CN110048884B - Intelligent power distribution network communication network planning method for resisting random attack and intentional network attack - Google Patents
Intelligent power distribution network communication network planning method for resisting random attack and intentional network attack Download PDFInfo
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- CN110048884B CN110048884B CN201910268348.1A CN201910268348A CN110048884B CN 110048884 B CN110048884 B CN 110048884B CN 201910268348 A CN201910268348 A CN 201910268348A CN 110048884 B CN110048884 B CN 110048884B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/06—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications
- H04L41/0654—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications using network fault recovery
- H04L41/0663—Performing the actions predefined by failover planning, e.g. switching to standby network elements
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/12—Discovery or management of network topologies
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/14—Network analysis or design
- H04L41/145—Network analysis or design involving simulating, designing, planning or modelling of a network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
Abstract
The invention provides a method for planning a communication network of an intelligent power distribution network for resisting random attacks and deliberate network attacks, which can avoid large-scale cascading failures caused by network attacks and is realized by the following main steps: (1) a new node is added and is connected with the two nodes of the communication network through the two edges; (2) by randomly attacking and intentionally attacking the communication network node, removing the fault node corresponding to the power network, calculating the power flow distribution, removing the out-of-limit line, returning the power network fault information to the communication network to search the fault node, and repeating the process until the cascading failure stops; (3) and calculating and recording fitness function values corresponding to the maximum connected subgraph number of the power network and the characteristic path transformation quantity of the communication network, and finding out the best connected edge mode. And (5) repeating the processes (1) and (2) until the node growth is finished. The method has the main functions of optimizing the distribution of the edges in the communication network in the planning process and preventing the major power failure accident caused by the attack of hackers on the power communication network.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a communication network planning method for an intelligent power distribution network, in particular to a communication network planning method for the intelligent power distribution network for resisting random attacks and intentional network attacks.
Background
With the vigorous investment and research of power companies in various countries around the world on the smart grid, the smart grid is developed vigorously, a communication information system which is used as an important component of the smart grid and is in coordination with a primary grid frame of a power network is greatly improved under the background, and the network safety problem is still very severe on the premise of the extremely rapid development of the smart grid. The electric power communication network is inevitably connected to an external network, is closely coupled with the electric power physical network, and faults caused by a single communication network can be evolved into communication-physical cascade faults, so that the destructiveness and the propagability of the faults are increased. Therefore, in order to destroy the local power network, some hackers often conduct network attacks against the vulnerabilities of their communication networks to crash the power network.
The planning research of the existing power distribution network communication network mainly focuses on the problems of communication station selection, link deployment and the like. For example, the minimum total cost of the investment cost and the operation cost of the optical cable is taken as an objective function, the number of the optical cables and the bandwidth capacity of each optical cable are taken as constraints, and a mixed integer programming method is used for solving to provide an optimal optical cable structure scheme. Or site selection and planning are carried out on the sensors in the wide area measurement system, the minimum total cost for deploying the sensors is taken as an optimization objective function, the coverage area of the sensors is taken as a constraint condition, and the sensor deployment scheme with the optimal economy is solved. The capability of the network for resisting network attack is not considered in the scheme, so that the network security of the communication network has great potential safety hazard.
The existing research on physical-communication network collaborative planning can be roughly divided into two types, and one type belongs to distribution network communication network mode planning based on power supply reliability requirements. In order to ensure the rapid and accurate transmission of information in areas with high power supply reliability requirements, optical fibers are selected as a main communication mode, redundant communication channels are arranged, and the ratio of wireless communication is increased in areas with low reliability requirements. In another type of distribution network communication network networking planning based on primary network frames, the construction of a communication system is based on the primary network frame structure of a power distribution network and the geographic information of the power distribution network, so that the investment is saved to the maximum extent and the operation efficiency of the communication system is improved. For example, in densely populated cities, the distribution network requires high reliability, and optical fiber communication should be selected as much as possible to ensure the reliability of communication, while optical cable laying should be coordinated with underground cable laying. In both types of collaborative planning research, the fault propagation range of the communication network and the physical network is not considered, and a small fault in the planned network is easy to evolve into a large-range fault.
In summary, no power distribution network planning method is available at present, which can well defend a large-scale power failure accident caused by random attack and deliberate network attack in intelligent power distribution network communication network planning, so that an actual power grid faces a potential safety risk.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects in the prior art, the invention aims to provide the intelligent power distribution network planning method for resisting random attack and intentional network attack, and mainly aims to prevent the malicious attack of internet hackers on the power communication network from causing large-scale cascading failures in the power communication network and improve the security of the power network.
The invention solves the technical problems through the following technical scheme:
a communication network planning method for an intelligent power distribution network for resisting random attacks and deliberate network attacks is characterized in that a communication network planning model in the intelligent power distribution network under network attacks is established according to the dynamic coupling relation between the communication network and a power network, and the model is solved through a scale-free network construction method; and determining each edge of the communication network in the model, judging the characteristic path length of the communication network and the maximum connection subgraph of the physical network after the communication network is attacked and the communication-power network has cascading failure, and judging the invisible failure of the power network in the physical network through load flow calculation.
The method comprises the following steps:
step one, an initial physical network generated by an IEEE-14 node and an initial communication network of 3 nodes are given;
step two, adding two nodes into the communication network each time according to the generation method of the BA scale-free network model;
step three, the added nodes select two edges in sequence to be connected, and the total is
The connection mode is planted, and then the nodes in the communication network are attacked in a random attack mode and a deliberate attack mode;
step four, the communication network transmits the fault node to the corresponding power network, and the fault node in the power network is judged according to a double-network interaction model provided by Buldyrev;
removing fault node information from an admittance matrix corresponding to the power network, and then calculating the load flow distribution of the line through load flow calculation;
step six, judging whether the line in the power network has out-of-limit, if so, removing the fault line in the power network, and then changing the physical network structure;
step seven, transmitting the fault node information of the power network to a communication network, removing the corresponding fault node in the communication network, judging whether an isolated node exists or not, if so, executing the step four, otherwise, executing the step eight;
step eight, calculating and recording the fitness function of the network at the moment, and judging whether the connection mode of the two edges is
If yes, executing the step nine, otherwise, executing the step three;
step nine, selecting two edges with the minimum objective function, and connecting the two edges with the newly added nodes;
step ten, judging whether the number of the added nodes is 11, if so, executing the step eleven, otherwise, executing the step two;
and step eleven, outputting the finally planned communication network and physical network mapping chart.
Preferably, the fitness function in the step eight is a connected subgraph of the physical network and a communication network characteristic path size variation, and normalization processing is performed on the connected subgraph and the communication network characteristic path size variation, and a calculation formula of the fitness function is as follows (1):
wherein a and b are weight coefficients of physical network communication subgraph and communication network characteristic path length respectively; l islast、L(i,j)、Nphysical、G(i,j)The sizes of the characteristic paths before planning, the sizes of the characteristic paths after planning, the total number of nodes of the physical network and the number of nodes which normally work after cascading failure occurs are respectively.
Preferably, the physical network constraints in the planning model mainly include voltage constraints and line power constraints for avoiding voltage out-of-limit and line power out-of-limit; the constraint of the device is mainly the constraint of the output of the generator; the communication network constraints are mainly connectivity constraints, looping rate constraints and scaleless network constraints in order to maintain the characteristics of the communication network.
Preferably, the cascading failure adopts a dual-network interaction model proposed by bullyrev, the modes of attacking the communication network nodes are random attack and deliberate attack, and the deliberate attack mode is to attack the nodes in the network according to degrees.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the positive improvement effects that:
the invention can minimize the range of cascading failures and the power failure range in a physical network after the communication network is subjected to deliberate or random attack, and simultaneously improves the information transmission efficiency of the communication network.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a communication network planning model of a smart distribution network, which can resist random attacks and deliberate network attacks.
Fig. 2 is a flowchart of a method for planning a communication network of a smart distribution network, which can resist random attacks and deliberate network attacks.
Fig. 3 is a diagram of a first edge selection mode for adding node number 4 to a communication network under degree attack.
Fig. 4 is a diagram of a second edge selection mode of adding node No. 4 to a communication network under degree attack.
Fig. 5 is a diagram of attacking the C3 node in a first edge selection manner under degree attack.
Fig. 6 is a diagram of a second edge selection mode under degree attack attacking a C3 node.
Fig. 7 is a dual-network map after communication network planning under degree attack.
Fig. 8 is a planned communication network node degree probability distribution diagram under degree attack.
Fig. 9 illustrates the size of the communication network node degree after planning under attack by degree.
Fig. 10 is a graph of No. 9 nodes added to a communication network under random attack without considering power flow out-of-limit of the power network.
Fig. 11 is a graph of considering power network load flow out-of-limit by adding number 9 nodes to a communication network under random attack.
Fig. 12 is a dual-network map after a communication network is planned under random attack.
Fig. 13 is a planned probability distribution diagram of the communication network node degree under random attack.
Fig. 14 shows the size of the communication network node degree after planning under random attack.
Fig. 15 is a graph of a planned communication network node fit under random attack.
Detailed Description
The following provides a detailed description of the preferred embodiments of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1: the model of the intelligent power distribution network communication network planning method capable of resisting random attacks and intentional network attacks is as follows:
the model of the intelligent power distribution network communication network planning method capable of resisting random attacks and intentional network attacks is divided into two parts: the first part is a planning power network, after the communication network is subjected to network attack and has cascading failure, the number of failure nodes in the power network is minimum, and the second part is the planning communication network, so that the characteristic path length of the communication network is minimum. And normalizing the communication network target value characteristic path length and the node number of the power network loss, as shown in the formulas (2) and (3):
and dividing the number of the fault nodes by the corresponding total number of the nodes of the power network, comparing the difference value of the characteristic path length and the initial communication network by the characteristic path length of the communication network, and giving weight coefficients to the fault nodes to meet different requirements. The constraint during planning of the power network mainly comprises two aspects, namely safety, namely, voltage constraint of 0.95U is added to avoid voltage out-of-limit and line power out-of-limit respectivelyN＜U＜1.05UNAnd line power constraint L < Lmax(ii) a Two-part self-restraint, e.g. generator output restraint Pmin＜P＜Pmax. The constraints when planning the communication network mainly comprise connectivity constraint of the network, ring forming rate constraint P ≧ 0.7 and scale-free network constraint for maintaining the characteristics of the communication network.
As shown in fig. 2: the intelligent power distribution network communication network planning method capable of resisting random network attack and intentional network attack comprises the following steps:
step one, an initial physical network generated by an IEEE-14 node and an initial communication network of 3 nodes are given;
step two, adding two nodes into the communication network each time according to the generation method of the BA scale-free network model;
step three, the added nodes select two edges in sequence to be connected, and the total is
The connection mode is planted, and then the nodes in the communication network are attacked in a random attack mode and a deliberate attack mode;
step four, the communication network transmits the fault node to the corresponding power network, and the fault node in the power network is judged according to a double-network interaction model provided by Buldyrev;
removing fault node information from an admittance matrix corresponding to the power network, and then calculating the load flow distribution of the line through load flow calculation;
step six, judging whether the line in the power network has out-of-limit, if so, removing the fault line in the power network, and then changing the physical network structure;
step seven, transmitting the fault node information of the power network to a communication network, removing the corresponding fault node in the communication network, judging whether an isolated node exists or not, if so, executing the step four, otherwise, executing the step eight;
step eight, calculating and recording the fitness function of the network at the moment, and judging whether the connection mode of the two edges is
If yes, executing the step nine, otherwise, executing the step three;
step nine, selecting two edges with the minimum objective function, and connecting the two edges with the newly added nodes;
step ten, judging whether the number of the added nodes is 11, if so, executing the step eleven, otherwise, executing the step two;
and step eleven, outputting the finally planned communication network and physical network mapping chart.
As shown in fig. 3-7: and (4) intentionally attacking the power distribution network communication network planning under the attack according to the degrees. Fig. 3 and 4 show two selection ways of adding two edges of node four in the communication network planning process. As can be seen from fig. 3, in the communication network, if node C4 selects node C1, and node C3 connects (the first connection mode of the edge), the node C3 is attacked according to the principle of the greatest degree, and the graph after the cascading failure is shown in fig. 5. If C1 in fig. 4 is selected, the dual-network diagram after the failure of the C2 connection (the second side connection mode) is shown in fig. 6, and then the connection in fig. 3 can be selected by performing judgment analysis on the power flow and solving the fitness function. The communication network layout diagram obtained in this way is shown in fig. 7. Analyzing the node degree probability distribution of the communication network in fig. 8 and the size distribution of the node degree of the communication network in fig. 9: the distribution of the node degrees is relatively even, because the network nodes are attacked in the attack mode with the maximum degree, the even distribution of the node degrees is beneficial to resisting the attack mode, and meanwhile, the planning effect is feasible and reasonable as proved from the side.
FIGS. 10-15 show: and planning a power distribution network communication network under random attack. Fig. 10 and 11 show that, under random attack, when the number 10 node is added to the communication network, the power flow topological graph is not considered and the power flow topological graph is considered, and this shows that the out-of-limit edge in the power network is removed, so that the objective function value is reduced, and the communication network edge is screened to obtain the communication network topology after the final planning in fig. 12. Fig. 13 and 14 are a node degree probability distribution diagram and a node degree size distribution diagram of the planned communication network, and it is seen that the entire network exhibits nodes with a few height numbers and nodes with a large number of low height numbers, a typical scale-free network characteristic, because the scale-free network characteristic has strong robustness to random attacks against random attacks, fig. 15 is a fitting curve diagram of the planned communication network node degrees under different coordinates, it is known that the planned network has power law characteristics, and the fitting curve is approximated to a straight line under a double logarithmic coordinate, which proves that the network conforms to the scale-free network characteristic, and also proves the rationality and reliability of the network planned by us.
Claims (3)
1. A method for planning a communication network of an intelligent power distribution network for resisting random attacks and intentional network attacks is characterized by comprising the following steps: establishing a communication network planning model in the intelligent power distribution network under network attack according to the dynamic coupling relation between the communication network and the power network, and solving the model by a scale-free network construction method; determining each edge of the communication network in the model, judging the characteristic path length of the communication network and the maximum connection subgraph of the physical network according to the fact that the communication network is attacked and the communication-power network has cascading failure, and judging the invisible failure of the power network in the physical network through load flow calculation;
the method comprises the following steps:
step one, an initial physical network generated by an IEEE-14 node and an initial communication network of 3 nodes are given;
step two, adding two nodes into the communication network each time according to the generation method of the BA scale-free network model;
step three, the added nodes select two edges in sequence to be connected, and the total is
The connection mode is planted, and then the nodes in the communication network are attacked in a random attack mode and a deliberate attack mode;
step four, the communication network transmits the fault node to the corresponding power network, and the fault node in the power network is judged according to a double-network interaction model provided by Buldyrev;
removing fault node information from an admittance matrix corresponding to the power network, and then calculating the load flow distribution of the line through load flow calculation;
step six, judging whether the line in the power network has out-of-limit, if so, removing the fault line in the power network, and then changing the physical network structure;
step seven, transmitting the fault node information of the power network to a communication network, removing the corresponding fault node in the communication network, judging whether an isolated node exists or not, if so, executing the step four, otherwise, executing the step eight;
step eight, calculating and recording the fitness function of the network at the moment, and judging whether the connection mode of the two edges is
If yes, executing the step nine, otherwise, executing the step three;
step nine, selecting two edges with the minimum objective function, and connecting the two edges with the newly added nodes;
step ten, judging whether the number of the added nodes is 11, if so, executing the step eleven, otherwise, executing the step two;
step eleven, outputting a communication network and a physical network mapping chart after final planning;
the fitness function in the step eight is a connected subgraph of the physical network and the size variation of the communication network characteristic path, and normalization processing is performed on the connected subgraph and the communication network characteristic path, and the calculation formula is as follows (1):
wherein a and b are weight coefficients of physical network communication subgraph and communication network characteristic path length respectively; l islast、L(i,j)、Nphysical、G(i,j)The sizes of the characteristic paths before planning, the sizes of the characteristic paths after planning, the total number of nodes of the physical network and the number of nodes which normally work after cascading failure occurs are respectively.
2. The method for intelligent power distribution network communication network planning for defending against random attacks and intentional network attacks according to claim 1, wherein physical network constraints in the planning model mainly include voltage constraints and line power constraints for avoiding voltage violations, line power violations; the constraint of the device is mainly the constraint of the output of the generator; the communication network constraints are mainly connectivity constraints, looping rate constraints and scaleless network constraints in order to maintain the characteristics of the communication network.
3. The method for planning the communication network of the intelligent power distribution network for resisting the random attack and the deliberate network attack as claimed in claim 1, wherein the cascading failure adopts a dual-network interaction model proposed by Buldyrev, the mode of attacking the nodes of the communication network is the random attack and the deliberate attack, and the deliberate attack mode is the mode of attacking the nodes in the network according to degrees.
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