CN109274674A - A kind of block chain isomerism common recognition method and terminal with high security - Google Patents

A kind of block chain isomerism common recognition method and terminal with high security Download PDF

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Publication number
CN109274674A
CN109274674A CN201811128359.1A CN201811128359A CN109274674A CN 109274674 A CN109274674 A CN 109274674A CN 201811128359 A CN201811128359 A CN 201811128359A CN 109274674 A CN109274674 A CN 109274674A
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fragment
decision node
node
message blocks
value
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CN109274674B (en
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斯雪明
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Fujian Fuchain Technology Co Ltd
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Fujian Fuchain Technology Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

Abstract

The present invention provides a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition method and terminal with high security, during each round common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out respectively, to filter out the first decision node of block, and the sub- message blocks generated by the corresponding decision node of the node verification fragment in fragment, during only sub- message blocks are fragmented, no less than preset number node verification is by the way that after block, the first decision node is just received；And it is verified by the sub- message blocks that decision node of the decision node to each fragment is sent, and the sub- message blocks being verified are merged, message blocks after being merged, and the decision node that message blocks are respectively sent to each fragment is verified, when the number being verified is greater than preset number threshold value, indicate that the message blocks are verified；The present invention solves the node when a certain fragment in hacker attack block chain, and cause block decision occur significant error the problem of, improve the safety of block chain.

Description

A kind of block chain isomerism common recognition method and terminal with high security
Technical field
The present invention relates to block chain technical field more particularly to a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition methods with high security And terminal.
Background technique
Common recognition mechanism is one of the core technology of block chain.Common recognition mechanism is that the user of mutual mistrust in block chain reaches letter The mechanism appointed is the basis of record transmitting, verifying, duplication in block chain.Current common recognition mechanism mainly includes proof of work (Proof of Work, PoW), equity prove (Proof of Stake, PoS), and equity is appointed to prove (Delegated Proof Of Stake, DPoS) and practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance, PBFT) And the deformation of this 4 kinds common recognition mechanism.Certainly, now novel distributed account book technology, such as with directed acyclic graph (Directed Acyclic Graph, DAG) is that the new distribution type account book technology of representative carries common recognition mechanism.Existing common recognition Mechanism is more or less problematic in that.Such as PoW common recognition mechanism is there are the wasting of resources, the common recognition time is long and common recognition monopolization and The defect of 51% natural attack；PoS common recognition mechanism haves the defects that long-chain attack, common recognition monopolization and knows together difficult of proof； DPoS common recognition mechanism haves the defects that centralization, long-chain attack and knows together difficult of proof；When PBFT knows together mechanism in the presence of common recognition Between with common recognition number of nodes exponential increase defect；And the new distribution type account book technology of the included common recognition based on DAG is deposited Safety it is weak and common recognition centralization the problem of.
Safety is the most important attribute of common recognition mechanism.Common recognition mechanism is the core of block chain, the safety for mechanism of knowing together Directly determine the safety of entire block catenary system.Therefore the safety for reinforcing common recognition mechanism is to promote entire block catenary system The key for being safely.Current common recognition mechanism has ignored the safety of a part mostly for availability, or only considers A part of safety, it may also be said to which common recognition mechanism only considers the safety that anti-internal system people makes sad work of it at present, and seldom examine Consider the safety of anti-hacking.
Current block chain mostly uses greatly the common recognition mechanism of single common recognition or a variety of common recognition laminated structures, such as has block Catenary system uses the common recognition mechanism of PoW+PBFT, and the common recognition mechanism of this superposition is to do preliminary common recognition with PoW mostly, then again Using other common recognition mechanism.The common recognition mechanism of this mode can not fundamentally solve common recognition mechanism above-mentioned and be faced Defect.
Summary of the invention
The technical problems to be solved by the present invention are: the present invention provides a kind of, the block chain isomerism with high security is total Knowledge method and terminal can prevent block chain safety issue caused by hacker attack to a certain extent, improve block The safety of chain.
In order to solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention provides a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition side with high security Method, comprising the following steps:
S1: during each round common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out；
S2: according to the decision node of all fragments, the first decision node of block is filtered out；
S3: the sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that the first decision node receives each fragment；The sub- message blocks It is generated for the decision node of the fragment, and passes through the no less than verifying of preset number node in the fragment；
S4: the signing messages for the sub- message blocks that first decision node respectively sends each fragment is verified；
S5: merge the sub- message blocks being verified, the message blocks after being merged；
S6: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by first decision node；
S7: if it is more than the first signature presetting the decision node of the first quantity threshold and postbacking that first decision node, which receives, Information then judges that the message blocks are verified；First signing messages is that the decision node of fragment is logical to message blocks verifying Later, what is postbacked is verified corresponding signing messages.
The block chain isomerism common recognition terminal with high security that the present invention also provides a kind of, including memory, processor And the computer program that can be run on a memory and on a processor is stored, when the processor executes the computer program It performs the steps of
S1: during each round common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out；
S2: according to the decision node of all fragments, the first decision node of block is filtered out；
S3: the sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that the first decision node receives each fragment；The sub- message blocks It is generated for the decision node of the fragment, and passes through the no less than verifying of preset number node in the fragment；
S4: the signing messages for the sub- message blocks that first decision node respectively sends each fragment is verified；
S5: merge the sub- message blocks being verified, the message blocks after being merged；
S6: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by first decision node；
S7: if it is more than the first signature presetting the decision node of the first quantity threshold and postbacking that first decision node, which receives, Information then judges that the message blocks are verified；First signing messages is that the decision node of fragment is logical to message blocks verifying Later, what is postbacked is verified corresponding signing messages.
The invention has the benefit that
The present invention provides a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition method and terminal with high security, knew together in each round Cheng Zhong, filters out the decision node of each fragment in block respectively, to filter out the first decision node of block, and passes through The sub- message blocks that the corresponding decision node of the node verification fragment in fragment generates, during only sub- message blocks are fragmented, much In preset number node verification by the way that after block, the first decision node is just received；And by decision node to each fragment The sub- message blocks that decision node is sent are verified, and are merged to the sub- message blocks being verified, disappearing after being merged Block is ceased, and message blocks are respectively sent to the corresponding decision node of each fragment and are verified, when the number being verified is greater than When preset number threshold value, indicates that the message blocks are verified, the message blocks can be broadcasted；The present invention is by the above method, each The decision node of each fragment and the decision node that all fragments composition block is new are selected during wheel common recognition, so that attacker It can not judge the decision node of each fragment and the decision node of block, also just be unable to control entire common recognition process, while each Common recognition algorithm used by fragment is different, and attacker can not be controlled all fragments by a kind of attack strategies, also can not just be controlled Entire common recognition process is made, attacker wants most nodes of the necessary control system of control common recognition process, this is undoubtedly increased The difficulty of attack to solve the node of a certain fragment in hacker attack block chain, and causes block decision that great mistake occurs Accidentally the problem of, improve the safety of block chain.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the key step according to a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition method with high security of the embodiment of the present invention Schematic diagram；
Fig. 2 is the structural representation according to a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition terminal with high security of the embodiment of the present invention Figure；
Label declaration:
1, memory；2, processor.
Specific embodiment
To explain the technical content, the achieved purpose and the effect of the present invention in detail, below in conjunction with embodiment and cooperate attached Figure is explained in detail.
Fig. 1 is please referred to, the block chain isomerism common recognition method with high security that the present invention provides a kind of, including following step It is rapid:
S1: during each round common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out；
S2: according to the decision node of all fragments, the first decision node of block is filtered out；
S3: the sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that the first decision node receives each fragment；The sub- message blocks It is generated for the decision node of the fragment, and passes through the no less than verifying of preset number node in the fragment；
S4: the signing messages for the sub- message blocks that first decision node respectively sends each fragment is verified；
S5: merge the sub- message blocks being verified, the message blocks after being merged；
S6: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by first decision node；
S7: if it is more than the first signature presetting the decision node of the first quantity threshold and postbacking that first decision node, which receives, Information then judges that the message blocks are verified；First signing messages is that the decision node of fragment is logical to message blocks verifying Later, what is postbacked is verified corresponding signing messages.
The method as can be seen from the above description, the block chain isomerism that the present invention provides a kind of with high security is known together, every During one wheel common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out respectively, to filter out the first decision of block Node, and the sub- message blocks generated by the corresponding decision node of the node verification fragment in fragment, only sub- message blocks quilt In fragment, no less than preset number node verification is by the way that after block, the first decision node is just received；And pass through decision node pair The sub- message blocks that the decision node of each fragment is sent are verified, and are merged to the sub- message blocks being verified, and are obtained Message blocks after merging, and message blocks are respectively sent to the corresponding decision node of each fragment and are verified, when being verified Number be greater than preset number threshold value when, indicate that the message blocks are verified, the message blocks can be broadcasted；The present invention passes through above-mentioned side Method selects the decision node of each fragment and the decision node that all fragments composition block is new during each round common recognition, So that attacker can not judge the decision node of each fragment and the decision node of block, also just it is unable to control and entirely knew together Journey, while common recognition algorithm used by each fragment is different, attacker can not control all fragments by a kind of attack strategies, Also it is just unable to control entire common recognition process, attacker wants most nodes of the necessary control system of control common recognition process, this The difficulty of attack is undoubtedly increased, to solve the node when a certain fragment in hacker attack block chain, and block is caused to be determined The problem of significant error, occurs for plan, improves the safety of block chain.
Further, the S1 specifically:
S11: during each round common recognition, it is corresponding that all nodes in a fragment are calculated separately by preset first formula Competition value, obtain multiple competition values；
S12: filtering out the competition value for meeting preset condition from the multiple competition value, obtains multiple first competition values；
S13: the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering is announced；
S14: within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements, the first minimum competition value are obtained；
S15: decision node of the corresponding node of screening the first minimum competition value as the fragment；
S16: repeating step S11 to S15, until filtering out the decision node of all fragments in the piecemeal.
As can be seen from the above description, the competition value of all nodes in each fragment is calculated during each round common recognition, And decision node of the corresponding node of minimum competition value as the fragment in the fragment is selected, so that attacker can not be determined in advance The decision node of each fragment during wheel common recognition improves the safety during block chain common recognition；Above-mentioned announcement is every One competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for the public key of data deciphering, passes through corresponding public affairs convenient for the node of each fragment Key verifies the signing messages of sub- message blocks.
Further, first formula specifically:
Wherein, describedIt is described for the competition value of the node to be selected of i-th of fragment serial number jIndicate i-th of fragment sequence Number for the private key that is used for encryption data on the node to be selected of j, r indicates the wheel number of current common recognition process,It indicates in r wheel common recognition The corresponding random number of i-th fragment,It indicates to utilize private keyTo i and r andCarry out data signature, H1To breathe out Uncommon function, i.e., to i, r andPass through private keyData after being signed carry out Hash operation.
Further, the S2 specifically:
According to the corresponding competition value of the decision node of each fragment, unique first decision node of the block is filtered out.
As can be seen from the above description, during each round common recognition, all in accordance with the decision node for each fragment selected, screening Unique first decision node of block of all fragment compositions out, improves the safety during common recognition.
Further, the S4 specifically:
The sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that first decision node receives each fragment；
The first decision node is controlled by the public key of the decision node of each fragment, corresponding fragment decision node is verified and sends Sub- message blocks signing messages correctness；The signing messages is the decision node of the fragment by storing on the decision node Private key carry out obtained information of signing.
It, can the sub- message blocks that send of the decision node effectively to each fragment as can be seen from the above description, by the above method It is verified, improves the safety of common recognition process；Meanwhile the public key of the decision node of each fragment, above-mentioned announcement can be passed through Node and the node on obtained for the public key acquisition of data deciphering；
Further, the S6 specifically:
It controls the first decision node and the message blocks is respectively sent to by each fragment by practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm Decision node.
As can be seen from the above description, can guarantee message blocks to be sent on the decision node of the first fragment, improve system Fault-tolerance.
Further, a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition method with high security, which is characterized in that also wrap It includes:
Default first attribute list A={ A1,A2,A3, i.e., three attribute-bit values are preset in the described first attribute list A A1,A2,A3；
Default second attribute list B={ B1,B2,B3, i.e., three attribute-bit values are preset in the described second attribute list B B1,B2,B3；
Judge whether there is newly-increased node in block chain, if so, then distributing an ident value from A and B, obtains the first mark Knowledge value and second identifier value；
According to first identifier value and second identifier value, the newly-increased node is distributed into the fragment of corresponding serial number.
Wherein the ident value of attribute is A1,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 1+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute For A1,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 2+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A1,B3Corresponding fragment serial number 3+ 9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A2,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 4+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the mark of attribute Knowledge value is A2,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 5+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A2,B3Corresponding fragment serial number For 6+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A3,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 7+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), attribute Ident value be A3,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 8+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A3,B3Corresponding fragment Serial number 9+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the n indicate the serial number of newly-increased node.
Referring to figure 2., the block chain isomerism common recognition terminal with high security that the present invention provides a kind of, including memory 1, processor 2 and it is stored in the computer program that can be run on memory 1 and on processor 2, the processor 2 executes described It is performed the steps of when program
S1: during each round common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out；
S2: according to the decision node of all fragments, the first decision node of block is filtered out；
S3: the sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that the first decision node receives each fragment；The sub- message blocks It is generated for the decision node of the fragment, and passes through the no less than verifying of preset number node in the fragment；
S4: the signing messages for the sub- message blocks that first decision node respectively sends each fragment is verified；
S5: merge the sub- message blocks being verified, the message blocks after being merged；
S6: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by first decision node；
S7: if it is more than the first signature presetting the decision node of the first quantity threshold and postbacking that first decision node, which receives, Information then judges that the message blocks are verified；First signing messages is that the decision node of fragment is logical to message blocks verifying Later, what is postbacked is verified corresponding signing messages.
Further, a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition terminal with high security, the S1 specifically:
S11: during each round common recognition, it is corresponding that all nodes in a fragment are calculated separately by preset first formula Competition value, obtain multiple competition values；
S12: filtering out the competition value for meeting preset condition from the multiple competition value, obtains multiple first competition values；
S13: the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering is announced；
S14: within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements, the first minimum competition value are obtained；
S15: decision node of the corresponding node of screening the first minimum competition value as the fragment；
S16: repeating step S11 to S15, until filtering out the decision node of all fragments in the piecemeal.
Further, a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition terminal with high security, first formula are specific Are as follows:
Wherein, describedIt is described for the competition value of the node to be selected of i-th of fragment serial number jIndicate i-th of fragment sequence Number for the private key that is used for encryption data on the node to be selected of j, r indicates the wheel number of current common recognition process,It indicates in r wheel common recognition The corresponding random number of i-th fragment,It indicates to utilize private keyTo i and r andCarry out data signature, H1To breathe out Uncommon function.
Further, a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition terminal with high security, the S2 specifically:
According to the corresponding competition value of the decision node of each fragment, unique first decision node of the block is filtered out.
Further, a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition terminal with high security, the S4 specifically:
The sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that first decision node receives each fragment；
By the public key of the decision node of each fragment, the sub- message blocks A.L.S. that corresponding fragment decision node is sent is verified The correctness of breath；The signing messages carries out signature institute by the private key stored on the decision node for the decision node of the fragment Obtained information.
Further, a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition terminal with high security, the S6 specifically:
It controls the first decision node and the message blocks is respectively sent to by each fragment by practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm Decision node.
Further, a kind of block chain isomerism common recognition method with high security, which is characterized in that also wrap It includes:
Default first attribute list A={ A1,A2,A3, i.e., three attribute-bit values are preset in the described first attribute list A A1,A2,A3；
Default second attribute list B={ B1,B2,B3, i.e., three attribute-bit values are preset in the described second attribute list B B1,B2,B3；
Judge whether there is newly-increased node in block chain, if so, then distributing an ident value from A and B, obtains the first mark Knowledge value and second identifier value；
According to first identifier value and second identifier value, the newly-increased node is distributed into the fragment of corresponding serial number.
Wherein the ident value of attribute is A1,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 1+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute For A1,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 2+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A1,B3Corresponding fragment serial number 3+ 9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A2,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 4+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the mark of attribute Knowledge value is A2,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 5+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A2,B3Corresponding fragment serial number For 6+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A3,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 7+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), attribute Ident value be A3,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 8+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A3,B3Corresponding fragment Serial number 9+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the n indicate the serial number of newly-increased node.
Please refer to Fig. 1, the embodiment of the present invention one are as follows:
The block chain isomerism common recognition method with high security that the present invention provides a kind of, comprising the following steps:
S0: default first attribute list A={ A1,A2,A3, i.e., three attribute-bits are preset in the described first attribute list A Value A1,A2,A3；Default second attribute list B={ B1,B2,B3, i.e., three attribute-bits are preset in the described second attribute list B Value B1,B2,B3；
Judge whether there is newly-increased node in block chain, if so, then distributing an ident value from A and B, obtains the first mark Knowledge value and second identifier value；According to first identifier value and second identifier value, the newly-increased node is distributed to corresponding serial number In fragment；
Wherein the ident value of attribute is A1,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 1+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute For A1,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 2+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A1,B3Corresponding fragment serial number 3+ 9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A2,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 4+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the mark of attribute Knowledge value is A2,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 5+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A2,B3Corresponding fragment serial number For 6+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A3,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 7+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), attribute Ident value be A3,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 8+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A3,B3Corresponding fragment Serial number 9+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the n indicate the serial number of newly-increased node.
S1: during each round common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out；
Wherein, the S1 specifically:
S11: during each round common recognition, it is corresponding that all nodes in a fragment are calculated separately by preset first formula Competition value, obtain multiple competition values；
Wherein, first formula specifically:
Wherein, describedIt is described for the competition value of the node to be selected of i-th of fragment serial number jIndicate i-th of fragment sequence Number for the private key that is used for encryption data on the node to be selected of j, r indicates the wheel number of current common recognition process,It indicates in r wheel common recognition The corresponding random number of i-th fragment,It indicates to utilize private keyTo i and r andCarry out data signature, H1To breathe out Uncommon function；
The corresponding competition value of all nodes in a fragment is calculated separately by preset first formula, obtains multiple competitions Value, specifically:
It is calculated by the first formula and calculates separately the corresponding cryptographic Hash of all nodes in a fragment, cryptographic Hash is converted For two numbers processed, multiple binary numbers are obtained, the multiple binary number is the multiple competition value, each competition value and institute It is corresponding to state a node in fragment.
S12: it is filtered out from the multiple competition value and meets the competition value of preset condition and (filter out and be less than default competition It is worth the competition value of threshold value, the number of nodes to be selected and needs of selection and the participation competition of this threshold value select the node to be selected come Quantity it is related, can according to actual needs oneself set), obtain multiple first competition values；
S13: the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering is announced；
S14: within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements, the first minimum competition value are obtained；
S15: decision node of the corresponding node of screening the first minimum competition value as the fragment；
S16: repeating step S11 to S15, until filtering out the decision node of all fragments in the piecemeal.
S2: according to the decision node of all fragments, the first decision node of block is filtered out；
Wherein, the S2 specifically:
According to the corresponding competition value of the decision node of each fragment, wherein the smallest second competition value is obtained；
The corresponding node of the second competition value is screened as unique first decision node of the block.
S3: the sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that the first decision node receives each fragment；The sub- message blocks It is the block that is generated in each fragment as the concept of the block on normal block chain, includes multiple message in block； The sub- message blocks are that the decision node of the fragment generates, and passes through the no less than verifying of preset number node in the fragment；
Wherein, the S3 specifically:
After the decision node of each fragment generates sub- message blocks, the sub- message blocks include signing messages, the signing messages The information signed for the decision node by the private key being stored on the decision node；
The decision node sends all nodes in the sub- message blocks to the fragment respectively, receives to the section of sub- message blocks Point, by the corresponding public key of the decision node, (public key on the node and the node that public key passes through announcement for data deciphering is obtained Obtain), sub- message blocks are verified, if after being verified, postbacking and being verified corresponding signed data to the decision Node；When what the decision node received is verified corresponding signed data more than preset number, then the sub- message is judged Block is verified；After the sub- message blocks are verified, which sends sub- message blocks to the first decision node；
Preferably, preset number be the fragment in all nodes number with 2/3 product.
S4: the signing messages for the sub- message blocks that first decision node respectively sends each fragment is verified；
Wherein, the S4 specifically:
The sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that first decision node receives each fragment；
By the public key of the decision node of each fragment, the sub- message blocks A.L.S. that corresponding fragment decision node is sent is verified The correctness of breath；The signing messages carries out signature institute by the private key stored on the decision node for the decision node of the fragment Obtained information.
S5: merge the sub- message blocks being verified, the message blocks after being merged；
S6: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by first decision node；
Wherein, the S6 specifically:
It controls the first decision node and the message blocks is respectively sent to by each fragment by practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm Decision node.
S7: if it is more than the first signature presetting the decision node of the first quantity threshold and postbacking that first decision node, which receives, Information then judges that the message blocks are verified；First signing messages is that the decision node of fragment is logical to message blocks verifying Later, what is postbacked is verified corresponding signing messages；
Wherein, wherein the first quantity threshold be all fragment decision nodes number with 2/3 product；
In actual application, it for the node of system is newly added, needs to be added into a certain fragment in advance.
Referring to figure 2., the embodiment of the present invention two are as follows:
The block chain isomerism that the present invention provides a kind of with high security is known together terminal, including memory, processor and The computer program that can be run on a memory and on a processor is stored, the processor executes real when the computer program Existing following steps:
S0: default first attribute list A={ A1,A2,A3, i.e., three attribute-bits are preset in the described first attribute list A Value A1,A2,A3；Default second attribute list B={ B1,B2,B3, i.e., three attribute-bits are preset in the described second attribute list B Value B1,B2,B3；
Judge whether there is newly-increased node in block chain, if so, then distributing an ident value from A and B, obtains the first mark Knowledge value and second identifier value；According to first identifier value and second identifier value, the newly-increased node is distributed to corresponding serial number In fragment；
Wherein the ident value of attribute is A1,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 1+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute For A1,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 2+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A1,B3Corresponding fragment serial number 3+ 9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A2,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 4+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the mark of attribute Knowledge value is A2,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 5+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A2,B3Corresponding fragment serial number For 6+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A3,B1Corresponding fragment serial number 7+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), attribute Ident value be A3,B2Corresponding fragment serial number 8+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the ident value of attribute is A3,B3Corresponding fragment Serial number 9+9n (n=0,1,2 ...), the n indicate the serial number of newly-increased node.
S1: during each round common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out；
Wherein, the S1 specifically:
S11: during each round common recognition, it is corresponding that all nodes in a fragment are calculated separately by preset first formula Competition value, obtain multiple competition values；
Wherein, first formula specifically:
Wherein, describedIt is described for the competition value of the node to be selected of i-th of fragment serial number jIndicate i-th of fragment sequence Number for the private key that is used for encryption data on the node to be selected of j, r indicates the wheel number of current common recognition process,It indicates in r wheel common recognition The corresponding random number of i-th fragment,It indicates to utilize private keyTo i and r andCarry out data signature, H1To breathe out Uncommon function.
S12: filtering out the competition value for meeting preset condition from the multiple competition value, obtains multiple first competition values；
S13: the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering is announced；
S14: within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements, the first minimum competition value are obtained；
S15: decision node of the corresponding node of screening the first minimum competition value as the fragment；
S16: repeating step S11 to S15, until filtering out the decision node of all fragments in the piecemeal.
S2: according to the decision node of all fragments, the first decision node of block is filtered out；
Wherein, the S2 specifically:
According to the corresponding competition value of the decision node of each fragment, wherein the smallest second competition value is obtained；
The corresponding node of the second competition value is screened as unique first decision node of the block.
S3: the sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that the first decision node receives each fragment；The sub- message blocks It is generated for the decision node of the fragment, and passes through the no less than verifying of preset number node in the fragment；
Wherein, the S3 specifically:
After the decision node of each fragment generates sub- message blocks, the sub- message blocks include signing messages, the signing messages The information signed for the decision node by the private key being stored on the decision node；
The decision node sends all nodes in the sub- message blocks to the fragment respectively, receives to the section of sub- message blocks Point, by the corresponding public key of the decision node, (public key on the node and the node that public key passes through announcement for data deciphering is obtained Obtain), sub- message blocks are verified, if after being verified, postbacking and being verified corresponding signed data to the decision Node；When what the decision node received is verified corresponding signed data more than preset number, then the sub- message is judged Block is verified；After the sub- message blocks are verified, which sends sub- message blocks to the first decision node；
Preferably, preset number be the fragment in all nodes number with 2/3 product.
S4: the signing messages for the sub- message blocks that first decision node respectively sends each fragment is verified；
Wherein, the S4 specifically:
The sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that first decision node receives each fragment；
By the public key of the decision node of each fragment, the sub- message blocks A.L.S. that corresponding fragment decision node is sent is verified The correctness of breath；The signing messages carries out signature institute by the private key stored on the decision node for the decision node of the fragment Obtained information.
S5: merge the sub- message blocks being verified, the message blocks after being merged；
S6: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by first decision node；
Wherein, the S6 specifically:
It controls the first decision node and the message blocks is respectively sent to by each fragment by practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm Decision node.
S7: if it is more than the first signature presetting the decision node of the first quantity threshold and postbacking that first decision node, which receives, Information then judges that the message blocks are verified；First signing messages is that the decision node of fragment is logical to message blocks verifying Later, what is postbacked is verified corresponding signing messages；
Wherein, wherein the first quantity threshold be all fragment decision nodes number with 2/3 product；
In conclusion the block chain isomerism common recognition method and terminal that the present invention provides a kind of with high security, every During one wheel common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out respectively, to filter out the first decision of block Node, and the sub- message blocks generated by the corresponding decision node of the node verification fragment in fragment, only sub- message blocks quilt In fragment, no less than preset number node verification is by the way that after block, the first decision node is just received；And pass through decision node pair The sub- message blocks that the decision node of each fragment is sent are verified, and are merged to the sub- message blocks being verified, and are obtained Message blocks after merging, and message blocks are respectively sent to the corresponding decision node of each fragment and are verified, when being verified Number be greater than preset number threshold value when, indicate that the message blocks are verified, the message blocks can be broadcasted；The present invention passes through above-mentioned side Method selects the decision node of each fragment and the decision node that all fragments composition block is new during each round common recognition, So that attacker can not judge the decision node of each fragment and the decision node of block, also just it is unable to control and entirely knew together Journey, while common recognition algorithm used by each fragment is different, attacker can not control all fragments by a kind of attack strategies, Also it is just unable to control entire common recognition process, attacker wants most nodes of the necessary control system of control common recognition process, this The difficulty of attack is undoubtedly increased, to solve the node of a certain fragment in hacker attack block chain, and causes block decision The problem of significant error occurs, improves the safety of block chain.
The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, all to utilize this hair Equivalents made by bright specification and accompanying drawing content are applied directly or indirectly in other relevant technical fields, similarly It is included within the scope of the present invention.

Claims (10)

  1. A kind of method 1. block chain isomerism with high security is known together, which comprises the following steps:
    S1: during each round common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out；
    S2: according to the decision node of all fragments, the first decision node of block is filtered out；
    S3: the sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that the first decision node receives each fragment；The sub- message blocks are should The decision node of fragment generates, and passes through the no less than verifying of preset number node in the fragment；
    S4: the signing messages for the sub- message blocks that first decision node respectively sends each fragment is verified；
    S5: merge the sub- message blocks being verified, the message blocks after being merged；
    S6: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by first decision node；
    S7: if it is more than the first A.L.S. presetting the decision node of the first quantity threshold and postbacking that first decision node, which receives, Breath, then judge that the message blocks are verified；First signing messages is that the decision node of fragment is verified message blocks Afterwards, what is postbacked is verified corresponding signing messages.
  2. The method 2. a kind of block chain isomerism with high security according to claim 1 is known together, which is characterized in that described S1 specifically:
    S11: during each round common recognition, it is corresponding competing that all nodes in a fragment are calculated separately by preset first formula Value is striven, multiple competition values are obtained；
    S12: filtering out the competition value for meeting preset condition from the multiple competition value, obtains multiple first competition values；
    S13: the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering is announced；
    S14: within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements, the first minimum competition value are obtained；
    S15: decision node of the corresponding node of screening the first minimum competition value as the fragment；
    S16: repeating step S11 to S15, until filtering out the decision node of all fragments in the piecemeal.
  3. The method 3. a kind of block chain isomerism with high security according to claim 2 is known together, which is characterized in that described First formula specifically:
    Wherein, describedIt is described for the competition value of the node to be selected of i-th of fragment serial number jIndicate i-th of fragment serial number The private key of encryption data is used on the node to be selected of j, r indicates the wheel number of current common recognition process,It indicates i-th in r wheel common recognition The corresponding random number of fragment,It indicates to utilize private keyTo i and r andCarry out data signature, H1For Hash Function.
  4. The method 4. a kind of block chain isomerism with high security according to claim 2 or 3 is known together, which is characterized in that The S2 specifically:
    According to the corresponding competition value of the decision node of each fragment, unique first decision node of the block is filtered out.
  5. The method 5. a kind of block chain isomerism with high security according to claim 2 is known together, which is characterized in that described S4 specifically:
    The sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that first decision node receives each fragment；
    By the public key of the decision node of each fragment, the sub- message blocks signing messages that corresponding fragment decision node is sent is verified Correctness；The signing messages is obtained by the decision node of the fragment is signed by the private key stored on the decision node Information.
  6. The method 6. a kind of block chain isomerism with high security according to claim 1 is known together, which is characterized in that described S6 specifically:
    It controls the first decision node and the message blocks is respectively sent to by determining for each fragment by practical Byzantine failure tolerance algorithm Plan node.
  7. The method 7. a kind of block chain isomerism with high security according to claim 1 is known together, which is characterized in that also wrap It includes:
    Default first attribute list A={ A1,A2,A3, i.e., three attribute-bit value A are preset in the described first attribute list A1,A2, A3；
    Default second attribute list B={ B1,B2,B3, i.e., three attribute-bit value B are preset in the described second attribute list B1,B2, B3；
    Judge whether there is newly-increased node in block chain, if so, then distributing an ident value from A and B, obtains first identifier value With second identifier value；
    According to first identifier value and second identifier value, the newly-increased node is distributed into the fragment of corresponding serial number.
  8. The terminal 8. a kind of block chain isomerism with high security is known together, including memory, processor and storage are on a memory And the computer program that can be run on a processor, which is characterized in that the processor is realized when executing the computer program Following steps:
    S1: during each round common recognition, the decision node of each fragment in block is filtered out；
    S2: according to the decision node of all fragments, the first decision node of block is filtered out；
    S3: the sub- message blocks sent by the decision node that the first decision node receives each fragment；The sub- message blocks are should The decision node of fragment generates, and passes through the no less than verifying of preset number node in the fragment；
    S4: the signing messages for the sub- message blocks that first decision node respectively sends each fragment is verified；
    S5: merge the sub- message blocks being verified, the message blocks after being merged；
    S6: the message blocks are respectively sent to the decision node of each fragment by first decision node；
    S7: if it is more than the first A.L.S. presetting the decision node of the first quantity threshold and postbacking that first decision node, which receives, Breath, then judge that the message blocks are verified；First signing messages is that the decision node of fragment is verified message blocks Afterwards, what is postbacked is verified corresponding signing messages.
  9. The terminal 9. a kind of block chain isomerism with high security according to claim 8 is known together, which is characterized in that described S1 specifically:
    S11: during each round common recognition, it is corresponding competing that all nodes in a fragment are calculated separately by preset first formula Value is striven, multiple competition values are obtained；
    S12: filtering out the competition value for meeting preset condition from the multiple competition value, obtains multiple first competition values；
    S13: the public key that each first competition is worth corresponding node and the node is used for data deciphering is announced；
    S14: within a preset time, the minimum value in the first competition value of all announcements, the first minimum competition value are obtained；
    S15: decision node of the corresponding node of screening the first minimum competition value as the fragment；
    S16: repeating step S11 to S15, until filtering out the decision node of all fragments in the piecemeal.
  10. The terminal 10. a kind of block chain isomerism with high security according to claim 9 is known together, which is characterized in that institute State the first formula specifically:
    Wherein, describedIt is described for the competition value of the node to be selected of i-th of fragment serial number jIndicate i-th of fragment serial number The private key of encryption data is used on the node to be selected of j, r indicates the wheel number of current common recognition process,It indicates i-th in r wheel common recognition The corresponding random number of fragment,It indicates to utilize private keyTo i and r andCarry out data signature, H1For Hash Function.
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