CN109522605A - Power consumption leakage type hardware Trojan horse based on AES encryption circuit - Google Patents
Power consumption leakage type hardware Trojan horse based on AES encryption circuit Download PDFInfo
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- G—PHYSICS
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Abstract
The present invention relates to Research on Integrated Circuit Security fields, to propose to obtain the concealed IC apparatus of information.For this purpose, of the invention, the power consumption leakage type hardware Trojan horse based on AES encryption circuit, including triggering part, payload portions and counter, when input successively predetermined sequence occurs in plain text, the output of triggering part is so that payload portions trigger；Payload segment is two shift registers, and second shift register starts continuous displacement after hardware Trojan horse activation, generate first part's extra power consumption, indicate that key information starts to reveal, start counting with 128 digit counters of season from 0；First shift register is controlled by code key value, 128 that code key is successively selected by 128 digit counters, when the code key value of choosing positioning is 0, second shift register saves original state, and when choosing positioning code key value is 1, which is displaced, and generates second part extra power consumption.Present invention is mainly applied to IC design occasions that manufactures.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to Research on Integrated Circuit Security fields, and in particular to a kind of power consumption leakage type based on AES encryption circuit is hard
Part wooden horse obtains the information such as the code key value of AES encryption circuit by the power consumption information changed and in the observation circuit course of work.
Background technique
With the rapid development of EDA Technique and semiconductor fabrication process, single-chip digital IC chip
Integrated function becomes increasingly complex, and circuit scale is increasing, and integrated level is higher and higher, to be widely used in modern science and technology
Every field, especially in finance device, mobile communication, communications and transportation, the Sensitive Domains such as government and the energy.Integrated circuit is to society
Can progress and expanding economy play increasing impetus, have become support socio-economic development it is strategic,
Basic and advanced sector.
In today of business globalization, design and the manufacture of IC chip gradually tend to globalize.Ic core
The listing of piece needs to undergo design, manufacture, packaging and testing four-stage.Due to the advance and complexity of IC products
Property, while in order to more reasonably utilize resource and fund to configure, the design and manufacturing process of monolithic integrated optical circuit are completely by more families
Unit consolidation is completed, wherein being no lack of joint venture or overseas-funded enterprise.The design of integrated circuit and the separation of manufacturing process, this gives
The safety of integrated circuit brings great security risk, such as is largely multiplexed third party's IP kernel in the design phase, is manufacturing
There is incredible mask plate in the process, there may be redundancy encapsulation etc. in encapsulation process.In the entire production of integrated circuit
In manufacturing process, whether because of the modification that circuit defect caused by fault or malicious attacker deliberately carry out circuit, all
Security threat will be caused to entire IC system.
During design is with manufacture, it might have attacker and participate, in uncontrolled circuit design and manufacture
It can be implanted into the circuit of malice, i.e. hardware Trojan horse in the process.Hardware Trojan horse is primarily referred to as deliberately being implanted into chip or electronic system
Special module or designer be not intended to the defect module left.This partial circuit can trigger under specific condition, thus by attacking
The person of hitting utilizes.Hardware Trojan horse can attack function with complete independently, such as reveal information to attacker, change circuit function, even straight
Connect destruction circuit, it is also possible to destroy system function with software collaboration.Hardware Trojan horse can be realized to specific integrated circuit (ASIC),
The modification of the hardware such as microprocessor, microcontroller, network processing unit, digital signal processor (DSP), is also able to achieve to FPGA ratio
The modification of the firmwares such as spy's stream
Hardware Trojan horse is likely to be present in each stage of integrated circuit Life cycle, and the door of attack is opened for attacker,
Allow attacker easily around the firm barrier such as various traditional tests and encryption.Hardware Trojan horse volume is small, powerful, has
Stronger concealment and controllability, by exquisite design and layout, various attacks purpose is may be implemented in hardware Trojan horse.
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) encrypted circuit is a kind of password electricity of key iteration grouping
Road, since its encryption method and decryption method must use identical key, alternatively referred to as symmetric block ciphers.AES has real
It is now easy, the advantages that encryption and decryption is high-efficient, this has been widely used it in information security field.Vehicle
AES encryption algorithm is all applied in the multinomial fields such as long-range keyless entry system (RKE), charging system, data base encryption, PLC.
In addition, the operation that AES encrypts data file, have a very strong diffusion, finally formed password have it is very high with
Machine.After aes algorithm encrypts, information can be effectively protected data file.
Bibliography
[1]Xuan T N,Naj Z,Bhasin S,et al.Integrated Sensor:A Backdoor for
Hardware Trojan Insertions? [C] //Digital System Design.IEEE, 2015:415-422.
[2] Sun Haitao, Liu Jie carrier leak type hardware Trojan horse chip design [J] war industry automation, 2012,31 (4):
65-68.
[3]Fern N,San I,Cheng K T.Hardware trojans in incompletely specified
on-chip bus systems[C]//Design,Automation&Test in Europe Conference&
Exhibition.IEEE,2016:527-530.
[4]He J,Zhao Y,Guo X,et al.Hardware Trojan Detection Through Chip-
Free Electromagnetic Side-Channel Statistical Analysis[J].IEEE Transactions
on Very Large Scale Integration(VLSI)Systems,2017.
Summary of the invention
In order to overcome the deficiencies of the prior art, the present invention is directed to propose obtaining the concealed IC apparatus of information.For this purpose, this
Invention adopts the technical scheme that, the power consumption leakage type hardware Trojan horse based on AES encryption circuit, including triggering part, effectively carries
Lotus part and counter, triggering part are made of finite state machine, and input terminal connects the plaintext of Standard Encryption AES encryption circuit
Input terminal, when input successively predetermined sequence occurs in plain text, the output of triggering part is so that payload portions trigger；Payload portion
It is divided into two shift registers, second shift register starts continuous displacement after hardware Trojan horse activation, generate first part
Extra power consumption indicates that key information starts to reveal, and starts counting with 128 digit counters of season from 0；First shift register
It is controlled by code key value, 128 that code key is successively selected by 128 digit counters, when the code key value of choosing positioning is 0, second
Shift register saves original state, and when choosing positioning code key value is 1, which is displaced, and it is additional to generate second part
Power consumption.
The plaintext that input terminal connects AES encryption circuit inputs in, in the initial state, when a=successively occurs in plain text in input
00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff, b=ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100, c=ffee
When tetra- sequences of ddccbbaa99887766554433221100, d=ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100, shape
State machine enters S3 state, in this case, activates hardware Trojan horse, so that payload portions trigger.
The features of the present invention and beneficial effect are:
(1) present invention utilizes power consumption attack technology, using AES encryption circuit as target of attack, additional by implantation early period
Shift register changes the power consumption number in the circuit course of work, by external monitoring change of power consumption, available AES encryption electricity
The key information on road.
(2) present invention is unfolded to attack using AES circuit as target, only verifies the validity of the hardware Trojan horse, suitable by doing
When minor modifications, this wooden horse can also be implanted into other types circuit, realize the acquisition of information purpose of a variety of circuits, have it is general
Adaptive.
Detailed description of the invention:
Fig. 1 hardware Trojan horse structural schematic diagram.
Fig. 2 finite state machine trigger module.
Fig. 3 hardware Trojan horse work flow diagram.
Fig. 4 simulation result.
(a) initial configuration phase.
(b) stage is triggered.
(c) the register shift stage.
(d) encrypted result.
Specific embodiment
The present invention, according to AES encryption principle of operation, is designed specific hardware Trojan horse and planted based on AES encryption circuit
Enter, and then the power consumption number in the circuit course of work is made to change.Pass through the external change of power consumption monitored in the circuit course of work
Curve realizes the attack purpose for obtaining circuit key information.
The fast development and extensive use of information technology so that we enter a novel epoch, information privacy technology also at
To influence most extensive and most deep emerging field, wherein with encrypted circuit using relatively broad.Encrypted circuit from be born so far,
Successively there are multiple encryption algorithms, with the continuous development of computing technique, Encryption Algorithm is kept updating, day crescent
It is different, and the safety of cryptographic algorithm is then directly related with the computing capability of code breaker.While encrypted circuit development, electricity is obtained
The technology of road information is not also rested, and in recent years, constantly has novel attack technology to occur, wherein the most with the hardware Trojan horse impetus
Rapidly.The present invention proposes a kind of power consumption leakage type hardware Trojan horse based on AES encryption circuit, which passes through into AES circuit
It is implanted into specific hardware wooden horse, and sets triggering mode, to realize the acquisition of the key information of AES encryption circuit.
In the current information age, the rapid emergence of e-commerce makes network become the new battlefield of international competition.Various letters
The propagation of breath is more and more convenient, and a large amount of sensitive informations are swapped often through public communication infrastructure or computer network,
And the secret and authenticity of these information be people there is an urgent need to.For the safety for protecting information, usually propagated in information
It is preceding that it is encrypted.Cipher mode is varied, and AES encryption is current widely used one kind.Want to obtain information, it is first
First encrypted circuit is attacked, obtain code key.The present invention is using AES encryption circuit as object of attack, according to its working principle
It designs and is implanted into dedicated hardware Trojan horse, its key information is obtained in the way of power consumption attack.
Power consumption attack be hardware Trojan horse pass through frequently with one of attack means, attack pattern is hidden, is not influencing circuit
Attack purpose is realized in the case where function.In view of the advantage of power consumption attack various aspects, this report devises a based on power consumption
The hardware Trojan horse of leakage.
Hardware Trojan horse is generally divided into trigger module and two parts of payload, as shown in Figure 1.Triggering part constitutes hardware
The activation mechanism of wooden horse, this part mostly come from a large amount of internal or external signal source；And payload refers to wooden horse electricity
The circuit part that road has an effect to ifq circuit.In the whole life cycle of chip, the hardware Trojan horse overwhelming majority time is all
Be in a dormant state, only can just be activated in rare cases, once hardware Trojan horse is activated, it will to original electricity
Road generates damaging influence.Hardware attack person needs to be with reference to premise, according to the characteristics of carrier circuit and malice with carrier circuit
Implementation purpose determine the activation attribute of hardware Trojan horse.
The hardware Trojan horse triggering part that the present invention designs is made of finite state machine, as shown in Figure 2.State machine includes four altogether
A state, the plaintext that input terminal connects AES encryption circuit input in, by monitoring the input value of plaintext in, carry out state of a control
The state of machine.In the initial state, when a=00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff, b successively occurs in plain text in input
=ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100, c=ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100, d=ff
When tetra- sequences of eeddccbbaa99887766554433221100, state machine enters S3 state, in this case, hardware Trojan horse
It is activated, so that payload portions trigger.Only when tetra- states of a, b, c, d successively continuously occur, hardware Trojan horse just can quilt
Triggering.Other any input sequences cannot all make state machine reach S3 state triggering wooden horse.
Payload segment is two additional shift registers, and second shift register (touches after hardware Trojan horse activation
Hair part enters S3 state) start continuous displacement, first part's extra power consumption is generated, indicates that key information starts to reveal, together
Seasonal 128 digit counters are started counting from 0.
First shift register is controlled by code key value, and 128 that code key is successively selected by 128 digit counters are elected to
When the code key value of positioning is 0, second shift register saves original state, and when choosing positioning code key value is 1, register hair
Raw displacement, generates second part extra power consumption.By the situation of change of power consumption during observation AES encryption, it can be analyzed
128 code key values achieve the purpose that obtain information.The work flow diagram of hardware Trojan horse is as shown in Figure 3.
For the validity for verifying hardware Trojan horse, emulate as follows.In simulation process, setting AES encryption circuit code key is to fix
128 ' haaaaaaaa_aaaaaaaa_aaaaaaaa_aaaaaaaa of value, two shift register initial values are 00110000.
Input plaintext is successively are as follows:
128'h11111111_11111111_11111111_11111111
128’h 10101010_10101010_10101010_1010101、
128’h 00112233_44556677_8899aabb_ccddeeff、
128’h ffeeddcc_bbaa9988_77665544_33221100、
128’h 01234567_01234567_01234567_01234567、
128'h 00000000_01234567_01234567_01234567.It observes shift register and shifts situation, emulation
As a result as shown in Figure 4.
Two shift register SHReg1, SHReg2 values of initial configuration phase are it can be seen from Fig. 4-a
00110000, indicate four values State0, State1, State2, State3 and wooden horse trigger signal Tj_Trig of state machine
It is 0.
Four plaintext input values meet the trigger condition of trigger module in Fig. 4-b, shown in figure State0, State1,
State2, State3 successively become 1 from 0, indicate that state machine enters S3 state, and wooden horse trigger signal Tj_Trig becomes 1 at this time,
Hardware Trojan horse activation, unison counter start counting.
Fig. 4-c indicates that SHReg2 starts to shift, and indicates that key information starts to reveal when Tj_Trig is 1.It counts simultaneously
Number device n is started counting, for selecting the position of code key.When code key position is 0, SHReg1 maintains the original state, and when code key position is 1
When, SHReg1 displacement is primary.The shifting function of shift register can increase considerably the power consumption of circuit, pass through observation circuit work
The variation of two parts extra power consumption value in the process can be detected out AES code key value.
Fig. 4-d is for indicating that the function of AES encryption module is not affected by influence, the encrypted ciphertext sequence of four shown in figure
Column out value be corresponding in turn to the plaintext sequence 128 ' 0 of input, 128'h11111111_11111111_11111111_11111111,
128'h10101010_10101010_10101010_10101010、
128'h00112233_44556677_8899aabb_ccddeeff, it is consistent with theory analysis.
By above-mentioned simulation result it is found that when input plaintext sequence meets hardware Trojan horse trigger mechanism, payload triggering,
Change circuit power consumption value by control shift register, the leakage of key information is completed in the way of power consumption attack, and not shadow
Ring circuit original encryption function.
The present invention devises a kind of hardware wood that circuit information is obtained using power consumption attack using encrypted circuit as target of attack
Horse.The method first has in early period be that AES encryption circuit is implanted into additional hardware Trojan horse trigger module (displacement is posted with payload
Storage), then hardware Trojan horse is triggered using external input signal.Once hardware Trojan horse triggers, shift register starts to shift, make
Circuit generates two parts extra power consumption.A portion power consumption number indicates that information leakage starts, and another part is then used to reveal
Information.By the variation of power consumption information in the external monitoring AES encryption circuit course of work, it can be realized and its key information is obtained
It takes, completes attack purpose.
Claims (2)
1. a kind of power consumption leakage type hardware Trojan horse based on AES encryption circuit, characterized in that including triggering part, payload
Part and counter, triggering part are made of finite state machine, and the plaintext that input terminal connects Standard Encryption AES encryption circuit is defeated
Enter end, when input successively predetermined sequence occurs in plain text, the output of triggering part is so that payload portions trigger；Payload segment
For two shift registers, second shift register starts continuous displacement after hardware Trojan horse activation, generates first part's volume
Outer power consumption indicates that key information starts to reveal, and starts counting with 128 digit counters of season from 0；First shift register by
The control of code key value, 128 that code key is successively selected by 128 digit counters, when the code key value of choosing positioning is 0, second shifting
Bit register saves original state, and when choosing positioning code key value is 1, which is displaced, and generates second part extra power
Consumption.
2. the power consumption leakage type hardware Trojan horse based on AES encryption circuit as described in claim 1, characterized in that input terminal connects
The plaintext input in of AES encryption circuit is met, in the initial state, when a=0011223344556677 successively occurs in plain text in input
8899aabbccddeeff, b=ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100, c=ffeeddccbbaa99887766
554433221100, when tetra- sequences of d=ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100, state machine enters S3 state,
In this case, hardware Trojan horse is activated, so that payload portions trigger.
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN114846473A (en) * | 2020-10-27 | 2022-08-02 | 京东方科技集团股份有限公司 | Data processing circuit, data processing method and electronic equipment |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN114846473A (en) * | 2020-10-27 | 2022-08-02 | 京东方科技集团股份有限公司 | Data processing circuit, data processing method and electronic equipment |
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