CN109413659A - A kind of frequency spectrum leasing method of cognitive radio networks - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of frequency spectrum leasing methods of cognitive radio networks, it is modeled by frequency spectrum leasing problem of the Stackelberg game to main users and secondary user's, under the frequency spectrum leasing price permanence condition of main users, optimal spectrum distribution factor is calculated, optimal spectrum value of leass is calculated according to the optimal spectrum distribution factor；It obtains the revenue function of each main users respectively according to the optimal spectrum distribution factor and optimal spectrum value of leass, and establishes the preference list of the main users according to the revenue function of the main users；The main users and secondary user's are matched according to the preference list of the main users, obtain optimal frequency spectrum leasing matching result, take into account main users and secondary user's investment and pricing decision in terms of interaction and user preference, improve the spectrum efficiency of frequency spectrum leasing system.
Description
[ technical field ] A method for producing a semiconductor device
The invention belongs to the technical field of wireless communication, and particularly relates to a frequency spectrum leasing method of a cognitive radio network.
[ background of the invention ]
With the rapid development of wireless services, shortage of spectrum resources becomes a serious problem. Research has shown that the traditional spectrum allocation method is inefficient, resulting in many existing spectrum resources being idle for a long time. With the development of cognitive radio technology, spectrum leasing is a promising technology that allows unauthorized wireless users (secondary users) to lease a part of spectrum of traditionally authorized spectrum users (primary users) and pay corresponding prices to the primary users. Meanwhile, the primary user also takes the secondary user as a relay to transmit information.
However, most of the existing secondary user scenario research works lack comprehensive consideration on user preference and investment and pricing, so that the overall system performance is not optimal, and therefore, a new spectrum leasing method is urgently designed.
[ summary of the invention ]
The invention aims to provide a spectrum leasing method of a cognitive radio network, which gives consideration to the interaction and user preference in the aspects of investment and pricing decision of main users and secondary users and improves the spectrum efficiency of a spectrum leasing system.
The invention adopts the following technical scheme: a method for leasing frequency spectrum of a cognitive radio network comprises the following steps:
modeling the spectrum leasing problems of the main users and the secondary users through a Stackelberg game, calculating to obtain an optimal spectrum allocation factor under the condition that the spectrum leasing price of the main users is unchanged, and calculating to obtain an optimal spectrum leasing price according to the optimal spectrum allocation factor;
respectively obtaining a revenue function of each main user according to the optimal spectrum allocation factor and the optimal spectrum lease price, and establishing a preference list of the main users according to the revenue functions of the main users;
and pairing the primary user and the secondary user according to the preference list of the primary user to obtain an optimal spectrum leasing matching result.
Further, the pairing process of the primary user and the secondary user specifically includes:
each primary user sends a spectrum leasing request to a first secondary user in the preference list of the primary user, and receives acceptance return information or rejection return information of the first secondary user;
and each main user receiving the rejection return information continuously sends a spectrum leasing request to the next secondary user in the preference list of the main user, and receives the acceptance return information or the rejection return information of the next secondary user until each main user receives the acceptance return information or finishes traversing the preference list of each main user to obtain an optimal spectrum leasing matching result.
Furthermore, each secondary user establishes a corresponding revenue function according to the optimal spectrum allocation factor and the optimal spectrum lease price, and establishes a preference list of the corresponding secondary user according to the revenue function of each secondary user;
when each secondary user receives a plurality of spectrum leasing requests, the primary user which is best matched is selected through the preference list of the corresponding secondary user, the acceptance return information is sent to the primary user, and the rejection return information is sent to the rest primary users which send the spectrum leasing requests.
Further, in each primary user's preference list, the primary user's revenue function value relative to the previous secondary user is greater than its revenue function value relative to the subsequent secondary user.
Further, in each secondary user's preference list, the secondary user's revenue function value relative to the previous primary user is greater than its revenue function value relative to the subsequent primary user.
Further, the optimal spectrum allocation factor is obtained by the following formula:
wherein R isthWhich represents the minimum information rate requirement and,representing the information rate when a secondary user occupies the full spectrum of the primary user, ci,jIndicating the price of the spectrum lease, β2Represents the cost, P, corresponding to the unit energy when the secondary user performs relay transmissionSPower representing secondary user forwarding information, β1Is the corresponding income of unit satisfaction.
Further, the optimal spectrum lease price is passedTo obtain a solution, wherein,representing a revenue function with the primary user's spectrum lease price unchanged.
Further, the revenue function for each primary user is:
wherein u isP() is the primary user's satisfaction with their transmission rate,indicating the information rate of the primary user at spectrum lease αi,jRepresenting the spectral allocation factor.
Further, the revenue function for each secondary user is:
wherein u isSIs the secondary user's satisfaction with its transmission rate,indicating the information rate of the secondary user.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: considering the situation that the profits of the primary user and the secondary user are ignored in many times, the optimal spectrum leasing price and the spectrum allocation factor when the primary user and the secondary user perform spectrum leasing are determined through the Stackelberg game, so that the profits of the users are optimal, and the interference to the primary user caused by the fact that the spectrum is excessively occupied by the selfishness of the secondary user is avoided. The final spectrum leasing schemes of the primary users and the secondary users are determined through a matching theory, and a stable matching, namely an optimal spectrum leasing scheme, between the primary users and the secondary users is finally formed through establishing preference lists for each of the primary users and the secondary users.
[ description of the drawings ]
FIG. 1 is a diagram of a cognitive radio spectrum leasing model according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram of a system frame structure according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a graph of the total revenue of a user in an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a graph of the total rate of users in an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 5 is a diagram illustrating a comparison effect of different spectrum leasing methods according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[ detailed description ] embodiments
The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
The invention discloses a method for leasing a frequency spectrum of a cognitive radio network, which comprises the following steps:
when the primary user and the secondary user rent the frequency spectrum, the primary user needs to determine the rent price to be charged according to the secondary user occupying the frequency spectrum of the primary user, and for the secondary user renting the frequency spectrum of the primary user, the secondary user needs to determine the optimal frequency spectrum allocation factor according to the existing rent price to enable the performance of the secondary user to reach the optimal performance. Therefore, the Stackelberg game is well suited for handling this process. In the Stackelberg game, the primary user acts as a leader and determines the optimal spectrum lease price to charge based on the received channel status information about the secondary users. The secondary users play the role of followers, and the secondary users determine the occupied frequency spectrum according to the received lease price information, namely determine the optimal frequency spectrum lease factor. For this problem, we use inverse induction to seek the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game.
When the jth secondary user rents the ith primary user's spectrum, the rental price α to be charged when the ith primary user is giveni,jThe optimal strategy for the jth secondary user can be expressed as the following optimization problem:
0＜αi,j＜0.5，
in thatRthIndicating the minimum information rate requirement, only satisfiedThe ith primary user wishes to lease its spectrum to the jth secondary user. It is easy to find ifCollaboration is not feasible.
When in useThen, the solution of the above optimization problem is:
as a game leader, the ith primary user needs to determine the best spectrum lease price to optimize the income of the ith primary user, and on the basis of knowing the best strategy made by the secondary user according to the decision of the ith primary user, the problem can be expressed as the following optimization problem:
ci,j≥0，
is to ensure the secondary user wishesWanting to rent the spectrum of the primary users, willing to cooperate with the primary users, it is easy to find ifThe above optimization problem is not feasible.
Suppose that the jth secondary user leases the spectrum of the ith primary user and the following condition is satisfied:
then it is determined that,is the equalization of the Stackelberg game, wherein,is the optimal spectrum allocation factor according to the formulaThe determination is carried out by the following steps,represents the optimum spectrum lease price byTo give, in the formula, ci,jE C, C is a set, which is defined as follows:
wherein,
particularly when β2PS＜2β1When the temperature of the water is higher than the set temperature,
in the optimization scheme, the primary user is used as a leader and is subjected to formula according to the channel state information received from the secondary usersThe optimal spectrum lease price is calculated. Then, the primary user sends the channel state information and the calculated spectrum leasing price to the secondary user, and the secondary user passes through a formula according to the received informationThe optimal spectrum lease factor is calculated. Thus, the benefits of primary and secondary users in spectrum leasing can be optimized.
Modeling the spectrum leasing problem of the main user and the secondary user through a Stackelberg game, and calculating to obtain an optimal spectrum allocation factor under the condition that the spectrum leasing price of the main user is unchanged, wherein the optimal spectrum allocation factor is obtained through the following formula:
wherein R isthWhich represents the minimum information rate requirement and,representing the information rate when a secondary user occupies the full spectrum of the primary user, ci,jRepresenting initial spectrum lease price, β2Represents the cost, P, corresponding to the unit energy when the secondary user performs relay transmissionSPower representing secondary user forwarding information, β1Is the corresponding income of unit satisfaction.
Calculating the optimal spectrum lease price according to the optimal spectrum allocation factor, wherein the optimal spectrum lease price passesTo obtain a solution, wherein,representing a revenue function with the primary user's spectrum lease price unchanged.
Respectively obtaining a revenue function of each main user according to the optimal spectrum allocation factor and the optimal spectrum lease price, wherein the revenue function of each main user when the main user leases the spectrum is as follows:
wherein u isP() is the primary user's satisfaction with his own transmission rate,indicating the information rate of the primary user at spectrum lease αi,jRepresenting the spectral allocation factor.
In the invention, considering that the main user and the secondary user are selfish, the two users can give wayMaximizing self interests, modeling the problem as a marital problem in order to deal with the cooperation problem between the main user and the secondary user, regarding the main user and the secondary user as both male and female parties of the marital, and setting the main user set M as { M ═ M1,...,mi,...mMAnd a secondary user set N ═ N1,...,nj,...,nNIs two mutually disjoint sets. Eventually, we will get a one-to-one match between the primary and secondary users.
Establishing a preference list of the main user according to a revenue function of the main user; in each primary user's preference list, the primary user's revenue function value relative to the previous secondary user is greater than its revenue function value relative to the subsequent secondary user.
Establishing a preference list for each primary user based on the revenue obtained from the Stackelberg gameAll secondary users are included in the preference list, all in descending order.
When in useThen, the ith primary user (m)i) Compared to the jth' secondary user (n)j′) Preference is given to the jth secondary user (n)j) When is coming into contact withWhen is shown asWherein m isi∈M,nj,nj′e.N, and j ≠ j'.
And pairing the primary user and the secondary user according to the preference list of the primary user to obtain an optimal spectrum leasing matching result.
The pairing process of the primary user and the secondary user specifically comprises the following steps:
each primary user gives their preference listIs the first secondary user njAnd sending a spectrum leasing request and receiving the acceptance return information or rejection return information of the first secondary user. To njThe requesting primary user forms a requesting user set AU (n)j) To njMake a request and is njAccepted primary user, form njMatch set of (n)j) There is at most one element in the set due to the one-to-one match.
Each secondary user establishes a corresponding revenue function according to the optimal spectrum allocation factor and the optimal spectrum lease price, and the revenue function of each secondary user is as follows:
wherein u isSIs the secondary user's satisfaction with his own transmission rate,and representing the information rate of the secondary users, and establishing a preference list of the corresponding secondary users according to the revenue function of each secondary user. In each secondary user's preference list, its revenue function value relative to the previous primary user is greater than its revenue function value relative to the next primary user.
When each secondary user receives multiple spectrum lease requests, njOne of the main users who prefers itself is selected and the other main users are rejected. And selecting the best matching primary user through the preference list corresponding to the secondary user, sending an acceptance return message to the primary user, and sending a rejection return message to the rest primary users who send the spectrum leasing requests.
Each primary user receiving the rejection return message continues to issue a spectrum lease request to the next secondary user in its preference list and receives the acceptance return message or rejection return message of the next secondary user.
And obtaining the optimal spectrum leasing matching result until each main user receives the receiving return information or the preference list of each main user is traversed.
According to the invention, the Stackelberg game is utilized to determine the optimal allocation factor and spectrum lease price when the primary user and the secondary user perform spectrum lease, and on the basis, the interaction modeling between the primary user and the secondary user is a marital problem, so that the stable matching between the primary user and the secondary user is obtained. And finally, the spectral efficiency of the system is improved. The scheme accomplishes the final spectrum leasing by simultaneously considering the user's preferences as well as investment and pricing. Specifically, the optimization design is mainly performed from spectrum allocation factors and spectrum prices when the users rent the spectrum and the preferences of the users, and meanwhile, the investment, pricing and preferences of the users are considered, and the spectrum efficiency of the system is improved by combining the investment, pricing and preferences of the users.
As shown in fig. 1, a cognitive radio network with a primary user base station and a cognitive base station is a system model studied by the present invention. In this model, there are M primary users and N secondary users. Due to Secondary Users (SU)1,SU2) There is no own licensed spectrum and thus the primary user's spectrum needs to be leased to send information to the secondary user information recipient. Meanwhile, the primary user also transmits part of the information to the primary user information receiver by taking the secondary user as a relay.
In order to further improve the spectral efficiency of the system, the invention comprehensively considers the investment, pricing and preference of users to improve the spectral efficiency of the system, and the adopted method comprises the following steps: the optimal spectrum price and the optimal spectrum allocation factor of the primary user and the secondary user are determined through the Stackelberg game, and then the optimal matching scheme between the primary user and the secondary user is determined through the matching theory.
In the model, a time division multiple access technique is adopted, and when the primary user and the secondary user perform spectrum leasing, the normalized frame structure is shown in fig. 2. The method mainly comprises three stages:
in phase one, the primary user is at power PPSending information to the primary user recipient and the secondary user sender.
In phase two, the secondary user sender decodes and forwards the data with power PSForwarding the information to the primary user recipient.
In the last phase, the secondary users are at power PSWherein, the first two stages constitute the process of the main user transmitting information by taking the secondary user as the relay, which respectively occupies α of the total frame lengthi,j，αi,jThe third stage accounts for 1-2 α of the total frame lengthi,jThe stage is that the secondary user sends own information.
In stage one, when the ith primary user sends information directly to the primary user recipient, the information rate at this time is denoted as Ri：
Wherein,is the channel gain of the link between the ith primary user and the primary user receiver,is the path loss on the link, N0Representing the power of the noise.
When the ith main user takes the jth secondary user as a relayWhen sending information, the information rate of the ith primary userLimited by the minimum rates of the first two phases, namely:
wherein,αi,jis the spectrum allocation factor for the ith primary user to lease spectrum to the jth secondary user,andrespectively the channel gain and path loss on the link between the ith primary user and the jth secondary user, is the channel gain on the ith primary user and jth primary user receiver links,is the path loss on that link. In addition, the first and second substrates are,andrespectively, the channel gain and path loss on the link between the ith secondary user and the jth primary user recipient. For convenience, we define
Meanwhile, when the ith secondary user transmits own information to the jth secondary user receiver, the achievable information rate on the link is:
wherein,
in order to avoid the secondary users from overusing the primary user's spectrum, the secondary users need to pay a certain fee to the primary users. Thus, when leasing the spectrum of the ith primary user, the revenue function for the jth secondary user is defined as follows:
in the above formula, uS(. is the secondary user's satisfaction with his own transmission rate, defined as a natural logarithmic function, namely: u. ofS(·) ln (·). As can be seen from the above equation, the revenue function for the secondary user consists of three parts, the first part representing the revenue generated by the transmission of information over leased spectrum; the second part represents the cost for forwarding information as a relay of the main user; the last part represents the cost to the primary user to be paid to rent the spectrum.
Correspondingly, the revenue function corresponding to the main user for spectrum leasing is as follows:
wherein u isPIs for it by the primary userThe satisfaction degree of the self transmission rate is also defined as a natural logarithmic function, namely: u. ofP(·) ln (·). As can be seen from the above equation, the revenue function for the primary user is composed of two parts, the first part representing the revenue corresponding to the transmission rate of the primary user and the second part representing the spectrum lease fee charged to the secondary user.
The proposed caching scheme is subjected to simulation analysis, as shown in fig. 1, the radius of a cell is 150 meters, 25 main users are provided, and the transmission power of the main users and the secondary users is 100 mW. All channels were modeled as rayleigh fading with an average of 0dB and noise power of-114 dBm. In addition, the path loss g ═ l-ηWhere the pathloss factor η is 4, the required SNR for the lowest primary user is 5db when calculating the revenue for the primary and secondary users, we set β11 and β2＝10。
As shown in fig. 3, given the respective total profits of the primary users and the secondary users after the proposed joint optimization algorithm, it can be seen from the figure that the total utility of the primary users increases as the number of the secondary users increases, because as the number of the secondary users increases, the number of objects that the primary users can select to match increases, and thus, the matching more suitable for themselves can be selected. While the total revenue of the secondary users is always approximately zero, which is a normal phenomenon consistent with the present disclosure.
As shown in fig. 4, given the respective total rates of the primary users and the secondary users after the proposed new spectrum leasing scheme, although the total profit of the secondary users always goes to zero, it can be found from the figure that the total rate of the secondary users is not zero, which is also the motivation for the cooperation of the secondary users and the primary users.
Fig. 5 shows a comparison between the performance of the proposed algorithm and the fixed-price-factor stable matching algorithm. The stable matching algorithm of the fixed price factor means that the frequency spectrum leasing price is always fixed and unchanged, and then the frequency spectrum leasing price passes through a stable matching stage which is the same as the algorithm provided by the invention. It can be seen from the curves in the figure that the performance of the algorithm proposed by the invention is obviously superior to that of the stable matching algorithm with fixed price factor. This shows that the Stackelberg game optimizes the revenue of the primary and secondary users well, improving spectral efficiency.
Claims (9)
1. A method for leasing frequency spectrum of a cognitive radio network is characterized by comprising the following steps:
modeling the spectrum leasing problems of the main users and the secondary users through a Stackelberg game, calculating to obtain an optimal spectrum allocation factor under the condition that the spectrum leasing price of the main users is unchanged, and calculating to obtain an optimal spectrum leasing price according to the optimal spectrum allocation factor;
respectively obtaining a revenue function of each main user according to the optimal spectrum allocation factor and the optimal spectrum lease price, and establishing a preference list of the main users according to the revenue functions of the main users;
and pairing the main user and the secondary user according to the preference list of the main user to obtain an optimal spectrum leasing matching result.
2. The method for leasing spectrum of a cognitive radio network as claimed in claim 1, wherein the pairing procedure between the primary user and the secondary user is specifically as follows:
each primary user sends a spectrum leasing request to a first secondary user in a preference list of the primary user, and receives acceptance return information or rejection return information of the first secondary user;
and each main user receiving the rejection return information continuously sends a spectrum leasing request to the next secondary user in the preference list of the main user, and receives acceptance return information or rejection return information of the next secondary user until each main user receives the acceptance return information or finishes traversing the preference list of each main user to obtain an optimal spectrum leasing matching result.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein each secondary user establishes a corresponding revenue function according to the optimal spectrum allocation factor and the optimal spectrum lease price, and establishes a preference list of the corresponding secondary user according to the revenue function of each secondary user;
when each secondary user receives a plurality of spectrum leasing requests, the primary user which is best matched is selected through the preference list of the corresponding secondary user, the acceptance return information is sent to the primary user, and the rejection return information is sent to the rest primary users which send the spectrum leasing requests.
4. The method for leasing spectrum of a cognitive radio network as claimed in claim 2, wherein in each of said primary users 'preference lists, said primary user's revenue function value with respect to a previous said secondary user is greater than its revenue function value with respect to a subsequent secondary user.
5. The method for leasing spectrum of a cognitive radio network as claimed in claim 2, wherein in each of said secondary users 'preference lists, said secondary user's revenue function value with respect to a previous said primary user is greater than its revenue function value with respect to a subsequent primary user.
6. The method for leasing spectrum of a cognitive radio network as claimed in claim 1, wherein said optimal spectrum allocation factor is obtained by the following formula:
wherein R isthWhich represents the minimum information rate requirement and,representing the information rate when a secondary user occupies the full spectrum of the primary user, ci,jIndicating the price of the spectrum lease, β2Represents the cost, P, corresponding to the unit energy when the secondary user performs relay transmissionSPower representing secondary user forwarding information, β1Is the corresponding income of unit satisfaction.
7. The method for spectrum lease in cognitive radio network as claimed in claim 6, wherein said optimal spectrum lease price is determined byTo obtain a solution, wherein,is shown in the main useAnd the user performs a revenue function when renting the frequency spectrum.
8. The method for leasing spectrum of a cognitive radio network as claimed in claim 6 or 7, wherein the revenue function of each said primary user is:
wherein u isP() is the primary user's satisfaction with their transmission rate,indicating the information rate of the primary user at spectrum lease αi,jRepresenting the spectral allocation factor.
9. The method for spectrum leasing of a cognitive radio network as claimed in claim 8, wherein the revenue function of each said secondary user is:
wherein u isSIs the secondary user's satisfaction with its transmission rate,representing the information rate at which the secondary user leases the spectrum.
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