CN102043973B - RFID ownership transfer method based on partially trusted centre - Google Patents
RFID ownership transfer method based on partially trusted centre Download PDFInfo
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- CN102043973B CN102043973B CN2010105863413A CN201010586341A CN102043973B CN 102043973 B CN102043973 B CN 102043973B CN 2010105863413 A CN2010105863413 A CN 2010105863413A CN 201010586341 A CN201010586341 A CN 201010586341A CN 102043973 B CN102043973 B CN 102043973B
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Abstract
The invention relates to a radio frequency identification technology, and discloses a RFID ownership transfer method based on a partially trusted centre, comprising the following steps: 1) a initial state step that the RFID respectively shares different secret keys with a reader-writer and the partially trusted centre; 2) a reader-writer secret key transmission step that an original owner reader-writer transmits the secret key to a new owner reader-writer; 3) a step of requesting a trusted centre, wherein the new owner reader-writer transmits a secret key updating request to the trusted centre; 4) a trusted centre responding step that the trusted centre transmits a permit to the new owner reader-writer; 5) a step of transmitting the secret key updating request to the RFID, wherein the new owner reader-writer transmits the updating request to the RFID; 6) a step of responding to the updating by the RFID, wherein the RFID updates the secret key and transmits an authentication code; and 7) a step of generating a new secret key by the new owner reader-writer, wherein the new owner reader-writer updates the secret key and transmits a piece of acknowledgment message. Compared with the prior RFID ownership transfer method, the method of the invention greatly enhances privacy protection for the new owner of the RFID, and can effectively various prior attacks.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to REID, particularly the relevant safety technique of RFID tag authentication.
Background technology
RF identification (Radio Frequency Identification is called for short " RFID ") technology is claimed electronic label technology again, is a kind of communication technology, can discern specific objective and read and write related data through radio signals.One of advantage of this technology is to need not to set up physics or other any visible contacting between recognition system and the specific objective.It is the unify contact tie of real world of department of computer science, for computing machine perception and identification real world provide a kind of efficient, inexpensive mode.
Rfid system is widely used, and can be used for retail supermarket, E-Passport, electronics banknote, personal identity card, digital library's management, even can be used for making up intelligent self-organizing network environment, or the like.Retail giant Wal-Mart, mechanisms such as U.S. Department of Defense have all adopted the RFID technology to discern and have followed the trail of the article that circulate in their product supply chain automatically.
Rfid system is made up of electronic tag (Tag) and read write line (Reader) usually.Electronic tag (also being called for short " label ") is the microcircuit that has antenna, does not have processor usually, only is made up of thousands of logic gates.Store the electronic data of certain format in the electronic tag, with this sign property information as article to be identified.In the application with electronic tag attached on the article to be identified, as the electronic marker of article to be identified.Read write line is the wireless transmit and the receiving equipment that have antenna, is responsible for the information in the electronic tag is read and write.In order to discern electronic tag, read write line connects a background data base (Back-end database is called for short " DB ") usually.Background data base is the Database Systems that run on hardware platform, it has been generally acknowledged that it has powerful calculating and storage capacity, and it comprises the information of all electronic tags in the system simultaneously.In recent years, along with developing rapidly of hardware technology, some read write line has possessed the hardware capabilities of toy data base in service, can independently retrieve and discern electronic tag.
Interactive communication between electronic tag and the read write line is open, therefore it has been generally acknowledged that the channel between label and the read write line is pregnable, and is unsafe.Read write line and background data base can be one on the hardware, also connect through symmetry or asymmetric cryptosystem safety, therefore, it has been generally acknowledged that the channel between them is safe.Thus, in the design of rfid system secure communication protocols, can think that read write line and background data base are one (promptly integral body are regarded the side in the communications protocol as, and the opposing party is an electronic tag).Therefore, in the present invention, we refer to " read write line and background data base " with " read write line ".Whole rfid system is as shown in Figure 1.
In rfid system, identification is typical " request-response " mode, and basic model is as shown in Figure 2.Read write line at first sends the identification request to electronic tag; Electronic tag returns the identification response message then, such as label ID and product information etc.
Increase along with what use, rfid system has been proposed very high demand for security, promptly protecting the privacy information of user by authentication the time is not one of them important demand for security by leakage.But in sweep limit, the read write line of malice can move the verification process of forging and survey the sensitive information of label to obtain writing down in the label.If there is not secret protection, label owner's identity and other sensitive information can discerned and write down to read write line through the sequence number that label sends arbitrarily.Therefore, the rfid system of a safety must satisfy following two demands.On the one hand, legal read write line must successfully be discerned legal label; On the other hand, illegal read write line can not obtain any privacy information from label.
Label has (Tag Ownership) and is meant and can discerns electronic tag and can control all relevant informations, also is that the article that this electronic tag is adhered to have ownership simultaneously.The electronic tag ownership shifts and is meant that a read write line shifts it to another read write line to some or certain some electronic tag ownership.The ownership of an electronic tag might constantly change in the cycle in serviceable life of this label.For example: initial electronics is signed and is attached on the product of being produced by the manufacturer, then encloses the product of label and is transferred to the retailer, and the ultimate consumer buys the product with label there from the retailer.The transfer of an electronic tag ownership means that the mandate of discerning this label shifted.Therefore the electronic tag ownership shifts and must guarantee: in case ownership shifts to the opposing party, the former side of having again can not discern this label.It is rfid system secret protection the very corn of a subject that the label ownership shifts.Suppose that user A has bought the article with electronic tag from the supermarket.The desired result that this transaction obtains should be: user A can pass through the label on his the handhold read-write device identify objects, and the read write line in supermarket can not trace into this label again.In case obtain all necessary informations of control label, newly the read write line of the side of having has just substituted former owner's read write line.With forward direction trackability not, because former owner is still keeping all secret informations on the label,
As far as we know, two types of RFID label ownership transfer systems are arranged at present.One type is that read write line directly shifts.In this type systematic; If user A has bought article that adhere to electronic tag, the label ownership transfer process of these article is following: the former owner's of above-mentioned label (i.e. the former owner of these commodity) read write line sends to the read write line that user A is held with all information of label through safe lane.Thus, user A can be through this label of read write line identification that he held.The advantage of this type systematic is that the ownership transfer process is simple, and efficient is high.But shortcoming is also very obvious: the former owner of label is still grasping all information of label, and the label that still can the recognition and tracking ownership have shifted is even the secret information that identification label is used can be brought in constant renewal in.This is because new and old owner grasps identical secret information and label about label and carries out on overt channel with communicating by letter of read write line.Therefore, can't protect the new owner's of label privacy in this type RIFD system.
The another kind of trusted party (Trusted Center is called for short " TC ") that is based on.In general, trusted party has two kinds, and a kind of is believable fully, and the whole behaviors in promptly credible center are all carried out according to the system protocol rule honestly; Another kind is partly believable; Be that credible center is fully honestly according to system protocol rule executive routine; But it is again curious simultaneously, collects the privacy information about some or some label through execution of participation system agreement or monitoring overt channel often, but never implements active attack.This trusted party is more near practical application.Existing label ownership transfer system based on trusted party all is based on complete believable trusted party.The used secret information of identification label is not directly to be stored on the read write line, but exists in the database of third party's trusted party.In this type systematic, the label ownership shifts under trusted party control and carries out.According to the label secret information of grasping; Trusted party upgrades the secret information in the target labels through the read write line that new owner held; And send corresponding secret information through safe lane and give the read write line that new owner held; So new owner is ability recognition objective label just, and the former owner of label can't this label of Tracking Recognition.This type systematic can effectively be protected the new owner's of label privacy, but its shortcoming also clearly: the trusted party that places one's entire reliance upon, trusted party must be believable fully, and this is difficult to realize in practical application.In addition, in this system, in fact the ownership of label does not change, all in trusted party control hand.
In order to address the above problem, we provide a kind of electronic tag ownership transfer system based on half trusted party.This system has overcome the shortcoming of above-mentioned two types of RIFD ownership transfer systems preferably.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, fundamental purpose of the present invention is to provide, a kind of electronic tag ownership transfer method based on half trusted party.Major advantage among the present invention is: one, realized the transfer of electronic tag ownership in the rfid system effectively; And the new owner's of protection label privacy is not revealed; Promptly guarantee the label ownership in case shift, the former owner of this label is this label of recognition and tracking again; Two, it is believable fully no longer requiring trusted party, can be partly believable, and more near practical application.Three, can cooperate with all kinds of tag recognition (comprising) based on fixed key or based on key updating; Four, can resist existing all known attacks of rfid system.
For reaching These characteristics, the invention provides a kind of electronic tag ownership transfer method based on half trusted party.Comprise following steps:
1) original state step; Former owner's read write line and target labels are shared a key; Trusted party and target labels are shared another key, and have the target labels ownership certificate that is presented to former owner, between the read write line and between read write line and the trusted party safe lane are arranged;
2) read write line key delivery step, former owner's read write line are utilized target labels ownership certificate that safe lane issues trusted party, are sent to new owner's read write line with some relevant informations of target labels cipher key shared and target labels;
3) request trusted party step after the message that new owner's read write line sends over former owner's read write line is deciphered and authentication passes through, utilizes safe lane that the message of above-mentioned deciphering is sent to trusted party with some relevant informations;
4) trusted party response of step; After the message that trusted party sends over new owner's read write line is deciphered and authentication passes through; Utilize with the target labels cipher key shared and generate key updating certificate and new key seed, utilize safe lane that above-mentioned key updating certificate, new key seed and some relevant informations are sent to new owner's read write line then;
5) send the key refresh request step to label; Trusted party is sended over after message is deciphered and authentication passes through; New owner's read write line to key updating certificate and some associated information calculation hash function values as authentication code; Send the key updating request to target labels then, and simultaneously above-mentioned authentication code and the above-mentioned relevant information that generates authentication code are sent label;
6) label response step of updating; After receiving above-mentioned authentication code and relevant information; The same utilization with the trusted party cipher key shared of target labels generates above-mentioned key updating certificate and new key seed; Utilize key updating certificate and the above-mentioned relevant information of receiving to come the authentication verification sign indicating number then,, then utilize new key seed and hash function to generate new key and new authentication code if authentication is passed through; And will be updated to the new key of above-mentioned generation with the read write line cipher key shared, subsequently new authentication code is sent to new owner's read write line;
7) new owner's read write line generates the new key step; Receive new authentication code from label; New owner's read write line utilizes the new key seed to verify, if pass through, then new key seed and hash function generate new key; And with this key as with the target labels cipher key shared, send confirmation to former owner's read write line at last.
In said method, said hash function is the hash function on the cryptography meaning.
In said method, said relevant information comprises: the sign of electronic tag, the random number of read write line information and required generation when implementing one-time pad etc.
In said method, said safe lane is based on symmetry or asymmetric cryptosystem.
Through finding that relatively the key distinction of technical scheme of the present invention and prior art is that the present invention has realized that effectively the electronic tag ownership shifts in the rfid system under the prerequisite of the new owner's privacy information of protection label; The safety hypothesis of foundation reduces, and trusted party is half believable getting final product, and the scope of application is wider; Compatible strong, can resist existing all known attacks of rfid system.
Description of drawings
Fig. 1 is a RFID existing system synoptic diagram.
Fig. 2 is a RFID existing system authentication protocol synoptic diagram.
Fig. 3 is an electronic tag ownership transfer process synoptic diagram among the present invention.
Embodiment
For making the object of the invention, technical scheme and advantage clearer, 3 couples of the present invention do further detailed description below in conjunction with accompanying drawing.
If two read write line A and B are arranged in the rfid system.TC is third-party trusted party, and T is the current goal electronic tag.En
PK(M) for message M is encrypted with PKI PK, Dec
SK(M) for ciphertext M is deciphered with private key SK, Sig
SK(M) for private key SK message M is signed, the signature of generation comprises the signature value of message M and M, Ver
PK(M) for signature M being verified with PKI PK.PK
A, PK
BAnd PK
TCBe respectively the PKI of Reader A, Reader B and TC, SK
A, SK
BAnd SK
TCBe respectively the private key of Reader A, Reader B and TC.ID is the identification number of electronic tag T, comprises some information relevant with label.H is the hash function on the cryptography meaning
L wherein
rSecurity parameter for rfid system.The purpose of agreement is: under the assistance of TC, read write line A shifts the B to Reader with it to the ownership of label T safely.
(1) under the original state, trusted party TC and target labels T cipher key shared are K
0, the record about T (ID, A, a K are arranged in the database of TC accordingly
0).Read write line A and label T share I D and current key are K
1Simultaneously, also have among the A TC be presented to it about having certificate H (ID, the K of label T
0, A).
(2) in the 1st step of agreement, A calculates
N wherein
ABe the random number that A generates, then with M
0Send to B.
(3) in the 2nd step of agreement, B receives M
0After, calculate
If pass through, then calculate
N wherein
BBe the random number that B generates, then with M
1Send to TC.Otherwise, return and report an error.
(4) in the 3rd step of agreement, TC receives M
1After, calculate
If pass through, then calculate
N wherein
TCBe the random number that TC generates, then with in the database about record (ID, A, the K of T
0) be updated to (ID, B, K
0), and with M
2Send to B.Otherwise, return and report an error.
(5) in the 4th step of agreement, B receives M
2After, calculate
If pass through, then with H (K
0, ID, N
A, N
B, N
TC), N
A, N
BAnd N
TCSend to label T together.Otherwise, return and report an error.
(6) the 5th step of agreement, after T receives the message from B, checking H (K
0, ID, N
A, N
B, N
TC) value, if pass through, then calculate authentication message M
3=H (H (K
0, ID, B, N
B), N
A, N
TC, K
1, 0) and upgrade key K
1=H (H (K
0, ID, B, N
B), N
A, N
TC, K
1, 1), then with M
3Send to B.Otherwise, return and report an error.
(7) in the 6th step of agreement, B receives M
3If the back checking is through then calculating M
4=H (K
1, " OK ") and calculating K
1=H (H (K
0, ID, B, N
B), N
A, N
TC, K
1, 1).Then with M
4Send to A.Otherwise, return and report an error.
Though through reference certain preferred embodiment of the present invention; The present invention is illustrated and describes; But those skilled in the art should be understood that; Can do various changes to it in form and details, for example: between the read write line and the safe lane between read write line and the trusted party also can be based upon on the DSE arithmetic or the like, and without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.
Claims (3)
1. electronic tag ownership transfer system based on half trusted party may further comprise the steps:
1) original state step; Former owner's read write line and target labels are shared a key; Trusted party and target labels are shared another key, and have the target labels ownership certificate that is presented to former owner, between the read write line and between read write line and the trusted party safe lane are arranged;
2) read write line key delivery step, former owner's read write line are utilized target labels ownership certificate that safe lane issues trusted party, are sent to new owner's read write line with some information of target labels cipher key shared and target labels;
3) request trusted party step after the message that new owner's read write line sends over former owner's read write line is deciphered and authentication passes through, utilizes safe lane that the message of above-mentioned deciphering is sent to trusted party with some information;
4) trusted party response of step; After the message that trusted party sends over new owner's read write line is deciphered and authentication passes through; Utilize with the target labels cipher key shared and generate key updating certificate and new key seed, utilize safe lane that above-mentioned key updating certificate, new key seed and some information are sent to new owner's read write line then;
5) send the key refresh request step to label; Trusted party is sended over after message is deciphered and authentication passes through; New owner's read write line to key updating certificate and some information calculations hash function values as authentication code; Send the key updating request to target labels then, and simultaneously above-mentioned authentication code and the above-mentioned information that generates authentication code are sent label;
6) label response step of updating; After receiving above-mentioned authentication code and information; The same utilization with the trusted party cipher key shared of target labels generates above-mentioned key updating certificate and new key seed; Utilize key updating certificate and the above-mentioned information of receiving to come the authentication verification sign indicating number then,, then utilize new key seed and hash function to generate new key and new authentication code if authentication is passed through; And will be updated to the new key of above-mentioned generation with the read write line cipher key shared, subsequently new authentication code is sent to new owner's read write line;
7) new owner's read write line generates the new key step; Receive new authentication code from label; New owner's read write line utilizes the new key seed to verify, if pass through, then new key seed and hash function generate new key; And with this key as with the target labels cipher key shared, send confirmation to former owner's read write line at last.
2. in the system of claim 1, it is characterized in that said hash function is to use the hash function on the cryptography meaning, said safe lane is based on symmetry or asymmetric cryptosystem.
3. in the system of claim 1, it is characterized in that comprising: the sign of electronic tag, the random number of required generation when read write line information and enforcement one-time pad in said relevant information.
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| CN2010105863413A CN102043973B (en) | 2010-12-13 | 2010-12-13 | RFID ownership transfer method based on partially trusted centre |
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| CN2010105863413A CN102043973B (en) | 2010-12-13 | 2010-12-13 | RFID ownership transfer method based on partially trusted centre |
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| CN102043973A CN102043973A (en) | 2011-05-04 |
| CN102043973B true CN102043973B (en) | 2012-10-31 |
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Families Citing this family (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102855504B (en) * | 2011-08-02 | 2015-11-25 | 深联致远(北京)科技有限公司 | RFID label tag ownership transfer method and device thereof |
| CN103281194B (en) * | 2013-06-15 | 2018-12-28 | 杨涛 | A kind of safety and lightweight RFID ownership transfer method based on Bilinear map |
| CN105681041B (en) * | 2014-11-18 | 2019-09-17 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | A kind of RFID ownership transfer method |
| TWI488607B (en) * | 2014-11-21 | 2015-06-21 | Physiological detection management system, physiological detection methods and the implementation of the method of computer software program | |
| CN105812130B (en) * | 2014-12-31 | 2020-01-24 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | RFID ownership transfer method |
| CN105046462A (en) * | 2015-06-17 | 2015-11-11 | 清华大学 | Article safety circulation, anti-counterfeit authentication, and tracking and tracing method and system |
| EP3253021A1 (en) * | 2016-06-03 | 2017-12-06 | Gemalto Sa | A method for managing the status of a connected device |
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| JP2008090424A (en) * | 2006-09-29 | 2008-04-17 | Sony Corp | Management system, management method, electronic appliance and program |
| CN101222325A (en) * | 2008-01-23 | 2008-07-16 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信有限公司 | Wireless multi-hop network key management method based on ID |
| TW200941993A (en) * | 2008-03-31 | 2009-10-01 | Univ Chaoyang Technology | A RFID systems conformation to EPC class 1 generation 2 standards ownership transfer scheme |
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