CN110048884A - Resist the intelligent distribution network communication network planing method of random attack and premeditated network attack - Google Patents
Resist the intelligent distribution network communication network planing method of random attack and premeditated network attack Download PDFInfo
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- CN110048884A CN110048884A CN201910268348.1A CN201910268348A CN110048884A CN 110048884 A CN110048884 A CN 110048884A CN 201910268348 A CN201910268348 A CN 201910268348A CN 110048884 A CN110048884 A CN 110048884A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/06—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications
- H04L41/0654—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications using network fault recovery
- H04L41/0663—Performing the actions predefined by failover planning, e.g. switching to standby network elements
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/12—Discovery or management of network topologies
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/14—Network analysis or design
- H04L41/145—Network analysis or design involving simulating, designing, planning or modelling of a network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of intelligent distribution network communication network planing method for resisting random attack and premeditated network attack, it can avoid cascading failure a wide range of as caused by network attack, the key step of realization includes: that (1) increases a new node, is connected by two sides with two nodes of communication network；(2) pass through attack and this communication network node of calculated attack at random, remove the malfunctioning node of corresponding electric power networks, it calculates trend and is distributed and rejects out-of-limit route, then by electric power networks fault message return communication network trouble-shooting node, repeat this process to cascading failure and stop；(3) electric power networks maximal connected subgraphs number and the corresponding fitness function value of communication network Path converted quantity are calculated and is recorded, best company's side mode is found out.Repeat (1), (2) process to node growth terminates.Side in communication network is allocated optimization in being to plan by the major function of this method, prevents large-scale blackout caused by hacker attack powerline network.
Description
Technical field
Random attack is resisted the present invention relates to a kind of intelligent distribution network communication network planing method, especially one kind and is deliberated
The intelligent distribution network communication network planing method of network attack.
Background technique
As countries in the world Utilities Electric Co. is to the investment energetically of smart grid and research, smart grid has obtained flourishing hair
Exhibition, the Communication Information System as rack phase cooperation of smart grid important component and electric power networks is in this background
Under obtained great promotion, network security problem still very severe under the premise of smart grid very fast development.Electric power
Communication network unavoidably accesses in external network, couples with electric power physical network closely, is caused by single communication network
Failure can be evolved into " communication-physics " cascading failure, increase the destructive and propagated of failure.Therefore, certain hackers in order to
Local electric power networks are destroyed, often carry out network attack for the fragility of its communication network come so that electric power networks are paralysed.
The project study of existing Distribution Network Communication network, be concentrated mainly on communication station click pull, link deployment the problems such as
On.Such as with optical cable cost of investment and the minimum objective function of operation cost totle drilling cost, with the quantity of optical cable and every optical cable
Bandwidth capacity is constraint, is solved with the method for mixed integer programming, provides optimal cable configuration scheme.Or wide area is surveyed
Sensor carries out siteselecting planning in amount system, to dispose total least cost of sensor as optimization object function, sensor covering
Range has solved the optimal sensor deployment scheme of economy as constraint condition.Do not consider that network resists net in scheme
The ability of network attack, so that the network security of communication network has great security risk.
It is existing to two classes are broadly divided into physics-communication network collaborative planning research, one kind belongs to can based on power supply
The distribution communication net mode planning required by property.It is different that different communication mode transmits the reliable letter of information, transmission rate, and distribution
The power supply reliability of net is again closely coupled with reliability of communication system, in the demanding area of power supply reliability, in order to guarantee to believe
The transmission of breath rapidly and accurately, it should select optical fiber as Primary communication mode, while the communication channel of redundancy is set, in reliability
Area of less demanding increases the ratio of wireless communication.The another kind of distribution communication networking planning based on a rack, leads to
The construction of letter system should reduce investment outlay to greatest extent using grid structure of power distribution network and power distribution network geography information as foundation
And improve the operational efficiency of communication system.For example, power distribution network requires high reliablity in densely populated city, should select as far as possible
The reliability that fiber optic communication guarantees communication is selected, while optical cable laying should mutually be coordinated with the laying of buried cable.Two class collaborative plannings
The fault propagation range of communication network and physical network is not all considered in research, a small failure is very in the network after planning
It is easy to be evolved into a large-scale failure.
In conclusion currently there is no a kind of distribution network planning method in the planning of intelligent distribution network communication network, well
Large-scale power outage caused by the random attack of defence and premeditated network attack, faces potential peace so as to cause actual electric network
Full blast danger.
Summary of the invention
In view of the defects existing in the prior art, random attack is resisted the object of the present invention is to provide one kind and premeditated network is attacked
The intelligent distribution network communication network planing method hit, main purpose are to be prevented in powerline network from internet
Hacker causes a wide range of cascading failure to the malicious attack of powerline network, improves power network security.
The present invention is to solve above-mentioned technical problem by following technical proposals:
A kind of intelligent distribution network communication network planing method for resisting random attack and premeditated network attack, according to communication network
Dynamic coupled relation between network and electric power networks establishes the communication network plan model under network attack in Intelligent power distribution network,
And this model is solved by scales-free network building method；The determination of communication network each edge in a model, according to communication network
Network is under attack, and after cascading failure occurs for communication-electric power networks, communication network characteristic path length and physical network are largest connected
Subgraph number is differentiated, and in physical network, the hidden failures of electric power networks are judged by Load flow calculation.
This method the following steps are included:
Step 1, the initial communication network of the given initial physical network and 3 nodes generated by IEEE-14 node；
Step 2 increases by two nodes into communication network according to the generation method of BA scale-free model every time；
Step 3, increased node successively select two sides to be attached, and shareKind connection type, then leads to
Random attack and calculated attack two ways are crossed, the node in communication network is attacked；
Malfunctioning node is transmitted to corresponding electric power networks by step 4, communication network, the double nets proposed according to Buldyrev
Interaction models judge the malfunctioning node in electric power networks；
Step 5, in the corresponding admittance matrix of electric power networks remove malfunctioning node information, then by Load flow calculation come
Calculate the trend distribution of route；
Step 6 judges whether there there is out-of-limit route in electric power networks, removes faulty line in electric power networks if any out-of-limit,
Then change physical network arrangement；
Electric power networks malfunctioning node information is passed to communication network, removes corresponding failure in communication network by step 7
Node judges whether there is isolated node if there is executing step 4, otherwise executes step 8；
Step 8 calculates the fitness function and record of network at this time, judge two sides connection type whether beIf it is step 9 is executed, step 3 is otherwise executed；
Step 9, the smallest two sides of selection target function, connects on the node newly increased；
Step 10 judges whether increased number of nodes is 11, if it is step 11 is executed, otherwise executes step 2；
Step 11, communication network and physical network mapping graph after exporting final planning.
Preferably, the fitness function in the step 8 is connected subgraph number and the communication network feature road of physical network
Diameter size variation amount, and it is normalized, calculating formula such as formula (1):
Wherein a, b are respectively the weight coefficient of physical network connected subgraph number and communication network characteristic path length；Llast、
L(i,j)、Nphysical、G(i,j)Path size before respectively planning, the Path size after planning, physical network always save
Points, and the number of nodes worked normally after cascading failure occurs.
Preferably, mainly there is in order to avoid voltage out-of-limit physical network constraint in the plan model, and line power is out-of-limit
Voltage constraint and line power constraint；And the constraint of device itself, mainly there is the constraint of generator output；Communication network is about
Beam has connectivity constraint, cyclic rate constraint and mainly in order to maintain the scales-free network of communication network characteristic to constrain.
Preferably, double net interaction models that the cascading failure uses Buldyrev to propose, attack communication network node
Mode is random attack and calculated attack, and calculated attack mode is to carry out attacking network interior joint by degree.
Compared with prior art, the positive effect of the present invention is that:
The present invention can be capable of the diminution cascading failure of bottom line after communication network is by premeditated or random attack
Scope of power outage in range and physical network, while improving the information transfer efficiency of communication network.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the intelligent distribution network communication network plan model schematic diagram that can resist random attack and premeditated network attack.
Fig. 2 is the process that can resist the intelligent distribution network communication network planing method of random attack and premeditated network attack
Figure.
Fig. 3 is that the first selects side mode figure by No. 4 nodes of the lower communication network increase of degree attack.
Fig. 4 is to attack lower communication network by degree and increase No. 4 to select side mode figure second of node.
Fig. 5 is the figure that the first selects side mode to attack C3 node under attacking by degree.
Fig. 6 is to attack lower second of figure for selecting side mode to attack C3 node by degree.
Fig. 7 is that double net mapping graphs after lower communication network planning are attacked by degree.
Fig. 8 is the communication network node degree probability distribution graph attacked after lower planning by degree.
Fig. 9 presses the size by the communication network node degree after the lower planning of degree attack.
Figure 10 is that random No. 9 nodes of lower communication network increase of attacking do not consider the out-of-limit figure of electric power networks trend.
Figure 11 is that random No. 9 nodes of lower communication network increase of attacking consider the out-of-limit figures of electric power networks trend.
Figure 12 is random double net mapping graphs after attacking lower communication network planning.
Figure 13 is the communication network node degree probability distribution graph after the lower planning of random attack.
Figure 14 presses the size of the communication network node degree after the lower planning of random attack.
Figure 15 is the communication network node matched curve figure after the lower planning of random attack.
Specific embodiment
Present pre-ferred embodiments are provided with reference to the accompanying drawing, in order to explain the technical scheme of the invention in detail.
The present invention can resist random attack and the intelligent distribution network communication network planning of premeditated network attack as shown in Figure 1:
The model of method is as follows:
The model of the intelligent distribution network communication network planing method for resisting random attack and premeditated network attack
Be divided into two parts: first part is planning electric power networks, after by network attack cascading failure is occurred for communication network, so that
Malfunctioning node number in electric power networks is minimum, and second part is planning communication network, so that communication network characteristic path length is most
It is small.And the number of nodes lost to communication network target value characteristic path length and electric power networks is normalized, such as formula
(2), shown in formula (3):
By malfunctioning node number divided by corresponding electric power networks total node number, the difference of characteristic path length and initial communication network
Then value is compared divided by the characteristic path length of telecommunication network, and give their weight coefficients to meet different demands.Institute
Constraint mainly includes two aspects when stating planning electric power networks, first is that mainly having in terms of safety in order to avoid voltage out-of-limit, line
Road power is out-of-limit, has been separately added into voltage constraint 0.95UN< U < 1.05UNL < L is constrained with line powermax；Two devices itself
Constraint, as generator output constrains Pmin< P < Pmax.Plan communication network when constraint mainly including network connectivity constraint,
Cyclic rate constrains P >=0.7 and in order to maintain the scales-free network of communication network characteristic to constrain.
As shown in Figure 2: the present invention can resist the intelligent distribution network communication network of random network attack and premeditated network attack
Planing method the following steps are included:
Step 1, the initial communication network of the given initial physical network and 3 nodes generated by IEEE-14 node；
Step 2 increases by two nodes into communication network according to the generation method of BA scale-free model every time；
Step 3, increased node successively select two sides to be attached, and shareKind connection type, then leads to
Random attack and calculated attack two ways are crossed, the node in communication network is attacked；
Malfunctioning node is transmitted to corresponding electric power networks by step 4, communication network, the double nets proposed according to Buldyrev
Interaction models judge the malfunctioning node in electric power networks；
Step 5, in the corresponding admittance matrix of electric power networks remove malfunctioning node information, then by Load flow calculation come
Calculate the trend distribution of route；
Step 6 judges whether there there is out-of-limit route in electric power networks, removes faulty line in electric power networks if any out-of-limit,
Then change physical network arrangement；
Electric power networks malfunctioning node information is passed to communication network, removes corresponding failure in communication network by step 7
Node judges whether there is isolated node if there is executing step 4, otherwise executes step 8；
Step 8 calculates the fitness function and record of network at this time, judge two sides connection type whether beIf it is step 9 is executed, step 3 is otherwise executed；
Step 9, the smallest two sides of selection target function, connects on the node newly increased；
Step 10 judges whether increased number of nodes is 11, if it is step 11 is executed, otherwise executes step 2；
Step 11, communication network and physical network mapping graph after exporting final planning.
As shown in fig. 3 to 7: calculated attack is by the Distribution Network Communication network planning under degree attack.It is shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 4
Increase the selection mode on two kinds of sides of No. four nodes in communication network planning process.Analysis chart 3 is it is found that in a communication network, such as C4
Number node selects C1, and C3 node is attached (connection type on the first side), then the maximum principle of foundation degree carries out attack C3
Number node, the figure after cascading failure are as shown in Figure 5.Such as select C1 in Fig. 4, C2 connection (connection type on second of side) failure
Rear double net figures as shown in fig. 6, then by carrying out discriminatory analysis to trend, to fitness function solved known to selection figure
3 connection.Finally obtained telecommunication network planning chart is as shown in Figure 7 in this way.8 communication network node degree probability of analysis chart
Distribution and Fig. 9 communication network network point degree size distribution are known: the distribution of node degree is more average, because being by the maximum attacker of degree
Formula attacking network node, node degree, which is evenly distributed, is advantageous for resisting such attack pattern, while also demonstrating me from side
Plan that effect is feasible, is reasonable.
Shown in Figure 10-15: the Distribution Network Communication network planning under random attack.Figure 10, Figure 11 are communication under random attack
When network increases No. 10 nodes, direction of energy topological diagram is not considered and considers direction of energy topological diagram, power network is illustrated by this
The removal on out-of-limit side in network, to reduce target function value, the screening on Lai Jinhang communication network side is last to obtain Figure 12
Communication network topology is starved after planning.Figure 13, Figure 14 are communication network node degree probability distribution graph and node degree size point after planning
Butut, it will be seen that whole network, which shows, has the several sections of points of a small number of height and a large amount of low powered posterior chamber nodes, typical scales-free network
Characteristic, because scales-free network characteristic has relatively strong " robustness " attack at random for random attack, Figure 15 is to lead to after planning
Matched curve figure under communication network node degree difference coordinate, the network after planning known to it have Power Law, and in double-log
Matched curve is approximately straight line under coordinate, it was demonstrated that it meets scales-free network characteristic, also demonstrates the reasonable of our planning networks
Property, reliability.
Claims (5)
1. a kind of intelligent distribution network communication network planing method for resisting random attack and premeditated network attack, it is characterised in that:
According to the dynamic coupled relation between communication network and electric power networks, the communication network under network attack in Intelligent power distribution network is established
Plan model, and this model is solved by scales-free network building method；The determination of communication network each edge in a model, according to
It is under attack according to communication network, after cascading failure occurs for communication-electric power networks, communication network characteristic path length and physical network
Maximal connected subgraphs number is differentiated, and in physical network, the hidden failures of electric power networks are judged by Load flow calculation.
2. the intelligent distribution network communication network planning side according to claim 1 for resisting random attack and premeditated network attack
Method, which is characterized in that itself the following steps are included:
Step 1, the initial communication network of the given initial physical network and 3 nodes generated by IEEE-14 node；
Step 2 increases by two nodes into communication network according to the generation method of BA scale-free model every time；
Step 3, increased node successively select two sides to be attached, and shareKind of connection type, then by with
Machine attack and calculated attack two ways, attack the node in communication network；
Malfunctioning node is transmitted to corresponding electric power networks by step 4, communication network, the double nets interaction proposed according to Buldyrev
Model judges the malfunctioning node in electric power networks；
Step 5 removes malfunctioning node information in the corresponding admittance matrix of electric power networks, is then calculated by Load flow calculation
The trend of route is distributed；
Step 6, judges whether there there is out-of-limit route in electric power networks, removes faulty line in electric power networks if any out-of-limit, then
Change physical network arrangement；
Electric power networks malfunctioning node information is passed to communication network, removes corresponding malfunctioning node in communication network by step 7,
Isolated node is judged whether there is if there is executing step 4, otherwise executes step 8；
Step 8 calculates the fitness function and record of network at this time, judge two sides connection type whether beIf it is step 9 is executed, step 3 is otherwise executed；
Step 9, the smallest two sides of selection target function, connects on the node newly increased；
Step 10 judges whether increased number of nodes is 11, if it is step 11 is executed, otherwise executes step 2；
Step 11, communication network and physical network mapping graph after exporting final planning.
3. the intelligent distribution network communication network planning side according to claim 2 for resisting random attack and premeditated network attack
Method, which is characterized in that the fitness function in the step 8 is connected subgraph number and the communication network feature road of physical network
Diameter size variation amount, and it is normalized, calculating formula such as formula (1):
Wherein a, b are respectively the weight coefficient of physical network connected subgraph number and communication network characteristic path length；Llast、
L(i,j)、Nphysical、G(i,j)Path size before respectively planning, the Path size after planning, physical network always save
Points, and the number of nodes worked normally after cascading failure occurs.
4. the intelligent distribution network communication network planning side according to claim 1 for resisting random attack and premeditated network attack
Method, which is characterized in that mainly there is in order to avoid voltage out-of-limit physical network constraint in the plan model, line power is out-of-limit
Voltage constraint and line power constraint；And the constraint of device itself, mainly there is the constraint of generator output；Communication network constraint
There are connectivity constraint, cyclic rate constraint and mainly in order to maintain the scales-free network of communication network characteristic to constrain.
5. the intelligent distribution network communication network planning side according to claim 1 for resisting random attack and premeditated network attack
Method, which is characterized in that double net interaction models that the cascading failure uses Buldyrev to propose attack the side of communication network node
Formula is random attack and calculated attack, and calculated attack mode is to carry out attacking network interior joint by degree.
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