CN109495449A - A kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method - Google Patents
A kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN109495449A CN109495449A CN201811214866.7A CN201811214866A CN109495449A CN 109495449 A CN109495449 A CN 109495449A CN 201811214866 A CN201811214866 A CN 201811214866A CN 109495449 A CN109495449 A CN 109495449A
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- Prior art keywords
- gateway
- box
- ciphertext
- data
- certification
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L12/40006—Architecture of a communication node
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
- H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
- H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method, this method carries out IMMO certification to T-box first, T-box sends message to gateway by bus CAN under conditions of IMMO certification passes through, message transmitted by T-box need to carry out encryption and decryption on hardware by the HSM of T-box and the HSM of gateway, T-box is equipped with a packet accouter and counts to the message of transmission, gateway detects packet accouter, meet setting rule and just judge that message is legal, message is decrypted under conditions of message is legal and is sent to remaining CAN separated time of vehicle.The invention has the advantages that: in such a way that soft or hard encryption combines, triple encryption methods are determined with IMMO certification, the encryption of HSM hardware, packet accouter, the safety of vehicle CAN bus is greatly improved, prevents the invasion of hacker, improve travel safety.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of encryption methods, refer in particular to a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method.
Background technique
Currently, the encryption to vehicle CAN bus, mainly accesses firewall using CAN bus agreement secrecy and CAN bus.
There are following defects for both encryption methods:
1, because the opening of CAN bus, attacker are easy to obtain a large amount of bus data from vehicle.Pass through logarithm
According to comparative analysis, can easily parse CAN bus data format.Due to bus data limited length, it includes data lattice
Formula is also relatively simple, therefore the proprietary protocol of CAN bus can not preferably prevent external attack.In fact, having already appeared big
For metering pin to the External Access Equipment of CAN bus, although such equipment is the auxiliary information displaying for driver, it is also possible to
It is used to the attack for initiating to be directed to CAN bus.
2, CAN bus firewall is located at crucial access point or gateway, can prevent external invalid data to a certain extent
Into bus.But this protective capacities is not enough to guarantee safety.Attacker may access bus around the position of firewall,
Firewall can only intercept external invalid data, cannot intercept the data of internal sending.
Summary of the invention
The technical problem to be solved in the present invention is to provide a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method, be mentioned by this method
The safety of high vehicle CAN bus, thus the information security of support vehicles.
The present invention is implemented as follows: a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method, described method includes following steps:
Step S1, the first certification ciphertext is generated by T-box, and the first certification ciphertext is sent to gateway；Gateway generates
Second certification ciphertext, and the second certification ciphertext is compared with the first certification ciphertext, and if the comparison results are consistent, then passes through
IMMO certification, and enter step S2；If it is inconsistent, not authenticating by IMMO, and terminate process；
Step S2, the clear data for needing to send is generated by T-box, is sent after clear data is encrypted to ciphertext data
To gateway；
Meanwhile a packet accouter is set on T-box, and during T-box sends ciphertext data to gateway, message
Counter counts the T-box number for sending ciphertext data, and statistical result is sent jointly to gateway；
Step S3, ciphertext data are decrypted in gateway, obtain the statistics of the clear data and packet accouter that decrypt
As a result；Gateway determines whether the statistical result of the packet accouter received is legal, if legal, then enters step S4；If not conforming to
Method then terminates process；
Step S4, clear data is sent to the power control system or body control system of vehicle by gateway.
Further, the step S1 specifically: an identical authentication key is stored in advance in T-box and gateway,
IMMO certification request is sent from T-box to gateway, gateway is after receiving IMMO certification request, to the bright of T-box feedback IMMO
Literary authentication data, T-box generates the first certification ciphertext by authentication key and plaintext authentication data, and the first certification ciphertext is sent out
Give gateway；Gateway generates the second certification ciphertext by authentication key and plaintext authentication data, and by the second certification ciphertext and the
One certification ciphertext is compared, and if the comparison results are consistent, then is authenticated by IMMO, enter step S2；If it is inconsistent,
It is not authenticated by IMMO, and terminates process.
Further, the plaintext authentication data are decrypted by the HSM that the HSM of gateway carries out encryption and T-box；
The first certification ciphertext is decrypted by the HSM that the HSM of T-box carries out encryption and gateway.
Further, described that the clear data for needing to send is generated by T-box in the step S2, by plaintext number
According to being sent to gateway after being encrypted to ciphertext data specifically: the clear data for needing to send is generated by the application program of T-box,
And gateway is sent to after by the HSM of T-box clear data being encrypted to ciphertext data.
Further, the step S3 specifically: ciphertext data are decrypted in the HSM of gateway, by the application journey of gateway
Sequence obtains the statistical result of the clear data and packet accouter that decrypt；Statistics by gateway to the packet accouter received
As a result determined, if the statistical result for the packet accouter that gateway is currently received is equal to the preceding packet counting once received
The statistical result of device adds 1, then gateway determines that current statistical result is legal, and enters step S4；What if gateway was currently received
The statistical result of packet accouter adds 1 not equal to the statistical result of the preceding packet accouter once received, then gateway judgement is worked as
Preceding statistical result is illegal, and terminates process.
Further, the step S4 specifically: clear data is sent to the power control of vehicle by the application program of gateway
System processed or body control system.
Further, the power control system includes EMS, ESC or EPS, the body control system include PEPS,
BCM or Meter.
The present invention has the advantage that
1, the cipher mode combined by triple softwares with hardware can encrypt CAN bus with significantly more efficient,
Guarantee to be further ensured that vehicle safety not by hacker attack in vehicle remote control process.
2, it due to being provided with packet accouter, is sent again after can preventing data from being distorted by hacker's interception.
3, since the message data in IMMO verification process has also carried out the encryption and decryption of HSM hardware, so that safety
It further increases.
Detailed description of the invention
The present invention is further illustrated in conjunction with the embodiments with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is the method for the present invention hardware block diagram.
Fig. 2 is IMMO identifying procedure figure.
Fig. 3 is packet accouter decision flowchart.
Specific embodiment
It please refers to shown in Fig. 1 to Fig. 3, a kind of preferred embodiment of vehicle CAN bus encryption method of the present invention includes as follows
Step:
Step S1, the first certification ciphertext is generated by T-box, and the first certification ciphertext is sent to gateway；Gateway generates
Second certification ciphertext, and the second certification ciphertext is compared with the first certification ciphertext, and if the comparison results are consistent, then passes through
IMMO certification, and enter step S2；If it is inconsistent, not authenticating by IMMO, and terminate process；IMMO certification is that CAN is total
The first line of defence of line；
Step S2, the clear data for needing to send is generated by T-box, is sent after clear data is encrypted to ciphertext data
To gateway；
Meanwhile a packet accouter is set on T-box, which is the counter of 8bit capacity, in T-box
During ciphertext data are sent to gateway, packet accouter counts the T-box number for sending ciphertext data, and will system
Meter result sends jointly to gateway；
Step S3, ciphertext data are decrypted in gateway, obtain the statistics of the clear data and packet accouter that decrypt
As a result；Gateway determines whether the statistical result of the packet accouter received is legal, if legal, then enters step S4；If not conforming to
Method then terminates process；
Step S4, clear data is sent to the power control system or body control system of vehicle by gateway.
The step S1 specifically: an identical authentication key, each T-box are stored in advance in T-box and gateway
Before controlling vehicle, an IMMO handshake authentication need to be carried out with gateway, send IMMO certification request from T-box to gateway, gateway exists
After receiving IMMO certification request, to the plaintext authentication data of T-box feedback IMMO, T-box recognizes by authentication key and in plain text
It demonstrate,proves data and generates the first certification ciphertext, and the first certification ciphertext is sent to gateway；Gateway passes through authentication key and plaintext authentication
Data generate the second certification ciphertext, and the second certification ciphertext are compared with the first certification ciphertext, and if comparison result one
It causes, is then authenticated by IMMO, enter step S2；If it is inconsistent, not authenticating by IMMO, and terminate process；Gateway and T-
The each suspend mode of box arrives sleep procedure to wake-up again, it is only necessary to which primary certification without repeatedly being authenticated, can save bandwidth
Resource；The calculating process of plaintext authentication data, the first certification ciphertext and the second certification ciphertext is all made of 128 algorithm of AES.
The plaintext authentication data are decrypted by the HSM that the HSM of gateway carries out encryption and T-box；Described first
Certification ciphertext is decrypted by the HSM that the HSM of T-box carries out encryption and gateway, can be just judged as correct IMMO and be recognized
Demonstrate,prove data.
It is described that the clear data for needing to send is generated by T-box in the step S2, clear data is encrypted to close
Gateway is sent to after literary data specifically: the clear data for needing to send is generated by the application program of T-box, and by T-box
HSM clear data is encrypted to ciphertext data after be sent to gateway.
The step S3 specifically: ciphertext data are decrypted in the HSM of gateway, obtain decryption by the application program of gateway
The statistical result of clear data and packet accouter out；Sentenced by statistical result of the gateway to the packet accouter received
It is fixed, if the statistical result for the packet accouter that gateway is currently received is equal to the statistics knot of the preceding packet accouter once received
Fruit adds 1, then gateway determines that current statistical result is legal, and enters step S4；If the packet accouter that gateway is currently received
Statistical result add 1 not equal to the statistical result of the preceding packet accouter once received, then gateway determines current statistics knot
Fruit is illegal, and terminates process.For example, the statistical result for the packet accouter that gateway receives is followed successively by 0,1,2,4,5,7,8,9
When, gateway only determines that 0,1,2,5,8,9 this statistical result several times are legal, determines that 4,7 this 2 statistical results are illegal.
The step S4 specifically: the application program of gateway by clear data be sent to vehicle power control system or
Body control system.
The power control system includes that (electronics helps by EMS (engine management system), ESC (electron speed regulator) or EPS
Power steering system), the body control system includes PEPS (keyless systems), BCM (car body controller) or Meter (instrument
Table).
In conclusion the present invention has the advantage that
1, the cipher mode combined by triple softwares with hardware can encrypt CAN bus with significantly more efficient,
Guarantee to be further ensured that vehicle safety not by hacker attack in vehicle remote control process.
2, it due to being provided with packet accouter, is sent again after can preventing data from being distorted by hacker's interception.
3, since the message data in IMMO verification process has also carried out the encryption and decryption of HSM hardware, so that safety
It further increases.
Although specific embodiments of the present invention have been described above, those familiar with the art should be managed
Solution, we are merely exemplary described specific embodiment, rather than for the restriction to the scope of the present invention, it is familiar with this
The technical staff in field should be covered of the invention according to modification and variation equivalent made by spirit of the invention
In scope of the claimed protection.
Claims (7)
1. a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method, it is characterised in that: described method includes following steps:
Step S1, the first certification ciphertext is generated by T-box, and the first certification ciphertext is sent to gateway；Gateway generates second
Ciphertext is authenticated, and the second certification ciphertext is compared with the first certification ciphertext, and if the comparison results are consistent, and enters step
S2；If it is inconsistent, terminating process；
Step S2, the clear data for needing to send is generated by T-box, is sent to net after clear data is encrypted to ciphertext data
It closes；
Meanwhile a packet accouter is set on T-box, and during T-box sends ciphertext data to gateway, packet counting
Device counts the T-box number for sending ciphertext data, and statistical result is sent jointly to gateway；
Step S3, ciphertext data are decrypted in gateway, obtain the statistical result of the clear data and packet accouter that decrypt；
Gateway determines whether the statistical result of the packet accouter received is legal, if legal, then enters step S4；If it is illegal, then
Terminate process；
Step S4, clear data is sent to the power control system or body control system of vehicle by gateway.
2. a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that: the step S1 specifically:
An identical authentication key is stored in advance in T-box and gateway, sends IMMO certification request from T-box to gateway, gateway exists
After receiving IMMO certification request, to the plaintext authentication data of T-box feedback IMMO, T-box recognizes by authentication key and in plain text
It demonstrate,proves data and generates the first certification ciphertext, and the first certification ciphertext is sent to gateway；Gateway passes through authentication key and plaintext authentication
Data generate the second certification ciphertext, and the second certification ciphertext are compared with the first certification ciphertext, and if comparison result one
It causes, is then authenticated by IMMO, enter step S2；If it is inconsistent, not authenticating by IMMO, and terminate process.
3. a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that: the plaintext authentication data are logical
The HSM for crossing gateway carries out encryption and the HSM of T-box is decrypted；The first certification ciphertext is carried out by the HSM of T-box
The HSM of encryption and gateway is decrypted.
4. a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that: described in the step S2
The clear data for needing to send is generated by T-box, is sent to gateway after clear data is encrypted to ciphertext data specifically: is logical
The application program for crossing T-box generates the clear data for needing to send, and clear data is encrypted to ciphertext number by the HSM of T-box
Gateway is sent to after.
5. a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that: the step S3 specifically: net
Ciphertext data are decrypted in the HSM of pass, obtain the clear data and packet accouter that decrypt by the application program of gateway
Statistical result；Determined by statistical result of the gateway to the packet accouter received, if the message that gateway is currently received
The statistical result that the statistical result of counter is equal to the preceding packet accouter once received adds 1, then gateway determines current system
It is legal to count result, and enters step S4；If the statistical result for the packet accouter that gateway is currently received once connects not equal to preceding
The statistical result of the packet accouter received adds 1, then gateway determines that current statistical result is illegal, and terminates process.
6. a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that: the step S4 specifically: net
Clear data is sent to the power control system or body control system of vehicle by the application program of pass.
7. a kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that: the power control system packet
Including EMS, ESC, perhaps the EPS body control system includes PEPS, BCM or Meter.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201811214866.7A CN109495449A (en) | 2018-10-18 | 2018-10-18 | A kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| CN201811214866.7A CN109495449A (en) | 2018-10-18 | 2018-10-18 | A kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method |
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| CN201811214866.7A Pending CN109495449A (en) | 2018-10-18 | 2018-10-18 | A kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method |
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Cited By (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN109905488A (en) * | 2019-03-20 | 2019-06-18 | 南京汽车集团有限公司 | Commercial vehicle electronic apparatus framework and its safe communication method |
| CN110138823A (en) * | 2019-03-29 | 2019-08-16 | 福建省汽车工业集团云度新能源汽车股份有限公司 | A kind of long-range Body Control method and system |
| CN111002947A (en) * | 2019-11-25 | 2020-04-14 | 江铃汽车股份有限公司 | Remote start control system and method for automatic transmission fuel automobile |
| CN111147237A (en) * | 2019-12-26 | 2020-05-12 | 联陆智能交通科技(上海)有限公司 | RSU information protection method, system, medium and device based on HSM enhancement |
| CN112187601A (en) * | 2020-09-25 | 2021-01-05 | 珠海格力电器股份有限公司 | Device and method for maintaining equipment based on CAN bus communication |
| CN113037720A (en) * | 2021-02-26 | 2021-06-25 | 江铃汽车股份有限公司 | Vehicle network access method, device, readable storage medium and gateway |
| CN113162928A (en) * | 2021-04-19 | 2021-07-23 | 广州小鹏汽车科技有限公司 | Communication method, communication device, ECU, vehicle and storage medium |
| CN113448299A (en) * | 2020-03-25 | 2021-09-28 | 北京新能源汽车股份有限公司 | Vehicle gateway controller, information processing method and vehicle |
| CN114422208A (en) * | 2021-12-30 | 2022-04-29 | 上海集度汽车有限公司 | Vehicle safety communication method, device, microprocessor and storage medium |
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| CN113162928A (en) * | 2021-04-19 | 2021-07-23 | 广州小鹏汽车科技有限公司 | Communication method, communication device, ECU, vehicle and storage medium |
| CN114422208A (en) * | 2021-12-30 | 2022-04-29 | 上海集度汽车有限公司 | Vehicle safety communication method, device, microprocessor and storage medium |
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| AD01 | Patent right deemed abandoned | ||
| AD01 | Patent right deemed abandoned |
Effective date of abandoning: 20220111 |