CN109343088B - Distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method based on signal to noise ratio - Google Patents
Distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method based on signal to noise ratio Download PDFInfo
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- CN109343088B CN109343088B CN201811425484.9A CN201811425484A CN109343088B CN 109343088 B CN109343088 B CN 109343088B CN 201811425484 A CN201811425484 A CN 201811425484A CN 109343088 B CN109343088 B CN 109343088B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
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- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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Abstract
The invention discloses a distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method based on a signal-to-noise ratio, which comprises at least two distributed receivers, wherein all the receivers are controlled to simultaneously receive Beidou satellite signals under a relative distance L, the signal-to-noise ratio difference value of each Beidou satellite signal received by any two receivers is extracted, the dispersion degree of the signal-to-noise ratio difference value is solved, and whether the receivers receive the deception jamming is judged according to the dispersion degree. The conclusion of deception jamming can be accurately detected, and the feasibility and the accuracy are good. The requirement on the antenna is reduced, the requirement on detecting the deception jamming can be met by the common satellite receiving antenna, and the cost is saved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of communication, relates to detection of Beidou deception signals, and particularly provides a distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method based on a signal-to-noise ratio.
Background
The existing power transmission time synchronization relates to national economic and civil safety, and the Beidou application is imperative. The power management department realizes the unification of the time reference of the whole power grid by using the time service function of the Beidou system, and the safe and stable operation of the power grid is guaranteed. The method mainly comprises the applications of power grid time reference unification, power station environment monitoring, electric vehicle monitoring and the like, wherein the power grid time reference unification is urgent to need high-precision Beidou service. However, the navigation message format, the coding modulation mode, the carrier frequency and other information of the civil part of the Beidou satellite signals are public, and the Beidou satellite simulator can be designed by easily utilizing the information. The spontaneous deception jamming is jamming that a Beidou satellite simulator automatically simulates a Beidou satellite signal to enable a Beidou receiving deception machine to receive a pseudo satellite signal to carry out wrong time service positioning. Once the Beidou receiver is subjected to deception interference, the time and the position analyzed by the Beidou receiver are not real time and position, and great potential safety hazards exist if time service and positioning are carried out according to the pseudo time and the pseudo position.
At present, some methods are proposed in the literature related to the detection of the satellite spoofing interference. Some documents judge whether the receiver is subjected to spoofing interference according to the power of the satellite signal received by the receiver, but once the receiver locks to the pseudolite signal, even if the power of the pseudolite signal is not too large, interference can be caused to the Beidou receiver. Some documents determine whether the signals are subjected to the spoofing interference according to the direction angles of the signals reaching the receiver, but the method has high requirements on the antenna and high cost. Some documents judge whether a receiving chip is subjected to deception interference according to whether data analyzed by satellite signals have sudden changes, but parameters of a satellite simulator are accurately set, so that the data received by a receiver cannot have sudden changes. Some literature theoretically indicates that if a distributed receiver is subjected to spoofing interference, the time of the distributed receiver is slightly deviated when the receivers in different positions solve the same position, but the positions of the receivers in different positions are not constant, and the relative positions of the receivers in different positions are not too different from the real relative positions. Some documents propose to obtain the signal-to-noise ratio of 2 groups of satellite signals through 2 antennas, and judge whether the spoofed interference is received or not according to the dispersion degree of the difference value of the signal-to-noise ratio. However, this method has high requirements for antennas, and the distance between antennas is relatively short. The common satellite receiving antenna can not obtain ideal effect through experiments, the deception experiments of the literature authors are carried out indoors, the outdoor complex experiment environment is not considered, the obtained ideal data model of deception interference is not established under the outdoor environment condition, and the deception interference can not be practically adopted.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method based on a signal-to-noise ratio. The method for judging the deception jamming by the distributed receiver based on the signal-to-noise ratio of the Beidou satellite signal is improved, and the appropriate relative distance and the corresponding detection threshold value of the distributed receiver are found.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme: based on signal noiseThe method for detecting Beidou deception jamming in a distributed mode comprises at least two distributed receivers and controls all the receivers to be in relative distance
And simultaneously receiving the Beidou satellite signals, extracting the signal-to-noise ratio difference value of each Beidou satellite signal received by any two receivers, solving the dispersion degree of the signal-to-noise ratio difference value, and judging whether the receiver receives deception interference according to the dispersion degree.
Further, the dispersion degree of the signal-to-noise ratio difference value is the variance of the signal-to-noise ratio difference values of the Beidou satellite signals received by the corresponding two receivers.
Further, setting a variance threshold H, judging that the variance is smaller than the variance threshold H, and judging that the receiver receives the deception interference.
Further, the variance is smaller than the variance threshold H for m times continuously, and the receiver is judged to receive the deception jamming.
Further, the variance threshold H =10.
Further, the receiver comprises a receiver 1 and a receiver 2, and at the time t, the relative distance between the receiver 1 and the receiver 2 is
Under the condition of (1), the average value of the signal-to-noise ratio difference values of the Beidou satellite signals received by the two receivers together is M A (t,l)，
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
for the signal-to-noise ratio of the beidou satellite signals received by the receiver 1,
is the signal-to-noise ratio, C, of the Beidou satellite signals received by the receiver 2 A Is the intersection of the beidou satellite signals received by the receiver 1 and the receiver 2,n is C A The number of the elements in (B).
Further, the average value of the signal-to-noise ratio difference values of the Beidou satellite signals received by the two receivers is M A (t, l), calculating the variance of the signal-to-noise ratio of the Beidou satellite signals of the receiver 1 and the receiver 2.
Further, two elements with the largest and the smallest numerical values are removed when the variance is calculated, and the obtained variance is V A (t,l)，
Further, the relative distance
Not less than 10m.
Further, the relative distance
After the technical scheme is adopted, the invention has the following advantages: firstly, the requirement on the antenna is reduced, the common satellite receiving antenna can meet the requirement on detecting the deception jamming, and the cost is saved; secondly, the influence of the relative distance between the distributed receivers on the dispersion degree of the SDN difference value of each Beidou satellite signal obtained by the two receivers is proved through experiments, the obtained relative distance is about 20m, the threshold value is set to be 10, the conclusion of deceptive interference can be accurately detected, and the feasibility and the accuracy are good; the invention has more reliability compared with the real situation.
Drawings
The invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings in which:
fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method based on a signal-to-noise ratio in the embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 2 is an SMBV satellite signal setting interface of the Beidou satellite signal simulator in the embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 3 is a variance of a Beidou satellite signal SDN difference value when the relative distance is 30cm in the embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 4 is a variance of a Beidou satellite signal SDN difference value at a relative distance of 1m in the embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 5 is a variance of a Beidou satellite signal SDN difference value at a relative distance of 5m in the embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 6 is a variance of a Beidou satellite signal SDN difference value at a relative distance of 10m in the embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 7 is a variance of a Beidou satellite signal SDN difference value at a relative distance of 15m according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 8 is a variance of a Beidou satellite signal SDN difference value at a relative distance of 20m according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 9 shows a variance of the SDN difference of the beidou satellite signal when the relative distance is 30m in the embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
Example (b):
as shown in figure 1, the invention relates to a distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method based on signal to noise ratio, which comprises at least two distributed receivers and is used for controlling all the receivers to be in relative distance
And simultaneously receiving the Beidou satellite signals, extracting the signal-to-noise ratio difference value of each Beidou satellite signal received by any two receivers, solving the dispersion degree of the signal-to-noise ratio difference value, and judging whether the receiver receives deception interference according to the dispersion degree. The dispersion degree of the signal-to-noise ratio difference value is the variance of the signal-to-noise ratio difference value of each Beidou satellite signal received by the corresponding two receivers. And setting a variance threshold H, judging that the variance is smaller than the variance threshold H, and judging that the receiver receives the deception interference. The variance threshold H =10.
In this embodiment, the receiver includes a receiver 1 and a receiver 2, and at time t, the relative distance between the receiver 1 and the receiver 2 is
In the case of (2), two receivers receive togetherThe average value of the signal-to-noise ratio difference value of the Beidou satellite signals is M A (t,l)，
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
for the signal-to-noise ratio of the beidou satellite signal received by the receiver 1,
is the signal-to-noise ratio, C, of the Beidou satellite signals received by the receiver 2 A Is the intersection of the Beidou satellite signals received by the receiver 1 and the receiver 2, and N is C A The number of the elements in (B).
The average value of the signal-to-noise ratio difference values of the Beidou satellite signals received by the two receivers is M A (t, l) calculating the variance of the signal-to-noise ratio of the Beidou satellite signals of the receiver 1 and the receiver 2. When calculating the variance, two elements with the maximum and minimum values are removed, and the obtained variance is V A (t,l)，
The relative distance
And judging that the receiver receives deception interference when the variance for m times is less than the variance threshold H.
The invention relates to a distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method based on a signal-to-noise ratio, which has the following principle:
in a real environment, a Beidou satellite a is assumed to be closer to a receiver 1 and farther from a receiver 2; and it is likely that another beidou satellite b is closer to the receiver 2 and further away from the receiver 1. This results in the receiver 1 receiving a satellite with a signal-to-noise ratio greater than that of b satellite, and the receiver 2 receiving the opposite. If the receiver 1,2 receives multiple satellites, the difference between the signal-to-noise ratios of the Beidou satellites obtained by the receiver 1,2 is relatively large.
Therefore, when the receiver 1,2 receives a satellite signal transmitted by a beidou satellite signal simulator from a specific place, there are only two possible cases: the signal-to-noise ratio of the signal obtained by the receiver 1 is always larger than the signal-to-noise ratio of the signal obtained by the receiver 2, or vice versa. Under the condition of deception interference, the receiver 1,2 obtains a smaller discrete degree of the difference between the signal-to-noise ratios of the Beidou satellite signals transmitted by the Beidou satellite signal simulators. The signal-to-noise ratio in NMEA (National Electronics Association, a format for satellite signal transmission) data received by both receivers is extracted by software, both in the case of spoofed and un-spoofed interference.
Suppose that at time t, the signal-to-noise ratio of the true satellite received by the receiver 1 is
The signal-to-noise ratio of the real satellite signal received by the receiver 2 is
Wherein, the first and the second end of the pipe are connected with each other,
representing the relative distance between the two Beidou satellite signal receivers. i1 And i2 respectively represents the sequence numbers of the real Beidou satellite signals received by the Beidou receiver 1 and the Beidou receiver 2. And i1 ∈ C1 A ，i2∈C2 A In which C1 A ，C2 A A set of true satellite sequence numbers received for receiver 1,2. Similarly, the receiver 1,2 receives a spoofed satellite signal having a signal-to-noise ratio of
And j1 ∈ C1 S ，j2∈C2 S In which C1 S ，C2 S A set of spoofed satellite sequence numbers received for receiver 1,2.
At the same time, the same relative distance is calculated, and the same satellite signal signals received by the two receivers under the condition of deception interference and the condition of not deception interference are calculatedThe degree of dispersion of the difference in the noise ratios. Under the condition of not being interfered by deception, the intersection C of the Beidou satellite signals received by the receiver 1,2 is firstly solved A And C is A The number of the middle elements is N: c A ＝C1 A ∩C2 A 。
The relative distance between the receivers 1,2 at time t can be found to be
In the case of (2), the average value M of the differences in signal-to-noise ratios of the satellites received in common by the two receivers A (t,l)：
According to the mean value M A (t, l) the variance V of the signal-to-noise ratio of the satellite signal between the receivers 1,2 can be determined A (t, l), considering that the influence of the difference of a certain Beidou satellite signal on receivers at different positions is larger, two elements with the largest and the smallest numerical values are removed during variance calculation, and the obtained variance V A (t, l) is as follows:
wherein:
in the same way, the variance V of the difference value of the signal-to-noise ratios of the satellites received by the two receivers at the time t can be solved under the condition that the receivers are subjected to deception jamming S (t,l)：
V was determined at a relative distance l of 30cm,1m,5m,10m,20m,25m,30m A (t,l)、V S (t, l). To ensure data reliability, V A (t,l)、V S The time span of t in (t, l) is about 5 minutes or so.
Through the results obtained by the experiments, the following conclusions can be obtained: within 30m, V increases with the relative distance of the receiver 1,2 A (t, l) and V S The difference in (t, l) also becomes larger, and in particular, when the relative distance of the receivers is only 30cm, V A (t, l) and V S (t, l) are substantially mixed together. V when the relative distance between receivers 1,2 is 20m A (t, l) and V S The difference between (t, l) is already significant, and a threshold H of 10 can be set to determine whether the receiver has received the jamming. In order to avoid misjudgment as much as possible, the receiver can be judged to receive the deception jamming only under the condition that V (t, l) is less than H for m continuous times by a method of comparing the V (t, l) with the threshold H for m continuous times.
To further prove the accuracy and reliability of the method of the present invention, the present embodiment provides the corresponding verification experiment process and data:
the receiver chip of the experiment is a common ATGM332D-5N chip on the market, which can analyze Beidou and GPS signals, and the receiving antenna is a common active omnidirectional antenna which can receive the Beidou and GPS signals. The big dipper satellite signal simulator of this experiment is SMBV100A, and it can simulate 12 different big dipper satellite signal at most. In order to simulate a scene of real deceptive interference, experiments are carried out in a place which is relatively open outdoors.
As shown in FIG. 2, the pseudo time of transmitting the Beidou satellite signals by the Beidou satellite simulator and the pseudo position calculated by the pseudo range are set. After the setting is finished, a radio frequency switch of the Beidou satellite simulator is turned on, and the pseudo Beidou satellite signal starts to be transmitted. The relative distance between the two Beidou receivers is controlled to be 30cm,1m,5m,10m,20m,25m and 30m. Under each relative distance, the two receivers receive the pseudo Beidou satellite signals at the same time, the difference value of the signal to noise ratio of each Beidou satellite signal received by the two receivers is extracted, and the variance of the difference values is solved. Then, under the condition that the Beidou satellite signal simulator is turned off, the difference value of the signal-to-noise ratio of each Beidou satellite signal of the receiver under the condition that the relative distance is 30cm,1m,5m,10m,20m,25m and 30m is also measured, and then the variance of the difference values is obtained. The results of fig. 3 to 9 can be obtained.
The abscissa of fig. 3 to fig. 9 represents the same time point of the signals received by the two receivers, represents the number of sample points, and the ordinate represents the variance of the difference value of each of the beidou satellite signals SDN received by the two receivers. In each image, the variance in the case of non-spoofed and spoofed interference is labeled separately. The 7 pictures respectively represent variance comparison of the difference values of the SDN of the Beidou satellite signals under the conditions of no deception interference and deception interference when the relative distances of the receivers are 30cm,1m,5m,10m,20m,25m and 30m.
From the results of fig. 3 to fig. 9, it can be seen that no matter how far the relative distance between the two receivers is, when the receivers are subjected to spoofing interference, the variance ratio of the relative difference values of the respective Beidou satellite signals received by the two receivers is small and basically does not exceed 10. When the receivers are not subjected to deception jamming, the variance of the relative difference values of the Beidou satellite signals received by the two receivers increases with the increase of the relative distance. When the relative distance between two receivers is about 20m, the difference between the variance value which is not cheated and the variance value which is cheated and interfered is obvious. It can be determined more accurately whether the receiver has received the spoofed interference based on the threshold 10.
Firstly, the requirement on the antenna is reduced, the common satellite receiving antenna can meet the requirement on detecting the deception jamming, and the cost is saved; secondly, the influence of the relative distance between the distributed receivers on the dispersion degree of the SDN difference value of each Beidou satellite signal obtained by the two receivers is proved through real verification, the obtained relative distance is about 20m, the threshold value is set to be 10, the conclusion of deceptive interference can be accurately detected, and the feasibility and the accuracy are good; the invention has more reliability compared with the real situation.
Other embodiments of the present invention than the preferred embodiments described above will be apparent to those skilled in the art from the present invention, and various changes and modifications can be made therein without departing from the spirit of the present invention as defined in the appended claims.
Claims (4)
1. A distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method based on signal to noise ratio is characterized by comprising at least two distributed receivers and controlling all the receivers to be in relative distance
Simultaneously receiving Beidou satellite signals, extracting a signal-to-noise ratio difference value of each Beidou satellite signal received by any two receivers, solving the dispersion degree of the signal-to-noise ratio difference value, and judging whether the receivers receive deception interference according to the dispersion degree; the dispersion degree of the signal-to-noise ratio difference value is the variance of the signal-to-noise ratio difference value of each Beidou satellite signal received by the corresponding two receivers, a variance threshold value H is set, the variance is judged to be smaller than the variance threshold value H, and the receiver is judged to receive the deception interference; the receiver comprises a receiver 1 and a receiver 2, and the relative distance between the receivers 1,2 at the time t is
Under the condition of (1), the average value of the signal-to-noise ratio difference values of the Beidou satellite signals received by the two receivers together is M A (t,l)，
Wherein, the first and the second end of the pipe are connected with each other,
for the signal-to-noise ratio of the beidou satellite signal received by the receiver 1,
received for said receiver 2Signal to noise ratio, C, of Beidou satellite signals A Is the intersection of the Beidou satellite signals received by the receiver 1 and the receiver 2, and N is C A The number of the medium elements; when calculating the variance, two elements with the maximum and minimum values are removed, and the obtained variance is
The relative distance
Not less than 10m.
2. The distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method based on signal-to-noise ratio as set forth in claim 1, wherein the variance is smaller than the variance threshold H for m consecutive times, and it is determined that the receiver receives the deception jamming.
3. The signal-to-noise ratio-based distributed detection of Beidou deception jamming according to claim 1, wherein the variance threshold H =10.
4. The signal-to-noise ratio-based distributed Beidou deception jamming detection method according to claim 1, wherein the relative distance is
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| CN109581426B (en) * | 2019-02-18 | 2021-04-23 | 帆美航空科技(北京)有限公司 | Method, system, equipment and storage medium for identifying GNSS abnormal signal |
| CN111487652A (en) * | 2020-05-28 | 2020-08-04 | 吴卓骏 | Power distribution monitoring device and monitoring method based on Beidou satellite and 5G network |
| CN112285746B (en) * | 2020-10-21 | 2024-02-13 | 厦门大学 | Spoofing detection method and device based on multipath signals |
| CN112954586B (en) * | 2021-01-29 | 2022-09-09 | 北京邮电大学 | Deception jamming source positioning method, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN115877411A (en) * | 2022-12-29 | 2023-03-31 | 中国民航大学 | Civil aviation anti-deception navigation positioning method utilizing communication satellite Doppler signals |
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