CN109101852B - Data self-verification RFID method based on hash signature - Google Patents
Data self-verification RFID method based on hash signature Download PDFInfo
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- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
- G06K7/10—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation
- G06K7/10009—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation sensing by radiation using wavelengths larger than 0.1 mm, e.g. radio-waves or microwaves
- G06K7/10257—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation sensing by radiation using wavelengths larger than 0.1 mm, e.g. radio-waves or microwaves arrangements for protecting the interrogation against piracy attacks
Abstract
The invention discloses a Data self-verification RFID method based on hash signature, which verifies the signature stored in the last reader-writer operation through the splicing of Data signature interception value and residual signature value; ensuring the reader-writer to perform related service reading and writing operations by using the Access-Pass password; data signature interception values are added for verification in each operation, and the rest signature values are stored in a database; and calculating a final signature value of the Data domain content, the RID, the operation type and the timestamp by using the hidden key, the hash function and the signature function, and returning the final signature value to the reader-writer. The RFID chip authentication method can ensure that the reader-writer can read and write the RFID chip under the condition of having a correct access password, provide a certain control function, realize the bidirectional operation authentication between the RFID reader-writer and the RFID chip through the Hash and signature algorithm, effectively prevent the data of the RFID chip from being damaged, pretended, tampered, replayed and the like, and further ensure that the read-write operation has the safety characteristics of non-repudiation and non-tampering.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of Hash signature calculation and radio frequency tags, in particular to a data self-verification RFID method based on Hash signature.
Background
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless, non-contact automatic identification technology that has been developed in the nineties and is widely used so far, and it uses the read-write related data to achieve the identification purpose by identifying a specific target and reading and writing the related data through radio signals without establishing mechanical or optical contact between the identification system and the specific target. The radio frequency identification technology has the remarkable advantages of non-contact property, capability of penetrating through a severe environment where snow, fog, ice, paint, dirt and bar codes cannot be used for reading tags, extremely high reading speed which is less than 100 milliseconds in most cases, no need of manual intervention and capability of realizing automation of rapid identification. In addition, the RFID tag can identify the radio frequency tag moving at high speed, and also can identify a plurality of radio frequency tags at the same time; the radio frequency tag is not afraid of severe environments such as oil stain and dust pollution, is not easy to damage, can penetrate through a non-metallic object to identify, and is high in anti-interference capability.
The RFID system mainly comprises three parts, namely a signal transmitter, a signal receiver and a transmitting and receiving antenna. Signal transmitters are typically in the form of tags that can be classified as passive, semi-active, and active, with the primary difference being whether the tag has its own power source so that it can actively transmit data to a corresponding RFID reader. The signal receiver is different according to different supported tag types, generally called as a reader/writer or a reader in popular terms, the general reader/writer is often only used for data transmission with the tag, advanced reader/writers also provide functions such as signal state control, parity error check and correction, and the like, but the current RFID market still lacks more advanced safety functions such as data-oriented functions. With the further comprehensive popularization of the RFID technology, especially the deep development of the Internet of things, the security requirement becomes more important.
Therefore, how to provide a data self-verification RFID method based on hash signature for ensuring data read-write security is an urgent problem to be solved by those skilled in the art.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, the present invention implements bidirectional operation authentication between the reader/writer and the RFID chip through hash and signature algorithms, effectively prevents the data of the RFID chip from being artificially damaged, spoofed, tampered, replayed, and the like, and improves the security of the RFID.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme: a data self-verification RFID method based on hash signature, software test result is displayed through a monitor, and the method comprises the following steps:
step 1: when a reader-writer is used for reading and writing the RFID chip, the reader-writer firstly reads the TID of the RFID chip and verifies whether a preset specific number segment exists;
step 2: if the TID has the specific number section, the reader-writer reads Data in a Data domain of the RFID chip to obtain a Data signature interception value, a residual signature value is inquired in a database of a control PC (personal computer) end according to the TID, after the residual signature value is spliced with the Data signature interception value, signature verification is carried out by using Data content in the Data domain and the spliced signature value, if the signature is wrong, the Data content in the Data domain is emptied through a correct Access-Pass password, and invalid Data processing is carried out;
and step 3: if the signature value is verified to be correct, the reader-writer performs related service reading-writing operation through a correct Access-Pass password; if the signature value is verified to be wrong, stopping the operation;
and 4, step 4: when the reader-writer performs read-write operation on the RFID chip, the reader-writer calculates a corresponding hash value and performs signature according to the content of the Data domain after the final read-write operation is completed by combining TID, RID, the current operation type and a timestamp, then the original text of the RFID chip, the corresponding hash value and the signature are stored in the database, the signature is intercepted, a new Data signature interception value is obtained, and the new Data signature interception value is added into the Data domain;
and 5: after the read-write operation of the reader-writer on the RFID chip is completed, the RFID chip calculates a final signature value by using the unreadable hidden secret key to the Data domain content together with the TID, the RID, the operation type and the timestamp through an expansion instruction, and returns the final signature value to the reader-writer; and the reader-writer judges whether the related information of any historical read-write operation occurs on the RFID chip or not by verifying the final signature value.
Preferably, the TID code in step 1 sets a specific number segment identifier, which is globally unique and corresponds to an unreadable hidden key built in the RFID chip.
Preferably, the data verification process in step 2 includes:
splicing the Data signature interception value and the residual signature value stored in the database, and verifying the operation of the last reader-writer;
the logic detection of the read-write operation of the related service of the reader-writer depends on the actual service data specification.
Preferably, when the reader-writer reads the Data area of the RFID chip, the reader-writer end verifies the operation of the last reader-writer by using a group signature algorithm, that is, the reader-writers belonging to the same group verify the signature value signed by any group of reader-writers.
Preferably, the unreadable hidden key area is an unreadable area, the reader cannot obtain the content of the unreadable hidden key area, and for each independent operation process of the RFID chip, after the read-write operation is completed, the final signature value is calculated for the Data area content, the RID, the operation type, and the timestamp, and is returned to the reader of the read-write operation.
Preferably, in step 4, the number of bits of the Data signature cutoff value is reduced according to the reduction of the number of bits of Data in the Data field.
Preferably, in the step 5, the database updates and maintains a mapping list of public keys corresponding to the TID and the built-in private key thereof in real time, so as to enable any reader to query the RFID chip source of the final signature value through the database, and determine whether the final signature value is obtained by signing a specific chip.
According to the technical scheme, the invention provides the data self-verification RFID method based on the hash signature, which has the following specific beneficial effects:
(1) at the reader-writer end, by means of hash calculation, the data is ensured not to be damaged artificially or unintentionally and artificially, and the integrity and the accuracy of the data are ensured.
(2) Based on the signature algorithm, the bidirectional verification between the reader-writer and the RFID chip is realized, namely the signature of the reader-writer can ensure that the operation of the reader-writer on the chip can not be denied, and the signature of the chip can also ensure that the execution object of the historical operation related to the reader-writer at a certain time is the RFID chip, thereby avoiding the occurrence of the situations of impersonation, tampering and denial of reading and writing.
(3) When signing, the signed data comprises a timestamp and the reader-writer ID (RID) read and written at the time, so that the uniqueness can be ensured for each independent operation of each RFID chip, and attacks such as replay and the like are prevented.
(4) The data self-verification method based on the Hash signature is arranged at a read-write end of the RFID system, so that the service end can pay more attention to the realization of the service, the coupling degree is reduced, and the data self-verification method has safety and a certain control function.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the provided drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a principle of RFID data self-verification according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an operating structure of an RFID system according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a data self-verification process performed by a single RFID chip at multiple readers according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Referring to an RFID data self-verification schematic diagram shown in fig. 1, a data self-verification RFID method based on a hash signature provided in an embodiment of the present invention mainly includes the following steps:
s1: when a reader-writer is used for reading and writing the RFID chip, the reader-writer firstly reads the TID of the RFID chip and verifies whether a preset specific number segment exists; the TID code of the RFID chip sets a specific number segment identification to support a block chain.
S2: if the TID has the specific number section, the reader-writer reads Data in a Data domain of the RFID chip to obtain a Data signature interception value, a residual signature value is inquired in a database of a control PC (personal computer) end according to the TID, after the residual signature value and the Data signature interception value are spliced, signature verification is carried out by using Data content in the Data domain and the spliced signature value, if the signature is wrong, the Data content in the Data domain is emptied through a correct Access-Pass password, and invalid Data is processed;
s3: if the signature value is verified to be correct, the reader-writer performs related service reading-writing operation through a correct Access-Pass password; if the signature value is verified to be wrong, stopping the operation;
s4: when the reader-writer performs read-write operation on the RFID chip, the reader-writer calculates a corresponding hash value and performs signature according to the content of the Data field after the final read-write operation is completed by combining TID, RID, the current operation type (read/write) and a timestamp, then the RFID chip original text, the corresponding hash value and the signature are stored in the database, the signature is intercepted, a new Data signature interception value (such as a left interception 64-bit value) is obtained and is added into the Data field;
s5: after the read-write operation of the reader-writer on the RFID chip is completed, the RFID chip calculates a final signature value by using the unreadable hidden secret key to the Data domain content together with the TID, the RID, the operation type and the timestamp through an expansion instruction, and returns the final signature value to the reader-writer; the reader-writer judges whether the related information of any historical read-write operation occurs on the RFID chip by verifying the final signature value, namely, any reader-writer can judge whether the related information of a certain historical read-write operation occurs on a certain chip by verifying the final signature value at any moment.
It should be noted that the RFID reader/writer in this embodiment has an id (rid), and performs the following operations: data verification, service reading and writing, Hash calculation (Hash-func), signature (Sign-func) and signature value processing. The RFID chip includes: the system comprises an Electronic Product Code (EPC), a tag identification number (TID), a Data field, an Access-Pass field, a Hidden Key field (Hidden-Key) and a signature field (Sign-func).
After the above steps are completed, the RFID reader completes verification of validity of the data in the RFID chip.
After the secondary reader-writer finishes the reading and writing operation of the chip, if a next reader-writer needs to perform the reading and writing operation on the chip, the final signature value reserved after the last operation in the Data field in the RFID chip is verified, and the specific mode is that the signature value in the Data field is spliced with the rest signature value inquired in the database and operated last time, namely the signature value is spliced with the latest signature value in the database before the current reading and writing operation, and the signature verification is performed, if the signature value passes through, the secondary reader-writer performs the related reading and writing operation required by the service, otherwise, the secondary reader-writer directly suspends the operation, and the schematic diagram can be seen in an attached figure 3.
In order to further optimize the above technical solution, the RFID chip will be used to distinguish the independent read/write operations performed by the RFID chip at different readers at different times before signing by splicing the Data in the Data domain, the type of this operation (which can be conveniently represented by bit 0/1 for reading/writing), the timestamp, and the reader RID currently reading and writing this chip. On the other hand, the TID is a chip with a specific number segment identifier to support the differentiation of different RFID chips in the scene of a stronger security requirement, and corresponds to the public Key of the Hidden-Key in the RFID chip. The corresponding relation between the TID and the Hidden-Key can be realized by adopting the simplest KV form mapping or a specific coding mode.
In order to further optimize the technical scheme, the reading of the TID can detect whether the current RFID reader can normally and effectively read and write the RFID chip while verifying whether the chip is in compliance, and if the read TID is in compliance, it indicates that both the reader and the chip have no fault, so that the reliability of subsequent read and write operations based on services can be ensured.
In order to further optimize the above technical solution, when the RFID reader reads the Data field of the RFID chip, the reader can verify the Data by using a signature algorithm at the reader end, the signature algorithm is a group signature algorithm, that is, the readers belonging to the same group (which can be understood as a manufacturer, a company, etc.) can verify the signature value signed by any group reader, and the group signature scheme adopted has no limitation because the calculation and storage capacities of the readers are generally high.
In order to further optimize the technical scheme, the Hidden-Key in the RFID chip is an unreadable and unwritable area, and the point is mainly realized by a hardware method. Correspondingly, in the distribution of Data bit number, TID generally takes 96bits as a main part, a Data domain takes 128bits to 512bits as a main part, an Access-Pass domain takes 32bits as a main part, and a Hidden-key is dynamically customized according to the security requirement and generally takes 128bits as a main part.
In order to further optimize the technical scheme, a signature algorithm adopted by the RFID chip through the expanded instruction can adopt an ECDSA signature algorithm with 113 bits or higher, the algorithm security of the 113-bit ECDSA is equivalent to that of a 512-bit RSA signature algorithm, and the calculation efficiency is higher, so that the RFID chip is more suitable for an RFID environment.
In the embodiment, the present invention is directed to provide a data self-verification RFID method based on hash signature, which can ensure that a reader can read and write an RFID chip under the condition of having a correct Access-Pass password (Access-Pass), provide a certain control function, and simultaneously implement bidirectional operation authentication between the RFID reader and the RFID chip through a hash and signature algorithm, thereby ensuring that the read and write operations performed have non-repudiation and non-falsification security characteristics, and is suitable for various industries applying RFID technologies and having security requirements.
The embodiments in the present description are described in a progressive manner, each embodiment focuses on differences from other embodiments, and the same and similar parts among the embodiments are referred to each other. The device disclosed by the embodiment corresponds to the method disclosed by the embodiment, so that the description is simple, and the relevant points can be referred to the method part for description.
The previous description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.
Claims (7)
1. A data self-verification RFID method based on hash signature is disclosed, a software test result is displayed through a monitor, and the method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: when a reader-writer is used for reading and writing the RFID chip, the reader-writer firstly reads the TID of the RFID chip and verifies whether a preset specific number segment exists;
step 2: if the TID has the specific number section, the reader-writer reads Data in a Data domain of the RFID chip to obtain a Data signature interception value, a residual signature value is inquired in a database of a control PC (personal computer) end according to the TID, after the residual signature value is spliced with the Data signature interception value, signature verification is carried out by using Data content in the Data domain and the spliced signature value, if the signature is wrong, the Data content in the Data domain is emptied through a correct Access-Pass password, and invalid Data processing is carried out;
and step 3: if the verification is correct, the reader-writer performs related service reading-writing operation through a correct Access-Pass password;
and 4, step 4: when the reader-writer performs read-write operation on the RFID chip, the reader-writer calculates a corresponding hash value and performs signature according to the content of the Data domain after the final read-write operation is completed by combining TID, RID, the current operation type and a timestamp, then the original text of the RFID chip, the corresponding hash value and the signature are stored in the database, the signature is intercepted, a new Data signature interception value is obtained, and the new Data signature interception value is added into the Data domain;
and 5: after the read-write operation of the reader-writer on the RFID chip is completed, the RFID chip calculates a final signature value by using the unreadable hidden secret key to the Data domain content together with the TID, the RID, the operation type and the timestamp through an expansion instruction, and returns the final signature value to the reader-writer; and the reader-writer judges whether the related information of any historical read-write operation occurs on the RFID chip or not by verifying the final signature value.
2. The hash signature-based data self-verification RFID method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the TID code in step 1 sets a specific number segment identifier, is globally unique, and corresponds to a built-in unreadable hidden key of the RFID chip.
3. The hash signature-based data self-verification RFID method according to claim 1, wherein the data verification process in the step 2 comprises:
splicing the Data signature interception value and the residual signature value stored in the database, and verifying the operation of the last reader-writer;
the logic detection of the read-write operation of the related service of the reader-writer depends on the actual service data specification.
4. The Data self-verification RFID method based on Hash signature as claimed in claim 1 or 3, wherein when a reader-writer reads the Data area of the RFID chip, the reader-writer end adopts a group signature algorithm to verify the operation of the last reader-writer, that is, the reader-writers belonging to the same group verify the signature value signed by any group of reader-writers.
5. The hash signature-based Data self-verification RFID method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the unreadable hidden key region is an unreadable region, the reader/writer cannot obtain the contents of the unreadable hidden key region, and for each independent operation process of the RFID chip, after the read/write operation is completed, the final signature value is calculated for the Data field contents together with the RID, the operation type, and the timestamp, and is returned to the reader/writer of the read/write operation.
6. The hash signature-based Data self-verification RFID method as claimed in claim 1, wherein in the step 4, the Data signature truncation value is reduced in bit number according to the reduction of Data field Data bit number.
7. The data self-verification RFID method based on Hash signature as claimed in claim 1, wherein in the step 5, the mapping list of the public keys corresponding to the TID and its built-in private key is updated and maintained in the database in real time, so as to realize that any reader can query the RFID chip source of the final signature value through the database.
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| CN107026874A (en) * | 2017-06-02 | 2017-08-08 | 李维刚 | One kind instruction signature and verification method and system |
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