CN109831292A - A kind of method for secret protection of intelligent electric meter information - Google Patents
A kind of method for secret protection of intelligent electric meter information Download PDFInfo
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- CN109831292A CN109831292A CN201910263980.7A CN201910263980A CN109831292A CN 109831292 A CN109831292 A CN 109831292A CN 201910263980 A CN201910263980 A CN 201910263980A CN 109831292 A CN109831292 A CN 109831292A
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of method for secret protection of intelligent electric meter information; this method distributes key and token by introducing third-party CA for each SM; and group key is issued for ES; ES can receive the encryption power information of all SM in same meter group; but group key can only decrypt the encryption polymerizing value of these encryption power informations; and the encryption power information of single SM cannot be decrypted; therefore the power information of specific user can not be obtained; simultaneously; CA will not receive the encryption power information of each SM, therefore can not also obtain the power information of specific user.The present invention can protect the electricity consumption privacy of user, and whether authentication data packet is tampered.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to Data Protection Technologies fields, more particularly to a kind of secret protection side of intelligent electric meter information
Method.
Background technique
The modernization of power grid improves energy efficiency for country, to renewable energy transition, reduce greenhouse gas emission with
And it establishes sustainable economical to ensure that the present age and the effort of offspring's prosperity are most important.Electric system is one huge and complicated
System.In order to keep the safety and stability of system, communication network and information technology are used widely in the power system.
This novel hybrid network is exactly so-called smart grid.Information and communication technology (ICT) is mutually tied with traditional energy delivery system
It closes, needs to provide higher quality and more reliable power capability from outmoded power infrastructures, effectively reduce cost simultaneously.
However, in frequent information exchange between intelligent electric meter and electricity provider, it is possible that the behavior of user
The phenomenon that being leaked with habit.It, can if energy supplier still can obtain the power information of user in smart grid
To obtain the privacy information of user from the angle of user.On the other hand, if the power information of user is intercepted by malicious objects,
Malicious objects can serve the devil to user, for example, if knowing nobody in user family, may give thief's opportunity.
In order to which the power information to user is protected, the prior art proposes a kind of homomorphic encryption scheme to protect user's
Privacy.Each intelligent electric meter (SM) encrypts the power information of user using single key, and secret value is sent to energy supply
Quotient (ES).ES selects a SM to collect each key from all SM as key polymerizer (KA), KA, but only by aggregation key Ka
It is sent to ES.ES decrypts the polymerizing value of the power informations of all encryption users using Ka, and obtain all users uses telecommunications
The summation of breath.Since ES does not know each key, it can only obtain the power information summation of all users, and can not decrypt
The power information of each user.
But above scheme has some disadvantages:
1.KA is the SM installed by ES, therefore KA can cooperate with ES and share each key with ES.By this
Mode, ES still may obtain the power information of personal user.
2. ES will obtain the polymerizing value of mistake if the data packet of some SM is maliciously tampered in transmission process, and
Can not determine it is which data packet is tampered.
Summary of the invention
The invention mainly solves the technical problem of providing a kind of method for secret protection of intelligent electric meter information, can
Protect the electricity consumption privacy of user.
In order to solve the above technical problems, one technical scheme adopted by the invention is that: a kind of intelligent electric meter letter is provided
The method for secret protection of breath, comprising: S1: multiple intelligent electric meter SM are divided into multiple electricity according to preset strategy by certification authority CA
Table group, and different group ID is distributed respectively for each meter group；S2: the CA issues unique token, Yi Ji to each SM
Each time slot issues the corresponding key of current time slots to each SM respectively；S3: current SM passes through homomorphic cryptography using the key
Algorithm encrypts original power information to obtain encryption power information, and encryption power information, group ID and token are sent to
Energy supplier ES, wherein the slot synchronization of described CA, SM and ES；S4: the ES polymerize in current meter group according to a group ID
The encryption power information of all SM obtains the encryption polymerizing value of current meter group, and group ID and token are sent to CA；S5: described
CA polymerize each SM in current meter group according to group ID and token and obtains the poly- of current meter group in the corresponding key of current time slots
Key is closed, and the aggregation key is sent to ES；S6: the ES decrypts current ammeter using the aggregation key of current meter group
The encryption polymerizing value of group obtains the power information summation of all SM in current meter group.
Preferably, the original power information includes a upper time slot to the value added of current time slots and the meter of current time slots
Magnitude；Current SM encrypts original power information by homomorphic encryption algorithm using the key to obtain encryption power information
The step of specifically: current SM is using the key by homomorphic encryption algorithm to the value added of a upper time slot to current time slots
It is encrypted to obtain encryption incremental value and encryption variable, the encryption incremental value and encryption respectively with the variable of current time slots
Variable constitutes encryption power information；Wherein, the encryption incremental value is expressed as EKn(An), the encryption variable is expressed as
EKn(Bn), n indicates current time slots, KnIndicate current SM in the corresponding key of current time slots, AnIndicate a time slot to currently
The value added of time slot, BnIndicate that the variable of current time slots, E () indicate homomorphic encryption algorithm；It is described after the step S3
Before step S4, the method for secret protection further include: group ID and token are sent to CA by the ES；The CA according to group ID and
Token obtains current SM in the corresponding key of a upper time slot and encrypted reference value is calculated to 0, then described will add
Close reference value is sent to ES, wherein the encrypted reference value is expressed as EKn-1(0)；The ES compares EKn-1(Bn-1) and EKn(An)
The sum of and EKn(Bn) and EKn-1The sum of (0) whether of equal value, and alarm is issued in non-equivalence, and step is carried out in equivalence
S4；Wherein, Bn-1Indicate current SM in the variable of a upper time slot, Kn-1Indicate current SM in the corresponding key of a upper time slot.
Preferably, before the step S2, the method for secret protection further include: the CA and each SM uses identical
Key schedule generate public key and private key；The CA and each SM obtains mutual public key using Diffie-Hellman；Institute
It states in step S2, the token and key that the CA is issued are respectively by the public key encryption: described hidden before the step S3
Private guard method further include: current SM is decrypted using the token and key of private key pair encryption.
Preferably, the Diffie-Hellman is Oakley algorithm.
It is in contrast to the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are: by introducing third-party CA come for each SM
Distributing key and token, and issues group key for ES, ES can receive the encryption power information of all SM in same meter group,
But group key can only decrypt the encryption polymerizing value of these encryption power informations, and the encryption telecommunications of single SM cannot be decrypted
Breath, therefore the power information of specific user can not be obtained, meanwhile, CA will not receive the encryption power information of each SM, therefore
The power information of specific user can not be obtained, so as to protect the electricity consumption privacy of user.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the flow diagram of the method for secret protection of the intelligent electric meter information of the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the Signalling exchange schematic diagram of the method for secret protection of the intelligent electric meter information of the embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention carries out clear, complete
Site preparation description, it is clear that the described embodiments are merely a part of the embodiments of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.It is based on
Embodiment in the present invention, it is obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts every other
Embodiment shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Refering to fig. 1, the method for secret protection of the intelligent electric meter information of the embodiment of the present invention includes:
S1:CA (Certificate Authority, certification authority) is according to preset strategy by multiple SM (Smart
Meter, intelligent electric meter) it is divided into multiple meter groups, and different group ID is distributed respectively for each meter group.
Wherein, each meter group has a unique group ID, and all intelligent electric meters in a meter group share the electricity
The group ID of table group.Multiple SM can be divided into multiple meter groups, and multiple meter groups can also be divided into according to actual installation position,
Specific division mode is determined according to preset strategy.
S2:CA issues unique token to each SM, and issues current time slots pair respectively to each SM in each time slot
The key answered.
Wherein, the key of the token of each SM and each time slot corresponds.Because key may for some reason and
Change (such as periodically change key or key are leaked).The token of each SM is unique.
S3: current SM encrypts original power information by homomorphic encryption algorithm using key to obtain encryption telecommunications
Breath, and encryption power information, group ID and token are sent to ES (Energy Supplier, energy supplier), wherein CA, SM
With the slot synchronization of ES.
The encryption power information that S4:ES polymerize all SM in current meter group according to group ID obtains adding for current meter group
Close polymerizing value, and group ID and token are sent to CA.
Wherein, ES can determine current meter group according to the group ID of current meter group, so as to distinguish current meter group
All SM encryption power information, and polymerize.
S5:CA is obtained currently according to each SM in group ID and the current meter group of token polymerization in the corresponding key of current time slots
The aggregation key of meter group, and aggregation key is sent to ES.
Wherein, current so as to distinguish likewise, CA can determine current meter group according to the group ID of current meter group
The encryption power information of all SM of meter group, meanwhile, CA can determine each according to the token of each SM in current meter group
SM is in the corresponding key of current time slots.Due to the slot synchronization of CA, SM and ES, CA can be determined when which being currently at
Gap.
S6:ES obtains current meter group using the encryption polymerizing value that the aggregation key of current meter group decrypts current meter group
In all SM power information summation.
Wherein, aggregation key can only be decrypted to obtain the power information summation of all SM in current meter group, and cannot decrypt
The specific power information of some SM is obtained, so as to protect the electricity consumption privacy of user.
In practical applications, if some SM is captured in the key of current time slots, the data packet of the SM may passed
It is maliciously tampered during defeated.In order to which whether authentication data packet is tampered, in the present embodiment, original power information includes upper one
A time slot is to the value added of current time slots and the variable of current time slots.
Current SM encrypts original power information by homomorphic encryption algorithm using key to obtain encryption power information
The step of specifically: current SM to the value added of a upper time slot to current time slots and is worked as using key by homomorphic encryption algorithm
The variable of preceding time slot is encrypted to obtain encryption incremental value and encryption variable, encryption incremental value and encryption variable structure respectively
At encryption power information；Wherein, the corresponding encryption incremental value of the value added of upper time slot to a current time slots is expressed as EKn(An),
The corresponding encryption variable of the variable of current time slots is expressed as EKn(Bn), n indicates current time slots, KnIndicate current SM current
The corresponding key of time slot, AnIndicate value added of the time slot to current time slots, BnIndicate the variable of current time slots, E ()
Indicate homomorphic encryption algorithm.
After step s 3, before step S4, method for secret protection further include:
Group ID and token are sent to CA by ES；
CA obtains current SM in the corresponding key of a upper time slot according to group ID and token and encryption is calculated to 0
Then encrypted reference value is sent to ES by reference value, wherein encrypted reference value is expressed as EKn-1(0)；
ES compares EKn-1(Bn-1) and EKn(An) the sum of and EKn(Bn) and EKn-1The sum of (0) whether of equal value, and in non-equivalence
When issue alarm, and in equivalence carry out step S4.
Wherein, Bn-1Indicate current SM in the variable of a upper time slot, Kn-1Indicate that current SM is corresponding close in a upper time slot
Key.
By EKn-1(Bn-1) and EKn(An) the sum of be denoted as N1, EKn(Bn) and EKn-1The sum of (0) it is denoted as N2, due to N1And N2Have
Identical aggregation key (i.e. Kn+Kn-1), if Bn-1+An=Bn, then N1And N2It should be equal.If N1Not equal to N2, then mean
Data packet be tampered in transmission process.
Further, in order to improve the safety that data between CA and SM are transmitted, in the present embodiment, step S2 it
Before, the method for secret protection further include: CA and each SM generates public key and private key using identical key schedule；CA and
Each SM obtains mutual public key using Diffie-Hellman.
In step S2, the token and key that CA is issued are respectively by public key encryption: before step S3, method for secret protection
Further include: current SM is decrypted using the token and key of private key pair encryption.
In a concrete application, the method for secret protection of the intelligent electric meter information of the present embodiment was as shown in Fig. 2, should
Signaling process is as follows:
CA, SM: public key, private key are generated and is exchanged；
CA: distribute token and key for SM；
SM: encryption power information, group ID, token are sent to ES；
ES: to CA transmission group ID, token；
CA: EK is calculatedn-1(0), and it is sent to ES；
ES: compare N1And N2, encryption polymerizing value is obtained, to CA transmission group ID and token；
CA: obtaining aggregation key, sends aggregation key to ES；
ES: aggregation key decryption encryption polymerizing value is used.
By the above-mentioned means, the present invention distributes key and token, Yi Jiwei by introducing third-party CA for each SM
ES issues group key, and ES can receive the encryption power information of all SM in same meter group, but group key can only decrypt this
The encryption polymerizing value of a little encryption power informations, and the encryption power information of single SM cannot be decrypted, therefore specific use can not be obtained
The power information at family, meanwhile, CA will not receive the encryption power information of each SM, therefore can not also obtain the electricity consumption of specific user
Information, so as to protect the electricity consumption privacy of user.
The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, all to utilize this hair
Equivalent structure or equivalent flow shift made by bright specification and accompanying drawing content is applied directly or indirectly in other relevant skills
Art field, is included within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. a kind of method for secret protection of intelligent electric meter information characterized by comprising
Multiple intelligent electric meter SM are divided into multiple meter groups according to preset strategy by S1: certification authority CA, and are each ammeter
Group distributes different group ID respectively；
S2: the CA issues unique token to each SM, and issues current time slots pair respectively to each SM in each time slot
The key answered；
S3: current SM encrypts original power information by homomorphic encryption algorithm using the key to obtain encryption telecommunications
Breath, and encryption power information, group ID and token are sent to energy supplier ES, wherein the time slot of described CA, SM and ES are same
Step；
S4: the ES encryption power information for polymerizeing all SM in current meter group according to group ID obtains adding for current meter group
Close polymerizing value, and group ID and token are sent to CA；
S5: the CA obtains currently according to each SM in group ID and the current meter group of token polymerization in the corresponding key of current time slots
The aggregation key of meter group, and the aggregation key is sent to ES；
S6: the ES obtains current meter group using the encryption polymerizing value that the aggregation key of current meter group decrypts current meter group
In all SM power information summation.
2. method for secret protection according to claim 1, which is characterized in that when the original power information includes upper one
Gap is to the value added of current time slots and the variable of current time slots；
Current SM encrypts original power information by homomorphic encryption algorithm using the key to obtain encryption power information
The step of specifically:
Current SM using the key by homomorphic encryption algorithm to the value added of a upper time slot to current time slots and it is current when
The variable of gap is encrypted to obtain encryption incremental value and encryption variable, the encryption incremental value and encryption variable structure respectively
At encryption power information；
Wherein, the encryption incremental value is expressed as EKn(An), the encryption variable is expressed as EKn(Bn), n indicates current time slots,
KnIndicate current SM in the corresponding key of current time slots, AnIndicate value added of the time slot to current time slots, BnIndicate current
The variable of time slot, E () indicate homomorphic encryption algorithm；
After the step S3, before the step S4, the method for secret protection further include:
Group ID and token are sent to CA by the ES；
The CA obtains current SM in the corresponding key of a upper time slot according to group ID and token and encryption is calculated to 0
Then the encrypted reference value is sent to ES by reference value, wherein the encrypted reference value is expressed as EKn-1(0)；
The ES compares EKn-1(Bn-1) and EKn(An) the sum of and EKn(Bn) and EKn-1The sum of (0) whether of equal value, and in non-equivalence
Alarm is issued, and carries out step S4 in equivalence；
Wherein, Bn-1Indicate current SM in the variable of a upper time slot, Kn-1Indicate current SM in the corresponding key of a upper time slot.
3. method for secret protection according to claim 1 or 2, which is characterized in that before the step S2, the privacy
Guard method further include:
The CA and each SM generates public key and private key using identical key schedule；
The CA and each SM obtains mutual public key using Diffie-Hellman；
In the step S2, the token and key that the CA is issued are respectively by the public key encryption:
Before the step S3, the method for secret protection further include:
S23: current SM is decrypted using the token and key of private key pair encryption.
4. method for secret protection according to claim 3, which is characterized in that the Diffie-Hellman is Oakley algorithm.
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| CN111131148A (en) * | 2019-11-11 | 2020-05-08 | 重庆邮电大学 | Aggregation method and system capable of protecting privacy data and facing smart power grid |
| CN113595739A (en) * | 2021-07-30 | 2021-11-02 | 宁波三星医疗电气股份有限公司 | System and method for switching safety kit of intelligent electric meter |
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Application publication date: 20190531 |