CN101458743A - Method for protecting computer system - Google Patents
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- CN101458743A CN101458743A CNA200710124895XA CN200710124895A CN101458743A CN 101458743 A CN101458743 A CN 101458743A CN A200710124895X A CNA200710124895X A CN A200710124895XA CN 200710124895 A CN200710124895 A CN 200710124895A CN 101458743 A CN101458743 A CN 101458743A
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Abstract
The invention provides a method for protecting compute system, belonging to the computer security technical field, which comprises: processing attestation of integrity on a computer system; recording the metric value via a credit calculation chip into a platform state register; judging the consistence between the metric value and an initial metric value corresponding to the platform state recorded in the credit calculation chip, when they are consistent, allowing the execution, or else, hanging the computer system. The computer system generates a credit root via embedding a hardware chip on a main board, utilizes password mechanism to build a credit chain from bottom components to superior application, and calculates and adds discrete values into a platform configuration register of a credit calculation chip. When the value is inconsistent to the one stored in the credit calculation chip, the computer system recovers or hangs, thereby confirming the safety of the computer system.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to computer safety field, relate in particular to a kind of method of protecting computer system security.
Background technology
Development along with infotech, PC (Personal Computer, PC), computer platform such as the notebook computer or the webserver using and using more and more widely, thus, greatly enrich and made things convenient for people's life, but meanwhile, because the leak that computer system architecture exists, the threat that computer platform is subjected to is also more and more, all the safety of computer system platforms such as the PC and the webserver has been constituted great threat as computer virus and online hacker.
Existing Computer Architecture imperfection has caused information security to have many leaks, because the uncontrollability of operation action, promptly from Basic Input or Output System (BIOS) (the Basic Input Output System of bottom, BIOS) chip quickflashing (Flash) can be write, to hard disk master boot record (Main Boot Record, MBR) can change, to operating system (Operation System, OS) application software under or process can be attacked and be destroyed, cause the paralysis of computer system or the leakage of data, give finance, bank, the tax, government or army etc. have caused very big economic loss to safety requirements than higher important special part.So how better setting up a safe and reliable computer architecture is a very important problem.
For computing platform, so-called credible, keep its integrality with regard to being meant the parts that participate in information processing, move by the expection mode.In the prior art scheme, the credible calculating platform of having realized mainly is a reliable PC, and its principal character is to be embedded with credible structure module on mainboard (Trusted Building Blocks, TBB), this TBB is exactly the root of trust of reliable PC platform.It comprises the root nuclear that is used for credible measurement, and (Core Root ofTrust for Measurement, CRTM), (Trusted Platform Module, TPM), and they are with the connection between the mainboard for credible platform module.When credible calculating platform starts, carry out, require all run time versions and configuration information before it is used or carries out, to want and to be measured, it is added in the status register of TPM by calculating hashed value in a kind of shielded mode.The principle of this credible calculating platform is: in computer starting and operational process, program all will be measured before operation, platform can't conceal the state of oneself, the operation that rogue program can't be hidden in system, but this credible calculating platform permission platform enters any state, therefore, described current this technical scheme can't fundamentally guarantee the safety of computer platform.
Summary of the invention
The purpose of the embodiment of the invention is to provide a kind of method of protecting computer system security; be intended to solve existing trusted computer permission platform and enter any state; and the completeness check result is not handled operation, can't fundamentally guarantee the problem of the safety of computer platform.
The embodiment of the invention is achieved in that a kind of method of protecting computer system security, and described method comprises the steps:
Computer system is carried out integrity measurement;
The Trusted Computing chip records metric in the platform status register;
Judge whether the corresponding initial metric of the platform status that write down in described metric and the Trusted Computing chip is consistent, is then to allow to carry out, otherwise hangs up computer system.
In embodiments of the present invention, computer system by in computing system integrated special module as root of trust, utilize the trust chain of cipher mechanism foundation from the bottom assembly to upper layer application, start from computer system power-on, detect to BIOS, detect to configuration information, to hardware platform, load to operating system, integrity measurement is carried out in the application operating under the operating system and the access of network, calculate hashed value and it is loaded into platform configuration register (the Platform Configuration Register of Trusted Computing chip, PCR) in, if the value of storage platform initial p CR is inconsistent in described PCR value and the Trusted Computing chip, then repair or operation such as hang-up, fundamentally guarantee the safety of computer platform.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is the system construction drawing of the protection computer system security that provides of the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 2 is that the computer system trusted chain that the embodiment of the invention provides transmits framework map;
Fig. 3 is the method realization flow figure of the protection computer system security that provides of the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 4 is the computer system integrity tolerance process flow diagram that the embodiment of the invention provides;
Fig. 5 is the computer system trusted root Stored Procedure synoptic diagram that the embodiment of the invention provides;
Fig. 6 is the computer system integrity report process flow diagram that the embodiment of the invention provides.
Embodiment
In order to make purpose of the present invention, technical scheme and advantage clearer,, the present invention is further elaborated below in conjunction with drawings and Examples.Should be appreciated that specific embodiment described herein only in order to explanation the present invention, and be not used in qualification the present invention.
In embodiments of the present invention, credible calculating platform by in computing system integrated special module as root of trust, utilize the trust chain of cipher mechanism foundation from the bottom assembly to upper layer application, start from computer system power-on, to BIOS, detect to configuration information, to hardware platform, load to operating system, integrity measurement is carried out in the application operating under the operating system and the access of network, calculate hashed value and it be loaded among the PCR of Trusted Computing chip, if store in the value of described PCR and the Trusted Computing chip inconsistent, then repair or operation such as hang-up, fundamentally guarantee the safety of computer platform.
Fig. 1 shows the system architecture of the suitable protection computer system security of the embodiment of the invention; comprise mainboard, hard disk and identification apparatus etc.; also integrated Trusted Computing chip (or TPM) and BIOS on the described mainboard; described BIOS also comprises log pattern, and described hard disk comprises hard Disk Management System, hard disk protection subregion and operating system module.
After computer system powers up startup, a series of startup self-detection processes before the Trusted Computing chip loads operating system are carried out integrity measurement, promptly from BIOS, to configuration information, to hardware platform, load preceding a series of processes to operating system and carry out integrity measurement, if the tolerance result is imperfect, then stop the continuation operation of computer system, hang up computing machine and provide operations such as information; Measure and just allow when complete computer system to continue to carry out next step, the user login operation system is carried out authentication.At first gather user's identity information by user identity identification equipment, by under the bottom BIOS of computing machine, adopting biological identity recognizing technology, integrated bio characteristic information eigenwert extraction algorithm in the UEFI chip, identity to the user authenticates, if authentication is not passed through, then stop the loading of operating system, hang up computing machine and provide operations such as information; If authentication is passed through, then open the operating system module of hard disk by hard Disk Management System, allow BIOS to read and carry out this partitioned record, and the operating system nucleus file carried out integrity measurement, if complete then load operation system, otherwise restart computer system, cover ruined file automatically from the backup recovery district.
In embodiments of the present invention, the Trusted Computing chip is the credible password module in the national Trusted Computing system, it is to be the computing module of core with the crypto-operation, be the core security control and the arithmetic unit of credible calculating platform, be independent of operating system and BIOS, not computed memory, external memory resource, inner realize standardization with the miscellaneous part interface, and the crypto-operation in the safe operation of inner execution is provided by the disclosed security password algorithm of definition (comprising the set of a cryptographic algorithm).The Trusted Computing chip mainly is responsible for the key generation and the operations such as storage and deciphering of encrypted transmission, user cipher and the biometric information data of communication instruction between foundation, hard disk and the BIOS of trusted root.This encryption and memory technology are difficult for being acquired and cracking based on bottom hardware, data, and security is high.
As one embodiment of the present of invention; described Trusted Computing chip can also be TPM; TPM is a safe and reliable hardware platform that is integrated in the computer host system bottom; can independently carry out key generates; the device of encryption and decryption; inside has separate processor and storage unit; but storage key and characteristic; for providing, encrypts and Security Authentication Service by computing machine; encrypt with TPM; key is stored in the hardware (being the safeguard protection subregion of TPM or hard disk); stolen data can't be deciphered, thereby make computer platform credible and protected data security.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, in the time of hard disk initialization (dispatching from the factory), in hard disk, open up a block space, create a hard disk protection subregion, be used to store user's significant data information, as encryption key etc.Because the maturation of technology; present hard-disk capacity is enough big; correspondingly; the capacity of protection subregion also can be accomplished fully big; and; its complementary space of hard disk protection subregion and hard disk is definitely isolated, and existing fdisk instrument, disk management instrument all can not be visited the space of this part, can only just can be operated it by special ATA instruction by bottom BIOS.Therefore, the hard disk protection subregion becomes secure memory space after certain access rights are set, and can store more user's significant data information safely.
In embodiments of the present invention, an embedded hard Disk Management System on the hard disk of computing machine, this hard Disk Management System can be considered as a microsystem, and its CPU, internal memory can not rely on CPU on the fail-safe computer mainboard, internal memory and carry out operation independent under the UEFI framework.The little embedding management system of hard disk is responsible for setting up the hard disk user partition, isolates the data in each hard disk user partition, and user's significant data of data in each hard disk user partition or hard disk protection subregion is encrypted.By above-mentioned serial of methods, the little embedding management system of hard disk has realized the control to hard disk protection regional addressing authority, prevents that the disabled user from visiting this part storage space.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, described BIOS is traditional B IOS or unified Extensible Firmware Interface (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface, UEFI) BIOS.UEFI is that a kind of opening (promptly not relying on specific BIOS and platform) is used to define the interface specification between platform firmware and the operating system, for the running status before operating system and the startup provides a standard environment, stipulated systematically how the control of computer system passes to operating system from starting preceding environment.The BIOS that observes this standard and develop promptly is called UEFI BIOS, and it is a kind of high safe BIOS, supports clean boot, drives signature and hash (Hash) technology.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, described log pattern is mainly used in storage described Trusted Computing chip or the TPM event log when computer system is carried out integrity measurement.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, the identity information that identification apparatus is mainly used in the user authenticates, and comprises biological identification etc.Described identification apparatus is hardware module or the external hardware module of USB that is integrated in the computer host system.
Credible calculating platform, promptly embeds hardware chip and produces the trusted root as root of trust by integrated special module in computing system on computer motherboard, utilize the trust chain of cipher mechanism foundation from the bottom assembly to upper layer application, makes up reliable computing environment.Credible calculating platform makes computing system be trusted by the Local or Remote entity, and the various safety problems that face for the solution computing system provide a kind of effective method more.The basic thought of trusted computer system integrity measurement is exactly: make up a root of trust, and begin to set up a trust chain from root of trust, BIOS, hardware platform, to operating system, arrive application program and network again, one-level authentication one-level, one-level is trusted one-level, thereby this trust is expanded to whole computer system, guarantee that computer system is credible.
Fig. 2 shows the unify trusted chain of data security of protection department of computer science that the embodiment of the invention is suitable for and transmits framework, and details are as follows:
Be arranged in the trusted storage root of integrity measurement of Trusted Computing chip and credible report root together as the starting point of trust chain, level metric trusted root on BIOS and the trust chain is carried out integrity measurement, tolerance by and give level metric trusted root control; Level metric trusted root continues the platform component of trusted computer system is carried out integrity measurement after obtaining right of execution, and next stage secondary tolerance trusted root is measured, and gives secondary tolerance root enforcement power then; Secondary tolerance root was measured the operating system nucleus integrality before the stage entering os starting, and three grades of tolerance of next stage trusted root is measured, and delivered control then and gave three grades of tolerance trusted roots.So analogize, one-level is trusted the transmission that one-level is finished the trusted chain.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, tolerance at first from the integrity measurement of BIOS to completeness of platform, arrive the tolerance of the integrality of operating system nucleus again, arrive the tolerance of the module integrality of os starting loading at last, one-level is trusted one-level, the credible of higher level is based upon on the believable basis of next stage, integrity measurement by the next stage part codes and reach the operation result of expection after, next stage is just given this upper level parts the execution authority of code, and, finally set up from hardware to the firmware by the Trusted Computing chip according to the flow performing of trusted computer system, to operating system, to software, arrive the chain of trust structure of network again.
As one embodiment of the present of invention; described trust chain is meant when credible calculating platform starts; carry out in a kind of shielded mode; require all run time versions and configuration information before it is used or carries out, to want and to be measured, promptly calculate hashed value and it is loaded among the PCR of Trusted Computing chip.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, credible calculating platform comprises three root of trusts, measures root, storage root and report root.Measure root and be at computer system platform and power up when starting, is trusted and be stored in the assembly of reporting root for Survey Software executing state reliably and with the result; The report root is trusted for reporting the assembly about completeness of platform information reliably; The storage root is trusted for storing the assembly about completeness of platform information reliably.Credible calculating platform as root of trust, utilizes the trust chain of cipher mechanism foundation from the bottom assembly to upper layer application by integrated special module in computing system, makes up reliable computing environment.Described root of trust is definitely believable, and its credible main anti-tamper characteristic of physics by control measures and root of trust hardware is guaranteed.
Fig. 3 shows the method realization flow of the protection computer system security that the embodiment of the invention provides, and details are as follows:
In step S301, computer system is carried out integrity measurement.
In embodiments of the present invention, integrity measurement is meant any entity that goes for the platform control, all will be measured before the acquisition control.Code or the key message that will measure parts (comprising BIOS and trusted storage device) send the Trusted Computing chip to by certain mode (as a safety communication agreement by definition), Hash computing execution unit by the Trusted Computing chip internal carries out computing to data, described computing is carried out at the Trusted Computing chip internal, thereby has guaranteed the safety of calculating process.Then result of calculation is passed to authentication.Described authentication is computer system and starts a side who needs to carry out integrity measurement in the operational process of back powering up, promptly from hardware platform, to BIOS, operating system, again to application program and network etc.
In step S302, the Trusted Computing chip records metric in the platform status register;
As one embodiment of the present of invention, described result of calculation after the computing of Trusted Computing chip is exactly the metric that calculates through the hash computing, the Trusted Computing chip this logout in the event log of system, be in the log pattern among the BIOS, and metric recorded among the corresponding PCR information such as time that comprise tolerance person's information, finished by tolerance person's information, PCR value, metric and tolerance original and new generation.The trusted storage of integrity measurement root and credible report are realized by the Trusted Computing chip.
In step S303, judge whether the corresponding initial metric of the platform status that write down in described metric and the Trusted Computing chip is consistent, be execution in step S305 then, otherwise execution in step S304.
In step S304, hang up computer system.
In this step, this process is the standard of judgement that provides according to computer system manufacturer, and makes corresponding processing.As carry out code recovery, restart computer system or only be set to alarm, hang up computing machine, remind user's operation.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, this processing procedure is finished by BIOS, and described BIOS is traditional B IOS, or UEFI BIOS.
In step S305, allow computer system to carry out next step operation.
Fig. 4 shows the computer system integrity tolerance flow process that the embodiment of the invention provides, and details are as follows:
In step S401, behind computer booting (promptly pressing power switch), power supply just begins to mainboard and miscellaneous equipment power supply, Trusted Computing chip synchronous initiation.
In step S402, read flash memory (Flash ROM), BIOS initialization, and code check such as operation service.
In step S403, judge whether code is complete, if execution in step S404 then, otherwise execution in step S405.
In step S404, carry out the code reparation.
In step S405, host B IOS start.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, described BIOS is traditional B IOS or UEFI BIOS.
In step S406, detect internal memory, (Low Pin Count, LPC) initialization finishes low pin number.
In step S407, call Trusted Computing chip BIOS driver.
In step S408, BIOS calls the Trusted Computing resources of chip by respective drive, and tolerance is current in real time according to a conventional method will carry out initialized code secondary trusted tolerance root.
In step S409, judge whether code is complete, if execution in step S410 then, otherwise execution in step S404 repairs.
In step S410, repeat above iteration, finish the code integrity tolerance and the initialization of each parts.
So far, integrity measurement finishes the phase one.As one embodiment of the present of invention, in this stage, mainly be that the computer platform underlying device is carried out integrity measurement.After this process finishes, enter subordinate phase.
In step S411, the configuration information of hardware is detected.
In step S412, judge whether hardware configuration is complete, if execution in step S414 then, otherwise execution in step S413.
In step S413, hang up and report to the police, wait for user's operation.
In step S414, detect video card ROM.
In step S415, judge whether the display card code is complete, be execution in step S415 then, otherwise carry out S416.
In step S416, the display card code is repaired.Reparation is finished and is continued execution in step S415, judges whether the display card code is complete.
In step S417, judge subscriber identity information, obtain device code and whether completely detect.
In step S418, the miscellaneous equipment BIOS setup code that the user is expanded carries out integrity detection.
In step S419, detect the BIOS part interface routine integrality that hard disk (memory device) and BIOS carry out two-way authentication.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, described detection hard disk and BIOS carry out the eigenwert that two-way authentication is write storage device in the UEFI of computer platform, and the eigenwert of described memory device is kept in the memory device, and in memory device, write the eigenwert of computer platform UEFI, and the eigenwert of described UEFI is kept among the UEFI.Computer platform and memory device inter-authentication method are: UEFI eigenwert among the UEFI of computer platform and the UEFI eigenwert in the memory device are compared; If identical, then UEFI authentication store equipment passes through; Memory device eigenwert among the UEFI of computer platform and the memory device eigenwert in the memory device are compared; If identical, then memory device authentication UEFI passes through.
In step S420, judge whether described code is complete, be execution in step S422 then, otherwise execution in step S421.
In step S421, hang up alarm, wait for user's operation.
In step S422, carry out authentication operation.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, described authentication operation is biological identification, the bottom UEFI of computing machine adopts biological identity recognizing technology, integrated bio characteristic information eigenwert extraction algorithm in the UEFI chip, the security that has further improved computer system down.
In step S423, judge whether authentication is passed through, if do not pass through then execution in step S421, hang up alarm.If pass through then the end of subordinate phase integrity detection
As one embodiment of the present of invention, in this stage, mainly the hardware configuration of computing machine is advanced and user's identity information, authentication row integrity detection.This stage enters the phase III integrity detection after finishing.
In step S424, BIOS calls the IPL interrupt bit.
In step S425, judge whether IPL interrupt bit code is complete, be execution in step S427 then, otherwise execution in step S426.
In step S426, restart computing machine.
In step S427, load three grades of tolerance trusted roots.
In step S428, judge whether three grades of trusted roots are complete, if complete then execution in step S430, otherwise execution in step S429.
In step S429, repair operation automatically, and execution in step S426 restarts computing machine.
In step S430, load also checked operation system core file one by one.
In step S431, judge whether its core document code is complete, if complete then phase III integrity detection finishes.Otherwise execution in step S432.
In step S432, restart computing machine, and from the automatic overlay file in backup recovery district.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, after the phase III integrity detection was finished, computing machine loaded to start and finishes, and enters operating system.
Fig. 5 shows the secure and trusted computer architecture trusted root Stored Procedure that the embodiment of the invention provides, and details are as follows:
The safety of trusted storage comprises two aspects, and a kind of physical protection that is based on chip is realized believable storage; Another kind is based on the virtual protection of cryptographic algorithm.
In embodiments of the present invention; the Trusted Computing chip have can its hardware identity of unique identification key and storage root key (Storage Root Key; SRK), realize credible transmission, the trusted application of Trusted Computing system, adopted the safest physical isolation to protect these sensitive informations.With the permanent Trusted Computing chip internal that is stored in of key, can not reveal outside module.Because the restriction of Trusted Computing chip cost; so data that its inner space can only memory limited; user key and other sensitive data with the platform binding; need be stored on the outer platform of chip (in the protection subregion as trusted storage device); utilize cryptographic technique protection; prevent to be subjected to the attack of extraneous malicious code, all keys and sensitive information are organized into the structure of tree, will be converted into the management for a key to the management of many keys.The root of key tree is SRK, and SRK is stored in the Trusted Computing chip, can be not under attack, thus guarantee the safety of whole tree.Simultaneously, all relevant encryption and decryption operations are finished at the Trusted Computing chip internal all, avoid the cleartext information of key to occur in the Trusted Computing chip exterior.
SRK is a pair of unsymmetrical key, and PKI is used for protection and encrypts the next stage storage key, and private key is stored in the Trusted Computing chip, is protected by the Trusted Computing chip.SRK carries out in the Trusted Computing chip the encryption and decryption computing of next stage storage key; therefore the assailant can't obtain storage root key can't crack the next stage storage key of being protected by storage root key; equally also can't crack next stage storage key by the storage key protection; key is protected by such key tree exactly; thereby data can't crack, and have realized the data security of trusted computer system trusted storage.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, described Trusted Computing chip can also be TPM.
Fig. 6 shows the secure and trusted computer architecture integrity report flow process that the embodiment of the invention provides, and details are as follows:
In step S601, authentication sends the checking request.
In this step, described authentication is computer system and starts a side who needs to carry out integrity measurement in the operational process of back powering up, promptly from hardware platform, to BIOS, operating system, again to application program and network etc.
In step S602, call the credible report root in the Trusted Computing chip.
In step S603, check platform configuration information, the display platform state.
In this step, the Trusted Computing chip is checked platform configuration information, a side's that promptly will measure information, and the configuration information state of the described platform of report strictly according to the facts.
In step S604, the module key carries out digital signature to PCR.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, described module key is the key that the Trusted Computing chip is stored, and utilizes described key that the PCR that the metrology platform state is produced is carried out digital signature.
In step S605, signing messages is passed to the authentication terminal.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, described authentication terminal is local authentication terminal or remote authentication terminal.Described local authentication terminal is computer system starting, and to BIOS, to configuration information, to hardware platform, to operating system, and application program authenticates, and described remote authentication terminal is telecommunication network inserted and authenticates.
In step S606, the signature when complete compares the verifier according to platform configuration information and module, judges whether terminal is credible.Be execution in step S607 then, otherwise execution in step S608.
In step S607, checking is passed through, and transfers control and allows and carry out.
In step S608, PCR is inconsistent, recovers or hangs up, and waits for user's operation.
As one embodiment of the present of invention, the report mechanism of integrity measurement is realized by the Trusted Computing chip, by the configuration information of Trusted Computing chip report computer system.At first at Trusted Computing chip internal storage PCR, message identification is the various states of platform at this moment.The platform authentication function is exactly that PCR-based information realizes, uses the module key that PCR is carried out digital signature, passes to the remote authentication terminal then; Remote validators is according to platform configuration information, and whether determine to access terminal credible.The effect of digital signature mainly is the owner who determines platform configuration information, to guarantee the secure access of platform.
In embodiments of the present invention, utilize the Trusted Computing chip, in computing machine, process the flow path source of handling from information, it is firmware level BIOS operation monitoring, and merge current cryptographic technique and integrity detection technology, realized conversion from software logic safety to system physical safety having guaranteed that the information of input computing machine can be carried out in the behavior according to expection in platform by the reliable delivery mechanism of trusted certificate.Realized from the system boot startup, the CPU electrification reset, the BIOS self check is carried out the platform authentication and is forced authentication, and execution leader record and operating system load preceding safety inspection, the application operating under the operating system is effective and the credible access of platform network.
The above only is preferred embodiment of the present invention, not in order to restriction the present invention, all any modifications of being done within the spirit and principles in the present invention, is equal to and replaces and improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (12)
1, a kind of method of protecting computer system security is characterized in that, described method comprises the steps:
Computer system is carried out integrity measurement;
The Trusted Computing chip records metric in the platform status register;
Judge whether the corresponding initial metric of the platform status that write down in described metric and the Trusted Computing chip is consistent, is then to allow to carry out, otherwise hangs up computer system.
2, the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, described generation step of computer system being carried out comprising before the integrity measurement step integrality trusted root: realize making up a root of trust by integrated special module in computer system.
3, the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, describedly computer system is carried out integrity measurement is: from computer system starting, to BIOS, to configuration information, to hardware platform, to operating system, carry out integrity measurement to the application program and the network platform.
4, the method for claim 1, it is characterized in that, described computer system is carried out the transmission step that integrity measurement further comprises integrality trusted root: begin to set up a trust chain from root of trust, from computer system starting, to BIOS, to configuration information, to hardware platform, to operating system, to the application program and the network platform, one-level authentication one-level, one-level is trusted one-level.
5, method as claimed in claim 4, it is characterized in that, the transmission step of described integrality trusted root further comprises: the credible of higher level is based upon on the credible basis of next stage, the next stage part codes complete and reach the operation result of expection after, next stage is just given this upper level parts the execution authority of code, and according to the flow performing of computer system.
6, the method for claim 1; it is characterized in that; described computer system is carried out the storing step that integrity measurement further comprises integrality trusted root: upper strata cryptographic key protection lower floor key, final storage root key is kept in the Trusted Computing chip.
7, method as claimed in claim 6 is characterized in that, described storage root key comprises PKI and private key, and the PKI user protects and encrypts the next stage storage key, and private key is stored in the Trusted Computing chip.
8, method as claimed in claim 6 is characterized in that, described storage root key all carries out at the Trusted Computing chip internal the encryption and decryption computing of next stage storage key.
9, the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, described computer system is carried out the reporting step that integrity measurement further comprises integrality trusted root: by the configuration information of Trusted Computing chip report computer system.
10, method as claimed in claim 9 is characterized in that, the configuration information of described Trusted Computing chip report computer system further comprises:
At Trusted Computing chip internal storage platform configuration register, the various states of sign platform this moment;
Use the signature mechanism of Trusted Computing chip that platform configuration information is carried out digital signature, pass to the authentication terminal then;
The authentication terminal determines according to the information of platform configuration register whether incoming end is credible.
11, method as claimed in claim 10 is characterized in that, described authentication terminal comprises local authentication terminal and remote authentication terminal.
12, the method for claim 1 is characterized in that, described hang-up computer system step further comprises: wait for user's operation, computer system is carried out the code reparation or restarted computer system.
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| CNA200710124895XA CN101458743A (en) | 2007-12-12 | 2007-12-12 | Method for protecting computer system |
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| CNA200710124895XA CN101458743A (en) | 2007-12-12 | 2007-12-12 | Method for protecting computer system |
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| CN102694776A (en) * | 2011-03-23 | 2012-09-26 | 国民技术股份有限公司 | Authentication system and method based on dependable computing |
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| CN103020531A (en) * | 2012-12-06 | 2013-04-03 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Method and system for trusted control of operating environment of Android intelligent terminal |
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| CN105122259A (en) * | 2013-04-23 | 2015-12-02 | 惠普发展公司，有限责任合伙企业 | Retrieving system boot code from a non-volatile memory |
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| CN108259471A (en) * | 2017-12-27 | 2018-07-06 | 新华三技术有限公司 | Encryption method, decryption method, device and the processing equipment of Proprietary Information |
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| CN110245495B (en) * | 2018-03-09 | 2023-05-26 | 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 | BIOS checking method, configuration method, device and system |
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| US11418335B2 (en) | 2019-02-01 | 2022-08-16 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Security credential derivation |
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