CN110034934A - CAN bus secure authentication method based on transient state - Google Patents
CAN bus secure authentication method based on transient state Download PDFInfo
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- CN110034934A CN110034934A CN201910235502.5A CN201910235502A CN110034934A CN 110034934 A CN110034934 A CN 110034934A CN 201910235502 A CN201910235502 A CN 201910235502A CN 110034934 A CN110034934 A CN 110034934A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
- H04L63/0846—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords using time-dependent-passwords, e.g. periodically changing passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0863—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3228—One-time or temporary data, i.e. information which is sent for every authentication or authorization, e.g. one-time-password, one-time-token or one-time-key
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
- H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
- H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The CAN bus secure authentication method based on transient state that the invention discloses a kind of carries out default setting by producer when including the following steps: the factory of step 1. automobile, carries out electrifying startup to each ECU, each ECU obtains the instantaneous value V of itselfts, and by VtsIssue other ECU, after default setting, each ECU is stored with the instantaneous value V of other ECUts；When each automobile starting of step 2., ECU obtains starting time stamp Ti；Each ECU of step 3. generates dynamic key K, key K only during this running car effectively, K cancels after automobile flameout, and when next automobile starting can regenerate new key K；Step 4.ECU is encrypted to obtain DATA using the dynamic key K of itself when sending message to message data；Recipient ECUiThe instantaneous value for finding sender after message in the instantaneous value of itself storage is received, and according to TiDecruption key K' is calculated, if K'=K, encrypted message DATA is decrypted and gets message data.
Description
Technical field
The transmission authentication method combined with timestamp the present invention relates to a kind of transient state is to CAN (Controller Area
Network) automobile bus transmission abnormality carries out mirror method, specifically a kind of CAN bus secure authentication method based on transient state.
Background technique
Controller local area network's agreement, that is, CAN protocol is a kind of serial communication bus association by the exploitation of German BOSCH company
View, using bus-type connection type connection automobile in multiple electronic control unit, compare legacy protocol greatly reduce it is vehicle-mounted needed for
Communication line quantity, and provide higher data transmission credibility.But the bus protocol is few in secure context consideration, by
Be in a kind of continuous high speed state in the process of moving in vehicle, the communication control of interior electronic control unit the traveling shape of vehicle
State may cause severe traffic accidents, to the life of driver if hacker implements to attack to vehicle in vehicle travel process
Safety causes to seriously threaten.
In order to effectively enhance the safety of CAN bus transmission, researcher proposes a series of secure transfer protocols, grinds at present
Study carefully the safety for mainly guaranteeing communication process using following three kinds of means.
(1) symmetric encipherment algorithm is used.
(2) certification mark is used.
(3) rivest, shamir, adelman is used.
The same key, current CAN secure authentication association are used when data are encrypted and decrypted in symmetric encipherment algorithm
Encryption Algorithm used in view is generally the preset key after automobile factory, and all electronic control unit hold the same key.By
A possibility that preset key is difficult to replace after automobile factory, therefore the key can be used for a long time, key is caused to be cracked is big
It is big to increase.Simultaneously when car breakdown replaces component, the electronic control unit discarded is there are the risk that key leaks, the electricity newly replaced
The preset key of control unit will be also consistent with other units on vehicle, this also improves complexity to a certain extent.
Certification mark is a kind of authenticity and validity by transmitting additional authentication information to guarantee message, is such as used
MAC algorithm calculates message authentication code and sends together with message, and recipient is calculated after receiving message using identical MAC
Method calculates message authentication code and is compared with the message authentication code received, to verify the authenticity of message.This method needs
Additional transmissions authentication information, CAN data frame structure figure as shown in Figure 1 is it is found that the real-time constraint of CAN data field is only
64bits, even if expanding data frame transfer amount using CAN+ technology, most multipotency extends to 64bits+f*64bits=(1+f) *
64bits, wherein f maximum can be 16, that is to say, that maximum transmitted bit is 1088bits=136bytes, this is also remote
It is not nearly enough, therefore to transmit additional authentication information and be bound to number of data frames to be increased, so that higher data be brought to postpone
With higher packet loss, security risk is caused.
There are two keys of public key and private key, public keys to disclose for rivest, shamir, adelman, and the encryption of message uses public key encryption,
Recipient is decrypted message using the private key that itself holds after receiving the message of the public key encryption.Since private key is held alone
Have, therefore this method is higher compared to symmetric encipherment algorithm safety, but regrettably, the complexity of this method is also higher, it should
Method needs the third-party institution and carries out certificate verification to guarantee the authenticity and validity of public key, at the same this method plus
Close and decryption is more complicated, therefore this method is actually not particularly suited for CAN communication encryption.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve the above technical problems existing in the prior art, the purpose of the invention is to improve the safety of key
Property, the case where avoiding long-term fixed key from being cracked, protection CAN bus transmission safety.Specific technical solution is as follows:
A kind of CAN bus secure authentication method based on transient state, includes the following steps:
When step 1. automobile dispatches from the factory, default setting is carried out by producer, electrifying startup is carried out to each ECU, each ECU obtains itself
Instantaneous value Vts, and by VtsIssue other ECU, after default setting, each ECU is stored with the instantaneous value V of other ECUts；
When each automobile starting of step 2., ECU obtains starting time stamp Ti, the T of each ECU acquisitioniPassing through error concealment
It is consistent afterwards；
Each ECU of step 3. generates dynamic key K, and key K is only effective during this running car, after automobile flameout
K cancels, and when next automobile starting can regenerate new key K；
Step 4.ECU is encrypted to obtain DATA using the dynamic key K of itself when sending message to message data,
Without additional certification mark and transmit it out；Recipient ECUiIt is found in the instantaneous value of itself storage after receiving message
The instantaneous value of sender, and according to TiDecruption key K ' is calculated, if K '=K, encrypted message DATA is decrypted and is obtained
Get message data.
Further, the instantaneous value VtsAmplitude a (t) and phase theta (t) by formula (1) and formula (2) calculating, wherein i
(t) and q (t) be respectively complex signal same phase and quadrature component:
The signal transient phase theta (t) that formula (2) is calculated is unfolded to make to eliminate t=2 π n (n=1.2 ..., N)
At discontinuity, the absolute value of each element in vector will be unfolded and be denoted as AV, for the noise and transient portion thereof of amplified signal
Between variation, then calculate phase property variance for each continuous part of AV, in length be N/s by these characteristic storages
The difference between phase variance is obtained in temporary vector TV to create a point shape track FT:
TV (i)=Var (AV (d+1), AV (d+2) ... AV (g)) (3)
Wherein N is total sample number, and i=1,2 ..., N/s, g=i × s, d=g-s, s is slide coefficient, and Var indicates amplitude
Variance；
The detection of transient state is executed using following two step process later:
(1) each element in the element is compared with threshold value, value and next 4 elements until element
Value meet formula (4):
FT (i), FT (i+1) ..., FT (i+4)≤5 (4)
(2) SV represents amplitude summation, and FT representative divides shape track
|SV(i)-SV(i-1)|≤0.25×FT(i) (5)
Instantaneous value V is got after meeting above-mentioned two stepts。
Further, error is eliminated by formula (6) in step 2:
Ti=f (ti) (6)
F function is error concealment function, which carries out Fuzzy Processing to ti.
Further, dynamic key K is generated according to formula (7) in step 3:
Wherein hash1 and hash2 is one-way hash function, exports the hashed value of regular length.
The present invention generates the initial of each electronic control unit using the physical attribute transient state of electronic control unit compared with prior art
Key, transient state are that uniquely, can be used as a kind of electronic fingerprint mark physical device, while introducing vapour for each physical device
Timestamp dynamic generation communication key when vehicle starts guarantees that automobile generates the freshness of key in each starting, realizes close
The dynamic change of key improves the safety of key.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is CAN data frame structure figure；
Fig. 2 is that instantaneous value obtains schematic diagram；
Fig. 3 is identification method flow chart of the invention.
Specific embodiment
The present invention will be further explained below with reference to the attached drawings.
Transient state is instantaneous voltage of the electronic device in electrifying startup, for any one electronic device, transient state
Value is unique, therefore the value can uniquely represent the device, plays the role of electronic fingerprint and carries out identity to device
Certification protects the uniqueness of each ECU, is just not necessarily to additionally introduce certification mark using transient state, protects message data complete, keep away
Exempting from unnecessary data redundancy leads to information drop-out.Existing research at present gives the method for instantaneous value measurement, the phase of signal
The influence vulnerable to noise and interference can not show different degrees of fluctuation, along with phase slope relevant to transient state is in line
Property, the present invention can believe transient state using radio-frequency fingerprint identification (RFF) technology of phase property detection transient state and fingerprint extraction
Number carry out efficient detection.Transient state amplitude a (t) and phase theta (t) are calculated by formula (1) and formula (2), and wherein i (t) and q (t) points
Not Wei complex signal same phase and quadrature component:
The signal transient phase theta (t) that formula (2) is calculated is unfolded to make to eliminate t=2 π n (n=1,2 ..., N)
At discontinuity, the absolute value of each element in vector will be unfolded and be denoted as AV, for the noise and transient portion thereof of amplified signal
Between variation, then calculate phase property variance for each continuous part of AV, in length be N/s by these characteristic storages
The difference between phase variance is obtained in temporary vector TV to create a point shape track FT:
TV (i)=Var (AV (d+1), AV (d+2) ... AV (g)) (3)
Wherein N is total sample number, and i=1,2 ..., N/s, g=i × s, d=g-s, s is that slide coefficient (promotes the sample of window
This number), Var indicates the variance of amplitude；
The detection of transient state is executed using following two step process later:
(1) each element in the element is compared with threshold value, value and next 4 elements until element
Value meet formula (4):
FT (i), FT (i+1) ..., FT (i+4)≤5 (4)
(2) SV represents amplitude summation, and FT representative divides shape track
|SV(i)-SV(i-1)|≤0.25×FT(i) (5)
Instantaneous value V can be got after meeting above-mentioned two stepts, as shown in Figure 2.
When automobile is dispatched from the factory, Initialize installation is carried out to automobile electronic control unit by producer, each electronic control unit is measured
The instantaneous value V of itselftsAnd other electronic control unit are sent it to, each electronic control unit storage inside has the transient state of other electronic control unit
Value.The long-time service bring disclosure risk of static keys in order to prevent carries out mobilism processing to key using timestamp.It will
Time stamp T when automobile startingiThe factor is generated as key, when each automobile starting, all electronic control unit can obtain identical
Ti and timestamp carried out to it be converted to Ti, use instantaneous value and TiIt generates this and starts the key used.
The generation of key and the V of each ECUtsWith the time stamp T of automobile startingiIt obtains, formula is
Ti=f (ti) (6)
Wherein hash1 and hash2 is one-way hash function, exports the hashed value of regular length.F function is error concealment letter
Number, the function can carry out Fuzzy Processing to ti, eliminate the ti of each ECU acquisition of bring the problems such as due to clock skew in the presence of thin
The other problem of elementary errors.
Embodiment
As shown in figure 3, the CAN bus secure authentication method of the invention based on transient state is specific as follows:
1. automobile dispatches from the factory, default setting is carried out by producer, which predominantly carries out electrifying startup, each ECU to each ECU
Obtain the instantaneous value V of itselfts, and by VtsIssue other ECU, after default setting, each ECU is stored with the wink of other ECU
State value Vts。
2. when each automobile starting, ECU obtains starting time stamp Ti, the T of each ECU acquisitioniIt is carried out by formula (6)
It is consistent after error concealment.
3. each ECU generates dynamic key K according to formula (7), key K is only effective during this running car, works as vapour
K cancels after vehicle is flame-out, and when next automobile starting can regenerate new key K.
4.ECU is encrypted to obtain DATA when sending message using the key pair message data of itself, without additional
Certification mark and transmit it out；Recipient ECUiFind sender's in the instantaneous value of itself storage after receiving message
Instantaneous value, and according to TiDecruption key K' is calculated, if K'=K, encrypted message DATA is decrypted and gets message
data。
Claims (4)
1. a kind of CAN bus secure authentication method based on transient state, includes the following steps:
When step 1. automobile dispatches from the factory, default setting is carried out by producer, electrifying startup is carried out to each ECU, each ECU obtains the wink of itself
State value Vts, and by VtsIssue other ECU, after default setting, each ECU is stored with the instantaneous value V of other ECUts；
When each automobile starting of step 2., ECU obtains starting time stamp Ti, the T of each ECU acquisitioniLatter by error concealment
It causes；
Each ECU of step 3. generates dynamic key K, and key K is only effective during this running car, and K makees after automobile flameout
Useless, when next automobile starting, can regenerate new key K；
Step 4.ECU is encrypted to obtain DATA using the dynamic key K of itself when sending message to message data, is not necessarily to
Additional certification mark simultaneously transmits it out；Recipient ECUiTransmission is found in the instantaneous value of itself storage after receiving message
The instantaneous value of side, and according to TiDecruption key K' is calculated, if K'=K, encrypted message DATA is decrypted and is got
Message data.
2. the CAN bus secure authentication method based on transient state as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
The instantaneous value VtsAmplitude a (t) and phase theta (t) calculated by formula (1) and formula (2), wherein i (t) and q (t) difference
For the same phase and quadrature component of complex signal:
The expansion of signal transient phase theta (t) that formula (2) is calculated to eliminate caused by t=2 π n (n=1,2 ..., N)
The absolute value that each element in vector is unfolded is denoted as AV, in order between the noise and transient portion thereof of amplified signal by discontinuity
Variation, then for AV each continuous part calculate phase property variance, by these characteristic storages length be N/s it is interim
The difference between phase variance is obtained in vector TV to create a point shape track FT:
TV (i)=Var (AV (d+1), AV (d+2) ... ... AV (g)) (3)
Wherein N is total sample number, and i=1,2 ..., N/s, g=i × s, d=g-s, s is slide coefficient, and Var indicates the side of amplitude
Difference；
The detection of transient state is executed using following two step process later:
(1) each element in the element is compared with threshold value, until the value of element and the value of next 4 elements
Meet formula (4):
FT (i), FT (i+1) ... ..., FT (i+4)≤5 (4)
(2) SV represents amplitude summation, and FT representative divides shape track
|SV(i)-SV(i-1)|≤0.25×FT(i) (5)
Instantaneous value V is got after meeting above-mentioned two stepts。
3. the CAN bus secure authentication method based on transient state as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
Error is eliminated by formula (6) in step 2:
Ti=f (ti) (6)
F function is error concealment function, which carries out Fuzzy Processing to ti.
4. the CAN bus secure authentication method based on transient state as claimed in claim 3, it is characterised in that:
Dynamic key K is generated according to formula (7) in step 3:
K=hash1 (Vts)⊕hash2(Ti) (7)
Wherein hash1 and hash2 is one-way hash function, exports the hashed value of regular length.
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Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN112003823A (en) * | 2020-07-17 | 2020-11-27 | 江阴市富仁高科股份有限公司 | Information safety transmission method based on CAN bus and application |
| CN113824552A (en) * | 2020-06-19 | 2021-12-21 | 上海汽车集团股份有限公司 | Key generation method and device for vehicle application program and electronic equipment |
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