CN110234143A - Reliable routing towards IWSN based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game - Google Patents
Reliable routing towards IWSN based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game Download PDFInfo
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/12—Shortest path evaluation
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- H04W40/02—Communication route or path selection, e.g. power-based or shortest path routing
- H04W40/023—Limited or focused flooding to selected areas of a network
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- H04W40/04—Communication route or path selection, e.g. power-based or shortest path routing based on wireless node resources
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Abstract
Reliable routing towards IWSN based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game is one kind for guaranteeing the technology of reliable data transmission in extensive IWSNs.Using this routing algorithm, the success rate of data transmission can effectively ensure that, to make industrial control system reliability with higher and safety.It carefully studies and analyzes first the relevant document of reliable routing algorithm carefully, theoretically grasped the actual demand of extensive IWSNs routing algorithm substantially；Secondly, analysis and more existing reliable data transmission in terms of the relevant technologies, propose the sealing sealed-bid first price auction betting model based on standardized normal distribution；On the basis of the model, in conjunction with the characteristics of the transmission of extensive IWSNs data, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium that bid node participates in the sealing sealed-bid first price auction game based on standardized normal distribution is given, the reliable transmission for data provides theoretical basis and supports.Finally, proposing dynamic income control method to promote the cooperation between sensor node, and complete the design and realization of the reliable routing algorithm based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to large-scale industry routing algorithm for wireless sensor.
Background technique
With the increasingly raising of traditional industry field technology and the market demand, wireless sensor network becomes industrial circle
One of important development direction.Industrial environment is complicated, and the especially numerous large-scale industries of interstitial content and data volume are wireless
The reliability of sensor network (Industrial Wireless Sensor Networks, IWSNs), data transmission is directly closed
It is the safety to the quality even industrial control system of industrial task.Therefore, extensive IWSNs number can be guaranteed by studying one kind
It is of great significance according to the routing algorithm of reliable transmission.
Summary of the invention
The purpose of the present invention is to provide a kind of reliable routing towards IWSN based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game, answers
With this routing algorithm, the success rate of data transmission can effectively ensure that, to keep industrial control system with higher reliable
Property and safety.
The technical solution adopted is that:
Reliable routing towards IWSN based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game is a kind of for protecting in extensive IWSNs
The technology of reliable data transmission is demonstrate,proved, main contents include: proposition network model, we will be using the net with multiple Sink nodes
Network model reduces data transmission distance and propagation delay time with this；To ensure the fault-tolerance routed, we take double path transmission
Data transmission mechanism；For the transmission link for selecting high reliablity, we utilize the first valence of sealing based on standardized normal distribution
The method of lattice Auction Game Theory selects optimal next-hop node；In order to promote the cooperation between sensor node, propose dynamic
State income control method；Specifically describe the implementation procedure of reliable routing algorithm.It specifically includes:
(1), network model designs
Reliable routing algorithm based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game uses the network model of more Sink nodes.In the mould
In type, we use for reference existing more Sink node Optimization deployment methods, are based on grid network structure, are guaranteed network life most
Make the Sink node number N that network cost is minimum while bigization, final determination is uniformly disposed in monitoring areaA Sink node.According to network model, Sink node number, neighbours' Sink node, purpose are proposed
The related definitions such as Sink node.
(2) the reliable routing algorithm, based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game
In route finding process, each sensor node establishes the neighbor list to neighbours' Sink node, saves sensing
The information of neighbor nodes of device node and hop count to neighbours' Sink node.In data transmission procedure, source node is arranged from neighbours
It is determined in table apart from oneself two nearest Sink node of distance Sink node as a purpose, and transfers data to the two
Purpose Sink node.During determining transmission path, by the way of on-demand routing, using based on standardized normal distribution
Seal sealed-bid first price auction game and select next-hop node, and propose dynamic income control method, promote sensor node it
Between cooperation.
(3), algorithm implementation procedure
Step1: building routing.After the completion of node deployment, start to construct initial routing.Each sensor node is in routing structure
After building, its neighbor node can all be arrived to the information preservations such as the hop count of each purpose Sink node and destination node collection
In the neighbor list of oneself；
Step2: selection purpose Sink node.Source node concentrates selection nearest two apart from oneself from purpose Sink node
Sink node is as final destination node；
Step3: determine whether to initiate game.The sensor node for needing to send data checks under last game determination
As soon as the confidence level of hop node meets the requirements and directly transmits data and turn to Step7；It does not meet and turns to Step4；
Step4: auction node initiates game.The sensor node for needing to send data initiates to auction to its neighbor node
Game；
Step5: bid node provides optimum price quotation.The sensor node in Auction Game Theory is participated in, calculates separately and comes from
Oneself optimal bid, and bid is sent to auction node；
Step6: next-hop node is determined.The bid of more all bid nodes of node is auctioned, checks highest biography of bidding
The confidence level of sensor node.If confidence level is met the requirements, this sensor node is just determined as next-hop node；Conversely,
The node is abandoned, the confidence level for highest node of bidding in remaining auction node is continued checking, it is satisfactory until finding
Node；
Step7: receiving the sensor node of data, checks in oneself jump range with the presence or absence of purpose Sink node.Such as
Fruit exists, and just sends the data to purpose Sink node, if it does not exist, then repeating Step3-Step7, sends until by data
To purpose Sink node.
The present invention use more Sink nodes network model, can be avoided network cavity, reduce data transmission range and
Time delay extends network life；Based on standardized normal distribution, classical sealing sealed-bid first price auction game is improved, by equal
The analysis for the result that weighs, this method can make auctioner obtain higher income；In route finding process, each Sink node is issued
Route establishment message be only diffused into neighbours' Sink node, it is not necessary to be sent to whole network, reduce time delay and network energy consumption；Number
According in transmission process, selecting two Sink nodes node as a purpose, and data are transmitted to two from two paths respectively
Destination node can increase the fault-tolerance of routing and the reliability of data；Data forwarding Auction Game Theory model is proposed, is sufficiently examined
Consider many factors for influencing data transmission credibility, guarantee data is successfully transmitted rate；Dynamic income control method, dynamically more
The descent coefficient of new sensor node confidence level promotes the cooperation between sensor node.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the more Sink node schematic network structures of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is inventive network model structure schematic diagram.
Fig. 3 is data forwarding Auction Game Theory process schematic of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Reliable routing towards IWSN based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game, from extensive IWSNs data transmission procedure
The angle of reliability is set out, reduced using the network model with more Sink nodes data transmission in network distance and when
Prolong, extends network life.Sealing sealed-bid first price auction game is studied and improved, the reliability of improve data transfer.
The advantage of algorithm is: carefully studying and analyze first the relevant document of reliable routing algorithm, theoretically base carefully
This has grasped the actual demand of extensive IWSNs routing algorithm；Secondly, in terms of analysis and more existing reliable data transmission
The relevant technologies propose the sealing sealed-bid first price auction betting model based on standardized normal distribution；On the basis of the model, knot
The characteristics of closing the transmission of extensive IWSNs data gives bid node and participates in the first price of sealing based on standardized normal distribution
The Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Auction Game Theory, the reliable transmission for data provide theoretical basis and support.Finally, in order to promote to pass
Cooperation between sensor node, propose dynamic income control method, and complete based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game can
By the design and realization of routing algorithm.
Based on the reliable routing algorithm of sealing sealed-bid first price auction game, technical characteristic includes following part:
1, network model is assumed
Algorithm uses the network structure of more Sink nodes, as shown in Figure 1.The data perceived are sent to by sensor node
Sink node, Sink node handle data, finally send the data to administrative center by Sink node.
The network model that algorithm uses is as shown in Figure 2.We assume that monitoring area is square region, use for reference existing more
Sink node Optimization deployment method is based on grid network structure, proposes the network life model and cost mould under more Sink nodes
Type, by calculate maximum network Life Cost ratio (RLC) method, be guaranteed network life maximumlly at the same make network at
This minimum Sink node number N.Final determination is uniformly disposed in monitoring areaA Sink section
Point.
According to model above, related definition is proposed:
Define 1 (Sink node number Si): Sink node is numbered in a manner of row major ascending order, then Sink node
Matrix are as follows:
It defines 2 (Sink node classifications): Sink node is divided into three classifications, use set Class_1, Class_ respectively
2, Class_3 indicate.Class_1 is the Sink node set in monitoring region quadrangle, i.e.,
Class_2 is the node set close to four sides of monitoring area, i.e.,；Class_3
For other Sink node set.
Define 3 (neighbours' Sink node collection NSi): Sink node SiThe horizontal adjacent Sink node with vertical direction forms
Set, use NSi(Neighbor nodes) is indicated.
Therefore, each Sink node has 2 neighbor nodes in Class_1, and each Sink node has 3 neighbours in Class_2
Node is occupied, each Sink node there are 4 neighbor nodes in Class_3.
For Class_1:NS1={ S2,S1+n, NSn={ Sn-1,S2n,
For Class_2:{ S1+n,S1+2n,…,S1+(n-2)nNSi={ Si-n,Si+1,Si+n, { S2,S3,…,Sn-1?
NSi={ Si-1,Si+1,Si+n, { S2n,S3n,…,Sn2-nNSi={ Si-n,Si+n,Si-1,'s
NSi={ Si-n,Si+1,Si-1}；
For Class_3:SiNSi={ Si-n,Si+1,Si+n,Si-1}。
Define 4 (purpose Sink node collection DSi): each sensor node can exist and uniquely be present in a Sink section
Within the scope of the grid of point, the set that this Sink node and its neighbours' Sink node are constituted, referred to as this sensor node
Purpose Sink node collection, use DSi(Destination nodes) is indicated.
2, the reliable routing algorithm based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game
Route finding process:
(1) all Sink nodes establish RC (Routing Creation) message, format to its neighbor node broadcast
For (Sink node number, to the hop count of the Sink node, upper hop node serial number, neighbours' Sink node collection), i.e. (Si,0,Si,
NSi)；
(2) sensor node CiWhen receiving RC message:
A. check that oneself node jumped in range whether there is NSiIn Sink node, if it does, just going off the air
RC message is directly sent to this Sink node by RC message；
B. check that neighbours' Sink node of the Sink node belonging to oneself is concentrated with the presence or absence of Si, if not then abandon RC
Message；
C. the content of RC message is stored into the neighbor list of oneself, 1 will be added to the jumping figure value of Sink node and is updated,
Then proceed to broadcast RC message (Si, arrive SiHop count, Ci,NSi)；
(3) when not having RC message to need to forward in network, or being more than setting time, each node is stored certainly
Oneself neighbor node and jumping figure value to multiple Sink nodes.
Data transmission procedure:
(1) by two Sink nodes nearest apart from oneself in purpose Sink node collection, Sink is saved source node as a purpose
Point；
(2) source node is according to its neighbor list, is determined respectively in the method for Auction Game Theory to two purpose Sink nodes
Two sensor nodes will need the data sent to be sent to two next-hop nodes as next-hop node；
(3) relay node determines that a next-hop node, final data are respectively transmitted to two purposes in the same way
Sink node；
(4) data sharing of Sink node carries out Accuracy Verification to data and makes corresponding place to inspection result
Reason, finally by treated, data are sent to administrative center.
Seal sealed-bid first price auction game:
(1) classical sealing sealed-bid first price auction game
Assuming that having n bidder, i.e. i=1,2 ..., n.Each bidder's progress is non-public to bid simultaneously, and auctioner determines
Highest-bidder obtains auction items.For the income of any two bidder i, the j bidder i to take part in auction are as follows:
Wherein, biIndicate the bid of bidder i；
viIndicate that auction items to the value of bidder i, are obeyed (0,1) and are uniformly distributed.
Assuming that the bid b of bidder ii(vi) it is viStrictly increasing differentiable function, then the expected revenus of bidder i are as follows:
The target of bidder i is to maximize his expected revenus, it may be assumed that
The optimization first-order condition of the formula are as follows:
WhenWhen, it is the optimal strategy of bidder i, it may be assumed that
The above-mentioned differential equation is solved to obtain:
This result is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium that n bidder participates in classical sealing sealed-bid first price auction game.
The above process is classical sealing sealed-bid first price auction gambling process, and auction object is (0,1) to bid people integration
On be uniformly distributed.But in actual auction process, bidder can have certain judgement to the value of auction object,
The probability distribution of valuation process is approximately normal distribution.It is therefore proposed that the sealing sealed-bid first price auction based on standardized normal distribution
Game.
(2) the sealing sealed-bid first price auction game based on standardized normal distribution
Assuming that auction object is the standardized normal distribution N (0,1) of (- ∞ ,+∞) to bid people integration.
Lemma 1: the bid of bidder isIt is that n bidder participates in based on standard normal
The Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the sealing sealed-bid first price auction game of distribution.
It proves: assuming that have n bidder, i.e. i=1,2 ..., n, the expected revenus of bidder i are as follows:
The target of bidder i is to maximize his expected revenus, it may be assumed that
The optimization first-order condition of the formula are as follows:
It carries it into formula (8), available:
The optimization first-order condition of the formula arranges are as follows:
It solves:
Equilibrium result analysis: Δ b is set as standardized normal distribution and in the case of being uniformly distributed two kinds, the income of auctioner is poor.
The result of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of two kinds of Auction Game Theories is analyzed:
Therefore, it replaces being uniformly distributed using standardized normal distribution to indicate auction items to bid people integration, auctioner
Higher income can be obtained, actual conditions are more in line with.
Data forwarding Auction Game Theory:
(1) Auction Game Theory process
According to the process and feature of extensive IWSNs data forwarding, the first price of sealing for establishing data forwarding process is clapped
Sell betting model.Gambling process is as shown in figure 3, the node for needing to send data initiates Auction Game Theory, neighbours as auctioner
Node participates in game as bidder, and auction items are to forward the qualification of data.Each bidder according to dump energy, arrive purpose
The information such as the hop count of Sink node provide optimum price quotation, and the quotation of more all bidders of auctioner, offer highest bidder
Obtain the qualification of forwarding data.Auctioner of the sensor node of data as next stage game is received, the neighbour to it is continued
It occupies node and initiates game.Times bidding game is eventually passed through, purpose Sink node is transferred data to.
During above-mentioned Auction Game Theory, sensor node can combine the dump energy of itself and arrive purpose Sink node
Hop count, to calculate oneself optimum price quotation.Therefore, more reliable node will quote higher price, can finally determine
One higher transmission path of reliability.
(2) income of node is auctioned
It auctions node and data is successfully sent to middle target next-hop node, it will obtain the report of middle target node payment
Reward, while itself can consume the cost for sending data.Send the energy consumption E of dataTx(auc) the length l sum number of data packet is depended on
According to the distance d of packet transmission:
Wherein, EelecIndicate energy consumption needed for sending 1bit data；
εfsIndicate the energy consumption of wireless antenna amplifier；
d0Indicate the distance between two sensor nodes threshold value.
When data packet is successfully sent to next-hop node, auction node can just obtain corresponding remuneration, auction node
Data packet successfully forwarded rate θaucAre as follows:
Wherein, Nsend(auc) data volume that auction node was successfully transmitted in the past is indicated；
Nrec(auc) auction node received data volume in the past is indicated.
Therefore, the income u of node is auctionedaucAre as follows:
Wherein, the price that target node is paid in b expression；
(3) income of bid node
If bid node is got the bid, it will the qualification of forwarding data is obtained, and sensor node reception data can generate energy
Consume ERx(ten):
ERx(ten)=lEelec (17)
Therefore, the income u of bid nodetenAre as follows:
uten=η (vten-bten-ERx(ten)+θten·uauc(ten)) (18)
Wherein, η value represents the acceptance of the bid of bid node for 1 or 0,1, and 0 representative is not got the bid；
vtenIndicate auction object to the value of bid node, this value obey on (- ∞ ,+∞) standardized normal distribution N (0,
1)；
θtenIndicate that the data packet of bid node successfully forwarded rate；
uauc(ten) auction node of the bid node as game next time, the income of acquisition are indicated.
(4) Bayesian Nash equilibrium calculates
Lemma 2: bidder bids to be
It is that bid node takes part in auction the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of game.
It proves: assuming that auction node has n neighbor node to participate in game, the then expectation for node i of submitting a tender as bid node
Income are as follows:
ui=η (vi-bi-l·Eelec+θi·uauc(i))Πj≠ip(bj< bi) (19)
The target of bid node i is to maximize his expected revenus, it may be assumed that
The optimization first-order condition of the formula are as follows:
It carries it into formula (20), available:
The optimization first-order condition of the formula arranges are as follows:
It solves:
(5) the optimal bid of bid node
In view of the reliability of sensor node is related with itself dump energy and to the hop count of Sink node, it is assumed that clap
Object is sold to the value v of bid node i itselfiCalculation method are as follows:
Wherein, EiIndicate the dump energy of bid node i；
hiIndicate average number of hops of the bid node i to purpose Sink node, hi≥1。
Therefore, bid residue energy of node is more, and the hop count to Sink node is smaller, then auctions object to the value of the node
Higher, the transmission link for auctioning node to the bid node is more reliable.
The data packet of bid node i successfully forwarded rate θiAre as follows:
Auction node of the bid node i as game next time, the income of acquisition are as follows:
Therefore, by formula (25), (26), (27) substitute into formula (24), and each bid node can calculate oneself
Optimal bid.
(6) dynamic income control method
In view of in extensive IWSNs, certain sensor nodes can generate refusal because of limited resource and participate in game
Process abandons the selfish behavior such as forwarding data packet and false quotation, seriously affects the reliability of data transmission.In order to promote to pass
Cooperation between sensor node proposes dynamic income control method:
Define the confidence level Z of sensor node iiIt is the node before current time, participates in the total revenue that game obtains,
Assuming that the confidence level of sensor node can be reduced as time increases:
Zi(t+1)=(1- σi(t))Zi(t) (28)
Wherein: Zi(t) confidence level of t moment sensor node i is indicated；
σi(t) indicate sensor node i in the descent coefficient of t moment；
Once the threshold value with a low credibility in setting of sensor node, the node are regarded as insincere node.For
The sensor node of enthusiastic cooperation, it will obtain corresponding reward: sensor node is successfully transmitted or forwards every time data,
The descent coefficient of confidence level will change.Descent coefficient is related with the total amount of data that sensor node is sent:
Therefore, in order to make confidence level meet condition, sensor node will strive for forwarding number by way of participating in game
According to chance, to increase the confidence level of oneself.The total amount of data of sensor node forwarding is more, and the value decline of confidence level is got over
Slowly.
(7) selection of next-hop node
After auctioning node initiation game, the bid of bid node is waited, auction node receives the bid of all bid nodes
Or when being more than waiting time threshold value, the confidence level Z of highest tender node i is checkedi:
a.Zi≥Z0, node i is as next-hop node；
b.Zi< Z0, node i is removed from neighbor list, continues checking highest node of bidding in remaining bid node
Confidence level；
C. above step is repeated, until finding satisfactory next-hop node.
In order to reduce the energy consumption of data transmission, each sensor node record last game as a result, when there is data to need
When forwarding, the confidence level of the next-hop node of direct inspection record is directly sent the data to if confidence level meets the requirements
This node.If confidence level is undesirable, game is initiated to neighbor node again.
3 routing algorithm implementation procedures
Step1: building routing.After the completion of node deployment, start to construct initial routing.Each sensor node is in routing structure
After building, its neighbor node can all be arrived to the information preservations such as the hop count of each purpose Sink node and destination node collection
In the neighbor list of oneself；
Step2: selection purpose Sink node.Source node concentrates selection nearest two apart from oneself from purpose Sink node
Sink node is as final destination node；
Step3: determine whether to initiate game.The sensor node for needing to send data checks under last game determination
As soon as the confidence level of hop node meets the requirements and directly transmits data and turn to Step7；It does not meet and turns to Step4；
Step4: auction node initiates game.The sensor node for needing to send data initiates to auction to its neighbor node
Game；
Step5: bid node provides optimum price quotation.The sensor node in Auction Game Theory is participated in, calculates separately and comes from
Oneself optimal bid, and bid is sent to auction node；
Step6: next-hop node is determined.The bid of more all bid nodes of node is auctioned, checks highest biography of bidding
The confidence level of sensor node.If confidence level is met the requirements, this sensor node is just determined as next-hop node；Conversely,
The node is abandoned, the confidence level for highest node of bidding in remaining auction node is continued checking, it is satisfactory until finding
Node；
Step7: receiving the sensor node of data, checks in oneself jump range with the presence or absence of purpose Sink node.Such as
Fruit exists, and just sends the data to purpose Sink node, if it does not exist, then repeating Step3-Step7, sends until by data
To purpose Sink node.
Claims (1)
1. the reliable routing towards IWSN based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game is a kind of for guaranteeing in extensive IWSNs
The technology of reliable data transmission, main contents include: proposition network model, we will be using the network with multiple Sink nodes
Model reduces data transmission distance and propagation delay time with this；To ensure the fault-tolerance routed, we take double path transmission
Data transmission mechanism；For the transmission link for selecting high reliablity, we utilize the first price of sealing based on standardized normal distribution
The method of Auction Game Theory selects optimal next-hop node；In order to promote the cooperation between sensor node, dynamic is proposed
Income control method；The implementation procedure of reliable routing algorithm is specifically described, it is characterized in that specifically including:
(1), network model designs
Reliable routing algorithm based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game uses the network model of more Sink nodes.In the model, I
Use for reference existing more Sink node Optimization deployment methods, be based on grid network structure, the network life that is guaranteed is maximumlly same
When keep network cost minimum Sink node number N, final determination uniformly disposes in monitoring area
A Sink node.According to network model, the related definitions such as Sink node number, neighbours' Sink node, purpose Sink node are proposed；
(2) the reliable routing algorithm, based on sealing sealed-bid first price auction game
In route finding process, each sensor node establishes the neighbor list to neighbours' Sink node, saves sensor section
The information of neighbor nodes put and the hop count to neighbours' Sink node, in data transmission procedure, source node is from neighbor list
It determines apart from oneself two nearest Sink node of distance Sink node as a purpose, and transfers data to the two purposes
Sink node；During determining transmission path, by the way of on-demand routing, the sealing based on standardized normal distribution is utilized
Sealed-bid first price auction game selects next-hop node, and proposes dynamic income control method, promotes between sensor node
Cooperation；
(3), algorithm implementation procedure
Step1: building routing.After the completion of node deployment, start to construct initial routing, each sensor node is in route construction knot
Shu Hou, all can by its neighbor node to the information preservations such as the hop count of each purpose Sink node and destination node collection to oneself
Neighbor list in；
Step2: selection purpose Sink node.Two Sink that source node concentrates selection nearest apart from oneself from purpose Sink node
Node is as final destination node；
Step3: determining whether to initiate game, and the sensor node for needing to send data checks the next-hop that last game determines
The confidence level of node meets the requirements and just directly transmits data and turn to Step7；It does not meet and turns to Step4；
Step4: auction node initiates game, and the sensor node for needing to send data is initiated auction to its neighbor node and won
It plays chess；
Step5: bid node provides optimum price quotation, participates in the sensor node in Auction Game Theory, calculates separately out oneself
Optimal bid, and bid is sent to auction node；
Step6: determining next-hop node, auctions the bid of more all bid nodes of node, checks highest sensor of bidding
The confidence level of node；If confidence level is met the requirements, this sensor node is just determined as next-hop node；Conversely, should
Node abandons, and the confidence level for highest node of bidding in remaining auction node is continued checking, until finding satisfactory node；
Step7: receiving the sensor node of data, checks in oneself jump range with the presence or absence of purpose Sink node, if deposited
Purpose Sink node is just being sent the data to, if it does not exist, then Step3-Step7 is repeated, until sending data to mesh
Sink node.
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