CN109872017B - Compensation method-based method for evaluating influence of information attack on power system - Google Patents
Compensation method-based method for evaluating influence of information attack on power system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN109872017B CN109872017B CN201711262840.5A CN201711262840A CN109872017B CN 109872017 B CN109872017 B CN 109872017B CN 201711262840 A CN201711262840 A CN 201711262840A CN 109872017 B CN109872017 B CN 109872017B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- information
- flow
- road
- attack
- node
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 33
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 claims description 32
- 238000013507 mapping Methods 0.000 claims description 32
- 230000035945 sensitivity Effects 0.000 claims description 11
- 230000005283 ground state Effects 0.000 claims description 8
- 239000011159 matrix material Substances 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 abstract description 14
- 230000008878 coupling Effects 0.000 abstract description 5
- 238000010168 coupling process Methods 0.000 abstract description 5
- 238000005859 coupling reaction Methods 0.000 abstract description 5
- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 description 3
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 description 3
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000006872 improvement Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
- Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
- Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
- Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security
Landscapes
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
Abstract
The invention relates to an evaluation method of influence of information attack on a power system based on a compensation method, which comprehensively considers information-physical coupling characteristics of the power system and utilizes an information flow network to realize evaluation of the information attack.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of power system safety evaluation, in particular to an evaluation method for influence of information attack on a power system based on a compensation method.
Background
At present, the information physical strong coupling characteristic of the power system is more and more remarkable, the power system is more and more dependent on the information system, and the vulnerability of the power information system is also more and more important. The primary design goal of information systems is to support the safe and reliable operation of the power system, so it is also a current critical issue to analyze how an information system will have an impact on the power system. In addition, the information security problem of the information system is also increasingly emphasized, and how the electric power system is affected by the attack on the information system is analyzed. The massive information comprises measurement, sensing and control, and the flow calculation is difficult to realize after the information is analyzed one by one.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects, and provides an evaluation method for the influence of information attack on a power system based on a compensation method.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
the method for evaluating the influence of the information attack on the power system based on the compensation method comprises the following specific steps:
s1, establishing a contribution model of an information flow road to node information, and calculating influence of information of a start point of the information flow road on certain node information based on the contribution model of the information flow road to the node information;
s2, based on the step S1, the contribution of a plurality of information flow roads to node information, namely, the information flow network mapping is expressed as the contribution of an information input node to an output node;
s3, calculating the deviation amount of the input information after the information attack;
s4, calculating the deviation amount of the output information after the information attack;
s5, calculating the control variable change amount of the power system;
s6, calculating the influence of the control variable change amount on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity;
s7, solving the power flow after the information attack based on a compensation method.
In the scheme, firstly, a contribution model of an information flow road to node information is established, and based on the contribution model of the information flow road to the node information, how the information of the starting point of the information flow road has influence on certain node information can be calculated; then, the contribution of the information flow roads to the node information, namely the information flow network mapping is expressed as the contribution of the information input node to the output node; secondly, calculating the deviation amount of the input information after the information attack; outputting information deviation after information attack is calculated again; further calculating a control variable change amount of the electric power system; then, calculating the influence of the control variable change amount on the power system tide based on the sensitivity; finally, solving the flow after the information attack based on a compensation method, and superposing the flow change amount after the information attack with the ground state flow for quickly evaluating the influence of the information attack on the power system; according to the technical scheme, the information-physical coupling characteristic of the power system is comprehensively considered, the information flow network is utilized to realize the evaluation of the information attack, the quick evaluation of the influence of the information attack on the power system can be realized without solving the tide equation again based on the theory of the compensation method, and the method is suitable for being applied to the safety evaluation of the information injection attack of each node in a large-scale power system.
Preferably, the step S2 is specifically as follows: the information flow network mapping comprises a branch information flow mapping and a directional road information flow mapping;
the input-output relation of the information branch of the branch information flow mapping is expressed by the following formula:
wherein ,
input information for information branch, < >>
For outputting information of information branch, E b Mapping relation of input and output functions of the information branch;
the information flow mapping of the plurality of directional roads forms a directional radial information flow network mapping; the radial information flow network is split into a plurality of directional roads, the information flow mapping of each directional road is calculated, and the contribution of the directional road rho to the terminal information is shown in the following formula:
wherein the road ρ= { b ρ,1 ,…,b ρ,k The k is more than or equal to 1, and the i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to k-1 for any meaning, thereby satisfying the conditions of branchRoad b ρ,i The output node of (a) is branch b ρ,i+1 Defining branch b ρ,1 Is injected as (1)
The information is the input information of the road rho, and defines the branch road in the road, b ρ,k Output information of (2) is->
The information is the output information of the road rho, E ρ,1 …E ρ,k Mapping operators of all branches are respectively represented;
wherein the above calculated information flow map is calculated:
wherein ,Eρ ＝E ρ,k ·(...·(E ρ,1 ·()))，
The method comprises the steps of solving information network output nodes:
and calculating the contribution value of each road by combining the contribution of each directed road to the output node, wherein the contribution value is shown in the following formula:
wherein yj A value (control instruction in the power system) indicating the information network output node j, path.j indicating the road set of the information network output node j, ρ e path.j indicating the road ρ in the road set of the information network output node j;
the contribution of the root node information to the information network output node is calculated as follows:
preferably, the step S3 is specifically as follows:
calculating the deviation of the input information after the information attack, as shown in (6)
wherein 
Inputting information deviation amount for road rho after information attack, < ->
Is the input information of the road rho after the information attack.
Preferably, the step S4 is specifically as follows:
calculating the deviation of the output information after the information attack, as shown in the formula (7):
wherein Δyj For the information deviation amount of the output node of the information network after the information attack,
the information deviation amount is input for the road ρ after the information attack.
Preferably, the step S5 is specifically as follows:
calculating the change amount of the control variable of the power system, wherein when the power system has no control fault, the change amount of the control variable is the same as the information deviation amount of the information network output node, and the control variable is shown in the following formula:
Δu j ＝Δy j (3)
wherein Δuj The control variable change amount of the control node j after the information attack is obtained.
Preferably, the step S6 is specifically as follows:
the influence of the control variable change amount on the power system flow is calculated based on the sensitivity, as shown in the following formula:
Δf＝S j ·Δu j ；
wherein Deltaf is the change amount of the tide after the information attack, S j A sensitivity matrix for the control node j to the power system state variables.
Preferably, the step S7 is specifically as follows:
solving the flow after the information attack based on a compensation method, and superposing the flow change amount after the information attack with the ground state flow, wherein the flow change amount is shown in the following formula:
f'＝f+Δf (4)
wherein f' is the flow after information attack, and f is the ground state flow; and the solving result is the tide after the information attack.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that: according to the technical scheme, the information-physical coupling characteristic of the power system is comprehensively considered, the information flow network is utilized to realize the evaluation of the information attack, the quick evaluation of the influence of the information attack on the power system can be realized without solving the tide equation again based on the theory of the compensation method, and the method is suitable for being applied to the safety evaluation of the information injection attack of each node in a large-scale power system.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a method for evaluating the influence of an information attack on a power system based on a compensation method.
Detailed Description
The drawings are for illustrative purposes only and are not to be construed as limiting the present patent; for the purpose of better illustrating the embodiments, certain elements of the drawings may be omitted, enlarged or reduced and do not represent the actual product dimensions; it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that certain well-known structures in the drawings and descriptions thereof may be omitted. The technical scheme of the invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.
The method for evaluating the influence of the information attack on the power system based on the compensation method comprises the following specific steps:
s1, establishing a contribution model of an information flow road to node information, and calculating influence of information of a start point of the information flow road on certain node information based on the contribution model of the information flow road to the node information;
s2, based on the step S1, the contribution of a plurality of information flow roads to node information, namely, the information flow network mapping is expressed as the contribution of an information input node to an output node;
s3, calculating the deviation amount of the input information after the information attack;
s4, calculating the deviation amount of the output information after the information attack;
s5, calculating the control variable change amount of the power system;
s6, calculating the influence of the control variable change amount on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity;
s7, solving the power flow after the information attack based on a compensation method.
In this embodiment, step S2 is specifically as follows: the information flow network mapping comprises a branch information flow mapping and a directional road information flow mapping;
the input-output relation of the information branch of the branch information flow mapping is expressed by the following formula:
wherein ,
input information for information branch, < >>
For outputting information of information branch, E b Mapping relation of input and output functions of the information branch;
the information flow mapping of the plurality of directional roads forms a directional radial information flow network mapping; the radial information flow network is split into a plurality of directional roads, the information flow mapping of each directional road is calculated, and the contribution of the directional road rho to the terminal information is shown in the following formula:
wherein the road ρ= { b ρ,1 ,…,b ρ,k And (k is more than or equal to 1), and for any arbitrary meaning, i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to k-1, the branch b is satisfied ρ,i The output node of (a) is branch b ρ,i+1 Defining branch b ρ,1 Is injected as (1)
The information is the input information of the road rho, and defines the branch road in the road, b ρ,k Output information of (2) is->
The information is the output information of the road rho, E ρ,1 …E ρ,k Mapping operators of all branches are respectively represented;
wherein the above calculated information flow map is calculated:
wherein ,Eρ ＝E ρ,k ·(...·(E ρ,1 ·()))，
The method comprises the steps of solving information network output nodes:
and calculating the contribution value of each road by combining the contribution of each directed road to the output node, wherein the contribution value is shown in the following formula:
wherein yj A value (control instruction in the power system) indicating the information network output node j, path.j indicating the road set of the information network output node j, ρ e path.j indicating the road ρ in the road set of the information network output node j;
the contribution of the root node information to the information network output node is calculated as follows:
in this embodiment, step S3 is specifically as follows:
calculating the deviation of the input information after the information attack, as shown in (6)
wherein 
Inputting information deviation amount for road rho after information attack, < ->
Is the input information of the road rho after the information attack.
In this embodiment, step S4 is specifically as follows:
calculating the deviation of the output information after the information attack, as shown in the formula (7):
wherein Δyj For the information deviation amount of the output node of the information network after the information attack,
the information deviation amount is input for the road ρ after the information attack.
In this embodiment, step S5 is specifically as follows:
calculating the change amount of the control variable of the power system, wherein when the power system has no control fault, the change amount of the control variable is the same as the information deviation amount of the information network output node, and the control variable is shown in the following formula:
Δu j ＝Δy j (5)
wherein Δuj For controlling node j after information attackThe control variable changes amount.
In this embodiment, step S6 is specifically as follows:
the influence of the control variable change amount on the power system flow is calculated based on the sensitivity, as shown in the following formula:
Δf＝S j ·Δu j ；
wherein Deltaf is the change amount of the tide after the information attack, S j A sensitivity matrix for the control node j to the power system state variables.
In this embodiment, step S7 is specifically as follows:
solving the flow after the information attack based on a compensation method, and superposing the flow change amount after the information attack with the ground state flow, wherein the flow change amount is shown in the following formula:
f'＝f+Δf (6)
wherein f' is the flow after information attack, and f is the ground state flow; and the solving result is the tide after the information attack.
In the scheme, firstly, a contribution model of an information flow road to node information is established, and based on the contribution model of the information flow road to the node information, how the information of the starting point of the information flow road has influence on certain node information can be calculated; then, the contribution of the information flow roads to the node information, namely the information flow network mapping is expressed as the contribution of the information input node to the output node; secondly, calculating the deviation amount of the input information after the information attack; outputting information deviation after information attack is calculated again; further calculating a control variable change amount of the electric power system; then, calculating the influence of the control variable change amount on the power system tide based on the sensitivity; finally, solving the flow after the information attack based on a compensation method, and superposing the flow change amount after the information attack with the ground state flow for quickly evaluating the influence of the information attack on the power system; according to the technical scheme, the information-physical coupling characteristic of the power system is comprehensively considered, the information flow network is utilized to realize the evaluation of the information attack, the quick evaluation of the influence of the information attack on the power system can be realized without solving the tide equation again based on the theory of the compensation method, and the method is suitable for being applied to the safety evaluation of the information injection attack of each node in a large-scale power system.
It is to be understood that the above examples of the present invention are provided by way of illustration only and not by way of limitation of the embodiments of the present invention. Other variations or modifications of the above teachings will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art. It is not necessary here nor is it exhaustive of all embodiments. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. which come within the spirit and principles of the invention are desired to be protected by the following claims.
Claims (1)
1. A method for evaluating the influence of information attack on a power system based on a compensation method is characterized by comprising the following steps: the method comprises the following specific steps:
s1, establishing a contribution model of an information flow road to node information, and calculating influence of information of a start point of the information flow road on certain node information based on the contribution model of the information flow road to the node information;
s2, based on the step S1, the contribution of a plurality of information flow roads to node information, namely, the information flow network mapping is expressed as the contribution of an information input node to an output node; the step S2 specifically comprises the following steps: the information flow network mapping comprises a branch information flow mapping and a directional road information flow mapping;
the input-output relation of the information branch of the branch information flow mapping is expressed by the following formula:
wherein ,
input information for information branch, < >>
Output information for information branch，E b Mapping relation of input and output functions of the information branch;
a plurality of information flow mappings of the directional roads form a directional radial information flow network mapping; the radial information flow network is split into a plurality of directional roads, the information flow mapping of each directional road is calculated, and the contribution of the directional road rho to the terminal information is shown in the following formula:
wherein the road ρ= { b ρ,1 ,…,b ρ,k And (k is more than or equal to 1), and for any 1.ltoreq.i.ltoreq.k-1, the branch b is satisfied ρ,i The output node of (a) is branch b ρ,i+1 Defining branch b ρ,1 Is injected as (1)
The information is the input information of the road rho, and defines the branch road in the road, b ρ,k Output information of (2) is->
The information is the output information of the road rho, E ρ,1 …E ρ,k Mapping operators of all branches are respectively represented;
wherein the above calculated information flow map is calculated:
wherein ,Eρ ＝E ρ,k ·(...·(E ρ,1 ·()))，
The method comprises the steps of solving information network output nodes:
and calculating the contribution value of each road by combining the contribution of each directed road to the output node, wherein the contribution value is shown in the following formula:
wherein yj A value representing an information network output node j, which is a control instruction in the power system, path.j representing a road set of the information network output node j, ρ e path.j representing a road ρ in the road set of the information network output node j;
the contribution of the root node information to the information network output node is calculated as follows:
s3, calculating the deviation amount of the input information after the information attack; the step S3 is specifically as follows:
calculating the deviation of the input information after the information attack, as shown in the following formula
wherein 
Inputting information deviation amount for road rho after information attack, < ->
The information is input to the road rho after the information attack;
s4, calculating the deviation amount of the output information after the information attack;
the step S4 specifically includes the following steps:
calculating the deviation amount of the output information after the information attack, wherein the deviation amount is shown as the following formula:
wherein Δyj For the information deviation amount of the output node of the information network after the information attack,
inputting information deviation amount for the road rho after the information attack;
s5, calculating the control variable change amount of the power system;
the step S5 specifically includes the following steps:
calculating the change amount of the control variable of the power system, wherein when the power system has no control fault, the change amount of the control variable is the same as the information deviation amount of the information network output node, and the control variable is shown in the following formula:
Δu j ＝Δy j
wherein Δuj The control variable change amount of the control node j after the information attack is obtained;
s6, calculating the influence of the control variable change amount on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity;
the step S6 specifically includes the following steps:
the influence of the control variable change amount on the power system flow is calculated based on the sensitivity, as shown in the following formula:
Δf＝S j ·Δu j ；
wherein Deltaf is the change amount of the tide after the information attack, S j A sensitivity matrix for the control node j to the power system state variables;
s7, solving the power flow after information attack based on a compensation method;
the step S7 specifically includes the following steps:
solving the flow after the information attack based on a compensation method, and superposing the flow change amount after the information attack with the ground state flow, wherein the flow change amount is shown in the following formula:
f'＝f+Δf
wherein f' is the flow after information attack, and f is the ground state flow; and the solving result is the tide after the information attack.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201711262840.5A CN109872017B (en) | 2017-12-04 | 2017-12-04 | Compensation method-based method for evaluating influence of information attack on power system |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201711262840.5A CN109872017B (en) | 2017-12-04 | 2017-12-04 | Compensation method-based method for evaluating influence of information attack on power system |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN109872017A CN109872017A (en) | 2019-06-11 |
| CN109872017B true CN109872017B (en) | 2023-05-09 |
Family
ID=66915859
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201711262840.5A Active CN109872017B (en) | 2017-12-04 | 2017-12-04 | Compensation method-based method for evaluating influence of information attack on power system |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN109872017B (en) |
Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN104376506A (en) * | 2014-11-17 | 2015-02-25 | 三峡大学 | Electric power system risk assessment method based on deterministic analysis |
| CN105048461A (en) * | 2015-08-25 | 2015-11-11 | 西安交通大学 | Attack and defense exercise method for direct-current optimal power flow calculation data integrity of power system |
Family Cites Families (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US10601854B2 (en) * | 2016-08-12 | 2020-03-24 | Tata Consultancy Services Limited | Comprehensive risk assessment in a heterogeneous dynamic network |
| CN106713354A (en) * | 2017-01-23 | 2017-05-24 | 全球能源互联网研究院 | Method for evaluating vulnerability node of electric cyber-physical system based on undetectable information attack pre-warning technology |
-
2017
- 2017-12-04 CN CN201711262840.5A patent/CN109872017B/en active Active
Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN104376506A (en) * | 2014-11-17 | 2015-02-25 | 三峡大学 | Electric power system risk assessment method based on deterministic analysis |
| CN105048461A (en) * | 2015-08-25 | 2015-11-11 | 西安交通大学 | Attack and defense exercise method for direct-current optimal power flow calculation data integrity of power system |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN109872017A (en) | 2019-06-11 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sargolzaei et al. | Delayed inputs attack on load frequency control in smart grid | |
| CN102761122A (en) | Defense method of false data injection attack of power state estimation system | |
| Tian et al. | On improved delay-dependent robust H∞ control for systems with interval time-varying delay | |
| US11874930B2 (en) | Anomaly detection for cyber-physical systems | |
| Wang et al. | Stochastic stability of extended filtering for non‐linear systems with measurement packet losses | |
| CN104538941A (en) | Traveling wave protection fixed value setting method for high-voltage direct-current transmission line | |
| Roy et al. | Robust adaptive backstepping speed controller design for a series DC motor | |
| CN103825576A (en) | Polynomial filtering fault detecting method for nonlinear system | |
| Ma et al. | A data-driven model predictive control for alleviating thermal overloads in the presence of possible false data | |
| WO2018127456A3 (en) | Pinocchio / trinocchio on authenticated data | |
| CN109872017B (en) | Compensation method-based method for evaluating influence of information attack on power system | |
| Jafari et al. | Optimal false data injection attacks against power system frequency stability | |
| US10860000B2 (en) | Power system stabilization system and method | |
| CN104503260A (en) | Method and device for setting speed regulator parameters | |
| Hou | Controlling chaos in permanent magnet synchronous motor control system via fuzzy guaranteed cost controller | |
| CN105229477A (en) | The method of area of computer aided determination power network impedance | |
| Paudel et al. | Stealthy attacks on smart grid PMU state estimation | |
| CN105516164A (en) | P2P botnet detection method based on fractal and self-adaptation fusion | |
| Befekadu et al. | Risk-sensitive control under a Markov modulated denial-of-service attack model | |
| CN106099915B (en) | Additional PMU Optimal Configuration Methods based on topological model and singular value decomposition | |
| Louie et al. | A method to improve the performance of conventional static load models | |
| CN109871559B (en) | Analysis method for information fault scanning of power system | |
| Geraldi et al. | Estimation of synchronous generator model parameters operating under unbalanced three-phase conditions | |
| Reynders et al. | Robust structural health monitoring in changing environmental conditions with uncertain data | |
| CN109149606B (en) | Electric power system oscillation instantaneous characteristic analysis method |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right |
Effective date of registration: 20230925 Address after: 510000 No. 75, Meihua Road, Yuexiu District, Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province (office building only) Patentee after: ELECTRICAL POWER DISPATCHING & CONTROL CENTER OF GUANGDONG POWER GRID Co.,Ltd. Address before: No.75, Meihua Road, Yuexiu District, Guangzhou, Guangdong 510000 Patentee before: ELECTRICAL POWER DISPATCHING & CONTROL CENTER OF GUANGDONG POWER GRID Co.,Ltd. Patentee before: TSINGHUA University |
|
| TR01 | Transfer of patent right |