CN109639431A - A kind of text authentication method, equipment, system and medium - Google Patents
A kind of text authentication method, equipment, system and medium Download PDFInfo
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- CN109639431A CN109639431A CN201811375509.9A CN201811375509A CN109639431A CN 109639431 A CN109639431 A CN 109639431A CN 201811375509 A CN201811375509 A CN 201811375509A CN 109639431 A CN109639431 A CN 109639431A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of text authentication method, including first terminal, second terminal and third terminal, this method utilizes the scalability of civil navigation message format, and second terminal will encrypt the key K of m-i navigation datam‑iIt writes in the m certification navigation signal of rear generation, third terminal is write in m-i certification navigation signal and sent it to encrypted result, third terminal extracts the key K in received m certification navigation signalm‑iAnd by key Km‑iThe m-i navigation data that re-encrypted receives, m-i navigation data passes through verifying if encrypted result is identical as the encrypted result in m-i certification navigation signal, m-i navigation data can't pass verifying if encrypted result is not identical, realize the verifying completed in the case where the degree that do not increase that the device is complicated to navigation data.On the other hand, the present invention also provides a kind of electronic equipment, system and computer-readable mediums for executing or storing above-mentioned authentication method.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to technical field of satellite navigation more particularly to a kind of text authentication method, equipment, system and media.
Background technique
Beidou navigation satellite is widely used in position positioning, weather forecast, communications and transportation and emergency and the various fields such as requires assistance,
But the navigation signal accident that takes place frequently in recent years causes people to Beidou navigation satellite system (Global Navigation
Satellite System, guide number SS) service safe credibility worry.Current GNSS broadcast singal design is completely public
It opens, is highly prone to spoofing attack, i.e., by the true Beidou navigation satellite of disguise as, broadcast similar to true navigation signal height
Deception navigation signal, and then to specific objective issue deception information.Existing GNSS deception preventive means mainly uses array
Antenna mode, which is detected, cheats navigation signal with identification, subsequent to need to upgrade great amount of terminals equipment, considerably increases terminal
Complexity and cost.
Summary of the invention
(1) technical problems to be solved
The present invention provides a kind of text authentication method, equipment, system and medium, may make not increase terminal hardware multiple
In the case where miscellaneous degree, the above technical problem is at least solved.
(2) technical solution
The present invention provides a kind of text authentication method, method includes: to generate key chain and navigation data in first terminal,
Wherein, key chain includes multiple key K0, K1... ... KN, and K0For root key；First terminal passes through key KmTo m navigation number
MAC is generated according to message authentication code operation is executedm, by MACm, m navigation data and key Km-iIt is sent to second terminal, wherein m
For the integer greater than zero and less than or equal to N, i is the integer greater than zero and less than or equal to m；Second terminal is by MACmWith key Km-i
Layout generates m certification navigation data in pre-set navigational message format, and m certification navigation data modulation is generated m certification
M certification navigation signal is sent to third terminal in t moment by navigation signal；At the t-i*T moment, second terminal will include
MACm-i, m-i navigation data and key Km-i-iM-i certification navigation signal be sent to third terminal, wherein T is third
Terminal completes the time interval of navigation signal certification twice in succession；In t+ δ t moment, third terminal receives m certification navigation letter
Number, m-i is received in t-i*T+ δ t moment and authenticates navigation signal, extracts the K in m certification navigation signalm-iM-i is authenticated
M-i navigation data in navigation signal executes message authentication code operation, generates MACm-i', compare MACm-i' and MACm-iIf two
Person is identical, then m-i navigation data passes through certification.
It optionally, further include to root key K in first terminal0It carries out encryption and generates digital signature, root key number is signed
Name information is sent to second terminal, second terminal by the layout of root key digital signature information in pre-set navigational message format,
In, root key digital signature information includes at least root key digital signature, root key K0And root key K0Affiliated key chain mark
Cid information.
Optionally, pre-set navigational message format uses B-CNAV1 message format, every frame text in B-CNAV1 message format
Including subframe 1, subframe 2 and subframe 3, new page is defined in subframe 3, by MACmAnd key Km-iSet on the new page of subframe 3
In.
Optionally, second terminal by the root key digital signature information layout in pre-set navigational message format, specifically
For root key digital signature information is set in the reserved byte of every frame text.
Optionally, third terminal authenticates the key K in navigation signal according to mm-iMessage is executed to m-i navigation data
It further include authentication secret K before authentication code operationm-iIf key Km-iBy verifying, then message authentication code operation is executed, if not having
By verifying, then m-i navigation data is not authenticated.
Optionally, the key K is verifiedm-iIt include: to identify CID according to key chain to judge whether third terminal is stored with phase
Same key chain identifies CID, and if it exists, then to key Km-iIt is calculated using one-way hash function and generates new key Knew, iteration meter
Calculate key KnewHashed value as new key Knew, judge the new key K generated every timenewIt is previously stored with third terminal close
Whether key is identical, if they are the same, then key Km-iPass through verifying；If it does not exist, then the public key decryptions root prestored using third terminal is close
Key digital signature obtains new root key, to key Km-iIt is calculated using one-way hash function and generates new key Knew, iterative calculation
Key KnewHashed value as new key Knew, judge the new key K generated every timenewThe new root decrypted with third terminal
Whether key is identical, if they are the same, then key Km-iPass through verifying.
Optionally, key K is sequentially generated by one-way hash function by seed keyN... ..., K1, K0, and use direction
For K0, K1... ... KN。
On the other hand the present invention also provides a kind of electronic equipment, comprising: processor；Memory is stored with computer
Executable program, the program is when being executed by processor, so that processor executes above-mentioned text authentication method.
In another aspect, the present invention also provides a kind of text Verification Systems, comprising: key chain and navigation data generate mould
Block, for generating key chain and navigation data in first terminal, wherein key chain includes multiple key K0, K1... ... KN, and K0
For root key；Authentication data generates and sending module, passes through key K for first terminalmMessage is executed to m navigation data to recognize
It demonstrate,proves code operation and generates MACm, by MACm, m navigation data and key Km-iBe sent to second terminal, wherein m be greater than zero and
Integer less than or equal to N, i are the integer greater than zero and less than or equal to m；Navigation signal generation module is authenticated, second terminal will
MACmWith key Km-iLayout generates m certification navigation data in pre-set navigational message format, and m is authenticated navigation data tune
System generates m and authenticates navigation signal, and in t moment, m certification navigation signal is sent to third terminal；At the t-i*T moment,
Two terminals will include MACm-i, m-i navigation data and key Km-i-iM-i certification navigation signal be sent to third terminal,
In, T is the time interval that third terminal completes navigation signal certification twice in succession；Navigation signal authentication module is authenticated, in t+ δ t
Moment, third terminal receive m and authenticate navigation signal, receive m-i in t-i*T+ △ t moment and authenticate navigation signal, extract m
Authenticate the K in navigation signalm-iMessage authentication code operation is executed to the m-i navigation data in m-i certification navigation signal, it is raw
At MACm-i', compare MACm-i' and MACm-iIf the two is identical, m-i navigation data passes through certification.
In another aspect, being stored thereon with computer program, feature the present invention also provides a kind of computer-readable medium
It is, which realizes above-mentioned text authentication method when being executed by processor.
(3) beneficial effect
The present invention provides a kind of text authentication method, equipment, system and media, using civil navigation message format can
Scalability writes text authentication information and its key in text authentication signal, and what is made believes when terminal receives text certification
The authenticity of received text authentication signal before being judged according to the key after number.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 diagrammatically illustrates the flow chart of the text authentication method of the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Fig. 2 diagrammatically illustrates each device deployment diagram in the Beidou navigation Verification System of the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Fig. 3 diagrammatically illustrates the generation of key chain and process for using figure in the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Fig. 4 diagrammatically illustrates authentication data in the embodiment of the present disclosure and generates schematic diagram；
Fig. 5 diagrammatically illustrates telegraph text data structural schematic diagram in the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Fig. 6 diagrammatically illustrates the formatting structure schematic diagram of the page type 5 newly defined in the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Fig. 7 diagrammatically illustrates MAC and key schedule structural schematic diagram in the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Fig. 8 diagrammatically illustrates root key digital signature information formatting structure schematic diagram in the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Fig. 9 diagrammatically illustrates root key and its digital signature formatting structure schematic diagram in the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Figure 10, which is diagrammatically illustrated, authenticates navigation signal generation schematic diagram in the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Figure 11 diagrammatically illustrates transmitting terminal work flow diagram in the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Figure 12 diagrammatically illustrates receiving end work flow diagram in the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Figure 13 diagrammatically illustrates electronic device block diagram in the embodiment of the present disclosure；
Figure 14 diagrammatically illustrates text Verification System block diagram in the embodiment of the present disclosure.
Specific embodiment
To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention clearer, below in conjunction with specific embodiment, and reference
Attached drawing, the present invention is described in more detail.
The present invention provides a kind of text authentication methods, this method comprises: generating key chain and navigation number in first terminal
According to, wherein key chain includes multiple key K0, K1... ... KN, and K0For root key；First terminal passes through key KmIt navigates to m
Data execute message authentication code operation and generate MACm, by MACm, m navigation data and key Km-iIt is sent to second terminal,
In, m is the integer greater than zero and less than or equal to N, and i is the integer greater than zero and less than or equal to m；Second terminal is by MACmWith it is close
Key Km-iLayout generates m certification navigation data in pre-set navigational message format, and m certification navigation data modulation is generated m
Navigation signal is authenticated, in t moment, m certification navigation signal is sent to third terminal；At the t-i*T moment, second terminal will
Include MACm-i, m-i navigation data and key Km-i-iM-i certification navigation signal be sent to third terminal, wherein T is
Third terminal completes the time interval of navigation signal certification twice in succession；In t+ δ t moment, third terminal receives m certification navigation
Signal receives m-i in t-i*T+ △ t moment and authenticates navigation signal, extracts the K in m certification navigation signalm-iM-i is recognized
The m-i navigation data demonstrate,proved in navigation signal executes message authentication code operation, generates MACm-i', compare MACm-i' and MACm-iIf
The two is identical, then m-i navigation data passes through certification.
Fig. 1 diagrammatically illustrates text authentication method flow chart in the first embodiment of the present disclosure；As shown in Fig. 1, the certification
Method is applicable to but is not limited in Beidou Navigation System, and the present embodiment is by taking Beidou Navigation System as an example, Beidou Navigation System packet
Ground control centre, big-dipper satellite and subscriber terminal equipment are included, as shown in Fig. 2, wherein ground control centre corresponds to first eventually
End, big-dipper satellite correspond to second terminal, and subscriber terminal equipment corresponds to third terminal, which mainly includes walking as follows
Suddenly.
S101 generates key chain and navigation data in first terminal, wherein key chain includes multiple key K0, K1... ...
KN, and K0For root key.
It is responsible for the generation and cipher key distribution of key chain in first terminal namely ground control centre.(1) it is generated in key chain
Stage generates seed key by random number generator, is starting input with seed key, is successively passed using one-way hash function H
Remaining key generated on key chain is pushed away, i.e., calculates the hashed value of current key using one-way hash function, this hashed value is made
For next key on key chain.In key chain generating process, seed key is the beginning for generating key chain, and root key is close
In the end of key chain, generating process such as Fig. 3 shown in " key generation direction ".To ensure that receiver gets true root key
K0, need other Verification Systems to authenticate root key, use digital signature identification here, that is, use asymmetric encryption side
Private key in method is digitally signed the root key, generates root key digital signature.(2) in cipher key distribution stage, the key
Key on chain is from K0, K1... ... KNIt is successively used every preset time, " key use/publisher in issuing process such as Fig. 3
To " shown in.Based on the one-way of one-way hash function H operation, when receiving key K1When may determine that it from being
The root key K that system signature authentication is crossed0, but effective key K of subsequent time can not be inferred to2, accordingly even when attacker obtains
The text authentication key and key schedule having disclosed, can not still extrapolate the next key to be announced, improve
To ability against the attack of cheating and text authentication service robustness.Meanwhile if the intermediate key for losing several publications, still may be used
With the key before extrapolating according to newest key, cipher key distribution packet loss problem can solve.That is, if a certain certification is all
Phase key KmNon- receiving end receives, then any received key K of authentication period afterm+iKey K can be extrapolatedm, into
And the navigation message of the authentication period is verified.Improving user's high dynamic lower channel losing lock, block etc. causes key to be lost
Lose the certification availability under scene.
Meanwhile the moment generates the navigation data used for subscriber terminal equipment in the control of ground.
S102, first terminal pass through key KmMessage authentication code operation is executed to m navigation data and generates MACm, by MACm、
M navigation data and key Km-iIt is sent to second terminal, wherein m is the integer less than or equal to N greater than zero, and i is greater than zero
Integer less than or equal to m.
First terminal namely ground control centre are according to key KmMessage authentication code operation is executed to m navigation data to generate
M message authentication code MACm, before this certain predetermined time, ground control centre is according to key Km-iTo m-i navigation data
It executes identical message authentication code operation and generates MACm-i, in the present embodiment, key and navigation data carry out message authentication code
Operation method is identical, key Km-iCompared to m-i navigation data and message authentication code MACm-iDelay preset time is disclosed, together
Reason, key KmCompared to MAC after m navigation data and message authentication codemDelay preset time is disclosed, therefore by MACm, m
Navigation data and key Km-iIt is sent in second terminal i.e. big-dipper satellite together.Meanwhile by step S101 it is found that in key chain
Comprising root key, for the correctness of subsequent authentication key, need to be digitally signed root key generation root key number label
Name, it should be noted that the signature that root key is carried out herein using private key preset in Beidou Navigation System, private key with
Public key pairing uses, and public key setting is in third terminal namely subscriber terminal equipment, when user terminal receives the root key number
Word can be decrypted the digital signature to obtain root key when signing using the public key, and then can be with further progress to key
It is verified, detailed verification process is shown in step S104.It needs root key digital signature information while being sent to big-dipper satellite,
Big-dipper satellite is set to carry out layout to above-mentioned data information.Similarly, first terminal passes through key Km-iM-i navigation data is executed
Message authentication code operation generates MACm-i, by MACm-i, m-i navigation data and key Km-i-iIt is sent to second terminal.
Due to root key digital signature information, MACmAnd key Km-iTo be subsequently used for the information authenticated, therefore in order to describe
It is conveniently referred to as m authentication data, generating process is as shown in Figure 4.
S103, second terminal is by the MACmWith key Km-iLayout generates m certification in pre-set navigational message format and leads
M certification navigation data modulation is generated m and authenticates navigation signal, in t moment, m authenticated navigation signal and is sent by boat data
To third terminal；At the t-i*T moment, second terminal will include MACm-i, m-i navigation data and key Km-i-iM-i certification
Navigation signal is sent to third terminal, wherein T is the time interval that third terminal completes navigation signal certification twice in succession.
By taking the pre-set navigational message format of second terminal namely big-dipper satellite is B-CNAV1 as an example, big-dipper satellite is received
The MAC that ground control centre is sentm, m navigation data, key Km-i, root key digital signature information, wherein root key number
Signing messages includes the cid information of root key, close chain belonging to root key digital signature and root key, and the m navigates first
In pre-set navigational text, every frame of B-CNAV1 text can contain the reserved place of unequal number amount, specific B- for data layout
Every frame text length is 878 bits/1800 sign bits in CNAV1 text, and character rate 100sps, broadcasting the period is 18 seconds,
The frame structure is as shown in figure 5, every frame text is made of 3 subframes, and subframe 1 includes second counting (SOH) in No. PRN and hour, altogether
14 bits, subframe 2 include system time parameter, telegraph text data version number, ephemeris parameter, clock deviation parameter, group delay corrected parameter
Etc. information, totally 600 bit, 3 message length of subframe be 264 bits, 6 bit of highest is page type, and last 24 bit is circulation
Redundancy check bit, remaining 234 bit are telegraph text data.Subframe 3 at most can define 63 kinds of page types, currently define 4 kinds of pages
Noodles type, respectively page type 1, page type 2, page type 3 and page type 4, the page type of subframe 3 are broadcast every time
One is broadcast when hair, and the sequence of broadcasting of each page type is dynamically adapted, each existing available reserved place of subframe is shown in Table 1.
Table 1
It in detail include compiling root key digital signature information by the layout of m authentication data in pre-set navigational message format
It arranges in the reserved byte of subframe 2 and subframe 3, MACmAnd key Km-iFormat is specific as follows in subframe 3.
MACmAnd key Km-iInformation, due to MACmAnd key Km-iThe bit of occupancy is more, and current reserved byte is insufficient
To accommodate the MACmAnd key Km-iInformation, it is therefore desirable to redefine new page type 5 in subframe 3 and be used for transmission MACm
And key Km-iThe formatting of information, page type 5 is as shown in Figure 6, wherein shares 225 bits and is used for transmission the MACmAnd
Key Km-iInformation, the MACmAnd key Km-iThe detailed arranged mode of information is as shown in Figure 7, wherein MAC is represented to navigation number
The information after truncating is exported according to message authentication code operation is executed, totally 10~20 bit；PRN is represented for executing message authentication code
The navigation data of operation corresponds to satellite pseudo noise code (PRN) number, totally 6 bit；ADKD, which is represented, participates in leading for message authentication code operation
Data type of navigating and its key KmTransmission delay information, totally 4 bit, detail parameters value and definition are shown in Table 2；IOD representation parameter
Version number, totally 4 bit, detail parameters value and definition are shown in Table 3, KEY and represent the key K that delay is sentm-i, totally 80~128 compare
It is special.
Table 2
Table 3
Root key digital signature information, by root key head, digital signature head, root key and its digital signature three parts group
At format format is as shown in figure 8, be described in detail as follows.
Root key head includes OS, CID, EOC, NKF, DS-ID and DS-B-ID, totally 14 bit, wherein OS represents navigation number
According to text authentication service state, 2 bits are accounted for, when OS=0 represents test mode, OS=1 represents normal service state；CID is to use
In the key chain identification parameter for executing message authentication code cryptographic calculation, 2 bits are accounted for；EOC is key chain end mark, accounts for 1 bit,
EOC=1 represents current key chain and closes to an end, and user will start to process the root key from another key chain；NKF is that root is close
Key updates mark, accounts for 1 bit, and NKF=1 warning receiver can read new root key；DS-ID is root key sig ID, accounts for 4
Bit；DS-B-ID represents key signature block ID, accounts for 4 bits.
Digital signature head includes NB and PK-ID, totally 8 bit, wherein NB represents digital signature block number mesh, accounts for 4 bits, in detail
Thin parameter value and definition are shown in Table 4；PK-ID represents the public key ID of digital signature, accounts for 4 bits.
Table 4
Root key and its digital signature (Digital Signature and K-Root Message abbreviation DSM) are one
The data block that group parameter is constituted, the detailed formatting of the data block are as shown in Figure 9, wherein CID is close belonging to root key
Key chain ID, totally 2 bit；KS is key length, totally 4 bit, and detail parameters value and definition are shown in Table 5；HF represents hash function, altogether
3 bits, detail parameters value and definition are shown in Table 6；MF is message authentication code encryption function, totally 2 bit, detail parameters value and fixed
Justice is shown in Table 7；MS represents MAC value length, totally 4 bit, and detail parameters value and definition are shown in Table 8；WN-Kr is that root key is relevant
The complete cycle of dipper system time counts, totally 13 bit；HOW-Kr is hour meter in the week of root key relevant dipper system time
It counts, totally 8 bit；K-ROOT is root key, and length is 80 bits~128 bits；Signature is root key signing messages,
Under the premise of meeting 128 bit security grades, root key Digital Signature Algorithm uses ECDSA-P256, signature length 512
Bit.Then a complete DSM amounts to 628 bits~676 bits.The root key Digital Signature Algorithm is in the embodiment of the present invention
It is middle to use ECDSA-P256, it can separately be selected in actual use.
Wherein, parameter value described in table 5 and table 8 and its be defined as optional length, the key length in actual use and
MAC value length is constrained by navigation signal bandwidth allocation, may not do specific limit in the embodiment of the present invention there are many configuration mode
It is fixed.
Hash function described in table 6 and table 7 and message authentication code function are optional function, the hash letter in actual use
Several and message authentication code function is not specifically limited in embodiments of the present invention.
Table 5
Table 6
| MF value | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Message authentication code function | HMAC-SHA-256 | CMAC-AES | It is reserved | It is reserved |
Table 7
Table 8
Root key digital signature information can by the subframe 2 and subframe 3 of B-CNAV1 text in table 1 (page type 1,2,
3,4,5) reserved place transmission.1,2,3,4,5 rotation of page type of subframe 3 is broadcast when due to broadcasting, then defines 5 frames pair
A root key digital signature information is answered to broadcast block.It is pre- with subframe 3 (page type 1) to can provide 34 bits for subframe 2 in first frame
Position is stayed, subframe 2 and subframe 3 (page type 2) can provide 37 bit reserved places in the second frame, subframe 2 and subframe 3 in third frame
(page type 3) can provide 21 bit reserved places, and it is reserved to can provide 54 bits for subframe 2 and subframe 3 (page type 4) in the 4th frame
, subframe 2 and subframe 3 (page type 5) can provide 7 bit reserved places in the 5th frame, and the 7 bit reserved place is all by subframe
2 provide, therefore each broadcasting the available reserved place of block is 153 bits.Because from the foregoing, it will be observed that a complete DSM is total
628 bits~676 bits, it is therefore desirable to broadcast block ability can completely for 5 and accommodate this DSM, root key digital signature information is broadcast
Mode is as shown in table 9, wherein digital signature head is only defined in first and broadcasts in block, and root key head, which is defined in, each broadcasts block
Head, root key and its digital signature definitions are in each tail portion for broadcasting block.
Table 9
It is the arranged mode of m authentication data above, the arranged mode of m-i authentication data etc. is identical with this, herein not
Repeat again, in the above manner can by the layout of m authentication data B-CNAV1 text reserved place and the new subframe 3 that defines
In page type 5, so that key delay discloses, complete after receiving the key of Laid-Open to this authentication data signal
Certification.
M authentication data and m navigation data are generated m and authenticate navigation data by big-dipper satellite, which is authenticated and is navigated
Data modulation generates m and authenticates navigation signal, and for generating process by Figure 10, signal is usually to be total to by data component and weight of pilot frequency
It is generated with modulation, in the present embodiment, data component is by m telegraph text data and pseudo-code CB1C_dataThrough subcarrier SCB1C_dataUsing just
String BOC (1,1) is adjusted
Mode processed modulates generation；Weight of pilot frequency is by pseudo-code CB1C_pilotThrough subcarrier SCB1C_pilotUsing QMBOC (6,1,4/
33) modulation system, which is modulated, to be generated, and in the present embodiment, the power ratio of data component and weight of pilot frequency is 1:3.
Using the above identical mode, generates m-i and authenticate navigation signal.
M certification navigation signal is sent to the user terminal equipment in t moment by big-dipper satellite, and subscriber terminal equipment is in t+ δ t
Reception authenticates navigation signal to m, wherein δ t is that m certification navigation signal reaches used in user terminal from big-dipper satellite
M-i certification navigation signal is sent to the user terminal equipment at the t-i*T moment by time, big-dipper satellite, and subscriber terminal equipment exists
T-i*T+ △ t moment receives m-i certification navigation signal, wherein T is that third terminal completes navigation signal certification twice in succession
Time interval, △ t is that m-i authenticates navigation signal and from big-dipper satellite reaches the time used in user terminal.
So far the transmission of signal is completed in transmitting terminal, as Figure 11 can schematically show this transmitting terminal (ground control centre and
Big-dipper satellite) work flow diagram.Ground is centrally generated navigation data, key chain etc., and is led by the key pair on key chain
Data of navigating carry out message authentication code operation, generate message authentication code MAC value, while it is close to be digitally signed generation root to root key
Key digital signature generates navigation data, MAC value, delay key and root key digital signature etc., by the navigation data, MAC
Value, the delay data such as key and root key digital signature are sent to big-dipper satellite, and big-dipper satellite generates above-mentioned data layout
Navigation data is authenticated, further the certification navigation data is modulated and generates certification navigation signal, and the certification navigation signal is sent out
It send to terminal device.
S104, in t+ δ t moment, third terminal receives m and authenticates navigation signal, in t-i*T+ △ t reception m-i
Navigation signal is authenticated, the K in m certification navigation signal is extractedm-iTo the m-i navigation data in m-i certification navigation signal
Message authentication code operation is executed, MAC is generatedm-i', compare MACm-i' and MACm-iIf the two is identical, m-i navigation data is logical
Cross certification.
In t+ δ t moment, subscriber terminal equipment receives m certification navigation signal, extracts and stores m navigation therein
Data, MACm, key Km-iAnd root key digital signature information, first determine whether key Km-iAuthenticity, specific judgment method
It is as follows.
According to the digitally signed root key K-ROOT being verified whether is prestored in subscriber terminal equipment in advancesOr
Key KEYsAnd the corresponding key chain identification parameter CID of the keys, two classes is divided to illustrate judgment method.
(1) the digitally signed root key K-ROOT being verified is previously stored in terminal devicesOr key KEYsAnd it should
The corresponding key chain identification parameter CID of keys。
First determine whether CID parameter is equal to CID in currently received DSMs, 1) if equal, illustrate current key chain with
The key chain that subscriber terminal equipment is previously stored belongs to same key chain.With key Km-iIt is raw referring to key chain for starting input
DSM is executed at process " key generation direction " shown in Fig. 3, the one-way hash function that wherein HF parameter represents, key Km-iUsing
One-way hash function, which calculates, generates new key Knew, iterate to calculate key KnewHashed value as new key Knew, judge to hash letter
The K that number generatesnewWith the root key K-ROOT being previously storedsOr key KEYsIt is whether identical, then key K if they are the samem-iVerifying is logical
It crosses, single-row function is continued to execute if not identical until its output and K-ROOTsOr key KEYsIt is equal；If 2) unequal, explanation
The key chain that current key chain and terminal device are previously stored is not belonging to same key chain.Terminal device is using public key to current
Signature executes digital signature authentication in received DSM, if digital signature authentication output and K- in currently received DSM
ROOT is identical, then the key and its corresponding key chain identification parameter are denoted as K-ROOT by terminal devicesAnd CIDsAnd store, it is right
Key Km-iIt is calculated using one-way hash function and generates new key Knew, iterate to calculate key KnewHashed value as new key
Knew, judge the new key K generated every timenewThe new root key K-ROOT decrypted with subscriber terminal equipmentsIt is whether identical, if
Identical then key Km-iIt is verified, with key K if unequalm-iFor starting input, the hash of key chain generating process is utilized
Function one-way, until hash function output is equal to K-ROOTs, then Km-iIt is verified.What needs to be explained here is that in order to subtract
The hash function number executed needed for few key authenticity verification link, under the premise of not updating key chain, receiver can be with
The newest key KEY through authenticity verification is stored as KEYs, to replace K-ROOTs。
(2) not stored any digitally signed root key being verified and its corresponding key chain mark in terminal device
Parameter is not equal to CID with CID parameter in above-mentioned currently received DSMsThe case where it is equivalent, key authenticity verification methods are same as above
2), details are not described herein again.
Key Km-iAfter being verified, key K that this is verifiedm-iRecognize in the received m-i of t-i*T+ △ t moment
It demonstrate,proves the m-i navigation data in navigation signal and executes message authentication code operation generation MACm-i', compare the MACm-i' with receiving
The MAC of storagem-iIf the two is identical, otherwise m-i navigation data can't pass certification, it was demonstrated that the navigation data by certification
It is not authentic and valid navigation data.
So far the verifying to certification navigation signal is completed in terminal device, works illustrate for this terminal device as shown in figure 12
Figure, terminal device extract and store navigation data Message, MAC value and root key number after receiving certification navigation signal
Signature verifies the key until extracting the delay key Key for being used to generate the MAC value in subsequent authentication navigation signal
The delay key Key is executed message with the navigation data Message received and stored before if being verified and recognized by correctness
Card code operation generates new MAC ', if the MAC ' generated is identical as the MAC of storage, which is true navigation letter
Number.
In curve, since deception source can not know key information used in system, it cannot generate and broadcast includes base
In true key generate MAC value, key and root key digital signature information certification navigation signal, received in terminal device
When the curve, true key can not be extracted, signal authentication will not be passed through naturally.
On the other hand, the present invention provides a kind of electronic equipment 1300, as shown in figure 13, including processor 1310, storage
Device 1320.The electronic equipment 1300 can execute the method described above with reference to Fig. 1, to carry out text certification.
Specifically, processor 1310 for example may include general purpose microprocessor, instruction set processor and/or related chip
Group and/or special microprocessor (for example, specific integrated circuit (ASIC)), etc..Processor 310 can also include for caching
The onboard storage device of purposes.Processor 310, which can be, refers to recognizing according to the text of the embodiment of the present disclosure for Fig. 1 description for executing
The single treatment unit of card either multiple processing units.
Memory 1320, such as can be the arbitrary medium can include, store, transmitting, propagating or transmitting instruction.Example
Such as, readable storage medium storing program for executing can include but is not limited to electricity, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared or semiconductor system, device, device or propagation
Medium.The specific example of readable storage medium storing program for executing includes: magnetic memory apparatus, such as tape or hard disk (HDD)；Light storage device, such as light
Disk (CD-ROM)；Memory, such as random access memory (RAM) or flash memory；And/or wire/wireless communication link.
Memory 1320 may include computer program 1321, which may include code/computer
Executable instruction executes processor 1310 for example above in conjunction with side described in Fig. 1
Method process and its any deformation.
Computer program 1321 can be configured to have the computer program code for example including computer program module.Example
Such as, in the exemplary embodiment, the code in computer program 1321 may include one or more program modules, for example including
1321A, module 1321B ....It should be noted that the division mode and number of module are not fixed, those skilled in the art
It can be combined according to the actual situation using suitable program module or program module, when these program modules are combined by processor
When 1310 execution, processor 1310 is executed for example above in conjunction with method flow described in Fig. 1 and its any change
Shape.
On the other hand, the present invention also provides a kind of text Verification Systems, as shown in figure 14, including key chain and navigation number
According to generation module 1401, authentication data generates and sending module 1402, certification navigation signal generation module 1403 and certification are led
Boat signal authentication module 1404.
Wherein, key chain and navigation data generation module 1401, for generating key chain and navigation data in first terminal,
Wherein, key chain includes multiple key K0, K1... ... KN, and K0For root key；Authentication data generates and sending module 1402, uses
Pass through key K in first terminalmMessage authentication code operation is executed to m navigation data and generates MACm, by MACm, m navigate number
According to, root key digital signature information and key Km-iIt is sent to second terminal, wherein m is the integer greater than zero and less than or equal to N,
I is the integer greater than zero and less than or equal to m；Navigation signal generation module 1403 is authenticated, second terminal is by MACmWith key Km-i
Layout generates m certification navigation data in pre-set navigational message format, and m certification navigation data modulation is generated m certification
M certification navigation signal is sent to third terminal at the t moment by navigation signal；At the t-i*T moment, second terminal will include
MACm-i, m-i navigation data and key Km-i-iM-i certification navigation signal be sent to third terminal, wherein T is that third is whole
Complete the time interval of navigation signal certification twice in succession in end；Navigation signal authentication module 1404 is authenticated, in t+ δ t moment, third
Terminal receives m and authenticates navigation signal, receives m-i in t-i*T+ △ t moment and authenticates navigation signal, extracts m certification navigation
K in signalm-iMessage authentication code operation is executed to the m-i navigation data in m-i certification navigation signal, generates MACm-i',
Compare MACm-i' and MACm-iIf the two is identical, m-i navigation data passes through certification.
It is understood that key chain and navigation data generation module 1401, authentication data generates and sending module 1402,
Certification navigation signal generation module 1403 and certification navigation signal authentication module 1404 may be incorporated in real in a module
Any one module existing or therein can be split into multiple modules.Alternatively, one or more modules in these modules
At least partly function can be combined at least partly function of other modules, and realized in a module.According to this hair
Bright embodiment, key chain and navigation data generation module 1401, authentication data generates and sending module 1402, certification navigation letter
At least one of number generation module 1403 and certification navigation signal authentication module 1404 can be at least implemented partly as
On hardware circuit, such as field programmable gate array (FPGA), programmable logic array (PLA), system on chip, substrate is
System, the system in encapsulation, specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or can be to carry out any other conjunction that is integrated or encapsulating to circuit
The hardware such as reason mode or firmware realize, or is realized with software, the appropriately combined of three kinds of implementations of hardware and firmware.Or
Person, key chain and navigation data generation module 1401, authentication data generates and sending module 1402, certification navigation signal generate mould
At least one of block 1403 and certification navigation signal authentication module 1404 can at least be implemented partly as computer journey
Sequence module can execute the function of corresponding module when the program is run by computer.
On the other hand, the present invention also provides a kind of computer-readable medium, which can be above-mentioned
Included in equipment/device/system described in embodiment；It is also possible to individualism, and without the supplying equipment/dress
Set/system in.Above-mentioned computer-readable medium carries one or more program, when said one or multiple programs are held
When row, the method according to the embodiment of the present disclosure is realized.
Particular embodiments described above has carried out further in detail the purpose of the present invention, technical scheme and beneficial effects
It describes in detail bright, it should be understood that the above is only a specific embodiment of the present invention, is not intended to restrict the invention, it is all
Within the spirit and principles in the present invention, any modification, equivalent substitution, improvement and etc. done should be included in guarantor of the invention
Within the scope of shield.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of text authentication method, which is characterized in that the described method includes:
Key chain and navigation data are generated in first terminal, wherein the key chain includes multiple key K0, K1... ... KN, and K0
For root key；
First terminal passes through key KmMessage authentication code operation is executed to m navigation data and generates MACm, by the MACm, m leads
Data of navigating and key Km-iIt is sent to second terminal, wherein m is the integer greater than zero and less than or equal to N, and i is greater than zero and to be less than
Integer equal to m；
Second terminal is by the MACmWith key Km-iLayout generates m certification navigation data in pre-set navigational message format, will
The m certification navigation data modulation generates m and authenticates navigation signal, and in t moment, m certification navigation signal is sent
To third terminal；At the t-i*T moment, second terminal will include MACm-i, m-i navigation data and key Km-i-iM-i certification
Navigation signal is sent to third terminal, wherein T is the time interval that third terminal completes navigation signal certification twice in succession；
In t+ δ t moment, third terminal receives m and authenticates navigation signal, receives m-i certification navigation letter in t-i*T+ △ t moment
Number, extract the K in m certification navigation signalm-iMessage is executed to the m-i navigation data in m-i certification navigation signal
Authentication code operation generates MACm-i', compare the MACm-i' and the MACm-iIf the two is identical, m-i navigation data is logical
Cross certification.
2. text authentication method according to claim 1 further includes to the root key K in the first terminal0Added
Dense that root key digital signature information is sent to second terminal at digital signature, the second terminal is by the root key number
The layout of word signing messages is in the pre-set navigational message format, wherein the root key digital signature information includes at least root
Key digital signature, root key K0And root key K0Affiliated key chain identifies cid information.
3. text authentication method according to claim 1 or 2, the pre-set navigational message format uses B-CNAV1 text
Format, every frame text includes subframe 1, subframe 2 and subframe 3 in the B-CNAV1 message format, is defined in the subframe 3 new
The page, by the MACmAnd key Km-iIn the new page of the subframe 3.
4. text authentication method according to claim 3, the second terminal compiles the root key digital signature information
It arranges in the pre-set navigational message format, the root key digital signature information is specially set to the pre- of every frame text
It writes down characters in section.
5. text authentication method according to claim 2, the third terminal authenticates in navigation signal according to the m
Key Km-iIt further include verifying the key K before executing message authentication code operation to the m-i navigation datam-iIt is true
Property, if key Km-iBy verifying, then the message authentication code operation is executed, if not over verifying, not to the m-i
Navigation data is authenticated.
6. text authentication method according to claim 5, the verifying key Km-iInclude:
CID is identified according to the key chain and judges whether the third terminal is stored with identical key chain mark CID, if depositing
Then to the key Km-iIt is calculated using one-way hash function and generates new key Knew, iterate to calculate key KnewHashed value make
For new key Knew, judge the new key K generated every timenewWhether the key being previously stored with third terminal is identical, if they are the same, then
The key Km-iPass through verifying；If it does not exist, then root key number label described in the public key decryptions for using the third terminal to prestore
Name obtains new root key, to the key Km-iIt is calculated using one-way hash function and generates new key Knew, iterate to calculate key
KnewHashed value as new key Knew, judge the new key K generated every timenewThe new root key decrypted with third terminal
It is whether identical, if they are the same, then the key Km-iPass through verifying.
7. text authentication method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that by seed key by one-way hash function according to
Secondary generation key KN... ..., K1, K0, and use direction is K0, K1... ... KN。
8. a kind of electronic equipment, comprising:
Processor；
Memory is stored with computer executable program, and the program by the processor when being executed, so that the processor
Execute the text authentication method as described in any one of claim 1~7.
9. a kind of text Verification System, comprising:
Key chain and navigation data generation module, for generating key chain and navigation data in first terminal, wherein key chain packet
Include multiple key K0, K1... ... KN, and K0For root key；
Authentication data generates and sending module, passes through key K for first terminalmMessage authentication code fortune is executed to m navigation data
It calculates and generates MACm, by the MACm, m navigation data and key Km-iIt is sent to second terminal, wherein m is greater than zero and to be less than
Integer equal to N, i are the integer greater than zero and less than or equal to m；
Navigation signal generation module is authenticated, second terminal is by the MACmWith key Km-iLayout is raw in pre-set navigational message format
Navigation data is authenticated at m, m certification navigation data modulation is generated into m and authenticates navigation signal, it, will be described in t moment
M certification navigation signal is sent to third terminal；At the t-i*T moment, second terminal will include MACm-i, m-i navigation data and
Key Km-i-iM-i certification navigation signal be sent to third terminal, wherein T be third terminal complete twice in succession navigation letter
Number certification time interval；
Navigation signal authentication module is authenticated, in t+ δ t moment, third terminal receives m and authenticates navigation signal, in t-i*T+ △ t
It carves and receives m-i certification navigation signal, extract the K in m certification navigation signalm-iTo in m-i certification navigation signal
M-i navigation data executes message authentication code operation, generates MACm-i', compare the MACm-i' and the MACm-iIf the two phase
Together, then m-i navigation data passes through certification.
10. a kind of computer-readable medium, is stored thereon with computer program, which is characterized in that the program is executed by processor
Text authentication method of the Shi Shixian as described in any one of claim 1~7.
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| CN112162300A (en) * | 2020-09-22 | 2021-01-01 | 中国科学院空天信息创新研究院 | Satellite-based enhancement system and text authentication method based on same |
| CN112305565A (en) * | 2020-10-26 | 2021-02-02 | 中国科学院空天信息创新研究院 | B1C authentication signal generation method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN112305565B (en) * | 2020-10-26 | 2024-01-26 | 中国科学院空天信息创新研究院 | B1C authentication signal generation method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN112291783A (en) * | 2020-10-28 | 2021-01-29 | 中国科学院空天信息创新研究院 | Text authentication method and system, sending end and receiving end |
| CN112671544B (en) * | 2020-12-30 | 2023-04-07 | 中国科学院空天信息创新研究院 | System and method for managing message authentication key |
| CN112671544A (en) * | 2020-12-30 | 2021-04-16 | 中国科学院空天信息创新研究院 | System and method for managing message authentication key |
| CN114124297A (en) * | 2021-11-02 | 2022-03-01 | 中国科学院国家授时中心 | Telegraph text coding method based on RS-LDPC cascade code |
| CN114124297B (en) * | 2021-11-02 | 2023-10-20 | 中国科学院国家授时中心 | Text coding method based on RS-LDPC cascade codes |
| CN114814903A (en) * | 2022-04-26 | 2022-07-29 | 中国计量科学研究院 | Common-view data processing method based on Beidou third-generation navigation satellite |
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