CN108494725A - A kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message - Google Patents
A kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message Download PDFInfo
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- CN108494725A CN108494725A CN201810089531.0A CN201810089531A CN108494725A CN 108494725 A CN108494725 A CN 108494725A CN 201810089531 A CN201810089531 A CN 201810089531A CN 108494725 A CN108494725 A CN 108494725A
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- replay attack
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L9/16—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms the keys or algorithms being changed during operation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
- H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
- H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of encryption communication methods of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message, specifically include following steps：S11, sending node introduce dynamic secret key, preset secret key holding tank table corresponding with CAN message ID in the internal security memory of ECU, and the secret key holding tank in MCU secure hardware modules presets secret key；S12, sending node introduce bob-weight and put aggressive mechanism, and the first character section of CAN message is set as anti-Replay Attack check value；S13, sending node form CAN message in plain text after integrating calculated anti-Replay Attack check value in CAN message and step S2, and CAN message plaintext and the corresponding secret keys of CAN message ID are transmitted to MCU secure hardware modules and be encrypted by buffer register, the encryption message formed after processing is sent to receiving node by CAN Transmission systems.The security reliability that ensure that CAN Transmission systems avoids being invaded by rogue attacks.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to In-vehicle networking field of encryption, more particularly to a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message.
Background technology
Existing car model is blended with various information technologies, and more and more intelligent use components are applied in automobile
On.In these components, electronic control unit（ECU）It is the important component for controlling vehicle electronic system, a vehicle electrical subsystem
It is made of dozens of ECU as unified, each ECU passes through controller local area network（CAN）Realize communication session, CAN is in automotive field
Reference vehicle-mounted internet is developed rapidly with automatic Pilot technology, the network security of automobile is also increasingly by weight
Depending on.Each vehicle-mounted ECU must be perfectly safe reliably, and then CAN bus message encryption method just becomes a kind of guarantee.It is vehicle-mounted at present
The message data encryption of CAN bus generally has following two modes, the first is to encrypt message number using pure software security module
According to the software algorithm code used in the encryption method usually can all occupy larger read-only memory（ROM）And arbitrary access
Memory（RAM）Resource there is a possibility that software code is illegally distorted, and can increase micro-control unit（MCU）Operation
Load, data encryption is less efficient, is not suitable for vehicle-mounted CAN bus message encryption scene.Second method is using band hardware
The MCU of security module encrypts CAN message data, more using hardware security module encryption selection mode, data encryption efficiency compared with
Height, high safety and reliability are increasingly becoming the first choice of message encryption method.Based on above-mentioned band hardware security module MCU, further
Dynamic secret key is injected to ciphering process, ensures secret key uniqueness and confidentiality, bob-weight is at the same time introduced and puts aggressive mechanism, one
Determining degree avoids CAN bus network from being invaded by rogue attacks, and the security reliability of CAN bus message has been effectively ensured, has been conducive to
Ensure the network security of vehicle body.
Invention content
In order to solve the above technical problems, The present invention provides a kind of encryption communication methods of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message.
A kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message, based on vehicle-mounted ECU, CAN Transmission systems（Controller
Area Network）And vehicle-mounted MCU secure hardware modules, specifically include following steps：
S11, sending node introduce dynamic secret key, and ID pairs of secret key holding tank and CAN message are preset in the internal security memory of ECU
Table is answered, and the secret key holding tank in MCU secure hardware modules presets secret key；
S12, sending node introduce bob-weight and put aggressive mechanism, and packet counting value and CAN message are effectively using the corresponding byte number of data
Check code anti-Replay Attack check value is calculated by special algorithm；
Calculated anti-Replay Attack check value in step S12 is integrated into the first character section of CAN message by S13, sending node
It forms CAN message in plain text, and CAN message plaintext and the corresponding secret keys of CAN message ID is transmitted to MCU peaces by buffer register
Devices at full hardware module is encrypted, and the encryption message formed after processing is sent to receiving node by CAN Transmission systems.
Further, further include following steps：
Whether S14, sending node real-time judgment receive specific sync message, if so then execute step S15；
Packet accouter is initialized as particular value by S15, sending node, executes step S12.
A kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message, based on vehicle-mounted ECU, CAN Transmission systems（Controller
Area Network）And vehicle-mounted MCU secure hardware modules, specifically include following steps：
S21, receiving node introduce dynamic secret key, and ID pairs of secret key holding tank and CAN message are preset in the internal security memory of ECU
Table is answered, and the secret key holding tank in MCU secure hardware modules presets secret key；
S22 receiving nodes introduce bob-weight and put aggressive mechanism, and local packet counting value and CAN message are effectively using the corresponding byte of data
Several check codes calculates local anti-Replay Attack check value by special algorithm；
After S23, receiving node receive encryption message, corresponding secret key is found out by CAN message ID, and will encryption message with it is secret
Key is input to MCU secure hardware modules and is decrypted together, obtains CAN message in plain text, while according to the side in step S22
Method calculates local anti-Replay Attack check value；
S24, judge the anti-Replay Attack that the anti-Replay Attack check value in local that receiving node is calculated is sent out with sending node
Whether check value is consistent, if unanimously, CAN message comes into force, if inconsistent, CAN message is abandoned.
Further, when the bob-weight that the anti-Replay Attack check value in local that receiving node is calculated is sent out with sending node
Put that continuous 5 times of check value of attack is inconsistent, and receiving node can pass through specific sync message, it is desirable that sending node is packet counting
Device is initialized as particular value, realizes that sending node is synchronous with receiving node.
Further, when the bob-weight that the anti-Replay Attack check value in local that receiving node is calculated is sent out with sending node
It is inconsistent to put attack continuous 20 appearance of check value, receiving node stops message and receives, and records fault code indications.
Further, fault code indications are uploaded to the server-side of manufacturer by the receiving node.
Further, described secret for calculating the special algorithm of anti-Replay Attack check value by manufacturer's Uniform provisions
Key holding tank table corresponding with CAN message ID and secret key are also provided by manufacturer, ID pairs of the secret key holding tank and CAN message
Answer table and secret key that can modify in such a way that CAN diagnoses calibration, and by the unified modification configuration of manufacturer.
Further, the secret key holding tank number is determined by MCU secure hardware modules.
Further, for the packet counting value by packet accouter by counting gained, the packet counting value can be in ECU
0 is initialized as when electrification reset.
Further, secret key holding tank table corresponding with CAN message ID indicates CAN message ID by 4 byte and 1
Indicate the byte composition of secret key holding tank ID.
The advantageous effects that the present invention is played are as follows：
Compared with prior art, the invention discloses a kind of encryption communication methods of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message, by ECU
Internal security memory preset secret key holding tank table corresponding with CAN message ID, the secret key in MCU secure hardware modules stores
Slot presets secret key, realizes the introducing of dynamic secret key, ensure that the uniqueness and confidentiality of secret key, improves CAN Transmission systems
Safety.It is effective to avoid CAN Transmission systems by non-in addition, CAN Transmission systems, which also introduce bob-weight, puts aggressive mechanism
Method attack invasion, it is more preferable to ensure that vehicle body network safety.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the encryption communication method schematic diagram of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is secret key holding tank of the present invention table corresponding with CAN message ID and the default process schematic of secret key.
Fig. 3 is the composition schematic diagram of secret key holding tank of the present invention table corresponding with CAN message ID.
Fig. 4 is the front and back comparison diagram of CAN message of the present invention encryption.
Fig. 5 is the process chart of sending node of the present invention.
Fig. 6 is the process chart of receiving node of the present invention.
Specific implementation mode
The preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, so that advantages and features of the invention are more
It is easily readily appreciated by one skilled in the art, to make apparent define to protection scope of the present invention.
Embodiment 1：
A kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message is present embodiments provided, based on vehicle-mounted ECU, CAN Transmission systems
（Controller Area Network）And vehicle-mounted MCU secure hardware modules, specifically include following steps：
S11, sending node introduce dynamic secret key, and ID pairs of secret key holding tank and CAN message are preset in the internal security memory of ECU
Table is answered, and the secret key holding tank in MCU secure hardware modules presets secret key, the same CAN message ID or same groups of CAN message
CAN message encryption is carried out using the secret key inside the same secret key holding tank；
S12, sending node introduce bob-weight and put aggressive mechanism, and packet counting value and CAN message are effectively using the corresponding byte number of data
Check code anti-Replay Attack check value is calculated by special algorithm；
Calculated anti-Replay Attack check value in step S12 is integrated into the first character section of CAN message by S13, sending node
It forms CAN message in plain text, and CAN message plaintext and the corresponding secret keys of CAN message ID is transmitted to MCU peaces by buffer register
Devices at full hardware module is encrypted, and the encryption message formed after processing is sent to receiving node by CAN Transmission systems.
In addition, sending node also needs to judge whether to need that packet accouter is accordingly arranged, specific deterministic process
Include the following steps：
Whether S14, sending node real-time judgment receive specific sync message, if so then execute step S15, if otherwise sending
Node is not necessarily to any operation；
Packet accouter is initialized as particular value by S15, sending node, executes step S12.
It is above-mentioned be related to for calculating the special algorithm of anti-Replay Attack check value by manufacturer's Uniform provisions, and it is each
ECU suppliers uniformly maintain secrecy, and are passed through by packet accouter for calculating the packet counting value used in anti-Replay Attack check value
Counting gained is crossed, the packet counting value generally can be initialized as 0 in ECU electrification resets.Above-mentioned secret key holding tank is reported with CAN
Literary ID corresponds to the byte that table indicates CAN message ID by 4 and 1 indicates that the byte of secret key holding tank ID forms.The secret key is deposited
Storage tank table corresponding with CAN message ID and secret key are also provided by manufacturer, and detailed process is downloaded by manufacturer's server-side
After be burned onto CAN diagnostic tools, then by CAN diagnostic tools by the order of CAN diagnostic services secret key holding tank and CAN message ID
Corresponding table is introduced in the internal security memory of ECU, secret key holding tank secret key being introduced in MCU secure hardware modules.
Wherein, secret key holding tank number is determined by MCU secure hardware modules.Secret key holding tank table corresponding with CAN message ID is introduced
To in the internal security memory of ECU it is possible to prevente effectively from data are distorted by malice.Above-mentioned secret key holding tank and CAN message
ID corresponds to table and secret key and can modify in such a way that CAN diagnoses calibration, and relevant configuration is also unified by manufacturer
Modification.
Embodiment 2
The present embodiment is similar with embodiment, further, a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message, based on vehicle-mounted
ECU, CAN Transmission system（Controller Area Network）And vehicle-mounted MCU secure hardware modules, specifically include following step
Suddenly：
S21, receiving node introduce dynamic secret key, and ID pairs of secret key holding tank and CAN message are preset in the internal security memory of ECU
Table is answered, and the secret key holding tank in MCU secure hardware modules presets secret key；
S22 receiving nodes introduce bob-weight and put aggressive mechanism, and local packet counting value and CAN message are effectively using the corresponding byte of data
Several check codes calculates local anti-Replay Attack check value by special algorithm；
After S23, receiving node receive encryption message, corresponding secret key is found out by CAN message ID, and will encryption message with it is secret
Key is input to MCU secure hardware modules and is decrypted together, obtains CAN message in plain text, while according to the side in step S22
Method calculates local anti-Replay Attack check value；
S24, judge the anti-Replay Attack that the anti-Replay Attack check value in local that receiving node is calculated is sent out with sending node
Whether check value is consistent, if unanimously, CAN message comes into force, if inconsistent, CAN message is abandoned.
When the anti-Replay Attack school that the anti-Replay Attack check value in local that receiving node is calculated is sent out with sending node
It is inconsistent to test continuous 5 times of value, receiving node can pass through specific sync message, it is desirable that sending node initializes packet accouter
For particular value, once sending node receives sync message is just initialized as particular value by packet accouter, and then realizes and send section
Point is synchronous with receiving node.
When the anti-Replay Attack school that the anti-Replay Attack check value in local that receiving node is calculated is sent out with sending node
It is inconsistent to test continuous 20 appearance of value, receiving node stops message and receives, and records fault code indications.The case where conditions permit
Under, fault message code can be uploaded to the server-side of manufacturer by receiving node, be safeguarded by manufacturer.
The complete transmission process of CAN message is as follows：
By taking the CAN message of standard as an example, sending node adds message data using the mode of symmetric cryptography with receiving node
It is close, and sending node is identical as the secret key that receiving node uses, it is unified to be provided by manufacturer.The CAN message of standard includes 8
As anti-Replay Attack check value, remaining 7 bytes are above-mentioned as application function data for a byte, wherein first character section
Anti- Replay Attack check value is by the CRC-8 check codes of packet counting value and the remaining 7 byte application data of CAN message by special
Different algorithm obtains.Sending node will form CAN message in plain text after anti-Replay Attack check value and application function Data Integration, by institute
It states CAN message and is input to MCU secure hardware modules in plain text, while according to CAN message ID in ID pairs of secret key holding tank and CAN message
It answers and maps out corresponding secret key holding tank in table, find out and be stored in MCU secure hardware modules further according to secret key holding tank
Secret key, and secret key and CAN message are formed into encryption message after Encryption Algorithm together in plain text, encryption message is controlled by CAN
Device and CAN transceiver are uploaded to CAN transfer bus, and receiving node is delivered to by message is encrypted by CAN transfer bus.The reception
Node receives the encryption message on CAN transfer bus by CAN transceiver and CAN controller, and encryption message is uploaded to MCU
Secure hardware module also needs first to map out correspondence in secret key holding tank table corresponding with CAN message ID according to CAN message ID
Secret key holding tank, find out corresponding secret key further according to secret key holding tank, then for secret key with encryption message together with carry out
Decipherment algorithm obtains CAN message in plain text, according to remaining 7 byte applications of the local packet counting value and CAN message of receiving node
The CRC-8 check codes of data calculate local anti-Replay Attack check value, further judge the local that receiving node is calculated
Whether anti-Replay Attack check value and the anti-Replay Attack check value that sending node is sent out are consistent, if unanimously, CAN message life
Effect, completes the transmission of CAN message, if inconsistent, CAN message is abandoned.
Embodiments of the present invention are explained in detail above in conjunction with attached drawing, but the present invention is not limited to above-mentioned implementations
Mode within the knowledge of a person skilled in the art can also be without departing from the purpose of the present invention
Various changes can be made.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message, which is characterized in that based on vehicle-mounted ECU, CAN Transmission systems
（Controller Area Network）And vehicle-mounted MCU secure hardware modules, specifically include following steps：
S11, sending node introduce dynamic secret key, and ID pairs of secret key holding tank and CAN message are preset in the internal security memory of ECU
Table is answered, and the secret key holding tank in MCU secure hardware modules presets secret key；
S12, sending node introduce bob-weight and put aggressive mechanism, and packet counting value and CAN message are effectively using the corresponding byte number of data
Check code anti-Replay Attack check value is calculated by special algorithm；
Calculated anti-Replay Attack check value in step S12 is integrated into the first character section of CAN message by S13, sending node
It forms CAN message in plain text, and CAN message plaintext and the corresponding secret keys of CAN message ID is transmitted to MCU peaces by buffer register
Devices at full hardware module is encrypted, and the encryption message formed after processing is sent to receiving node by CAN Transmission systems.
2. a kind of encryption communication method of CAN bus message as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that further include following steps：
Whether S14, sending node real-time judgment receive specific sync message, if so then execute step S15；
Packet accouter is initialized as particular value by S15, sending node, executes step S12.
3. a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message, which is characterized in that based on vehicle-mounted ECU, CAN Transmission systems
（Controller Area Network）And vehicle-mounted MCU secure hardware modules, specifically include following steps：
S21, receiving node introduce dynamic secret key, and ID pairs of secret key holding tank and CAN message are preset in the internal security memory of ECU
Table is answered, and the secret key holding tank in MCU secure hardware modules presets secret key；
S22 receiving nodes introduce bob-weight and put aggressive mechanism, and local packet counting value and CAN message are effectively using the corresponding byte of data
Several check codes calculates local anti-Replay Attack check value by special algorithm；
After S23, receiving node receive encryption message, corresponding secret key is found out by CAN message ID, and will encryption message with it is secret
Key is input to MCU secure hardware modules and is decrypted together, obtains CAN message in plain text, while according to the side in step S22
Method calculates local anti-Replay Attack check value；
S24, judge the anti-Replay Attack that the anti-Replay Attack check value in local that receiving node is calculated is sent out with sending node
Whether check value is consistent, if unanimously, CAN message comes into force, if inconsistent, CAN message is abandoned.
4. a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message as claimed in claim 3, which is characterized in that work as receiving node
Continuous 5 times of the anti-Replay Attack check value that sends out of the anti-Replay Attack check value in local and the sending node being calculated is inconsistent,
Receiving node can pass through specific sync message, it is desirable that packet accouter is initialized as particular value by sending node, is realized and is sent
Node is synchronous with receiving node.
5. a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message as described in claim 3 or 4, which is characterized in that saved when receiving
The anti-Replay Attack check value in local that point is calculated and continuous 20 appearance of the anti-Replay Attack check value that sending node is sent out
Inconsistent, receiving node stops message and receives, and records fault code indications.
6. a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message as claimed in claim 5, which is characterized in that the reception section
Fault code indications are uploaded to the server-side of manufacturer by point.
7. a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message as described in claim 1 or 3 any one, which is characterized in that use
In calculating the special algorithm of anti-Replay Attack check value by manufacturer's Uniform provisions, the secret key holding tank and CAN message ID
Corresponding table and secret key are also provided by manufacturer, and secret key holding tank table corresponding with CAN message ID and secret key can pass through
The mode of CAN diagnosis calibration is modified, and by the unified modification configuration of manufacturer.
8. a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message as described in claim 1 or 3 any one, which is characterized in that institute
Secret key holding tank number is stated to be determined by MCU secure hardware modules.
9. a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message as described in claim 1 or 3 any one, which is characterized in that institute
Stating packet counting value can be initialized as by packet accouter by counting gained, the packet counting value in ECU electrification resets
0。
10. a kind of encryption communication method of vehicle-mounted CAN bus message as described in claim 1 or 3 any one, which is characterized in that
The byte and 1 expression secret key holding tank ID that the secret key holding tank table corresponding with CAN message ID indicates CAN message ID by 4
Byte composition.
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| CN109495449A (en) * | 2018-10-18 | 2019-03-19 | 东南（福建）汽车工业有限公司 | A kind of vehicle CAN bus encryption method |
| CN110198314A (en) * | 2019-05-28 | 2019-09-03 | 中山安信通机器人制造有限公司 | Method, computer installation and the computer readable storage medium that the data transmitted in a kind of couple of on-vehicle machines people are encrypted |
| CN110213018A (en) * | 2019-05-09 | 2019-09-06 | 北京汽车股份有限公司 | Data communications method, device and the vehicle of vehicle bus |
| CN110377002A (en) * | 2019-06-06 | 2019-10-25 | 西安电子科技大学 | A kind of adaptive interior CAN bus method of controlling security and system |
| CN110430215A (en) * | 2019-08-16 | 2019-11-08 | 深圳特蓝图科技有限公司 | A kind of robot communication control method |
| CN111210539A (en) * | 2020-01-02 | 2020-05-29 | 浙江吉利新能源商用车集团有限公司 | Power storage battery data analysis system |
| CN111404925A (en) * | 2020-03-12 | 2020-07-10 | 北京航空航天大学 | Vehicle-mounted CAN bus data encryption method based on dynamic digital watermarking |
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| CN112291125A (en) * | 2020-10-16 | 2021-01-29 | 江苏徐工工程机械研究院有限公司 | Multi-node automatic identification method and device for CAN bus |
| CN112640365A (en) * | 2020-02-29 | 2021-04-09 | 华为技术有限公司 | Controller area network CAN bus secure communication method and device |
| CN113364805A (en) * | 2021-06-29 | 2021-09-07 | 潍柴动力股份有限公司 | CAN message protection method, device, storage medium and equipment |
| CN114095302A (en) * | 2021-11-23 | 2022-02-25 | 北京云迹科技有限公司 | Encryption system based on CAN bus transmission |
| CN114142998A (en) * | 2021-11-26 | 2022-03-04 | 北京神经元网络技术有限公司 | Data encryption processing method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN114301623A (en) * | 2021-11-24 | 2022-04-08 | 岚图汽车科技有限公司 | Message encryption method and related equipment |
| CN114567521A (en) * | 2022-02-28 | 2022-05-31 | 湖南三一中型起重机械有限公司 | CAN bus communication method, transmitting device, receiving device and automobile |
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| CN115242530A (en) * | 2022-07-27 | 2022-10-25 | 常州星宇车灯股份有限公司 | Vehicle-mounted safety communication system and method based on state cryptographic algorithm and automobile |
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