CN109872017A - It is a kind of based on the information attack of penalty method to the appraisal procedure of effect on power system - Google Patents
It is a kind of based on the information attack of penalty method to the appraisal procedure of effect on power system Download PDFInfo
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
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- Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of based on the information attack of penalty method to the appraisal procedure of effect on power system, the technical program comprehensively considers information-physical coupling characteristic of electric system, the assessment of information attack is realized using information flow network, the present invention is based on the theories of penalty method, power flow equation can not be solved again and realize information attack to the rapid evaluation of effect on power system, be suitably employed in large-scale electrical power system in the security evaluation of each nodal information injection attacks.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of power system security evaluation, in particular to a compensation method-based evaluation method for influence of information attack on a power system.
Background
At present, the information physical strong coupling characteristic of the power system is more and more obvious, the power system is more and more dependent on the information system, and the vulnerability of the power information system is more and more paid attention. The initial design goal of the information system is to support the safe and reliable operation of the power system, so it is also the current key issue to analyze how the information system will affect the power system. In addition, the information security problem of the information system is increasingly emphasized, and the influence of the power system caused by the attack on the information system is analyzed. The massive information comprises measurement, sensing and control, and the measurement, sensing and control are difficult to realize after being analyzed one by one and then load flow calculation is carried out.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to overcome the defects, the invention provides an evaluation method for the influence of information attack on a power system based on a compensation method.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
a method for evaluating the influence of information attack on a power system based on a compensation method comprises the following specific steps:
s1, establishing a contribution model of an information flow channel to node information, and calculating how the information of an information flow channel starting point affects certain node information based on the contribution model of the information flow channel to the node information;
s2, based on the step S1, representing the contribution of the plurality of information flow channels to the node information, namely the information flow network mapping as the contribution of the information input node to the output node;
s3, calculating the deviation value of the input information after the information attack;
s4, calculating the deviation value of the output information after the information attack;
s5, calculating a control variable variation of the power system;
s6, calculating the influence of the control variable variation on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity;
and S7, solving the trend after the information attack based on a compensation method.
In the scheme, firstly, a contribution model of the information flow path to the node information is established, and how the information of the information flow path starting point affects certain node information can be calculated based on the contribution model of the information flow path to the node information; then, representing the contribution of the plurality of information flow paths to the node information, namely the information flow network mapping as the contribution of the information input node to the output node; secondly, calculating the deviation amount of input information after information attack; calculating the information deviation amount after the information attack again; further calculating a control variable change amount of the power system; then, calculating the influence of the control variable change quantity on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity; finally, solving the power flow after the information attack based on a compensation method, and superposing the power flow change amount after the information attack and the ground state power flow for quickly evaluating the influence of the information attack on the power system; the technical scheme comprehensively considers the information-physical coupling characteristics of the power system and utilizes the information flow network to realize the evaluation of the information attack.
Preferably, the step S2 is as follows: the information flow network mapping comprises branch information flow mapping and information flow mapping of directed roads;
the input-output relationship of the information branch mapped by the branch information flow is represented by the following formula:
wherein ,is the input information of the information branch,for the output information of the information branch, EbMapping relation of input and output functions of the information branch;
the information flow mappings of the directed roads form directed radial information flow network mappings; the method comprises the following steps of splitting a radial information flow network into a plurality of directed roads, respectively calculating information flow mapping of each directed road, wherein the contribution of a directed road rho to terminal point information is shown as the following formula:
where, road ρ ═ bρ,1,…,bρ,kI is more than or equal to 1 and more than or equal to k-1 for any meaning, and the branch b is satisfiedρ,iThe output node of (b) is a branchρ,i+1Defining a branch bρ,1Is injected with information ofThe information is input information of a road rho, and a branch in the road b is defined at the same timeρ,kOutput information ofThis information is the output information of the road ρ, Eρ,1…Eρ,kRespectively representing mapping operators of each branch;
wherein the calculated information flow mapping is calculated:
wherein ,Eρ＝Eρ,k·(...·(Eρ,1·()))，
Solving an information network output node:
and calculating the contribution value of each road by combining the contribution of each directed road to the output node, wherein the contribution value is shown as the following formula:
wherein yjA value representing an information network output node j (a control command in the power system), path.j represents a road set of the information network output node j, and rho ∈ path.j represents a road rho in the road set of the information network output node j;
calculating the contribution of the root node information to the output nodes of the information network, as shown in the following formula:
preferably, the step S3 is as follows:
calculating the deviation amount of the input information after the information attack, as shown in formula (6)
wherein The information deviation amount is input for the road p after the information attack,as informationInput information of the post-attack road ρ.
Preferably, the step S4 is as follows:
calculating the deviation amount of output information after information attack, as shown in formula (7):
wherein ΔyjFor the information deviation amount of the information network output node after the information attack,the information deviation amount is input for the road ρ after the information attack.
Preferably, the step S5 is as follows:
calculating the control variable variation of the power system, wherein when the power system has no control fault, the control variable is the same as the information deviation amount of the information network output node, and the following formula is shown:
Δuj＝Δyj(3)
wherein ΔujThe method is used for controlling the variable quantity of the node j after the information attack.
Preferably, the step S6 is as follows:
calculating the influence of the control variable change quantity on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity, as shown in the following formula:
Δf＝Sj·Δuj；
wherein, Delta f is the power flow change quantity after information attack, SjIs a sensitivity matrix of the control node j to the power system state variables.
Preferably, the step S7 is as follows:
solving the power flow after the information attack based on a compensation method, and superposing the power flow change amount after the information attack and the ground state power flow, wherein the formula is shown as follows:
f'＝f+Δf (4)
wherein f' is the trend after information attack, and f is the ground state trend; and solving the result to obtain the trend after the information attack.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that: the technical scheme comprehensively considers the information-physical coupling characteristics of the power system and utilizes the information flow network to realize the evaluation of the information attack.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a method for evaluating the influence of information attack on a power system based on a compensation method.
Detailed Description
The drawings are for illustrative purposes only and are not to be construed as limiting the patent; for the purpose of better illustrating the embodiments, certain features of the drawings may be omitted, enlarged or reduced, and do not represent the size of an actual product; it will be understood by those skilled in the art that certain well-known structures in the drawings and descriptions thereof may be omitted. The technical solution of the present invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.
A method for evaluating the influence of information attack on a power system based on a compensation method comprises the following specific steps:
s1, establishing a contribution model of an information flow channel to node information, and calculating how the information of an information flow channel starting point affects certain node information based on the contribution model of the information flow channel to the node information;
s2, based on the step S1, representing the contribution of the plurality of information flow channels to the node information, namely the information flow network mapping as the contribution of the information input node to the output node;
s3, calculating the deviation value of the input information after the information attack;
s4, calculating the deviation value of the output information after the information attack;
s5, calculating a control variable variation of the power system;
s6, calculating the influence of the control variable variation on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity;
and S7, solving the trend after the information attack based on a compensation method.
In this embodiment, step S2 is specifically as follows: the information flow network mapping comprises branch information flow mapping and information flow mapping of directed roads;
the input-output relationship of the information branch mapped by the branch information flow is represented by the following formula:
wherein ,is the input information of the information branch,for the output information of the information branch, EbMapping relation of input and output functions of the information branch;
the information flow mappings of the directed roads form directed radial information flow network mappings; the method comprises the following steps of splitting a radial information flow network into a plurality of directed roads, respectively calculating information flow mapping of each directed road, wherein the contribution of a directed road rho to terminal point information is shown as the following formula:
where, road ρ ═ bρ,1,…,bρ,kI is more than or equal to 1 and more than or equal to k-1 for any meaning, and the branch b is satisfiedρ,iThe output node of (b) is a branchρ,i+1Defining a branch bρ,1Is injected with information ofThe information is input information of a road rho, and a branch in the road b is defined at the same timeρ,kOutput information ofThis information is the output information of the road ρ, Eρ,1…Eρ,kRespectively representing mapping operators of each branch;
wherein the calculated information flow mapping is calculated:
wherein ,Eρ＝Eρ,k·(...·(Eρ,1·()))，
Solving an information network output node:
and calculating the contribution value of each road by combining the contribution of each directed road to the output node, wherein the contribution value is shown as the following formula:
wherein yjRepresenting the value of the information network output node j (in the power system)The middle is a control instruction), path.j represents a road set of the information network output node j, and rho belongs to the road set of the information network output node j;
calculating the contribution of the root node information to the output nodes of the information network, as shown in the following formula:
in this embodiment, step S3 is specifically as follows:
calculating the deviation amount of the input information after the information attack, as shown in formula (6)
wherein The information deviation amount is input for the road p after the information attack,is the input information of the road rho after the information attack.
In this embodiment, step S4 is specifically as follows:
calculating the deviation amount of output information after information attack, as shown in formula (7):
wherein ΔyjFor the information deviation amount of the information network output node after the information attack,the information deviation amount is input for the road ρ after the information attack.
In this embodiment, step S5 is specifically as follows:
calculating the control variable variation of the power system, wherein when the power system has no control fault, the control variable is the same as the information deviation amount of the information network output node, and the following formula is shown:
Δuj＝Δyj(5)
wherein ΔujThe method is used for controlling the variable quantity of the node j after the information attack.
In this embodiment, step S6 is specifically as follows:
calculating the influence of the control variable change quantity on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity, as shown in the following formula:
Δf＝Sj·Δuj；
wherein, Delta f is the power flow change quantity after information attack, SjIs a sensitivity matrix of the control node j to the power system state variables.
In this embodiment, step S7 is specifically as follows:
solving the power flow after the information attack based on a compensation method, and superposing the power flow change amount after the information attack and the ground state power flow, wherein the formula is shown as follows:
f'＝f+Δf (6)
wherein f' is the trend after information attack, and f is the ground state trend; and solving the result to obtain the trend after the information attack.
In the scheme, firstly, a contribution model of the information flow path to the node information is established, and how the information of the information flow path starting point affects certain node information can be calculated based on the contribution model of the information flow path to the node information; then, representing the contribution of the plurality of information flow paths to the node information, namely the information flow network mapping as the contribution of the information input node to the output node; secondly, calculating the deviation amount of input information after information attack; calculating the information deviation amount after the information attack again; further calculating a control variable change amount of the power system; then, calculating the influence of the control variable change quantity on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity; finally, solving the power flow after the information attack based on a compensation method, and superposing the power flow change amount after the information attack and the ground state power flow for quickly evaluating the influence of the information attack on the power system; the technical scheme comprehensively considers the information-physical coupling characteristics of the power system and utilizes the information flow network to realize the evaluation of the information attack.
It should be understood that the above-described embodiments of the present invention are merely examples for clearly illustrating the present invention, and are not intended to limit the embodiments of the present invention. Other variations and modifications will be apparent to persons skilled in the art in light of the above description. And are neither required nor exhaustive of all embodiments. Any modification, equivalent replacement, and improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the claims of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. A method for evaluating the influence of information attack on a power system based on a compensation method is characterized by comprising the following steps: the method comprises the following specific steps:
s1, establishing a contribution model of an information flow channel to node information, and calculating how the information of an information flow channel starting point affects certain node information based on the contribution model of the information flow channel to the node information;
s2, based on the step S1, representing the contribution of the plurality of information flow channels to the node information, namely the information flow network mapping as the contribution of the information input node to the output node;
s3, calculating the deviation value of the input information after the information attack;
s4, calculating the deviation value of the output information after the information attack;
s5, calculating a control variable variation of the power system;
s6, calculating the influence of the control variable variation on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity;
and S7, solving the trend after the information attack based on a compensation method.
2. The method for evaluating the influence of information attack on the power system based on the compensation method according to claim 1, wherein: the step S2 is specifically as follows: the information flow network mapping comprises branch information flow mapping and information flow mapping of directed roads;
the input-output relationship of the information branch mapped by the branch information flow is represented by the following formula:
wherein ,is the input information of the information branch,for the output information of the information branch, EbMapping relation of input and output functions of the information branch;
the information flow mappings of the directed roads form directed radial information flow network mappings; the method comprises the following steps of splitting a radial information flow network into a plurality of directed roads, respectively calculating information flow mapping of each directed road, wherein the contribution of a directed road rho to terminal point information is shown as the following formula:
where, road ρ ═ bρ,1,…,bρ,kI is more than or equal to 1 and more than or equal to k-1 for any meaning, and the branch b is satisfiedρ,iThe output node of (b) is a branchρ,i+1Defining a branch bρ,1Is injected with information ofThe information is input information of a road rho, and a branch in the road b is defined at the same timeρ,kOutput information ofThis information is the output information of the road ρ, Eρ,1…Eρ,kRespectively representing mapping operators of each branch;
wherein the calculated information flow mapping is calculated:
wherein ,Eρ＝Eρ,k·(...·(Eρ,1·()))，
Solving an information network output node:
and calculating the contribution value of each road by combining the contribution of each directed road to the output node, wherein the contribution value is shown as the following formula:
wherein yjA value representing an information network output node j (a control command in the power system), path.j represents a road set of the information network output node j, and rho ∈ path.j represents a road rho in the road set of the information network output node j;
calculating the contribution of the root node information to the output nodes of the information network, as shown in the following formula:
3. the method for evaluating the influence of information attack on the power system based on the compensation method according to claim 1, wherein: the step S3 is specifically as follows:
calculating the deviation amount of the input information after the information attack, as shown in formula (6)
wherein The information deviation amount is input for the road p after the information attack,is the input information of the road rho after the information attack.
4. The method for evaluating the influence of information attack on the power system based on the compensation method according to claim 1, wherein: the step S4 is specifically as follows:
calculating the deviation amount of output information after information attack, as shown in formula (7):
wherein △yjFor the information deviation amount of the information network output node after the information attack,the information deviation amount is input for the road ρ after the information attack.
5. The method for evaluating the influence of information attack on the power system based on the compensation method according to claim 1, wherein: the step S5 is specifically as follows:
calculating the control variable variation of the power system, wherein when the power system has no control fault, the control variable is the same as the information deviation amount of the information network output node, and the following formula is shown:
△uj＝△yj(1)
wherein △ujThe method is used for controlling the variable quantity of the node j after the information attack.
6. The method for evaluating the influence of information attack on the power system based on the compensation method according to claim 1, wherein: the step S6 is specifically as follows:
calculating the influence of the control variable change quantity on the power flow of the power system based on the sensitivity, as shown in the following formula:
△f＝Sj·△uj；
wherein △ f is the change of power flow after information attack, SjIs a sensitivity matrix of the control node j to the power system state variables.
7. The method for evaluating the influence of information attack on the power system based on the compensation method according to claim 1, wherein: the step S7 is specifically as follows:
solving the power flow after the information attack based on a compensation method, and superposing the power flow change amount after the information attack and the ground state power flow, wherein the formula is shown as follows:
f'＝f+△f (2)
wherein f' is the trend after information attack, and f is the ground state trend; and solving the result to obtain the trend after the information attack.
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