CN109313678B - API calling method and terminal - Google Patents
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- CN109313678B CN109313678B CN201880001269.8A CN201880001269A CN109313678B CN 109313678 B CN109313678 B CN 109313678B CN 201880001269 A CN201880001269 A CN 201880001269A CN 109313678 B CN109313678 B CN 109313678B
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 26
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 claims description 21
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 12
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 12
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/12—Protecting executable software
- G06F21/121—Restricting unauthorised execution of programs
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/46—Multiprogramming arrangements
- G06F9/54—Interprogram communication
- G06F9/547—Remote procedure calls [RPC]; Web services
Abstract
The invention relates to a method and a terminal for calling an API (application program interface), wherein each upper application is provided with a unique application name and signature information for identification, when the upper application calls a bottom API, the calling authority of the upper application for calling the bottom API is limited according to the application name and the signature information.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of computers, in particular to a method and a terminal for calling an API (application program interface).
Background
For the design of software layering, the concept of a bottom layer and an upper layer is common, and the bottom layer API is called by an upper layer application. For an underlying API, there may be multiple upper layer applications that can call the underlying API, but in certain cases, the underlying API is not open to all upper layer applications for some security concerns. Aiming at the scene, currently, simple authority control is usually performed on the bottom layer API, for example, the authority control is realized by inputting a password, if the password is leaked, an unauthorized upper layer application can also take the password and call the bottom layer API, and the authority control effect is very poor.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is as follows: the method and the terminal for calling the API can improve the safety of calling the bottom API.
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
a method of calling an API, comprising the steps of:
s1, configuring an application name and signature information for the upper-layer application;
and S2, limiting the authority of the upper layer application for calling the bottom layer API according to the application name and the signature information.
In order to solve the technical problem, the invention adopts another technical scheme as follows:
a terminal for calling an API, comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the following steps when executing the computer program:
s1, configuring an application name and signature information for the upper-layer application;
and S2, limiting the authority of the upper layer application for calling the bottom layer API according to the application name and the signature information.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: each upper application has a unique application name and signature information for identification, when the upper application calls the bottom API, the calling authority of the upper application for calling the bottom API is limited according to the application name and the signature information, and compared with the traditional calling limiting mode of inputting the password, the method and the device have the advantages that the risk that the unauthorized upper application calls the bottom API caused by password leakage is avoided by configuring the application name and the signature information for the upper application and limiting the calling authority through the application name and the signature information, and the safety of calling the bottom API is greatly improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart illustrating a method of calling an API in accordance with the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal for calling an API according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a method for calling an API according to a third embodiment of the present invention;
description of reference numerals:
1. a terminal calling an API; 2. a memory; 3. a processor.
Detailed Description
In order to explain technical contents, achieved objects, and effects of the present invention in detail, the following description is made with reference to the accompanying drawings in combination with the embodiments.
The most key concept of the invention is as follows: each upper application is identified by a unique application name and signature information, and when the upper application calls the bottom API, the calling authority of the upper application for calling the bottom API is limited according to the application name and the signature information.
Referring to fig. 1, a method for calling an API provided by the present invention includes the following steps:
s1, configuring an application name and signature information for the upper-layer application;
and S2, limiting the authority of the upper layer application for calling the bottom layer API according to the application name and the signature information.
From the above description, each upper layer application has a unique application name and signature information for identification, when the upper layer application calls the bottom layer API, the calling authority of the upper layer application for calling the bottom layer API is limited according to the application name and the signature information, compared with the previous calling limiting mode of inputting the password, the method and the device of the invention configure the application name and the signature information for the upper layer application and limit the calling authority through the application name and the signature information, thereby avoiding the risk of unauthorized upper layer application calling the bottom layer API caused by password leakage and greatly improving the security of calling the bottom layer API.
Further, S1 includes:
s101, configuring a compiling environment of an upper application, compiling the compiling environment to generate the upper application to be downloaded to an operation carrier, and configuring a corresponding application name for the upper application;
and S102, signing the upper-layer application to be downloaded to the running carrier through the compiling environment to obtain signature information.
As can be seen from the above description, compared with the case of directly downloading the existing upper layer application to the running carrier, the upper layer application to be downloaded to the running carrier is generated through compiling by the compiling environment, and the application name and the signature information are configured for the upper layer application through the compiling environment, so that the security of the upper layer application and the reliability of the application name and the signature information are both improved.
Further, S2 specifically includes:
and judging whether the application name and the signature information of the upper-layer application exist in the authorization list of the bottom-layer API, if so, allowing the upper-layer application to call the bottom-layer API, and if not, not allowing the upper-layer application to call the bottom-layer API.
From the above description, the authorization list is used to verify the validity of the upper layer application calling the bottom layer API, so as to ensure that the verification result is authentic and credible.
Further, S2 includes:
s201, setting an authorization list of upper-layer application, wherein the authorization list comprises an application name of the upper-layer application and a signer identifier in signature information;
s202, when the upper application downloaded to the running carrier calls a bottom API, analyzing the application name of the upper application and extracting the signer identifier in the signature information of the upper application;
s203, judging whether the application name and the signer identification of the upper layer application exist in the authorization list, if so, allowing the upper layer application to call the bottom layer API, and if not, not allowing the upper layer application to call the bottom layer API.
Further, between S1 and S2, there are:
s103, when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, validity verification is carried out on the signature information of the upper-layer application, if the signature information is legal, the upper-layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the signature information is illegal, the upper-layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
As can be seen from the above description, the use of digital signature technology ensures the legitimacy of the upper layer application, and only legitimate upper layer applications are allowed to be downloaded to the runtime carrier.
Further, the signature information includes a signature work certificate key domain.
Further, S103 specifically is:
when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, the upper-layer public key solidified by the bottom API is used for carrying out validity verification on the key domain of the signature working certificate, if the upper-layer application is legal, the upper-layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the upper-layer application is illegal, the upper-layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
Further, the signature information includes a signature work certificate key field and a signature data key field.
Further, S103 includes:
s103a, when the upper layer application is downloaded to the operation carrier, extracting a public key in a key domain of the signature work certificate;
s103b, carrying out public key operation on the key domain of the signature data by using the public key in the key domain of the signature working certificate to obtain a HASH value H1；
S103c, calculating the HASH value H of the effective data of the upper layer application2To H1And H2And comparing the consistency, if the consistency is consistent, the upper layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the consistency is not consistent, the upper layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
Further, S103a specifically includes: and when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, using the upper-layer public key solidified by the bottom API to verify the legality of the key domain of the signature working certificate, if the key domain is legal, extracting the public key in the key domain of the signature working certificate, and if the key domain is illegal, not allowing the upper-layer application to be downloaded to the running carrier and terminating the subsequent steps.
Referring to fig. 2, a terminal for calling an API provided by the present invention includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, where the processor executes the computer program to implement the following steps:
s1, configuring an application name and signature information for the upper-layer application;
and S2, limiting the authority of the upper layer application for calling the bottom layer API according to the application name and the signature information.
From the above description, each upper layer application has a unique application name and signature information for identification, when the upper layer application calls the bottom layer API, the calling authority of the upper layer application for calling the bottom layer API is limited according to the application name and the signature information, compared with the previous calling limiting mode of inputting the password, the method and the device of the invention configure the application name and the signature information for the upper layer application and limit the calling authority through the application name and the signature information, thereby avoiding the risk of unauthorized upper layer application calling the bottom layer API caused by password leakage and greatly improving the security of calling the bottom layer API.
Further, S1 includes:
s101, configuring a compiling environment of an upper application, compiling the compiling environment to generate the upper application to be downloaded to an operation carrier, and configuring a corresponding application name for the upper application;
and S102, signing the upper-layer application to be downloaded to the running carrier through the compiling environment to obtain signature information.
As can be seen from the above description, compared with the case of directly downloading the existing upper layer application to the running carrier, the upper layer application to be downloaded to the running carrier is generated through compiling by the compiling environment, and the application name and the signature information are configured for the upper layer application through the compiling environment, so that the security of the upper layer application and the reliability of the application name and the signature information are both improved.
Further, S2 specifically includes:
and judging whether the application name and the signature information of the upper-layer application exist in the authorization list of the bottom-layer API, if so, allowing the upper-layer application to call the bottom-layer API, and if not, not allowing the upper-layer application to call the bottom-layer API.
From the above description, the authorization list is used to verify the validity of the upper layer application calling the bottom layer API, so as to ensure that the verification result is authentic and credible.
Further, S2 includes:
s201, setting an authorization list of upper-layer application, wherein the authorization list comprises an application name of the upper-layer application and a signer identifier in signature information;
s202, when the upper application downloaded to the running carrier calls a bottom API, analyzing the application name of the upper application and extracting the signer identifier in the signature information of the upper application;
s203, judging whether the application name and the signer identification of the upper layer application exist in the authorization list, if so, allowing the upper layer application to call the bottom layer API, and if not, not allowing the upper layer application to call the bottom layer API.
Further, between S1 and S2, there are:
s103, when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, validity verification is carried out on the signature information of the upper-layer application, if the signature information is legal, the upper-layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the signature information is illegal, the upper-layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
As can be seen from the above description, the use of digital signature technology ensures the legitimacy of the upper layer application, and only legitimate upper layer applications are allowed to be downloaded to the runtime carrier.
Further, the signature information includes a signature work certificate key domain.
Further, S103 specifically is:
when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, the upper-layer public key solidified by the bottom API is used for carrying out validity verification on the key domain of the signature working certificate, if the upper-layer application is legal, the upper-layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the upper-layer application is illegal, the upper-layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
Further, the signature information includes a signature work certificate key field and a signature data key field.
Further, S103 includes:
s103a, when the upper layer application is downloaded to the operation carrier, extracting a public key in a key domain of the signature work certificate;
s103b, carrying out public key operation on the key domain of the signature data by using the public key in the key domain of the signature working certificate to obtain a HASH value H1；
S103c, calculating the HASH value H of the effective data of the upper layer application2To H1And H2And comparing the consistency, if the consistency is consistent, the upper layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the consistency is not consistent, the upper layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
Further, S103a specifically includes: and when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, using the upper-layer public key solidified by the bottom API to verify the legality of the key domain of the signature working certificate, if the key domain is legal, extracting the public key in the key domain of the signature working certificate, and if the key domain is illegal, not allowing the upper-layer application to be downloaded to the running carrier and terminating the subsequent steps.
Referring to fig. 1, a first embodiment of the present invention is:
a method of calling an API, comprising the steps of:
s1, configuring an application name and signature information for the upper-layer application;
and S2, limiting the authority of the upper layer application for calling the bottom layer API according to the application name and the signature information.
Wherein S1 includes:
s101, configuring a compiling environment of an upper application, compiling the compiling environment to generate the upper application to be downloaded to an operation carrier, and configuring a corresponding application name for the upper application;
s102, signing an upper application to be downloaded to an operation carrier through a compiling environment to obtain signature information;
s2 includes:
s201, setting an authorization list of upper-layer application, wherein the authorization list comprises an application name of the upper-layer application and a signer identifier in signature information;
s202, when the upper application downloaded to the running carrier calls a bottom API, analyzing the application name of the upper application and extracting the signer identifier in the signature information of the upper application;
s203, judging whether the application name and the signer identifier of the upper-layer application exist in the authorization list, if so, allowing the upper-layer application to call the bottom-layer API, and if not, not allowing the upper-layer application to call the bottom-layer API;
between S1 and S2 include:
s103, when the upper-layer application is downloaded to an operation carrier, carrying out validity verification on the signature information of the upper-layer application, if the signature information is legal, allowing the upper-layer application to be downloaded to the operation carrier, and if the signature information is illegal, not allowing the upper-layer application to be downloaded to the operation carrier;
referring to fig. 1, a second embodiment of the present invention is:
a method for calling API, which has the following features on the basis of the first embodiment:
the signature information includes a signature work certificate key field, and S103 specifically is: when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, the upper-layer public key solidified by the bottom API is used for carrying out validity verification on the key domain of the signature working certificate, if the upper-layer application is legal, the upper-layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the upper-layer application is illegal, the upper-layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
Preferably, the format of the key domain of the signing work certificate is a standard X509 format.
Referring to fig. 3, a third embodiment of the present invention is:
a method for calling API, which has the following features on the basis of the first embodiment:
the signature information includes a signature work certificate key field and a signature data key field, and S103 includes:
s103a, when the upper layer application is downloaded to the operation carrier, extracting a public key in a key domain of the signature work certificate;
s103b, carrying out public key operation on the key domain of the signature data by using the public key in the key domain of the signature working certificate to obtain a HASH value H1；
S103c, calculating the HASH value H of the effective data of the upper layer application2To H1And H2And comparing the consistency, if the consistency is consistent, the upper layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the consistency is not consistent, the upper layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
Preferably, S103a specifically is: and when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, using the upper-layer public key solidified by the bottom API to verify the legality of the key domain of the signature working certificate, if the key domain is legal, extracting the public key in the key domain of the signature working certificate, and if the key domain is illegal, not allowing the upper-layer application to be downloaded to the running carrier and terminating the subsequent steps.
Referring to fig. 2, a fourth embodiment of the present invention is:
a terminal 1 for calling API, comprising a memory 2, a processor 3 and a computer program stored on said memory 2 and operable on said processor 3, said processor 2 executing the steps of embodiment one when executing said computer program.
Referring to fig. 2, a fifth embodiment of the present invention is:
a terminal 1 for calling API, comprising a memory 2, a processor 3 and a computer program stored on said memory 2 and operable on said processor 3, said processor 2 executing the steps of embodiment two when executing said computer program.
Referring to fig. 2, a sixth embodiment of the present invention is:
a terminal 1 for calling API comprises a memory 2, a processor 3 and a computer program stored on the memory 2 and capable of running on the processor 3, wherein the processor 2 executes the steps of the third embodiment when executing the computer program.
In summary, each upper application has a unique application name and signature information for identifying, when the upper application calls the bottom API, the calling authority for the upper application to call the bottom API is defined according to the application name and signature information, and compared with the previous calling limiting method for inputting a password, the method and the terminal for calling the API avoid the risk of unauthorized upper application calling the bottom API due to password leakage by configuring the application name and signature information for the upper application and limiting the calling authority through the application name and signature information, and greatly improve the security of calling the bottom API.
The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, and not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and all equivalent changes made by using the contents of the present specification and the drawings, or applied directly or indirectly to the related technical fields, are included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (18)
1. A method of calling an API, comprising the steps of:
s1, configuring an application name and signature information for the upper-layer application;
s1 includes:
s101, configuring a compiling environment of an upper application, compiling the compiling environment to generate the upper application to be downloaded to an operation carrier, and configuring a corresponding application name for the upper application;
s102, signing an upper application to be downloaded to an operation carrier through a compiling environment to obtain signature information;
and S2, limiting the authority of the upper layer application for calling the bottom layer API according to the application name and the signature information.
2. The method for calling the API according to claim 1, wherein S2 specifically is:
and judging whether the application name and the signature information of the upper-layer application exist in the authorization list of the bottom-layer API, if so, allowing the upper-layer application to call the bottom-layer API, and if not, not allowing the upper-layer application to call the bottom-layer API.
3. The method for calling the API of claim 1 wherein S2 includes:
s201, setting an authorization list of upper-layer application, wherein the authorization list comprises an application name of the upper-layer application and a signer identifier in signature information;
s202, when the upper application downloaded to the running carrier calls a bottom API, analyzing the application name of the upper application and extracting the signer identifier in the signature information of the upper application;
s203, judging whether the application name and the signer identification of the upper layer application exist in the authorization list, if so, allowing the upper layer application to call the bottom layer API, and if not, not allowing the upper layer application to call the bottom layer API.
4. The method for calling the API of claim 1, further comprising between S1 and S2:
s103, when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, validity verification is carried out on the signature information of the upper-layer application, if the signature information is legal, the upper-layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the signature information is illegal, the upper-layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
5. The method of calling the API of claim 4 wherein the signing information includes a signing work certificate key field.
6. The method for calling the API according to claim 5, wherein S103 is specifically:
when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, the upper-layer public key solidified by the bottom API is used for carrying out validity verification on the key domain of the signature working certificate, if the upper-layer application is legal, the upper-layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the upper-layer application is illegal, the upper-layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
7. The method of calling the API of claim 4 wherein the signing information includes a signing work certificate key field and a signing data key field.
8. The method for calling the API of claim 7 wherein S103 comprises:
s103a, when the upper layer application is downloaded to the operation carrier, extracting a public key in a key domain of the signature work certificate;
s103b, carrying out public key operation on the key domain of the signature data by using the public key in the key domain of the signature working certificate to obtain a HASH value H1；
S103c, calculating the upper partHASH value H of payload data of a layer application2To H1And H2And comparing the consistency, if the consistency is consistent, the upper layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the consistency is not consistent, the upper layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
9. The method for calling the API according to claim 8, wherein S103a specifically is: and when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, using the upper-layer public key solidified by the bottom API to verify the legality of the key domain of the signature working certificate, if the key domain is legal, extracting the public key in the key domain of the signature working certificate, and if the key domain is illegal, not allowing the upper-layer application to be downloaded to the running carrier and terminating the subsequent steps.
10. A terminal for calling an API, comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the following steps when executing the computer program:
s1, configuring an application name and signature information for the upper-layer application;
s1 includes:
s101, configuring a compiling environment of an upper application, compiling the compiling environment to generate the upper application to be downloaded to an operation carrier, and configuring a corresponding application name for the upper application;
s102, signing an upper application to be downloaded to an operation carrier through a compiling environment to obtain signature information;
and S2, limiting the calling authority of the upper-layer application for calling the bottom-layer API according to the application name and the signature information.
11. The API-calling terminal of claim 10, wherein S2 specifically is:
and judging whether the application name and the signature information of the upper-layer application exist in the authorization list of the bottom-layer API, if so, allowing the upper-layer application to call the bottom-layer API, and if not, not allowing the upper-layer application to call the bottom-layer API.
12. The API-calling terminal of claim 10, wherein S2 includes:
s201, setting an authorization list of upper-layer application, wherein the authorization list comprises an application name of the upper-layer application and a signer identifier in signature information;
s202, when the upper application downloaded to the running carrier calls a bottom API, analyzing the application name of the upper application and extracting the signer identifier in the signature information of the upper application;
s203, judging whether the application name and the signer identification of the upper layer application exist in the authorization list, if so, allowing the upper layer application to call the bottom layer API, and if not, not allowing the upper layer application to call the bottom layer API.
13. The API-calling terminal of claim 10, further comprising, between S1 and S2:
s103, when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, validity verification is carried out on the signature information of the upper-layer application, if the signature information is legal, the upper-layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the signature information is illegal, the upper-layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
14. The API-calling terminal of claim 13, wherein the signing information includes a signing work certificate key field.
15. The API-calling terminal according to claim 14, wherein S103 specifically is:
when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, the upper-layer public key solidified by the bottom API is used for carrying out validity verification on the key domain of the signature working certificate, if the upper-layer application is legal, the upper-layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the upper-layer application is illegal, the upper-layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
16. The API-calling terminal of claim 13, wherein the signing information includes a signing work certificate key field and a signing data key field.
17. The API-calling terminal of claim 16, wherein S103 comprises:
s103a, when the upper layer application is downloaded to the operation carrier, extracting a public key in a key domain of the signature work certificate;
s103b, carrying out public key operation on the key domain of the signature data by using the public key in the key domain of the signature working certificate to obtain a HASH value H1；
S103c, calculating the HASH value H of the effective data of the upper layer application2To H1And H2And comparing the consistency, if the consistency is consistent, the upper layer application is allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier, and if the consistency is not consistent, the upper layer application is not allowed to be downloaded to the running carrier.
18. The API-calling terminal of claim 17, wherein S103a specifically is: and when the upper-layer application is downloaded to the running carrier, using the upper-layer public key solidified by the bottom API to verify the legality of the key domain of the signature working certificate, if the key domain is legal, extracting the public key in the key domain of the signature working certificate, and if the key domain is illegal, not allowing the upper-layer application to be downloaded to the running carrier and terminating the subsequent steps.
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| CN1553349A (en) * | 2003-05-29 | 2004-12-08 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | Safety chip and information safety processor and processing method |
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| CN104680061A (en) * | 2015-02-28 | 2015-06-03 | 国鼎网络空间安全技术有限公司 | Method and system for verifying code signing during startup of application in Android environment |
| CN105260663A (en) * | 2015-09-15 | 2016-01-20 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Secure storage service system and method based on TrustZone technology |
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| CN108199834A (en) * | 2018-01-16 | 2018-06-22 | 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 | A kind of method and device of intelligent cipher key equipment work |
| CN108319823A (en) * | 2018-02-02 | 2018-07-24 | 广东蜂助手网络技术股份有限公司 | A kind of Android APP signature binding method and device |
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| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| WO2020047764A1 (en) | 2020-03-12 |
| CN109313678A (en) | 2019-02-05 |
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