CN110034934B - CAN bus safety identification method based on transient state - Google Patents

CAN bus safety identification method based on transient state Download PDF

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CN110034934B
CN110034934B CN201910235502.5A CN201910235502A CN110034934B CN 110034934 B CN110034934 B CN 110034934B CN 201910235502 A CN201910235502 A CN 201910235502A CN 110034934 B CN110034934 B CN 110034934B
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CN110034934A (en
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潘琪
谭劲
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China Jiliang University
China Jiliang University Shangyu Advanced Research Institute Co Ltd
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China Jiliang University Shangyu Advanced Research Institute Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H04L63/0846—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords using time-dependent-passwords, e.g. periodically changing passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0863—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H04L9/3228—One-time or temporary data, i.e. information which is sent for every authentication or authorization, e.g. one-time-password, one-time-token or one-time-key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
    • H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
    • H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle

Abstract

The invention discloses a CAN bus safety identification method based on transient state, which comprises the following steps: step 1, when an automobile leaves a factory, factory setting is carried out by a manufacturer, each ECU is electrified and started, and each ECU obtains a transient value V of the ECUtsAnd will VtsSending the transient values V to other ECUs, and after factory setting is finished, storing the transient values V of the other ECUs in each ECUts(ii) a Step 2, when the automobile is started every time, the ECU acquires a starting time stamp Ti(ii) a Step 3, each ECU generates a dynamic key K, wherein the key K is only effective during the driving period of the automobile, and when the K is invalidated after the automobile is flamed out, a new key K is generated again when the automobile is started next time; step 4, when the ECU sends the message, the dynamic key K of the ECU is used for encrypting the message DATA to obtain DATA; receiver ECUiFinding out the transient value of the sender from the stored transient values after receiving the message, and according to TiAnd calculating a decryption key K ', if K' = K, decrypting the encrypted message DATA to obtain the message DATA.

Description

CAN bus safety identification method based on transient state
Technical Field
The invention relates to a method for identifying CAN (controller Area network) automobile bus transmission abnormality by a transmission authentication method combining transient state and timestamp, in particular to a CAN bus safety identification method based on transient state.
Background
The controller area network protocol (CAN) is a serial communication bus protocol developed by the German BOSCH company, and is connected with a plurality of electric control units in an automobile in a bus type connection mode, so that the number of communication lines required by the automobile is greatly reduced compared with the traditional protocol, and higher data transmission reliability is provided. However, the bus protocol is not considered in a safety aspect, because the vehicle is in a continuous high-speed state in the driving process, the communication of the electronic control unit in the vehicle controls the driving state of the vehicle, if a hacker attacks the vehicle in the driving process of the vehicle, a serious traffic accident may be caused, and the life safety of a driver is seriously threatened.
In order to effectively enhance the security of the CAN bus transmission, researchers propose a series of secure transmission protocols, and currently, the following three means are mainly used for ensuring the security of the communication process.
(1) A symmetric encryption algorithm is used.
(2) An authentication mark is used.
(3) An asymmetric encryption algorithm is used.
The symmetric encryption algorithm uses the same key when encrypting and decrypting data, the encryption algorithm used in the current CAN security authentication protocol is generally a preset key after the automobile leaves the factory, and all the electric control units hold the same key. Since the preset key is difficult to replace after the automobile leaves the factory, the key can be used for a long time, and the possibility that the key is cracked is greatly increased. Meanwhile, when the automobile damages and replaces parts, the discarded electric control unit has the risk of key leakage, and the preset key of the newly replaced electric control unit is consistent with other units on the automobile, so that the complexity is improved to a certain extent.
The authentication mark is a mark for ensuring the authenticity and validity of the message by transmitting additional authentication information, for example, the message authentication code is calculated by using an MAC algorithm and is sent out together with the message, and the receiver calculates the message authentication code by using the same MAC algorithm after receiving the message and compares the message authentication code with the received message authentication code, thereby verifying the authenticity of the message. The method needs to transmit additional authentication information, and as CAN be known from the CAN data frame structure diagram shown in fig. 1, the real-time constraint of the CAN data domain is only 64bits, even if the CAN + technology is used to expand the transmission amount of the data frame, the real-time constraint CAN be extended to 64bits + f + 64bits ═ 1+ f) × 64bits at most, where f CAN be 16 at maximum, that is, the maximum transmission bit is 1088bits ═ 136bytes, which is far from sufficient, so that the number of data frames needs to be increased to transmit additional authentication information, which brings higher data delay and higher packet loss rate, and causes potential safety hazard.
The asymmetric encryption algorithm comprises a public key and a private key, wherein the public key is public, the message is encrypted by using the public key, and the message is decrypted by using the private key held by the receiver after the receiver receives the message encrypted by using the public key. The method has higher security compared with a symmetric encryption algorithm because the private key is independently held, but unfortunately, the complexity of the method is higher, the method needs a third party organization for certificate authentication in order to ensure the authenticity and validity of the public key, and meanwhile, the encryption and decryption of the method are more complicated, so the method is not practically suitable for CAN communication encryption.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problems in the prior art, the invention aims to improve the security of the secret key, avoid the situation that the fixed secret key is broken for a long time and protect the transmission security of the CAN bus. The specific technical scheme is as follows:
a CAN bus safety identification method based on transient state comprises the following steps:
step 1, when an automobile leaves a factory, factory setting is carried out by a manufacturer, each ECU is electrified and started, and each ECU obtains a transient value V of the ECUtsAnd will VtsSending the transient values V to other ECUs, and after factory setting is finished, storing the transient values V of the other ECUs in each ECUts；
Step 2, when the automobile is started every time, the ECU acquires a starting time stamp TiT obtained by each ECUiAfter error elimination, the two are consistent;
step 3, each ECU generates a dynamic key K, wherein the key K is only effective during the driving period of the automobile, and when the K is invalidated after the automobile is flamed out, a new key K is generated again when the automobile is started next time;
step 4, when the ECU sends the message, the dynamic key K of the ECU is used for encrypting the DATA of the message to obtain DATA, and no additional authentication mark is needed and the DATA is sent out; receiver ECUiFinding out the transient value of the sender from the stored transient values after receiving the message, and according to TiAnd calculating a decryption key K', and if K ═ K, decrypting the encrypted message DATA to obtain the message DATA.
Further, the transient value VtsThe amplitude a (t) and the phase theta (t) of (1)) And equation (2), where i (t) and q (t) are the in-phase and quadrature components of the complex signal, respectively:
Figure BDA0002007564810000031
Figure BDA0002007564810000032
the instantaneous phase θ (t) of the signal calculated by equation (2) is expanded to eliminate the discontinuity caused by t 2 pi · N (N1.2.. said., N), the absolute value of each element in the expanded vector is denoted as AV, in order to amplify the variation between the noise and transient portions of the signal, the phase feature variance is calculated for each continuous portion of AV, and these features are stored in a temporary vector TV of length N/s to obtain the difference between the phase variances to create a fractal trajectory FT:
TV(i)＝Var(AV(d+1)，AV(d+2)，......AV(g)) (3)
where N is the total number of samples, i is 1,2, …, N/s, g is i × s, d is g-s, s is the sliding coefficient, and Var represents the variance of the amplitude;
detection of transients is then performed using a two-step process as follows:
(1) comparing each of the elements to a threshold until the value of the element and the values of the next 4 elements satisfy equation (4):
FT(i)，FT(i+1)，......，FT(i+4)≤5 (4)
(2) SV represents sum of amplitudes, FT represents fractal trace
|SV(i)-SV(i-1)|≤0.25×FT(i) (5)
The transient value V is obtained after the two steps are metts。
Further, in step 2, the error is eliminated by formula (6):
Ti＝f(ti) (6)
the f-function is an error cancellation function that blurs ti.
Further, in step 3, a dynamic key K is generated according to formula (7):
Figure BDA0002007564810000033
wherein hash1 and hash2 are one-way hash functions, outputting hash values of fixed length.
Compared with the prior art, the method and the device have the advantages that the initial keys of the electric control units are generated by using the physical attribute transients of the electric control units, the transients are unique for each physical device, the electronic fingerprint identification physical device can be used, meanwhile, the timestamp during the starting of the automobile is introduced to dynamically generate the communication key, the freshness of the generated key during the starting of the automobile is ensured, the dynamic change of the key is realized, and the security of the key is improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a diagram of a CAN data frame structure;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of transient value acquisition;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the authentication method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention will be further explained with reference to the drawings.
The transient state is the transient voltage of the electronic device when being electrified and started, and the transient value of any electronic device is unique, so that the value can uniquely represent the electronic device, the electronic fingerprint effect is achieved, the identity authentication of the electronic device is carried out, the uniqueness of each ECU is protected, an authentication mark does not need to be additionally introduced when the transient state is used, the integrity of message data is protected, and the message loss caused by unnecessary data redundancy is avoided. At present, the existing research provides a method for measuring transient values, the phase of a signal is not easily influenced by noise and interference, fluctuation with different degrees can be shown, and in addition, the phase slope related to the transient state is linear, and the method can be used for efficiently detecting the transient signal by adopting a radio frequency fingerprint identification (RFF) technology of detecting the transient state by phase characteristics and fingerprint extraction. The transient amplitude a (t) and phase θ (t) are calculated according to equations (1) and (2), where i (t) and q (t) are the in-phase and quadrature components of the complex signal, respectively:
Figure BDA0002007564810000041
Figure BDA0002007564810000042
the instantaneous phase θ (t) of the signal calculated by equation (2) is expanded to eliminate the discontinuity caused by t 2 pi · N (N1, 2.. said., N), the absolute value of each element in the expanded vector is denoted as AV, in order to amplify the variation between the noise and transient portions of the signal, the phase feature variance is calculated for each continuous portion of AV, and these features are stored in a temporary vector TV of length N/s to obtain the difference between the phase variances to create a fractal trajectory FT:
TV(i)＝Var(AV(d+1)，AV(d+2)，......AV(g)) (3)
where N is the total number of samples, i is 1,2, …, N/s, g is i × s, d is g-s, s is the sliding coefficient (number of samples of the push window), and Var represents the variance of the amplitude;
detection of transients is then performed using a two-step process as follows:
(1) comparing each of the elements to a threshold until the value of the element and the values of the next 4 elements satisfy equation (4):
FT(i)，FT(i+1)，......，FT(i+4)≤5 (4)
(2) SV represents sum of amplitudes, FT represents fractal trace
|SV(i)-SV(i-1)|≤0.25×FT(i) (5)
The transient value V can be obtained after the two steps are mettsAs shown in fig. 2.
When the automobile leaves the factory, the factory initializes the automobile electric control units, and each electric control unit measures the transient value V of the electric control unittsAnd sending the transient values to other electric control units, wherein the transient values of the other electric control units are stored in each electric control unit. To prevent leakage due to long-term use of static keysAnd exposing the risk, and performing dynamic processing on the key by using the timestamp. Time stamp T when starting automobileiAs a key generation factor, when the automobile is started each time, all the electric control units can obtain the same ti and carry out time stamp conversion on the ti to obtain TiUsing instantaneous value and TiAnd generating a key used for the current start.
Generation of keys and V of each ECUtsAnd timestamp T of vehicle startiIs obtained by the formula
Ti＝f(ti) (6)
Figure BDA0002007564810000051
Wherein hash1 and hash2 are one-way hash functions, outputting hash values of fixed length. The f function is an error elimination function which can perform fuzzy processing on ti and eliminate the problem that the ti acquired by each ECU has slight difference due to the problems of clock offset and the like.
Examples
As shown in fig. 3, the method for security authentication of a transient-based CAN bus of the present invention specifically includes:
1. when the automobile leaves the factory, factory setting is carried out by a manufacturer, the setting is mainly to electrify and start each ECU, and each ECU obtains the transient value V of the ECUtsAnd will VtsSending the transient values V to other ECUs, and after factory setting is finished, storing the transient values V of the other ECUs in each ECUts。
2. Every time the automobile is started, the ECU acquires a starting time stamp TiT obtained by each ECUiIs consistent after error elimination through equation (6).
3. And (3) each ECU generates a dynamic key K according to a formula (7), wherein the key K is only effective during the driving period of the automobile, and when the K is invalid after the automobile is shut down, a new key K can be generated again when the automobile is started next time.
When the ECU sends the message, the message DATA is encrypted by using a key of the ECU to obtain DATA, and an additional authentication mark is not needed and is sent out; receiver ECUiReceiving a messageThen finding out the transient value of the sender from the stored transient values, and according to TiAnd calculating a decryption key K', and if K ═ K, decrypting the encrypted message DATA to obtain the message DATA.

Claims (2)

1. A CAN bus safety identification method based on transient state comprises the following steps:
step 1, when an automobile leaves a factory, factory setting is carried out by a manufacturer, each ECU is electrified and started, and each ECU obtains a transient value V of the ECUtsAnd will VtsSending the transient values V to other ECUs, and after factory setting is finished, storing the transient values V of the other ECUs in each ECUts；
Step 2, when the automobile is started every time, the ECU acquires a starting time stamp TiT obtained by each ECUiAfter error elimination, the two are consistent;
step 3, each ECU generates a dynamic key K, wherein the key K is only effective during the driving period of the automobile, and when the K is invalidated after the automobile is flamed out, a new key K is generated again when the automobile is started next time;
step 4, when the ECU sends the message, the dynamic key K of the ECU is used for encrypting the DATA of the message to obtain DATA, and no additional authentication mark is needed and the DATA is sent out; receiver ECUiFinding out the transient value of the sender from the stored transient values after receiving the message, and according to TiCalculating a decryption key K', and if K ═ K, decrypting the encrypted message DATA to obtain the message DATA;
in step 3, a dynamic key K is generated according to formula (7):
K＝hash1(Vts)⊕hash2(Ti) (7)
wherein hash1 and hash2 are one-way hash functions, outputting hash values of fixed length.
2. The transient-based CAN bus security qualification method of claim 1, wherein:
the transient value VtsThe amplitude a (t) and the phase θ (t) of (a) are calculated according to the formula (1) and the formula (2), wherein i (t) and q (t) are the in-phase sum of the complex signals, respectivelyOrthogonal component:
Figure FDA0003193626470000011
Figure FDA0003193626470000012
the instantaneous phase θ (t) of the signal calculated by equation (2) is expanded to eliminate the discontinuity caused by t 2 pi · N (N1, 2, …, N), the absolute value of each element in the expanded vector is denoted as AV, in order to amplify the variation between the noise and transient portions of the signal, the phase feature variance is calculated for each continuous portion of AV, these features are stored in a provisional vector TV of length N/s to obtain the difference between the phase variances to create a fractal trajectory FT:
TV(i)＝Var(AV(d+1)，AV(d+2)，……AV(g)) (3)
where N is the total number of samples, i is 1,2, …, N/s, g is i × s, d is g-s, s is the sliding coefficient, and Var represents the variance of the amplitude;
detection of transients is then performed using a two-step process as follows:
(1) the value of each element in the expanded vector is compared to a threshold until the value of the element and the values of the next 4 elements satisfy equation (4):
FT(i),FT(i+1)，……，FT(i+4)≤5 (4)
(2) SV represents sum of amplitudes, FT represents fractal trace
|SV(i)-SV(i-1)|≤0.25×FT(i) (5)
The transient value V is obtained after the two steps are metts。
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CN113824552A (en) * 2020-06-19 2021-12-21 上海汽车集团股份有限公司 Key generation method and device for vehicle application program and electronic equipment
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