CN109039607A - A kind of Safety Analysis Method of code key agreement protocol - Google Patents

A kind of Safety Analysis Method of code key agreement protocol Download PDF

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Publication number
CN109039607A
CN109039607A CN201810969683.XA CN201810969683A CN109039607A CN 109039607 A CN109039607 A CN 109039607A CN 201810969683 A CN201810969683 A CN 201810969683A CN 109039607 A CN109039607 A CN 109039607A
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CN
China
Prior art keywords
cert
agreement protocol
key agreement
safety analysis
key
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
CN201810969683.XA
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Chinese (zh)
Inventor
余磊
卓泽朋
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Huaibei Normal University
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Huaibei Normal University
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Publication date
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Priority to CN201810969683.XA priority Critical patent/CN109039607A/en
Publication of CN109039607A publication Critical patent/CN109039607A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

Abstract

It is disclosed by the invention to belong to field of information security technology, specially a kind of Safety Analysis Method of code key agreement protocol, the Safety Analysis Method of the code key agreement protocol includes the following steps: S1: choosing an attacker E, is realized using attacker E and implement unknown key-share attack to key agreement protocol；S2:A verifies the digital signature of E, and checks 1 < gyWhether < q is true；S3:A randomly selects a secret valueAnd with the public key PK of EBEncryption；S4:B SKBDecryptionAnd ENC is decrypted with xx(α, Cert (A)), obtains α and verifying Cert (A), and B verifies Cert (A)；S5:B calculates β=h1((gα)y), and be compared with α；S6:B calculates h2(gx), and it is sent to A as confirmation message, A calculates h2(gx), and message h is sent with E2(gx) be compared, key agreement protocol can be analyzed in the safety by known various attacks, the safety analysis to passive attack and go-between's forgery attack is realized, substantially increase the safety of key agreement protocol.

Description

A kind of Safety Analysis Method of code key agreement protocol
Technical field
The present invention relates to field of information security technology, specially a kind of Safety Analysis Method of code key agreement protocol.
Background technique
Key agreement protocol is that the parameter that session key is generated respectively by each agreement participant is calculated by certain Out.Key Establishing Protocol refers to that two or more participants establish the mistake of interim secret session key on disclosed network Journey, the session key obtained using this agreement, participants can establish safe lane in open network, to guarantee The safety of information is transmitted, Key Establishing Protocol is the basic module of cryptography, and safety is established on unsafe network The most basic demand of channel.Not only there is complicated calculating for existing key agreement protocol, and there is also insecurity, So needing to carry out safety analysis to key agreement protocol, existing analysis method complex steps, analytic angle is single, thus Comprehensively key agreement protocol can not be analyzed.For this purpose, it is proposed that a kind of safety analysis side of code key agreement protocol Method.
Summary of the invention
The purpose of the present invention is to provide a kind of Safety Analysis Methods of code key agreement protocol, to solve above-mentioned background skill The problem of being proposed in art.
To achieve the above object, the invention provides the following technical scheme: a kind of safety analysis side of code key agreement protocol The Safety Analysis Method of method, the code key agreement protocol includes the following steps:
S1: choosing an attacker E, is realized using attacker E and implements unknown key-share attack to key agreement protocol, Randomly select a secret valueCalculate gyAnd X=gyModp, B are using the private key of oneself to gy, Cert (B) does number Sign { gy,Cert(B)sigB, B is gy, Cert (B), { gy,Cert(B)sigBIt is sent to A；
S2:A verifies the digital signature of E, and checks 1 < gyWhether < q is true, if so, it authenticates successfully, if not, Authentification failure；
S3:A randomly selects a secret valueAnd with the public key PK of EBEncryption, and α and Cert (A), A are encrypted with x ?ENCx(Cert (A)) is sent to E；
S4:B SKBDecryptionAnd ENC is decrypted with xx(α, Cert (A)) obtains α and verifying Cert (A), B verifying Cert (A), if it fails, authentification failure, if success, authenticates successfully；
S5:B calculates β=h1((gα)y), and be compared with α, if two differences, authentification failure, if they are the same, certification at Function；
S6:B calculates h2(gx), and it is sent to A as confirmation message, A calculates h2(gx), and message h is sent with E2 (gx) be compared, if two differences, authentification failure authenticate successfully if they are the same.
Preferably, in the step S1, attacker E needs to generate the long-term private of oneself, and applies for the certificate of oneself Cert(E)。
Preferably, in the step S1 private key of B calculation method be using based on Lagrange Polynomial interpolating method into Row private key calculates.
Compared with prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are: a kind of safety for code key agreement protocol that the invention proposes Property analysis method, key agreement protocol can be analyzed in the safety by known various attacks, realize to passive attack and The safety analysis of go-between's forgery attack substantially increases the safety of key agreement protocol.
Specific embodiment
The technical scheme in the embodiments of the invention will be clearly and completely described below, it is clear that described implementation Example is only a part of the embodiment of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.Based on the embodiments of the present invention, this field is common Technical staff's every other embodiment obtained without making creative work belongs to the model that the present invention protects It encloses.
The present invention provides a kind of technical solution: a kind of Safety Analysis Method of code key agreement protocol, which negotiates association The Safety Analysis Method of view includes the following steps:
S1: choosing an attacker E, is realized using attacker E and implements unknown key-share attack to key agreement protocol, Randomly select a secret valueCalculate gyAnd X=gyModp, B are using the private key of oneself to gy, Cert (B) does number Sign { gy,Cert(B)sigB, B is gy, Cert (B), { gy,Cert(B)sigBIt is sent to A；
S2:A verifies the digital signature of E, and checks 1 < gyWhether < q is true, if so, it authenticates successfully, if not, Authentification failure；
S3:A randomly selects a secret valueAnd with the public key PK of EBEncryption, and α and Cert (A), A are encrypted with x ?ENCx(Cert (A)) is sent to E；
S4:B SKBDecryptionAnd ENC is decrypted with xx(α, Cert (A)) obtains α and verifying Cert (A), B verifying Cert (A), if it fails, authentification failure, if success, authenticates successfully；
S5:B calculates β=h1((gα)y), and be compared with α, if two differences, authentification failure, if they are the same, certification at Function；
S6:B calculates h2(gx), and it is sent to A as confirmation message, A calculates h2(gx), and message h is sent with E2 (gx) be compared, if two differences, authentification failure authenticate successfully if they are the same.
Wherein, in the step S1, attacker E needs to generate the long-term private of oneself, and applies for the certificate Cert of oneself (E), the calculation method of the private key of B is to carry out private key calculating using based on Lagrange Polynomial interpolating method in the step S1.
It although an embodiment of the present invention has been shown and described, for the ordinary skill in the art, can be with A variety of variations, modification, replacement can be carried out to these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the present invention by understanding And modification, the scope of the present invention is defined by the appended.

Claims (3)

1. a kind of Safety Analysis Method of code key agreement protocol, it is characterised in that: the safety analysis of the code key agreement protocol Method includes the following steps:
S1: choosing an attacker E, is realized using attacker E and implements unknown key-share attack to key agreement protocol, at random Choose a secret valueCalculate gyAnd X=gyModp, B are using the private key of oneself to gy, Cert (B) does digital signature {gy,Cert(B)sigB, B is gy, Cert (B), { gy,Cert(B)sigBIt is sent to A；
S2:A verifies the digital signature of E, and checks 1 < gyWhether < q is true, if so, it authenticates successfully, if not, certification is lost It loses；
S3:A randomly selects a secret valueAnd with the public key PK of EBEncryption, and α and Cert (A), A handle are encrypted with xIt is sent to E；
S4:B SKBDecryptionAnd ENC is decrypted with xx(α, Cert (A)), obtains α and verifying Cert (A), and B verifies Cert (A), if it fails, authentification failure authenticates successfully if successful；
S5:B calculates β=h1((gα)y), and be compared with α, if two differences, authentification failure authenticate successfully if they are the same；
S6:B calculates h2(gx), and it is sent to A as confirmation message, A calculates h2(gx), and message h is sent with E2(gx) It is compared, if two differences, authentification failure authenticate successfully if they are the same.
2. a kind of Safety Analysis Method of code key agreement protocol according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: the step In S1, attacker E needs to generate the long-term private of oneself, and applies for the certificate Cert (E) of oneself.
3. a kind of Safety Analysis Method of code key agreement protocol according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: the step The calculation method of the private key of B is to carry out private key calculating using based on Lagrange Polynomial interpolating method in S1.
CN201810969683.XA 2018-08-23 2018-08-23 A kind of Safety Analysis Method of code key agreement protocol Pending CN109039607A (en)

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN111835516A (en) * 2020-06-14 2020-10-27 西安电子科技大学 Public key repudiatable encryption method and system

Citations (3)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101119196A (en) * 2006-08-03 2008-02-06 西安电子科技大学 Bidirectional identification method and system
CN102833748A (en) * 2012-09-20 2012-12-19 北京邮电大学 Wireless network lightweight class authentication key negotiation protocol based on digital certificate
CN103634104A (en) * 2013-11-26 2014-03-12 常州大学 Three-party authentication key agreement protocol generating method based on certificates

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101119196A (en) * 2006-08-03 2008-02-06 西安电子科技大学 Bidirectional identification method and system
CN102833748A (en) * 2012-09-20 2012-12-19 北京邮电大学 Wireless network lightweight class authentication key negotiation protocol based on digital certificate
CN103634104A (en) * 2013-11-26 2014-03-12 常州大学 Three-party authentication key agreement protocol generating method based on certificates

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Title
周永彬等: ""一种认证密钥协商协议的安全分析及改进"", 《软件学报》 *

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN111835516A (en) * 2020-06-14 2020-10-27 西安电子科技大学 Public key repudiatable encryption method and system
CN111835516B (en) * 2020-06-14 2021-11-23 西安电子科技大学 Public key repudiatable encryption method and system

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Application publication date: 20181218

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