CN109291958A - Means of defence when going out clear based on the meter shaft failure maloperation mistake that train counts - Google Patents
Means of defence when going out clear based on the meter shaft failure maloperation mistake that train counts Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN109291958A CN109291958A CN201810830233.2A CN201810830233A CN109291958A CN 109291958 A CN109291958 A CN 109291958A CN 201810830233 A CN201810830233 A CN 201810830233A CN 109291958 A CN109291958 A CN 109291958A
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- nivb
- meter shaft
- train
- fault section
- failure
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- 230000009467 reduction Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 26
- 230000004888 barrier function Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 abstract description 4
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 3
- PLAIAIKZKCZEQF-UHFFFAOYSA-N methyl 6-chloro-2-oxo-3h-1,2$l^{4},3-benzodithiazole-4-carboxylate Chemical compound COC(=O)C1=CC(Cl)=CC2=C1NS(=O)S2 PLAIAIKZKCZEQF-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 3
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 235000013399 edible fruits Nutrition 0.000 description 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000007689 inspection Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005457 optimization Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011084 recovery Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L23/00—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L1/00—Devices along the route controlled by interaction with the vehicle or train
- B61L1/16—Devices for counting axles; Devices for counting vehicles
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
- Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
Abstract
A kind of means of defence when going out clear the invention discloses meter shaft failure maloperation mistake counted based on train, meter shaft direct reduction is operated, whether ZC correctly judges the operation of meter shaft direct reduction by way of being merged into for NIVB on NTVB/SVB and failure meter shaft section and being counted in a NIVB there may be train quantity, only when being counted as " 0 " in NIVB, after executing meter shaft direct reduction failure meter shaft section and becoming clear state out, the clear status information out of this fault section just can be used in ZC, and when NIVB only covers this fault section, ZC can just delete the NIVB on this fault section.The present invention has accomplished that there may be the collision detection of situation and the operation of staff's meter shaft direct reduction for true train on operating line, to the correctness of manual operation meter shaft direct reduction carried out secondary protection and check (especially when meter shaft wide-area failures), reduce because the possible train of staff's maloperation chase after lose caused by safety problem.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to technology of track traffic, and in particular to CBTC control system.
Background technique
In rail traffic CBTC control system, whether trackside equipment can report train position to it in real time according to train
Information distinguishes tracking to train:
NIVB: there may be the trains that one or more can not carry out train position report in this region；
NTVB: there is only one in this region to be once identified, but can not carry out the train of train position report；
TVB: there is only a sustainable communication trains for reporting train active position in this region；
SVB: there is only the trains of a suspend mode in this region；
In addition to CBTC entrance, all regions being managed except train (including NIVB, TVB, NTVB, SVB) range occur
When new section occupied state, ZC can determine the secondary train occupation detection device, and there are failures.
After ZC judges meter shaft section fault, will not directly thus fault section increase NIVB mark, if close to this failure
The first car of section is TVB train, then will not influence the normal operation of this TVB train；If close to the of this fault section
One vehicle is non-TVB train, then non-TVB train, which encounters, first carries out adhesion after fault section and be split into two NIVB again to be chased after
Track, corresponding schematic diagram is as shown in Figure 1.
If subsequent when having the NTVB/SVB train for reacceesing and crossing this fault section, NTVB/SVB and failure meter shaft area
NIVB in section can merge into a NIVB, when staff executes meter shaft direct reduction to the fault section within the scope of NIVB
Afterwards, failure meter shaft section can become clear state out, and ZC thinks to delete on this section on this fault section without train and fault recovery
NIVB (for all NIVB, what ZC trusted that meter shaft gives completely goes out to settle accounts fruit).
After meter shaft failure, if the first car close to this meter shaft fault section is non-TVB train, non-TVB train is met
Adhesion first carried out after to fault section be split into two NIVB to be again tracked, if subsequent reaccees and cross this faulty section
When the NTVB/SVB train of section, the NIVB on NTVB/SVB and failure meter shaft section can merge into a NIVB, if work people
Member executes meter shaft direct reduction to the fault section within the scope of NIVB, and after failure meter shaft section becomes clear state out, ZC be will be considered that
The NIVB on this fault section is directly deleted on this section without train, and for NIVB on NTVB/SVB and failure meter shaft section
The case where merging into a NIVB can actually have the possibility for having vehicle on this fault section, at this time if what ZC gave according to meter shaft
Clear information errors are judged as that no vehicle directly deletes NIVB out, and may cause that subsequent train knocks on this fault section train can
Can, declining to a great extent for operation ability on rail traffic safety accident or working line, or even obstruction will be caused in this way.
Summary of the invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is to provide a kind of meter shaft failure maloperation mistakes counted based on train
Means of defence when clear out is protected when meter shaft failure maloperation mistake goes out clear, guarantees safe train operation.
In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme: accidentally being grasped based on the meter shaft failure that train counts
Means of defence when work mistake goes out clear, it is characterised in that: operated for meter shaft direct reduction, ZC passes through for NTVB/SVB and event
NIVB is merged into the interior mode counted there may be train quantity of a NIVB to meter shaft direct reduction on barrier meter shaft section
Whether operation is correctly judged, only when being counted as " 0 " in NIVB, is become executing meter shaft direct reduction failure meter shaft section
Out after clear state, the clear status information out of this fault section is just can be used in ZC, and when NIVB only covers this fault section, ZC is
NIVB on this fault section can be deleted.
Preferably, a non-TVB Train Approaching and fault section is crossed, non-TVB train first carries out after encountering fault section
Adhesion is divided again, and ZC establishes a NIVB to meter shaft fault section and is tracked, and for this NIVB on this fault section, ZC is opened
With train tally function, and the train number amount of NIVB on this fault section is calculated as " 0 "；One NTVB/SVB drives into faulty section
Section, after merging into a NIVB with NIVB existing on the fault section, ZC is by the train number meter of NIVB on this fault section
For " 1 "；With train operation, the train quantity of NIVB on fault section is remained " 1 " by ZC；Staff holds fault section
Row meter shaft direct reduction, failure meter shaft section become clear state out.
Further, ZC is carried out according to the train quantity of NIVB on fault section and the clear state that goes out of failure meter shaft section
Whether meter shaft has the judgement of clear failure；Because the train quantity of NIVB is non-" 0 " on fault section, then ZC is determined as that meter shaft goes out clear event
Hinder and carry out warning note to center man-machine interface, ZC goes out clear status information without using this fault section；NIVB is split into
After NIVB_1 and NIVB_2, ZC detect that NIVB is divided, the train quantity of NIVB_1 on fault section after division is reset
For " 0 "；Staff executes meter shaft direct reduction to the fault section, and failure meter shaft section becomes clear state out.
Further, ZC according to the train quantity of NIVB_1 on fault section and failure meter shaft section go out clear state into
Whether meter shaft has the judgement of clear failure to row；Because the train quantity of NIVB_1 is " 0 " on fault section, then ZC is determined as that meter shaft goes out
The clear status information out of this fault section can be used in clear fault-free, ZC.
The technical solution adopted by the present invention has accomplished that there may be situations and staff to count for true train on operating line
The collision detection of axis direct reduction operation, has carried out secondary protection and inspection to the correctness of manual operation meter shaft direct reduction
(especially when meter shaft wide-area failures), reduce because the possible train of staff's maloperation chase after lose caused by pacify
Full problem.
The specific technical solution of the present invention and its advantages will in the following detailed description in conjunction with attached drawing into
Row detailed description.
Detailed description of the invention
Present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments:
Fig. 1 is that non-TVB train encounters and first carries out adhesion after fault section and be split into two NIVB again being tracked schematic diagram.
Fig. 2 is that NIVB merges into a NIVB schematic diagram on NTVB/SVB and meter shaft fault section.
Specific embodiment
The present invention operates meter shaft direct reduction, and ZC for NIVB on NTVB/SVB and failure meter shaft section by merging
At whether there may be the modes that train quantity is counted correctly to judge the operation of meter shaft direct reduction in a NIVB,
Only when being counted as " 0 " in NIVB, after executing meter shaft direct reduction failure meter shaft section and becoming clear state out, ZC just be can be used
This fault section goes out clear status information, and when NIVB only covers this fault section, ZC just can will be on this fault section
NIVB is deleted.
Below in conjunction with Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 illustrate the present invention is based on train count meter shaft failure maloperation mistake go out clear when
Means of defence.
Entire protection process when going out clear based on the meter shaft failure maloperation mistake that train counts is as follows:
Step 1: as shown in Figure 1, a non-TVB Train Approaching and crossing this fault section, non-TVB train encounters failure
It first carries out adhesion after section to divide again, ZC establishes a NIVB to meter shaft fault section and is tracked, on this fault section
This NIVB, ZC enables train tally function, and the train number amount of NIVB on this fault section is calculated as " 0 "；
Step 2: as shown in the scene a/b in Fig. 2, a NTVB/SVB drives into fault section, on the fault section both
Some NIVB (correspond to scene b), the train number amount of NIVB on this fault section is calculated as " 1 " by ZC after merging into a NIVB；
Step 3: as shown in the scene b/c/d/e in Fig. 2, with train operation, ZC is by the train of NIVB on fault section
Quantity remains " 1 "；
Step 4: staff executes meter shaft direct reduction to fault section, and failure meter shaft section becomes clear state out；
Step 5: ZC is according to the clear state that goes out of the train quantity of NIVB on fault section and failure meter shaft section
No meter shaft has the judgement of clear failure；Because the train quantity of NIVB is non-" 0 " on fault section, then ZC is determined as that meter shaft has clear failure
And warning note is carried out to center man-machine interface, ZC goes out clear status information without using this fault section, that is, is directed to scene c, ZC
NIVB on this fault section will not be deleted；For scene b, NIVB will not be foreshortened to the left margin of fault section by ZC；Needle
To scene d/e, NIVB will not be foreshortened to the right margin of fault section by ZC；
Step 6: as shown in the scene f in Fig. 2, NIVB is split into NIVB_1 and NIVB_2, and ZC detects that NIVB occurs to divide
After splitting, the train quantity of NIVB_1 on fault section after division is reset to " 0 ", and (NIVB_2 on non-faulting section, ZC will not
Start train tally function)；
Step 7: staff executes meter shaft direct reduction to the fault section, and failure meter shaft section becomes clear state out；
Step 8: ZC is carried out according to the train quantity of NIVB_1 on fault section and the clear state that goes out of failure meter shaft section
Whether meter shaft has the judgement of clear failure；Because the train quantity of NIVB_1 is " 0 " on fault section, then ZC is determined as that meter shaft is clear out
Fault-free, ZC can be used the clear status information out of this fault section, that is, be directed to scene f, ZC can be by the NIVB_ on this fault section
1 deletes.
The invention has the advantages that
1, system processing is simple, and ZC can accomplish the optimization solution of problem under the premise of not influencing existing train trace mode
Certainly；
2, accomplished on operating line true train there may be situations to rush with what staff's meter shaft direct reduction operated
Prominent detection has carried out secondary protection to the correctness of manual operation meter shaft direct reduction and has checked (especially when meter shaft large area
When failure), reduce because the possible train of staff's maloperation chase after lose caused by safety problem；
3, ZC only just enables train tally function in meter shaft fault section, can accomplish that mistake is clear out when meter shaft failure maloperation
The specific aim of problem solves；
4, this method can not do the judgement for haveing clear failure to meter shaft after NIVB division, that is, improve because of manual operation meter
The safety that axis direct reduction may cause, and availability of the meter shaft direct reduction function in engineer application is not influenced.
The above description is merely a specific embodiment, but scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto, is familiar with
Person skilled in art should be understood that the present invention includes but is not limited to content described in specific embodiment above.It is any not
The modification for deviateing function and structure principle of the invention is intended to be included in the range of claims.
Claims (4)
1. means of defence when going out clear based on the meter shaft failure maloperation mistake that train counts, it is characterised in that: straight for meter shaft
Reset operation is connect, there may be trains by being merged into a NIVB for NIVB on NTVB/SVB and failure meter shaft section by ZC
Whether the mode that quantity is counted correctly judges the operation of meter shaft direct reduction, only when being counted as " 0 " in NIVB,
After execution meter shaft direct reduction failure meter shaft section becomes clear state out, just the clear state that goes out of this fault section can be used to believe for ZC
Breath, and when NIVB only covers this fault section, ZC can just delete the NIVB on this fault section.
Means of defence when 2. the meter shaft failure maloperation mistake according to claim 1 counted based on train goes out clear,
Be characterized in that: a non-TVB Train Approaching simultaneously crosses fault section, and non-TVB train first carries out adhesion again after encountering fault section
Division, ZC establish a NIVB to meter shaft fault section and are tracked, and enable train for this NIVB on this fault section, ZC
Tally function, and the train number amount of NIVB on this fault section is calculated as " 0 "；One NTVB/SVB drives into fault section, with this
After existing NIVB merges into a NIVB on fault section, the train number amount of NIVB on this fault section is calculated as " 1 " by ZC；With
Train operation, ZC the train quantity of NIVB on fault section is remained into " 1 "；It is straight that staff executes meter shaft to fault section
Reset is connect, failure meter shaft section becomes clear state out.
Means of defence when 3. the meter shaft failure maloperation mistake according to claim 2 counted based on train goes out clear,
Be characterized in that: ZC is made whether meter shaft according to the train quantity of NIVB on fault section and the clear state that goes out of failure meter shaft section
It has the judgement of clear failure；Because the train quantity of NIVB is non-" 0 " on fault section, then ZC is determined as that meter shaft has clear failure and in
Heart man-machine interface carries out warning note, and ZC goes out clear status information without using this fault section；NIVB be split into NIVB_1 and
After NIVB_2, ZC detect that NIVB is divided, the train quantity of NIVB_1 on fault section after division is reset into " 0 "；Work
Make personnel and meter shaft direct reduction is executed to the fault section, failure meter shaft section becomes clear state out.
Means of defence when 4. the meter shaft failure maloperation mistake according to claim 3 counted based on train goes out clear,
Be characterized in that: ZC is made whether to count according to the train quantity of NIVB_1 on fault section and the clear state that goes out of failure meter shaft section
Axis has the judgement of clear failure；Because the train quantity of NIVB_1 is " 0 " on fault section, then ZC is determined as that meter shaft goes out clearly without reason
The clear status information out of this fault section can be used in barrier, ZC.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810830233.2A CN109291958B (en) | 2018-07-24 | 2018-07-24 | Protection method for counting shaft fault misoperation error clearing based on train counting |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810830233.2A CN109291958B (en) | 2018-07-24 | 2018-07-24 | Protection method for counting shaft fault misoperation error clearing based on train counting |
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| CN109291958A true CN109291958A (en) | 2019-02-01 |
| CN109291958B CN109291958B (en) | 2020-08-18 |
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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| CN201810830233.2A Active CN109291958B (en) | 2018-07-24 | 2018-07-24 | Protection method for counting shaft fault misoperation error clearing based on train counting |
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Citations (11)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN86103414A (en) * | 1986-05-20 | 1987-01-31 | 铁道部通信信号公司西安器材研究所 | Microcomputer axle-counting close device |
| US4787581A (en) * | 1984-08-24 | 1988-11-29 | Alcatel N.V. | Train detection system operating in accordance with the axle-counting principle |
| JPH0616131A (en) * | 1992-06-30 | 1994-01-25 | East Japan Railway Co | Route control device |
| CN1086181A (en) * | 1992-10-01 | 1994-05-04 | 西门子公司 | The calibrating method of erros of axle-counting device in railway and equipment thereof |
| CN102101483A (en) * | 2010-12-27 | 2011-06-22 | 深圳思量微系统有限公司 | Sensor structure for monitoring track axle |
| CN102566442A (en) * | 2011-12-29 | 2012-07-11 | 北京交控科技有限公司 | CBTC (Communications Based Train Control) signal system simulation testing platform |
| CN102826106A (en) * | 2012-08-10 | 2012-12-19 | 西南交通大学 | Method for judging safety protection positions of trains in sections by train control center in passenger transport line |
| CN104260761A (en) * | 2014-08-20 | 2015-01-07 | 北京交控科技有限公司 | An orbital tracking method |
| CN104661890A (en) * | 2012-09-27 | 2015-05-27 | 西门子公司 | Method and arrangement for monitoring a route section which is bounded by two axle-counting sensor units |
| CN104724144A (en) * | 2015-01-28 | 2015-06-24 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Automatic calculation and calibration method for parking in shunting operation process |
| CN108163011A (en) * | 2017-12-26 | 2018-06-15 | 大连奇辉计算机网络有限公司 | A kind of railroad train self-correcting axle counting method and system |
-
2018
- 2018-07-24 CN CN201810830233.2A patent/CN109291958B/en active Active
Patent Citations (11)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US4787581A (en) * | 1984-08-24 | 1988-11-29 | Alcatel N.V. | Train detection system operating in accordance with the axle-counting principle |
| CN86103414A (en) * | 1986-05-20 | 1987-01-31 | 铁道部通信信号公司西安器材研究所 | Microcomputer axle-counting close device |
| JPH0616131A (en) * | 1992-06-30 | 1994-01-25 | East Japan Railway Co | Route control device |
| CN1086181A (en) * | 1992-10-01 | 1994-05-04 | 西门子公司 | The calibrating method of erros of axle-counting device in railway and equipment thereof |
| CN102101483A (en) * | 2010-12-27 | 2011-06-22 | 深圳思量微系统有限公司 | Sensor structure for monitoring track axle |
| CN102566442A (en) * | 2011-12-29 | 2012-07-11 | 北京交控科技有限公司 | CBTC (Communications Based Train Control) signal system simulation testing platform |
| CN102826106A (en) * | 2012-08-10 | 2012-12-19 | 西南交通大学 | Method for judging safety protection positions of trains in sections by train control center in passenger transport line |
| CN104661890A (en) * | 2012-09-27 | 2015-05-27 | 西门子公司 | Method and arrangement for monitoring a route section which is bounded by two axle-counting sensor units |
| CN104260761A (en) * | 2014-08-20 | 2015-01-07 | 北京交控科技有限公司 | An orbital tracking method |
| CN104724144A (en) * | 2015-01-28 | 2015-06-24 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Automatic calculation and calibration method for parking in shunting operation process |
| CN108163011A (en) * | 2017-12-26 | 2018-06-15 | 大连奇辉计算机网络有限公司 | A kind of railroad train self-correcting axle counting method and system |
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| CN109291958B (en) | 2020-08-18 |
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