000000." Then, as a way, segmenting the text message content can obtain "you" , "at", "**year**month**project", "applied", "mobile phone", "number", "registration", "verification code", "yes", "000000", and then divide the words The results are compared with the pre-stored target keywords to determine whether the word segmentation results contain the target keywords. It is understandable that since the word segmentation results include the keyword "verification code", it can be determined that the text message content includes the target keywords. word, that is, it is determined that the remote terminal has received the target text message, that is, the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station.
请参阅图7,图7示出了本申请的图6所示的伪基站处理方法的步骤S420的流程示意图。下面将针对图7所示的流程进行详细的阐述,所示方法具体可以包括以下步骤:Please refer to FIG. 7 , which shows a schematic flowchart of step S420 of the pseudo base station processing method shown in FIG. 6 of the present application. The process shown in Figure 7 will be described in detail below. The method shown may specifically include the following steps:
步骤S421:当所述移动终端从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区且接收到目标短信时,检测所述常驻小区的信号强度衰减值。Step S421: When the mobile terminal drops from the resident cell to the non-resident cell and receives the target text message, detect the signal strength attenuation value of the resident cell.
作为一种实施方式,在移动终端从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区且接收到目标短信时,可以检测该常驻小区的信号强度衰减值。具体地,当移动终端驻留在常驻小区时,对该常驻小区的信号强度进行监测以实时获取该常驻小区的第一信号强度值,当该移动终端从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区后,再检测该常驻小区的信号强度获得第二信号强度,然后计算该第一信号强度值和第二信号强度值之间的差值,得到所述常驻小区的信号强度衰减值。As an implementation manner, when a mobile terminal drops from a resident cell to a non-resident cell and receives a target text message, the signal strength attenuation value of the resident cell can be detected. Specifically, when the mobile terminal is camped in the resident cell, the signal strength of the resident cell is monitored to obtain the first signal strength value of the resident cell in real time. When the mobile terminal drops from the resident cell to the non-resident cell, After detecting the resident cell, the signal strength of the resident cell is detected to obtain the second signal strength, and then the difference between the first signal strength value and the second signal strength value is calculated to obtain the signal strength attenuation value of the resident cell.
步骤S422:判断所述信号强度衰减值是否小于指定衰减值。Step S422: Determine whether the signal strength attenuation value is less than the specified attenuation value.
作为一种方式,该移动终端设置指定衰减值,用于作为常驻小区的信号强度衰减值的判断依据,可以理解的,该指定衰减值可以由移动终端预先存储在本地,也可以是在判断时再进行设置,在此不做限定。其中,该指定衰减值可以由移动终端自动配置,可以由移动终端所对应的用户手动设置,也可以由移动终端连接的服务器配置后发送至移动终端,在此不做限定。进一步地,在获取所述常驻小区的信号强度衰减值后,将该常驻小区的信号强度衰减值与指定衰减值进行比较,以判断该常驻小区的信号强度衰减值是否小于所述指定衰减值。As a method, the mobile terminal sets a designated attenuation value, which is used as a basis for judging the signal strength attenuation value of the resident cell. It is understandable that the designated attenuation value can be stored locally by the mobile terminal in advance, or it can be judged Set it again when necessary, and there is no limit here. The specified attenuation value can be automatically configured by the mobile terminal, can be manually set by the user corresponding to the mobile terminal, or can be configured by a server connected to the mobile terminal and then sent to the mobile terminal, which is not limited here. Further, after obtaining the signal strength attenuation value of the resident cell, compare the signal strength attenuation value of the resident cell with the specified attenuation value to determine whether the signal strength attenuation value of the resident cell is less than the specified attenuation value. Attenuation value.
步骤S423:当所述信号强度衰减值小于所述指定衰减值时,确定所述移动终端被伪基站攻击。Step S423: When the signal strength attenuation value is less than the specified attenuation value, determine that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station.
其中,在确定该常驻小区的信号强度衰减值小于该指定衰减值时,表征该常驻小区的信号未变弱,也就是说,移动终端不是因为常驻小区信号衰减的原因掉到非常驻小区的,而是因为伪基站的介入,因此,可以确定该移动终端被伪基站攻击。Among them, when it is determined that the signal strength attenuation value of the resident cell is less than the specified attenuation value, it means that the signal of the resident cell has not become weaker. That is to say, the mobile terminal does not fall into the non-resident state due to the signal attenuation of the resident cell. cell, but because of the intervention of the pseudo base station, therefore, it can be determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by the pseudo base station.
步骤S430:当检测到所述移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与所述伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站。Step S430: When detecting that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, disconnect the mobile terminal from the pseudo base station and try to access the target base station.
步骤S440:在所述移动终端成功接入所述目标基站时,发出报警信息。Step S440: When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, send an alarm message.
步骤S450:控制所述移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。Step S450: Control the mobile terminal to log out of the network and enter airplane mode.
其中,步骤S430-步骤S450的具体描述请参阅步骤S110-步骤S130,在此不再赘述。For detailed descriptions of steps S430 to S450, please refer to steps S110 to S130, which will not be described again here.
本申请另一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法,监测移动终端的网络连接状态,当该移动终端从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区且接收到目标短信时,确定该移动终端被伪基站攻击,当检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站,在移动终端成功接入目标基站时,发出报警新信息,控制移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。相较于图3所示的伪基站处理方法,本实施例通过在监测到移动终端从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区,且接收到目标短信时,确定该移动终端被伪基站攻击,以减少移动终端被伪基站攻击。Another embodiment of the present application provides a pseudo base station processing method that monitors the network connection status of a mobile terminal. When the mobile terminal drops from a resident cell to a non-resident cell and receives a target text message, it is determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station. When it is detected that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, it disconnects from the pseudo base station and attempts to access the target base station. When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, a new alarm message is sent and the mobile terminal is controlled to log off the network and enter flight mode. Compared with the pseudo base station processing method shown in Figure 3, this embodiment detects that the mobile terminal has dropped from a resident cell to a non-resident cell and receives a target text message, and determines that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station to reduce the number of attacks. Mobile terminals are attacked by pseudo base stations.
请参阅图8,图8示出了本申请又再一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图。下面将针对图8所示的流程进行详细的阐述,所示伪基站处理方法具体可以包括以下步骤:Please refer to FIG. 8 , which shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by yet another embodiment of the present application. The process shown in Figure 8 will be described in detail below. The pseudo base station processing method shown may specifically include the following steps:
步骤S510:监测所述移动终端的网络连接状态。Step S510: Monitor the network connection status of the mobile terminal.
步骤S520:当所述移动终端从原小区掉到新小区且接收到目标短信时,确定所述移动终端被伪基站攻击。Step S520: When the mobile terminal drops from the original cell to the new cell and receives the target text message, it is determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station.
当监测到移动终端从原小区掉到新小区时,对移动终端是否接收到短信进行检测,其中,若移动终端在从原小区掉到新小区且接收到短信时,对该短信进行识别,以判断该短信是否为目标短信,在本实施例中,当该短信是目标短信时,可以确定该移动终端被伪基站攻击,当该短信不是目标短信时,可以确定该移动终端没有被伪基站攻击。其中,目标短信的检测方法请参阅步骤S420的具体描述,在此不再赘述。When it is monitored that the mobile terminal drops from the original cell to the new cell, it is detected whether the mobile terminal receives the text message. If the mobile terminal drops from the original cell to the new cell and receives the text message, the text message is identified to Determine whether the text message is a target text message. In this embodiment, when the text message is a target text message, it can be determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station. When the text message is not a target text message, it can be determined that the mobile terminal is not attacked by a pseudo base station. . For the detection method of the target text message, please refer to the specific description of step S420, which will not be described again here.
请参阅图9,图9示出了本申请的图8所示的伪基站处理方法的步骤S520的流程示意图。下面将针对图9所示的流程进行详细的阐述,所示方法具体可以包括以下步骤:Please refer to FIG. 9 , which shows a schematic flowchart of step S520 of the pseudo base station processing method shown in FIG. 8 of the present application. The process shown in Figure 9 will be described in detail below. The method shown may specifically include the following steps:
步骤S521:当所述移动终端从原小区掉到新小区且接收到所述目标短信时,判断所述原小区的信号是否受到干扰。Step S521: When the mobile terminal drops from the original cell to the new cell and receives the target text message, determine whether the signal of the original cell is interfered.
作为一种实施方式,在移动终端从原小区掉到新小区且接收到目标短信时,对原小区的信号是否受到干扰进行判断。具体地,可以对移动终端驻留在原小区的时间内的原小区的信号进行实时监测,以及对移动终端从原小区掉到新小区的过程中的原小区信号进行实时监测,其中,当监测到原小区的信号有较大的波动时,可以确定该原小区的信号受到干扰,例如,当监测到原小区的信号在某一时刻突然变弱时,可以确定该原小区的信号受到干扰。As an implementation manner, when the mobile terminal drops from the original cell to the new cell and receives the target text message, it is judged whether the signal of the original cell is interfered. Specifically, the signal of the original cell can be monitored in real time while the mobile terminal is stationed in the original cell, and the signal of the original cell can be monitored in real time during the process when the mobile terminal drops from the original cell to the new cell. Wherein, when the mobile terminal is detected When the signal of the original cell fluctuates greatly, it can be determined that the signal of the original cell is interfered. For example, when it is detected that the signal of the original cell suddenly becomes weak at a certain moment, it can be determined that the signal of the original cell is interfered.
步骤S522:当所述原小区的信号受到干扰时,确定所述移动终端被伪基站攻击。Step S522: When the signal of the original cell is interfered, determine that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station.
其中,若判断结果表示原小区的信号受到干扰时,可以认为移动终端不是通过正常的方式从原小区掉到新小区,而是由于原小区的信号受到干扰,该干扰可能由伪基站造成,因此,可以确定该移动终端被伪基站攻击。Among them, if the judgment result indicates that the signal of the original cell is interfered, it can be considered that the mobile terminal did not fall from the original cell to the new cell in a normal way, but because the signal of the original cell was interfered, and the interference may be caused by a pseudo base station. Therefore, , it can be determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station.
步骤S530:当检测到所述移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与所述伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站。Step S530: When detecting that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, disconnect the mobile terminal from the pseudo base station and try to access the target base station.
步骤S540:在所述移动终端成功接入所述目标基站时,发出报警信息。Step S540: When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, send an alarm message.
步骤S550:控制所述移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。Step S550: Control the mobile terminal to log out of the network and enter airplane mode.
其中,步骤S530-步骤S550的具体描述请参阅步骤S110-步骤S130,在此不再赘述。For detailed descriptions of steps S530 to S550, please refer to steps S110 to S130, which will not be described again here.
本申请又再一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法,监测移动终端的网络连接状态,当移动终端从原小区掉到新小区且接收到目标短信时,确定移动终端被伪基站攻击,当检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站,在移动终端成功接入目标基站时,发出报警信息,控制移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。相较于图3所示的伪基站处理方法,本实施例通过在监测到移动终端从原小区掉到新小区,且接收到目标短信时,确定该移动终端被伪基站攻击,以减少移动终端被伪基站攻击。The pseudo base station processing method provided in yet another embodiment of the present application monitors the network connection status of the mobile terminal. When the mobile terminal drops from the original cell to the new cell and receives the target text message, it is determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by the pseudo base station. When the mobile terminal is detected When the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, it disconnects from the pseudo base station and attempts to access the target base station. When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, an alarm message is issued and the mobile terminal is controlled to log off the network and enter flight mode. Compared with the pseudo base station processing method shown in Figure 3, this embodiment detects that the mobile terminal has dropped from the original cell to the new cell and receives the target text message, and determines that the mobile terminal is attacked by the pseudo base station to reduce the number of mobile terminals. Attacked by fake base station.
请参阅图10,图10示出了本申请又另一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法的流程示意图。下面将针对图10所示的流程进行详细的阐述,所示伪基站处理方法具体可以包括以下步骤:Please refer to Figure 10, which shows a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station processing method provided by yet another embodiment of the present application. The process shown in Figure 10 will be described in detail below. The pseudo base station processing method shown may specifically include the following steps:
步骤S610:监测作用于所述移动终端的操作。Step S610: Monitor operations on the mobile terminal.
在本实施例中,作用于移动终端的操作可以包括作用于移动终端的触控操作,或输入该移动终端的语音信息,在此不做限定。其中,该触控操作可以包括屏幕触摸、按键点击、重力感应变化、灭屏等,其中,屏幕触摸包括大面积按压、持续长按、持续超长按、双指长按、复制后、多指连续点击等,其中,大面积按压是指按压面积超过预设面积,持续长按是指连续按压时长超过预设时长,持续超长按是指按压时长超过预设超长时长,双指长按是指双指同时按压时长超过预设时长,复制后是指复制内容到粘贴板,多指连续连接是指连续点击的次数超过预设次数。In this embodiment, operations performed on the mobile terminal may include touch operations performed on the mobile terminal, or voice information input to the mobile terminal, which is not limited here. Among them, the touch operation may include screen touch, button click, gravity induction change, screen off, etc., wherein the screen touch includes large area press, continuous long press, continuous long press, two-finger long press, copying, multi-finger press, etc. Continuous clicks, etc. Among them, large-area pressing means that the pressing area exceeds the preset area, continuous long pressing means that the continuous pressing time exceeds the preset time, continuous ultra-long pressing means that the pressing time exceeds the preset ultra-long time, and two-finger long pressing It means pressing two fingers at the same time for longer than the preset time. After copying, it means copying the content to the pasteboard. Multi-finger continuous connection means the number of consecutive clicks exceeds the preset number.
步骤S620:当没有检测到作用于所述移动终端的操作且接收到目标短信时,确定所述移动终端被伪基站攻击。Step S620: When no operation on the mobile terminal is detected and a target text message is received, it is determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station.
其中,当没有检测到作用于移动终端的操作且接收到目标短信时,表征用户在没有操作移动终端的情况下自动接收到目标短信,也就是说,目标短信并不是基于用户的请求操作而反馈的结果,而可能是伪基站攻击移动终端造成的,那么,可以确定该移动终端被伪基站攻击。其中,目标短信的检测方法请参阅步骤S420的具体描述,在此不再赘述。Among them, when no operation on the mobile terminal is detected and the target text message is received, it means that the user automatically receives the target text message without operating the mobile terminal. That is to say, the target text message is not fed back based on the user's requested operation. The result may be caused by the pseudo base station attacking the mobile terminal, then it can be determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by the pseudo base station. For the detection method of the target text message, please refer to the specific description of step S420, which will not be described again here.
步骤S630:当检测到所述移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与所述伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站。Step S630: When detecting that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, disconnect the mobile terminal from the pseudo base station and try to access the target base station.
步骤S640:在所述移动终端成功接入所述目标基站时,发出报警信息。Step S640: When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, send an alarm message.
步骤S650:控制所述移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。Step S650: Control the mobile terminal to log out of the network and enter airplane mode.
本申请又另一个实施例提供的伪基站处理方法,监测作用于移动终端的操作,当没有检测到作用于移动终端的操作且接收到目标短信时,确定移动终端被伪基站攻击,当检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站,在移动终端成功接入目标基站时,发出报警信息,控制移动终端注销网络进行飞行模式。相较于图3所示的伪基站处理方法,本实施例通过在移动终端没有检测到作用于其的操作且接收到目标短信时,确定该移动终端被伪基站攻击,以减少移动终端被伪基站攻击。Another embodiment of the present application provides a pseudo base station processing method that monitors operations on the mobile terminal. When no operations on the mobile terminal are detected and a target text message is received, it is determined that the mobile terminal is attacked by the pseudo base station. When the operation on the mobile terminal is detected, When the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, it disconnects from the pseudo base station and attempts to access the target base station. When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, an alarm message is issued and the mobile terminal is controlled to log off the network and enter flight mode. Compared with the pseudo base station processing method shown in Figure 3, this embodiment determines that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station when the mobile terminal does not detect the operation acting on it and receives the target text message, so as to reduce the mobile terminal being attacked by the pseudo base station. Base station attack.
请参阅图11,图11示出了本申请实施例提供的伪基站处理装置200的模块框图。该伪基站处理装置200应用于上述移动终端,下面将针对图11所示的框图进行阐述,所示伪基站处理装置200包括:断开模块210、报警模块220以及控制模块230,其中:Please refer to FIG. 11 , which shows a module block diagram of the pseudo base station processing device 200 provided by the embodiment of the present application. The pseudo base station processing device 200 is applied to the above-mentioned mobile terminal. The following will be described with reference to the block diagram shown in Figure 11. The pseudo base station processing device 200 includes: a disconnection module 210, an alarm module 220 and a control module 230, wherein:
断开模块210,用于当检测到所述移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与所述伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站。进一步地,所示断开模块210包括:特征参数获取子模块、基站禁止子模块、目标基站接入子模块、网络禁止子模块以及网络接入子模块,其中:The disconnection module 210 is configured to disconnect the mobile terminal from the pseudo base station and attempt to access the target base station when it is detected that the mobile terminal is attacked by the pseudo base station. Further, the disconnection module 210 shown includes: characteristic parameter acquisition sub-module, base station prohibition sub-module, target base station access sub-module, network prohibition sub-module and network access sub-module, wherein:
特征参数获取子模块,用于获取所述伪基站的特征参数。The characteristic parameter acquisition submodule is used to obtain the characteristic parameters of the pseudo base station.
基站禁止子模块,用于禁止所述移动终端接入所述特征参数所对应的基站。The base station prohibition submodule is used to prohibit the mobile terminal from accessing the base station corresponding to the characteristic parameter.
目标基站接入子模块,用于尝试接入除所述特征参数以外的其他特征参数所对应的目标基站。The target base station access submodule is used to attempt to access the target base station corresponding to other characteristic parameters except the characteristic parameters.
网络禁止子模块,用于禁止所述移动终端接入2G网络和3G网络。The network prohibition submodule is used to prohibit the mobile terminal from accessing the 2G network and the 3G network.
网络接入子模块,用于尝试接入4G网络进入VOLTE模式。The network access submodule is used to attempt to access the 4G network and enter VOLTE mode.
报警模块220,用于在所述移动终端成功接入所述目标基站时,发出报警信息。The alarm module 220 is configured to send an alarm message when the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station.
控制模块230,用于控制所述移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式。The control module 230 is used to control the mobile terminal to log out of the network and enter airplane mode.
进一步地,所述伪基站处理装置200还包括:时长检测模块、时长判断模块以及模式推出模块,其中:Further, the pseudo base station processing device 200 also includes: a duration detection module, a duration judgment module and a mode derivation module, wherein:
时长检测模块,用于检测所述移动终端进入所述飞行模式的时长。A duration detection module is used to detect the duration of the mobile terminal entering the flight mode.
时长判断模块,用于判断所述时长是否大于预设时长。The duration judgment module is used to determine whether the duration is greater than the preset duration.
模式退出模块,用于当所述时长大于所述预设时长时,控制所述移动终端退出所述飞行模式并接入网络。A mode exit module, configured to control the mobile terminal to exit the airplane mode and access the network when the duration is greater than the preset duration.
进一步地,所述伪基站处理装置200还包括:第一状态监测模块、第一确定模块、第二状态监测模块、第二确定模块、操作监测模块以及第三确定模块,其中:Further, the pseudo base station processing device 200 also includes: a first status monitoring module, a first determination module, a second status monitoring module, a second determination module, an operation monitoring module and a third determination module, wherein:
第一状态监测模块,用于监测所述移动终端的网络连接状态。The first status monitoring module is used to monitor the network connection status of the mobile terminal.
第一确定模块,用于当所述移动终端从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区且接收到目标短信时,确定所述移动终端被伪基站攻击。进一步地,所述第一确定模块包括:衰减值监测子模块、衰减值判断子模块以及第一确定子模块,其中:The first determination module is configured to determine that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station when the mobile terminal drops from a resident cell to a non-resident cell and receives a target text message. Further, the first determination module includes: attenuation value monitoring sub-module, attenuation value judgment sub-module and first determination sub-module, wherein:
衰减值监测子模块,用于当所述移动终端从常驻小区掉到非常驻小区且接收到目标短信时,检测所述常驻小区的信号强度衰减值。The attenuation value monitoring submodule is used to detect the signal strength attenuation value of the resident cell when the mobile terminal drops from the resident cell to the non-resident cell and receives the target text message.
衰减值判断子模块,用于判断所述信号强度衰减值是否小于指定衰减值。The attenuation value judgment sub-module is used to judge whether the signal strength attenuation value is less than the specified attenuation value.
第一确定子模块,用于当所述信号强度衰减值小于所述指定衰减值时,确定所述移动终端被伪基站攻击。The first determination sub-module is configured to determine that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station when the signal strength attenuation value is less than the specified attenuation value.
第二状态监测模块,用于监测所述移动终端的网络连接状态。The second status monitoring module is used to monitor the network connection status of the mobile terminal.
第二确定模块,用于当所述移动终端从原小区掉到新小区且接收到目标短信时,确定所述移动终端被伪基站攻击。进一步地,所述第二确定模块包括:干扰判断子模块和第二确定子模块,其中:The second determination module is used to determine that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station when the mobile terminal drops from the original cell to the new cell and receives the target text message. Further, the second determination module includes: an interference determination sub-module and a second determination sub-module, wherein:
干扰判断子模块,用于当所述移动终端从原小区掉到新小区且接收到所述目标短信时,判断所述原小区的信号是否受到干扰。The interference judgment submodule is used to judge whether the signal of the original cell is interfered when the mobile terminal drops from the original cell to the new cell and receives the target text message.
第二确定子模块,用于当所述原小区的信号受到干扰时,确定所述移动终端被伪基站攻击。The second determination sub-module is used to determine that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station when the signal of the original cell is interfered.
操作监测模块,用于监测作用于所述移动终端的操作。An operation monitoring module is used to monitor operations on the mobile terminal.
第三确定模块,用于当没有检测到作用于所述移动终端的操作且接收到目标短信时,确定所述移动终端被伪基站攻击。The third determination module is configured to determine that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station when no operation on the mobile terminal is detected and a target text message is received.
所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到,为描述的方便和简洁,上述描述装置和模块的具体工作过程,可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程,在此不再赘述。Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that for the convenience and simplicity of description, the specific working processes of the above-described devices and modules can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be described again here.
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中,模块相互之间的耦合可以是电性,机械或其它形式的耦合。In several embodiments provided in this application, the coupling between modules may be electrical, mechanical or other forms of coupling.
另外,在本申请各个实施例中的各功能模块可以集成在一个处理模块中,也可以是各个模块单独物理存在,也可以两个或两个以上模块集成在一个模块中。上述集成的模块既可以采用硬件的形式实现,也可以采用软件功能模块的形式实现。In addition, each functional module in each embodiment of the present application can be integrated into one processing module, or each module can exist physically alone, or two or more modules can be integrated into one module. The above integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or software function modules.
请参阅图12,其示出了本申请实施例提供的一种移动终端100的结构框图。该移动终端100可以是智能手机、平板电脑、电子书等能够运行应用程序的移动终端。本申请中的移动终端100可以包括一个或多个如下部件:处理器110、存储器120、屏幕130以及一个或多个应用程序,其中一个或多个应用程序可以被存储在存储器120中并被配置为由一个或多个处理器110执行,一个或多个程序配置用于执行如前述方法实施例所描述的方法。Please refer to FIG. 12 , which shows a structural block diagram of a mobile terminal 100 provided by an embodiment of the present application. The mobile terminal 100 may be a smartphone, a tablet computer, an e-book, or other mobile terminal capable of running application programs. The mobile terminal 100 in the present application may include one or more of the following components: a processor 110, a memory 120, a screen 130, and one or more application programs, wherein one or more application programs may be stored in the memory 120 and configured. For execution by the one or more processors 110, the one or more programs are configured to perform the method as described in the preceding method embodiments.
其中,处理器110可以包括一个或者多个处理核。处理器110利用各种接口和线路连接整个移动终端100内的各个部分,通过运行或执行存储在存储器120内的指令、程序、代码集或指令集,以及调用存储在存储器120内的数据,执行移动终端100的各种功能和处理数据。可选地,处理器110可以采用数字信号处理(Digital Signal Processing,DSP)、现场可编程门阵列(Field-Programmable Gate Array,FPGA)、可编程逻辑阵列(ProgrammableLogic Array,PLA)中的至少一种硬件形式来实现。处理器110可集成中央处理器(CentralProcessing Unit,CPU)、图形处理器(Graphics Processing Unit,GPU)和调制解调器等中的一种或几种的组合。其中,CPU主要处理操作系统、用户界面和应用程序等;GPU用于负责显示内容的渲染和绘制;调制解调器用于处理无线通信。可以理解的是,上述调制解调器也可以不集成到处理器110中,单独通过一块通信芯片进行实现。The processor 110 may include one or more processing cores. The processor 110 uses various interfaces and lines to connect various parts of the entire mobile terminal 100, and executes by running or executing instructions, programs, code sets or instruction sets stored in the memory 120, and calling data stored in the memory 120. Various functions and processing data of the mobile terminal 100. Optionally, the processor 110 may adopt at least one of digital signal processing (Digital Signal Processing, DSP), field-programmable gate array (Field-Programmable Gate Array, FPGA), and programmable logic array (Programmable Logic Array, PLA). implemented in hardware form. The processor 110 may integrate one or a combination of a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU), a graphics processor (Graphics Processing Unit, GPU), a modem, and the like. Among them, the CPU mainly handles the operating system, user interface, and applications; the GPU is responsible for rendering and drawing the display content; and the modem is used to handle wireless communications. It can be understood that the above-mentioned modem may not be integrated into the processor 110 and may be implemented solely through a communication chip.
存储器120可以包括随机存储器(Random Access Memory,RAM),也可以包括只读存储器(Read-Only Memory)。存储器120可用于存储指令、程序、代码、代码集或指令集。存储器120可包括存储程序区和存储数据区,其中,存储程序区可存储用于实现操作系统的指令、用于实现至少一个功能的指令(比如触控功能、声音播放功能、图像播放功能等)、用于实现下述各个方法实施例的指令等。存储数据区还可以存储终端100在使用中所创建的数据(比如电话本、音视频数据、聊天记录数据)等。The memory 120 may include random access memory (RAM) or read-only memory (Read-Only Memory). Memory 120 may be used to store instructions, programs, codes, sets of codes, or sets of instructions. The memory 120 may include a program storage area and a data storage area, where the program storage area may store instructions for implementing an operating system and instructions for implementing at least one function (such as a touch function, a sound playback function, an image playback function, etc.) , instructions for implementing each of the following method embodiments, etc. The storage data area can also store data created during use of the terminal 100 (such as phone book, audio and video data, chat record data), etc.
进一步地,所述屏幕130可以为液晶显示屏(Liquid Crystal Display,LCD),可以为有机发光二极管(Organic Light-Emitting Diode,OLED)等。所述屏幕130用于显示由用户输入的信息、提供给用户的信息以及所述移动终端的各种图形用户接口,这些图形用户接口可以由图形、文本、图标、数字、视频和其任意组合来构成。Further, the screen 130 may be a liquid crystal display (LCD), an organic light-emitting diode (OLED), or the like. The screen 130 is used to display information input by the user, information provided to the user, and various graphical user interfaces of the mobile terminal. These graphical user interfaces can be composed of graphics, text, icons, numbers, videos, and any combination thereof. constitute.
请参阅图13,其示出了本申请实施例提供的一种计算机可读存储介质的结构框图。该计算机可读介质300中存储有程序代码,所述程序代码可被处理器调用执行上述方法实施例中所描述的方法。Please refer to Figure 13, which shows a structural block diagram of a computer-readable storage medium provided by an embodiment of the present application. Program code is stored in the computer-readable medium 300, and the program code can be called by the processor to execute the method described in the above method embodiment.
计算机可读存储介质300可以是诸如闪存、EEPROM(电可擦除可编程只读存储器)、EPROM、硬盘或者ROM之类的电子存储器。可选地,计算机可读存储介质300包括非易失性计算机可读介质(non-transitory computer-readable storage medium)。计算机可读存储介质300具有执行上述方法中的任何方法步骤的程序代码310的存储空间。这些程序代码可以从一个或者多个计算机程序产品中读出或者写入到这一个或者多个计算机程序产品中。程序代码310可以例如以适当形式进行压缩。Computer-readable storage medium 300 may be electronic memory such as flash memory, EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory), EPROM, hard disk, or ROM. Optionally, the computer-readable storage medium 300 includes non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium 300 has storage space for the program code 310 that performs any method steps in the above-mentioned methods. These program codes can be read from or written into one or more computer program products. Program code 310 may, for example, be compressed in a suitable form.
综上所述,本申请实施例提供的伪基站处理方法、装置、移动终端以及存储介质,当检测到移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与该伪基站的连接并尝试接入目标基站,在移动终端成功接入该目标基站时,发出报警信息,控制移动终端注销网络进入飞行模式,从而通过在移动终端被伪基站攻击时,断开与伪基站的连接并连接目标基站发送报警信息,并在发送报警信息之后注销网络进行飞行模式,以降低伪基站对移动终端的攻击几率,提升移动终端的信息安全性。In summary, the pseudo base station processing method, device, mobile terminal and storage medium provided by the embodiments of the present application, when detecting that the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, disconnects from the pseudo base station and attempts to access the target base station. When the mobile terminal successfully accesses the target base station, an alarm message is issued, and the mobile terminal is controlled to log off the network and enter flight mode. Thus, when the mobile terminal is attacked by a pseudo base station, it disconnects from the pseudo base station and connects to the target base station to send an alarm message. And after sending the alarm information, log out of the network and enter flight mode to reduce the probability of attacks by pseudo base stations on mobile terminals and improve the information security of mobile terminals.
最后应说明的是:以上实施例仅用以说明本申请的技术方案,而非对其限制;尽管参照前述实施例对本申请进行了详细的说明,本领域的普通技术人员当理解:其依然可以对前述各实施例所记载的技术方案进行修改,或者对其中部分技术特征进行等同替换;而这些修改或者替换,并不驱使相应技术方案的本质脱离本申请各实施例技术方案的精神和范围。Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solution of the present application, but not to limit it; although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those of ordinary skill in the art will understand that: it can still Modifications are made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions are made to some of the technical features; however, these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application.
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