CN109379343A - A kind of the isomery common recognition method and terminal of block chain - Google Patents
A kind of the isomery common recognition method and terminal of block chain Download PDFInfo
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- CN109379343A CN109379343A CN201811128351.5A CN201811128351A CN109379343A CN 109379343 A CN109379343 A CN 109379343A CN 201811128351 A CN201811128351 A CN 201811128351A CN 109379343 A CN109379343 A CN 109379343A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
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- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
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Abstract
The present invention provides the isomery common recognition method and terminal of a kind of block chain, and method includes: to filter out decision node of the exclusive node as block during each round common recognition；The sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent are received by the decision node, and the sub- message blocks sent respectively to each fragment are verified；The sub- message blocks being verified are merged, the message blocks after being merged；The message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by the decision node of the block；If receiving the first signing messages postbacked more than the fragment decision node of preset number threshold value, judge that the message blocks are verified；First signing messages is after the decision node of fragment is verified message blocks, and what is postbacked is verified corresponding signing messages.The present invention can prevent block chain safety issue caused by hacker attack to a certain extent, improve the safety of block chain.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of isomery of block chain technical field more particularly to block chain common recognition method and terminals.
Background technique
Common recognition mechanism is one of the core technology of block chain.Common recognition mechanism is that the user of mutual mistrust in block chain reaches letter
The mechanism appointed is the basis of record transmitting, verifying, duplication in block chain.Current common recognition mechanism mainly includes proof of work
(Proof of Work, PoW), equity prove (Proof of Stake, PoS), and equity is appointed to prove (Delegated Proof
Of Stake, DPoS) and practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance, PBFT)
And the deformation of this 4 kinds common recognition mechanism.Certainly, now novel distributed account book technology, such as with directed acyclic graph
(Directed Acyclic Graph, DAG) is that the new distribution type account book technology of representative carries common recognition mechanism.Existing common recognition
Mechanism is more or less problematic in that.Such as PoW common recognition mechanism is there are the wasting of resources, the common recognition time is long and common recognition monopolization and
The defect of 51% natural attack；PoS common recognition mechanism haves the defects that long-chain attack, common recognition monopolization and knows together difficult of proof；
DPoS common recognition mechanism haves the defects that centralization, long-chain attack and knows together difficult of proof；When PBFT knows together mechanism in the presence of common recognition
Between with common recognition number of nodes exponential increase defect；And the new distribution type account book technology of the included common recognition based on DAG is deposited
Safety it is weak and common recognition centralization the problem of.
Safety is the most important attribute of common recognition mechanism.Common recognition mechanism is the core of block chain, the safety for mechanism of knowing together
Directly determine the safety of entire block catenary system.Therefore the safety for reinforcing common recognition mechanism is to promote entire block catenary system
The key for being safely.Current common recognition mechanism has ignored the safety of a part mostly for availability, or only considers
A part of safety, it may also be said to which common recognition mechanism only considers the safety that anti-internal system people makes sad work of it at present, and seldom examine
Consider the safety of anti-hacking.
Current block chain mostly uses greatly the common recognition mechanism of single common recognition or a variety of common recognition laminated structures, such as has block
Catenary system uses the common recognition mechanism of PoW+PBFT, and the common recognition mechanism of this superposition is to do preliminary common recognition with PoW mostly, then again
Using other common recognition mechanism.The common recognition mechanism of this mode can not fundamentally solve common recognition mechanism above-mentioned and be faced
Defect.
Summary of the invention
The technical problems to be solved by the present invention are: the present invention provides a kind of isomery of block chain common recognition method and ends
End, can prevent block chain safety issue caused by hacker attack to a certain extent, improve the safety of block chain.
In order to solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention provides a kind of isomery of block chain common recognition methods, including following step
It is rapid:
S1: during each round common recognition, decision node of the exclusive node as block is filtered out；
S2: receiving the sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent by the decision node, and each fragment is sent respectively
Sub- message blocks are verified；
S3: the sub- message blocks being verified are merged, the message blocks after being merged；
S4: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by the decision node of the block；
S5: if receiving the first signing messages postbacked more than the fragment decision node of preset number threshold value, described in judgement
Message blocks are verified；First signing messages is the verifying that postbacks after the decision node of fragment is verified message blocks
Pass through corresponding signing messages.
It knows together terminal the present invention also provides a kind of isomery of block chain, including memory, processor and is stored in storage
On device and the computer program that can run on a processor, the processor realize following step when executing the computer program
It is rapid:
S1: during each round common recognition, decision node of the exclusive node as block is filtered out；
S2: receiving the sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent by the decision node, and each fragment is sent respectively
Sub- message blocks are verified；
S3: the sub- message blocks being verified are merged, the message blocks after being merged；
S4: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by the decision node of the block；
S5: if receiving the first signing messages postbacked more than the fragment decision node of preset number threshold value, described in judgement
Message blocks are verified；First signing messages is the verifying that postbacks after the decision node of fragment is verified message blocks
Pass through corresponding signing messages.
The invention has the benefit that
The present invention provides a kind of isomery of block chain common recognition method and terminals to select during each round common recognition
Decision node of the exclusive node as block is carried out by the sub- message blocks that decision node of the decision node to each fragment is sent
Verifying, and the sub- message blocks being verified are merged, the message blocks after being merged, and message blocks are respectively sent to often
The corresponding decision node of one fragment is verified, and when the number being verified is greater than preset number threshold value, indicates the message blocks
It is verified, the message blocks can be broadcasted；The present invention by the above method, selected during each round common recognition block it is new certainly
Plan node is also just unable to control entire common recognition so that attacker can not judge " leader " (decision node of fragment) of decision
Process, while common recognition algorithm used by each fragment is different, attacker can not control all points by a kind of attack strategies
Piece is also just unable to control entire common recognition process, and attacker wants most nodes of the necessary control system of control common recognition process,
This undoubtedly increases the difficulty of attack, to solve the node of a certain fragment in hacker attack block chain, and block is caused to be determined
The problem of significant error, occurs for plan, improves the safety of block chain.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the step schematic diagram according to the isomery of one of embodiment of the present invention one block chain common recognition method；
Fig. 2 is the structural schematic diagram according to a kind of isomery common recognition terminal of block chain of the embodiment of the present invention；
Label declaration:
1, memory；2, processor.
Specific embodiment
To explain the technical content, the achieved purpose and the effect of the present invention in detail, below in conjunction with embodiment and cooperate attached
Figure is explained in detail.
Fig. 1 is please referred to, the present invention provides a kind of isomery of block chain common recognition methods, comprising the following steps:
S1: during each round common recognition, decision node of the exclusive node as block is filtered out；
S2: receiving the sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent by the decision node, and each fragment is sent respectively
Sub- message blocks are verified；
S3: the sub- message blocks being verified are merged, the message blocks after being merged；
S4: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by the decision node of the block；
S5: if receiving the first signing messages postbacked more than the fragment decision node of preset number threshold value, described in judgement
Message blocks are verified；First signing messages is the verifying that postbacks after the decision node of fragment is verified message blocks
Pass through corresponding signing messages.
As can be seen from the above description, the present invention provides a kind of isomery of block chain common recognition method, in each round common recognition process
In, decision node of the exclusive node as block is selected, the son sent by decision node of the decision node to each fragment
Message blocks are verified, and are merged to the sub- message blocks being verified, the message blocks after being merged, and message blocks are divided
The corresponding decision node of each fragment is not sent to be verified, when the number being verified is greater than preset number threshold value, table
Show that the message blocks are verified, the message blocks can be broadcasted；The present invention is selected during each round common recognition by the above method
The new decision node of block is also just unable to control entire common recognition process, together so that attacker can not judge " leader " of decision
When each fragment used by common recognition algorithm it is different, attacker can not control all fragments by a kind of attack strategies, also
It is unable to control entire common recognition process, attacker wants most nodes of the necessary control system of control common recognition process, this is undoubtedly
The difficulty of attack is increased, to solve the node of a certain fragment in hacker attack block chain, and block decision is caused to occur
The problem of significant error, improves the safety of block chain.
Further, the S1 specifically:
During each round common recognition, the corresponding competition value of each node to be selected is calculated by preset first formula,
Obtain multiple competition values；Each described node to be selected is the corresponding decision node of each fragment；
The competition value for meeting preset condition is filtered out from the multiple competition value, obtains multiple first competition values；
Announce the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering；
Within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements is obtained, the first minimum competition value is obtained；
Screen decision node of the corresponding node of the first minimum competition value as block.
As can be seen from the above description, during each round common recognition, it is corresponding to filter out minimum competition value by the above method
Decision node of the node as the block mentioned so that the decision node during wheel common recognition can not be determined in advance in attacker
Safety during high block chain common recognition；Each competition of above-mentioned announcement is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data solution
Close public key is verified convenient for the decision node of fragment by signing messages of the public key to sub- message blocks.
Further, first formula specifically:
Wherein, the CiFor the competition value of i-th of node to be selected, the skiIt indicates on the node to be selected for encryption data
Private key, r indicates the wheel number of current common recognition process, QrIndicate that the corresponding random number of r wheel common recognition process (is known together in each round
A random number is generated in the process),It indicates to utilize private key skiTo r and QrCarry out data signature, H1For Hash letter
Number.
As can be seen from the above description, being directed to each node to be selected by the above method during each round common recognition, calculating
It obtains corresponding competition value to be all different, guarantees that the decision node of fragment obtained in each round common recognition process generates at random,
The probability that the decision node of fragment is attacked can be greatly reduced.
Further, the S2 specifically:
The sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent are received by the decision node of the block；
The block is made of the sub- message blocks of multiple fragments.
By the public key of the decision node of each fragment, the sub- message blocks A.L.S. that corresponding fragment decision node is sent is verified
The correctness of breath；The signing messages carries out signature institute by the private key stored on the decision node for the decision node of the fragment
Obtained information.
It, can the sub- message blocks that send of the decision node effectively to each fragment as can be seen from the above description, by the above method
It is verified, improves the safety of common recognition process；Meanwhile the public key of the decision node of each fragment, above-mentioned announcement can be passed through
Node and the node on obtained for the public key acquisition of data deciphering；
Further, the S4 specifically:
The message blocks are respectively sent to often by the decision node for controlling the block by practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm
The decision node of one fragment.
As can be seen from the above description, can guarantee message blocks to be sent on the decision node of the first fragment, improve system
Fault-tolerance.
Further, the isomery common recognition method of a kind of block chain, further includes:
By preset second formula, newly-increased node is distributed into corresponding fragment；
Second formula is x=sToi (addi) %n, wherein the i is the serial number of node, x is that node i is to be allocated
The serial number of fragment, addi indicate the address of node i, and sToi indicates that address sequence is transformed into the function of integer；Specifically, by address
Sequence transitions utilize the strtol function in C java standard library at the function of integer.
Further, the isomery common recognition method of a kind of block chain, further includes:
Default common recognition algorithm set Co={ Co1,Co2,…,Com(preset m common recognition algorithm), wherein Cok, k=1,
2 ..., m, the common recognition algorithm of the row of expression serial number k；
If generating new fragment in block chain, the row's serial number for the common recognition algorithm that new fragment usesWherein, the g indicates the serial number of new fragment, describedIndicate the new corresponding Kazakhstan of fragment decision node
Uncommon value, cryptographic Hash are calculated by the first formula, and % indicates complementation operation.
Referring to figure 2., a kind of block chain provided by the invention isomery know together terminal, including memory 1, processor 2 and
It is stored in the computer program that can be run on memory 1 and on processor 2, the processor 2 is realized when executing described program
Following steps:
S1: during each round common recognition, decision node of the exclusive node as block is filtered out；
S2: receiving the sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent by the decision node, and each fragment is sent respectively
Sub- message blocks are verified；
S3: the sub- message blocks being verified are merged, the message blocks after being merged；
S4: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by the decision node of the block；
S5: if receiving the first signing messages postbacked more than the fragment decision node of preset number threshold value, described in judgement
Message blocks are verified；First signing messages is the verifying that postbacks after the decision node of fragment is verified message blocks
Pass through corresponding signing messages.
Further, the isomery common recognition terminal of a kind of block chain, the S1 specifically:
During each round common recognition, the corresponding competition value of each node to be selected is calculated by preset first formula,
Obtain multiple competition values；Each described node to be selected is the corresponding decision node of each fragment；
The competition value for meeting preset condition is filtered out from the multiple competition value, obtains multiple first competition values；
Announce the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering；
Within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements is obtained, the first minimum competition value is obtained；
Screen decision node of the corresponding node of the first minimum competition value as block.
Further, the isomery common recognition terminal of a kind of block chain, first formula specifically:
Wherein, the CiFor the competition value of i-th of node to be selected, the skiIt indicates on the node to be selected for encryption data
Private key, r indicates the wheel number of current common recognition process, QrIndicate the corresponding random number of r wheel common recognition process,It indicates
Utilize private key skiTo r and QrCarry out data signature, H1For hash function.
Further, the isomery common recognition terminal of a kind of block chain, the S2 specifically:
The sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent are received by the decision node of the block；
By the public key of the decision node of each fragment, the sub- message blocks A.L.S. that corresponding fragment decision node is sent is verified
The correctness of breath；The signing messages carries out signature institute by the private key stored on the decision node for the decision node of the fragment
Obtained information.
Further, the isomery common recognition terminal of a kind of block chain, the S4 specifically:
The message blocks are respectively sent to often by the decision node for controlling the block by practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm
The decision node of one fragment.
Further, the isomery common recognition method of a kind of block chain, further includes:
By preset second formula, newly-increased node is distributed into corresponding fragment；
Second formula is x=sToi (addi) %n, wherein the i is the serial number of node, x is that node i is to be allocated
The serial number of fragment, addi indicate the address of node i, and sToi indicates that address sequence is transformed into the function of integer；Specifically, by address
Sequence transitions utilize the strtol function in C java standard library at the function of integer.
Further, the isomery common recognition method of a kind of block chain, further includes:
Default common recognition algorithm set Co={ Co1,Co2,…,Com(preset m common recognition algorithm), wherein Cok, k=1,
2 ..., m, the common recognition algorithm of the row of expression serial number k；
If generating new fragment in block chain, the row's serial number for the common recognition algorithm that new fragment usesWherein, the g indicates the serial number of new fragment, describedIndicate the new corresponding Kazakhstan of fragment decision node
Uncommon value, % indicate complementation operation.
Please refer to Fig. 1, the embodiment of the present invention one are as follows:
The present invention provides a kind of isomery of block chain common recognition methods, comprising the following steps:
By preset formula, newly-increased node is distributed into corresponding fragment；
The formula is x=sToi (addi) %n, wherein the i is the serial number of node, x is node i fragment to be allocated
Serial number, addi indicates the address of node i, and sToi indicates that address sequence is transformed into the function of integer；Specifically, by address sequence
The function for being transformed into integer utilizes the strtol function in C java standard library.
Default common recognition algorithm set Co={ Co1,Co2,…,Com(preset m common recognition algorithm), wherein Cok, k=1,
2 ..., m, the common recognition algorithm of the row of expression serial number k；
If generating new fragment in block chain, the row's serial number for the common recognition algorithm that new fragment usesWherein, the g indicates the serial number of new fragment, describedIndicate the new corresponding Kazakhstan of fragment decision node
Uncommon value, % indicate complementation operation.
During each round common recognition, decision node of the exclusive node as block is filtered out；
Wherein, during each round is known together, decision node of the exclusive node as block is filtered out, specifically:
During each round common recognition, the corresponding competition value of each node to be selected is calculated by preset first formula,
Obtain multiple competition values；Each described node to be selected is the corresponding decision node of each fragment；From the multiple competition value
In filter out and meet the competition value of preset condition and (filter out the competition value for being less than default competition value threshold value, the choosing of this threshold value
Take the quantity of node to be selected for selecting to come with needs with the number of nodes to be selected for participating in competition related, it can be according to actual needs
Oneself setting), obtain multiple first competition values；
Announce the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering；
Within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements is obtained, the first minimum competition value is obtained；
Screen decision node of the corresponding node of the first minimum competition value as block.
Wherein, first formula specifically:
Wherein, the CiFor the competition value of i-th of node to be selected, the skiIt indicates on the node to be selected for encryption data
Private key, r indicates the wheel number of current common recognition process, QrIndicate the corresponding random number of r wheel common recognition process,It indicates
Utilize private key skiTo r and QrCarry out data signature, H1For hash function, i.e., Hash operation is carried out to the data after signature；
The corresponding competition value of each node to be selected is calculated by preset first formula, obtains multiple competition values, specifically
Are as follows:
The corresponding cryptographic Hash of each node to be selected is calculated by the first formula, cryptographic Hash is converted into two numbers processed,
Multiple binary numbers are obtained, the multiple binary number is the multiple competition value, each competition value and a node to be selected
It is corresponding.
The sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent are received by the decision node, and the son sent respectively to each fragment disappears
Breath block is verified；
Wherein, the sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent are received by the decision node, and each fragment is sent respectively
Sub- message blocks verified, specifically:
The sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent are received by the decision node of the block；Sub- message blocks are in each point
The block generated in piece includes multiple message in block as the concept of the block on normal block chain；
The decision node of control block verifies corresponding fragment decision node hair by the public key of the decision node of each fragment
The correctness of the sub- message blocks signing messages sent；The signing messages is the decision node of the fragment by depositing on the decision node
The private key of storage carries out obtained information of signing.
The sub- message blocks being verified are merged, the message blocks after being merged；
The message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by the decision node of the block；
Wherein, the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by the decision node of the block,
Specifically:
The message blocks are respectively sent to often by the decision node for controlling the block by practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm
The decision node of one fragment.
If the decision node of fragment receives the first signing messages postbacked more than the fragment decision node of preset number threshold value,
Then judge that the message blocks are verified；After being verified, then the message blocks are broadcasted to network；First signing messages is
The decision node of fragment to message blocks be verified after (verifying be exactly the signed data for including in message blocks is verified, with
And message format in message blocks is verified), what is postbacked is verified corresponding signing messages；Wherein the quantity threshold is
The number of all fragment decision nodes with 2/3 product.
Referring to figure 2., the embodiment of the present invention two are as follows:
It knows together terminal the present invention provides a kind of isomery of block chain, including memory 1, processor 2 and is stored in storage
On device 1 and the computer program that can run on processor 2, the processor 2 realize embodiment one when executing described program
All steps.
In conclusion the present invention provides a kind of isomery of block chain common recognition method and terminal, in each round common recognition process
In, decision node of the exclusive node as block is selected, the son sent by decision node of the decision node to each fragment
Message blocks are verified, and are merged to the sub- message blocks being verified, the message blocks after being merged, and message blocks are divided
The corresponding decision node of each fragment is not sent to be verified, when the number being verified is greater than preset number threshold value, table
Show that the message blocks are verified, the message blocks can be broadcasted；The present invention is selected during each round common recognition by the above method
The new decision node of block is also just unable to control entire common recognition process, together so that attacker can not judge " leader " of decision
When each fragment used by common recognition algorithm it is different, attacker can not control all fragments by a kind of attack strategies, also
It is unable to control entire common recognition process, attacker wants most nodes of the necessary control system of control common recognition process, this is undoubtedly
The difficulty of attack is increased, to solve the node of a certain fragment in hacker attack block chain, and block decision is caused to occur
The problem of significant error, improves the safety of block chain.
The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, all to utilize this hair
Equivalents made by bright specification and accompanying drawing content are applied directly or indirectly in other relevant technical fields, similarly
It is included within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
- The method 1. a kind of isomery of block chain is known together, which comprises the following steps:S1: during each round common recognition, decision node of the exclusive node as block is filtered out；S2: the sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent are received by the decision node, and the son sent respectively to each fragment disappears Breath block is verified；S3: the sub- message blocks being verified are merged, the message blocks after being merged；S4: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by the decision node of the block；S5: if receiving the first signing messages postbacked more than the fragment decision node of preset number threshold value, judge the message Block is verified；First signing messages is after the decision node of fragment is verified message blocks, and what is postbacked is verified Corresponding signing messages.
- The method 2. a kind of isomery of block chain according to claim 1 is known together, which is characterized in that the S1 specifically:During each round common recognition, the corresponding competition value of each node to be selected is calculated by preset first formula, is obtained Multiple competition values；Each described node to be selected is the corresponding decision node of each fragment；The competition value for meeting preset condition is filtered out from the multiple competition value, obtains multiple first competition values；Announce the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering；Within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements is obtained, the first minimum competition value is obtained；Screen decision node of the corresponding node of the first minimum competition value as block.
- The method 3. a kind of isomery of block chain according to claim 2 is known together, which is characterized in that first formula is specific Are as follows:Wherein, the CiFor the competition value of i-th of node to be selected, the skiIndicate the private that encryption data is used on the node to be selected Key, r indicate the wheel number of current common recognition process, QrIndicate the corresponding random number of r wheel common recognition process,It indicates to utilize Private key skiTo r and QrCarry out data signature, H1For hash function.
- The method 4. a kind of isomery of block chain according to claim 2 is known together, which is characterized in that the S2 specifically:The sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent are received by the decision node of the block；By the public key of the decision node of each fragment, the sub- message blocks signing messages that corresponding fragment decision node is sent is verified Correctness；The signing messages is obtained by the decision node of the fragment is signed by the private key stored on the decision node Information.
- The method 5. a kind of isomery of block chain according to claim 1 is known together, which is characterized in that the S4 specifically:The message blocks are respectively sent to each point by practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm by the decision node for controlling the block The decision node of piece.
- The method 6. a kind of isomery of block chain according to claim 1 is known together, which is characterized in that further include:By preset second formula, newly-increased node is distributed into corresponding fragment；Second formula is x=sToi (addi) %n, wherein the i is the serial number of node, x is node i fragment to be allocated Serial number, addi indicates the address of node i, and sToi indicates that address sequence is transformed into the function of integer.
- The method 7. a kind of isomery of block chain according to claim 1 is known together, which is characterized in that further include:Default common recognition algorithm set Co={ Co1,Co2,…,Com, wherein Cok, k=1,2 ..., m, the row of expression serial number k's is total to Know algorithm；If generating new fragment in block chain, the row's serial number for the common recognition algorithm that new fragment usesIts In, the g indicates the serial number of new fragment, describedIndicate the new corresponding cryptographic Hash of fragment decision node, % indicates complementation Operation.
- The terminal 8. isomery of block chain a kind of is known together, including memory, processor and storage are on a memory and can be in processor The computer program of upper operation, which is characterized in that the processor performs the steps of when executing the computer programS1: during each round common recognition, decision node of the exclusive node as block is filtered out；S2: the sub- message blocks that each fragment is sent are received by the decision node, and the son sent respectively to each fragment disappears Breath block is verified；S3: the sub- message blocks being verified are merged, the message blocks after being merged；S4: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by the decision node of the block；S5: if receiving the first signing messages postbacked more than the fragment decision node of preset number threshold value, judge the message Block is verified；First signing messages is after the decision node of fragment is verified message blocks, and what is postbacked is verified Corresponding signing messages.
- The terminal 9. a kind of isomery of block chain according to claim 8 is known together, which is characterized in that the S1 specifically:During each round common recognition, the corresponding competition value of each node to be selected is calculated by preset first formula, is obtained Multiple competition values；Each described node to be selected is the corresponding decision node of each fragment；The competition value for meeting preset condition is filtered out from the multiple competition value, obtains multiple first competition values；Announce the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering；Within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements is obtained, the first minimum competition value is obtained；Screen decision node of the corresponding node of the first minimum competition value as block.
- The terminal 10. a kind of isomery of block chain according to claim 9 is known together, which is characterized in that the first formula tool Body are as follows:Wherein, the CiFor the competition value of i-th of node to be selected, the skiIndicate the private that encryption data is used on the node to be selected Key, r indicate the wheel number of current common recognition process, QrIndicate the corresponding random number of r wheel common recognition process,It indicates to utilize Private key skiTo r and QrCarry out data signature, H1For hash function.
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| CN112968883B (en) | 2023-04-07 |
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| CN112968884B (en) | 2023-03-24 |
| CN109379343B (en) | 2020-12-18 |
| CN112968884A (en) | 2021-06-15 |
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