CN108966223A - Physical layer authentication method and system based on single-bit concealment agreement - Google Patents

Physical layer authentication method and system based on single-bit concealment agreement Download PDF

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CN108966223A
CN108966223A CN201810404236.XA CN201810404236A CN108966223A CN 108966223 A CN108966223 A CN 108966223A CN 201810404236 A CN201810404236 A CN 201810404236A CN 108966223 A CN108966223 A CN 108966223A
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signal
certification
probability
physical layer
indicate
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CN108966223B (en
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谢宁
罗钢
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Shenzhen University
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Shenzhen University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W52/00—Power management, e.g. TPC [Transmission Power Control], power saving or power classes
    • H04W52/04—TPC
    • H04W52/18—TPC being performed according to specific parameters
    • H04W52/24—TPC being performed according to specific parameters using SIR [Signal to Interference Ratio] or other wireless path parameters
    • H04W52/241—TPC being performed according to specific parameters using SIR [Signal to Interference Ratio] or other wireless path parameters taking into account channel quality metrics, e.g. SIR, SNR, CIR, Eb/lo

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Quality & Reliability (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

This disclosure relates to a kind of physical layer authentication method based on single-bit concealment agreement, it is the Concealment Analyzing method of the physical layer certification of the wireless communication system comprising transmitting terminal and receiving end, it is characterized in that, it include: that transmitting terminal is based on single-bit concealment agreement to wireless channel emission mark signal, marking signal includes authentication signal and information signal, in single-bit concealment agreement, enables the energy distribution factor of information signal be kept fixed in interval time section and be optimal value；Receiving end receives marking signal, is based on single-bit concealment agreement, handles marking signal, obtains security certification probability；Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio based on received information signal obtains certification request transmission probability, hidden certification rejection probability；And security certification efficiency is calculated based on security certification probability, certification request transmission probability, hidden certification rejection probability, to determine the hidden grade of physical layer certification.

Description

Physical layer authentication method and system based on single-bit concealment agreement
Technical field
This disclosure relates to wireless communication technology field, and in particular to a kind of physical layer based on single-bit concealment agreement is recognized Demonstrate,prove method and system.
Background technique
Quick with wireless device is popularized, and the demand also sharp increase to transmitter certification, physical layer is authenticated and is based on There are two main advantages compared to tool for the conventional authentication technology of upper layer cryptographic tool: firstly, physical layer certification is by allowing illegally to connect Debit only carries out noisy observations to it to protect label, is comparatively safe from the perspective of information theory.Secondly, physical layer is recognized Card enables legal recipient quickly to distinguish legal transmitter section and illegal transmitter section, without completing higher processing.Object The certificate scheme of reason layer design can be generally divided into passive form and active form two major classes.
This paper primary study is active, and authentication signal is embedded in the message signale of transmitting terminal, is then mentioned at receiver section Take authentication signal.The common prior art has: (1) using time division multiplexing method authentication signal is attached to data in, but This needs additional transmission time, and is easy authentication signal being exposed to illicit reception end, because authentication signal has and disappears The identical signal-to-noise ratio of information signal (SNR)；(2) for ofdm system, by repeating certain disappear on sub-carriers according to authentication signal Breath symbol is steadily signed to generate loop, this wastes message throughput；(3) frequency shift (FS) is modified according to authentication signal, However, the ratio of the authentication signal of transmission per second is relatively low；(4) for the duobinary system signaling system of precoding, according to recognizing The certain initial bits of modification of signal are demonstrate,proved, this scheme makes unknown receiver section recovery message signale challenging, violated hidden The requirement of covering property.
Currently used widest authentication techniques are certification superposition (Auth-SUP) technologies, and certification superimposing technique can pass through Software Radio platform provides and analysis experimental result.By analysis, certification superimposing technique can overcome to a certain extent on The shortcomings that stating four kinds of prior arts meets the requirement of effective authentication techniques.
However, effective physical layer authentication techniques usually require to consider safety simultaneously, robustness and concealment.It is specific and Speech, safety typically refers to illicit reception end cannot be by various attacks (including interference attack, Replay Attack and simulation attack) Authentication is destroyed easily；Robustness typically refers to the presence of transmission in random fading environment, and certificate scheme can resist letter Road decline and influence of noise；Concealment typically refers to receiver section in the case where not knowing certificate scheme, is unable to detect that and recognizes It is abnormal for demonstrate,proving signal.Although a general physical layer authentication framework, which has been proposed, in existing technology carrys out comprehensive assessment safety Property and robustness, but in terms of concealment, due to its diversity and complexity, the prior art horizontal lacks quantization point to recessive Analysis, there are also many rooms for improvement.
Summary of the invention
The disclosure is proposed in view of above-mentioned situation, can more preferably be assessed request its purpose is to provide one kind and be prolonged Slow and concealment the physical layer authentication method and system based on single-bit concealment agreement.
For this purpose, the first aspect of the disclosure provides a kind of physical layer authentication method based on single-bit concealment agreement, It is the physical layer authentication method of the wireless communication system comprising transmitting terminal and receiving end characterized by comprising the transmitting terminal Based on single-bit concealment agreement to wireless channel emission mark signal, the marking signal includes authentication signal and information letter Number, in the single-bit concealment agreement, the energy distribution factor of the information signal is enabled to keep solid in interval time section Determine and is optimal value；The receiving end receives the marking signal, is based on the single-bit concealment agreement, believes the label It number is handled, obtains security certification probability；Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio based on the received information signal obtains certification request transmission Probability and hidden certification rejection probability；And based on the security certification probability, the certification request transmission probability and described hidden It covers certification rejection probability and calculates security certification efficiency, to determine the hidden grade of physical layer certification.
In the disclosure, the transmitting terminal is based on single-bit concealment agreement emission mark signal, and the receiving end receives The marking signal obtains security certification efficiency (secrecy by processing based on single-bit concealment agreement Authentication efficiency, SAE).Wherein, the single-bit concealment agreement provides the information in marking signal The energy distribution factor of signal is kept fixed in interval time section and is optimal value.In this case, hidden based on single-bit Covering property agreement and for physical layer certification measurement index --- security certification efficiency (SAE) can more preferably assess hidden grade.
In the physical layer authentication method involved in disclosure first aspect, in the single-bit concealment agreement, institute State single bit of information of the receiving end to transmitting terminal feedback signal-to-noise ratio threshold value μ, settingEnable PACR=0, wherein Rb Indicate normal signal rate.Thereby, it is possible to analyze the feasibility of the limitation of covert physical layer certification.
In the physical layer authentication method involved in disclosure first aspect, it is based on PACR=0, the distribution of the energy of information signal because The optimal value of son is calculated by following formula (I): Wherein,εARTIt is the lower limit of certification request transmission probability, γbIndicate average signal-to-noise ratio, RbIt indicates Normal signal rate.In this case, single-bit concealment agreement can be optimized.
In the physical layer authentication method involved in disclosure first aspect, channel assumed condition is the letter of the receiving end There are single bit feedbacks for channel state information.In this case, concealment can more preferably be assessed based on single-bit concealment agreement Energy.
In the physical layer authentication method involved in disclosure first aspect, the security certification efficiency is counted by following formula (II) It obtains: η=PART(1-PACR)PSA(II), wherein PARTIndicate the certification request transmission probability, PACRIndicate described hidden Authenticate rejection probability, PSAIndicate the security certification probability.Thereby, it is possible to determine the hidden grade of physical layer certification.
In the physical layer authentication method involved in disclosure first aspect, the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio of the information signal is by following formula (III) it is calculated:Wherein, Indicate the energy distribution factor of the information signal,Indicate the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal, the marking signal Piecemeal is sent, γb,iIndicate channel SNRs of i-th piece of marking signal in the receiving end, hb,iIndicate i-th piece of marking signal Channel gain,Indicate the noise variance of the receiving end.Thereby, it is possible to obtain hidden certification rejection probability, and then judge object Manage the hidden grade of layer certification.The second aspect of the disclosure provides a kind of physical layer certification based on single-bit concealment agreement Equipment characterized by comprising processor executes the computer program of the memory storage to realize any of the above-described The physical layer authentication method；And memory.
The third aspect of the disclosure provides a kind of computer readable storage medium, which is characterized in that the computer can It reads storage medium and is stored at least one instruction, at least one described instruction is realized described in any of the above-described when being executed by processor Physical layer authentication method.
The fourth aspect of the disclosure provides a kind of physical layer Verification System based on single-bit concealment agreement, feature It is, comprising: emitter, the emitter are based on single-bit concealment agreement to wireless channel emission mark signal, institute Stating marking signal includes that authentication signal and information signal enable the energy of the information signal in the single-bit concealment agreement Amount distribution factor is kept fixed in interval time section and is optimal value；Reception device comprising: processing module receives institute Marking signal is stated, the single-bit concealment agreement is based on, the marking signal is handled, obtains security certification probability； Computing module, the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio based on the received information signal obtain certification request transmission probability and hidden certification refusal Probability；And determination module, it is refused according to the security certification probability, the certification request transmission probability and the hidden certification Exhausted probability calculation goes out security certification efficiency, to determine the hidden grade of physical layer certification.
In the disclosure, the emitter is based on single-bit concealment agreement emission mark signal, the reception device The marking signal is received, security certification efficiency (SAE) is obtained by processing based on single-bit concealment agreement.Wherein, described Single-bit concealment agreement provides that the energy distribution factor of the information signal in marking signal is kept fixed in interval time section It and is optimal value.In this case, based on single-bit concealment agreement and for the measurement index of physical layer certification --- it protects Close authentication efficiency (SAE), can more preferably assess hidden grade.
In the physical layer Verification System involved in disclosure fourth aspect, in the single-bit concealment agreement, institute It states receiving end and feeds back signal-to-noise ratio threshold value μ, setting to the transmitting terminalEnable PACR=0, wherein RbIndicate normal signal Rate.Thereby, it is possible to analyze the feasibility of the limitation of covert physical layer certification.
In the physical layer Verification System involved in disclosure fourth aspect, it is based on PACR=0, the energy point of information signal Optimal value with the factor is calculated by following formula (I): Wherein,εARTIt is the lower limit of certification request transmission probability, γbIndicate average signal-to-noise ratio, RbTable Show normal signal rate.In this case, single-bit concealment agreement can be optimized.
In the physical layer Verification System involved in disclosure fourth aspect, channel assumed condition is the reception device There are single bit feedbacks for channel state information.In this case, it can more preferably be assessed based on single-bit concealment agreement hidden Performance.
In the physical layer Verification System involved in disclosure fourth aspect, in the determination module, the secrecy is recognized Card efficiency is calculated by following formula (II): η=PART(1-PACR)PSA(II), wherein PARTIndicate that the certification request transmission is general Rate, PACRIndicate the hidden certification rejection probability, PSAIndicate security certification probability.Thereby, it is possible to determine the hidden of physical layer certification Cover grade.
In the physical layer Verification System involved in disclosure fourth aspect, in the computing module, the information letter Number Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio be calculated by following formula (III):Its In,Indicate the energy distribution factor of the information signal,Indicate the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal, the label Signal piecemeal is sent, γb,iIndicate channel SNRs of i-th piece of marking signal in the reception device, hb,iIndicate i-th piece of label The channel gain of signal,Indicate the noise variance of the reception device.Thereby, it is possible to obtain hidden certification rejection probability, into And judge the hidden grade of physical layer certification.Compared with prior art, the example of the disclosure have it is following the utility model has the advantages that
In existing technology, due to the diversity and complexity of system, lack the quantitative analysis to hidden level, because This, the disclosure, which devises a kind of single-bit concealment agreement and proposes a kind of new measurement for physical layer certification, to be referred to Mark --- security certification efficiency (SAE) can more preferably assess the concealment of physical layer certification.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is to show the signal authentication schematic diagram of physical layer authentication method involved in the example of the disclosure.
Fig. 2 is to show physical layer authentication method flow diagram involved in the example of the disclosure.
Fig. 3 is to show the structural representation of the transmitting signal of physical layer authentication method transmitting terminal involved in the example of the disclosure Figure.
Fig. 4 is to show the receiving end security certification efficiency profile of physical layer authentication method involved in the example of the disclosure Schematic diagram.
Fig. 5 is to show the illicit reception end security certification efficiency of physical layer authentication method involved in the example of the disclosure Waveform diagram.
Fig. 6 is to show physical layer Verification System structural schematic diagram involved in the example of the disclosure.
Fig. 7 is to show the signal of physical layer Verification System reception device signal processing module involved in the example of the disclosure Figure.
Fig. 8 is to show the structural schematic diagram of physical layer authenticating device involved in the example of the disclosure.
Specific embodiment
Hereinafter, explaining the preferred embodiment of the disclosure in detail with reference to attached drawing.In the following description, for identical Component assign identical symbol, the repetitive description thereof will be omitted.Scheme in addition, attached drawing is only schematical, the mutual ruler of component Very little shape of ratio or component etc. can be with actual difference.
It should be noted that the specification and claims of the disclosure and term " first " in above-mentioned attached drawing, " Two ", " third " and " the 4th " etc. are not use to describe a particular order for distinguishing different objects.In addition, term " includes " " having " and their any deformations, it is intended that cover and non-exclusive include.Such as contain a series of steps or units Process, method, system, product or equipment be not limited to listed step or unit, but optionally further comprising do not have The step of listing or unit, or optionally further comprising for the intrinsic other steps of these process, methods, product or equipment or list Member.
In addition, the subhead etc. involved in describing below the disclosure is not intended to limitation content of this disclosure or model It encloses, is merely possible to the suggesting effect read.Such subhead can neither be interpreted as the content for dividing article, also not Content under subhead should be limited only in the range of subhead.
Present disclose provides physical layer authentication method, equipment and systems based on single-bit concealment agreement.In the disclosure In, it can more accurately assess the request delay and concealment of physical layer certification.It is described in detail below in conjunction with attached drawing The disclosure.
Fig. 1 is to show the signal model schematic diagram of physical layer authentication method involved in the example of the disclosure.
As shown in Figure 1, physical layer authentication method, equipment and system based on single-bit concealment agreement, which can be, has hair Penetrate physical layer authentication method, equipment and the system of the wireless communication system of end and receiving end.Wherein, receiving end may include legal Receiving end and illicit reception end.
In some instances, as shown in Figure 1, transmitting terminal is used to emit signal to wireless channel.Transmitting terminal is usually legal Sender.Transmitting terminal also may include illegal sender.Transmitting terminal mentioned below each means legitimate sender.Receiving end receives The signal of transmitting terminal transmitting.Since receiving end may include legitimate receipt end and illicit reception end, therefore the signal of transmitting terminal transmitting Both it can be received by legitimate receipt end, it is also possible to be received by illicit reception end.
In some instances, receiving end can be test receiving end.Test receiving end is typically referred to for detecting transmitting terminal Transmitting signal receiving end.For example, test receiving end can be under the scene of the wireless channel in simulation daily life, use In the test equipment of detection transmitting terminal transmitting signal.Wherein, test receiving end may include legitimate receipt end and illicit reception end.
In some instances, transmitting terminal can be two or more, and receiving end can be two or more, tool For body, legitimate receipt end can be two or more, and illicit reception end can also be two or more respectively.
In some instances, as shown in Figure 1, in the presence of illicit reception end, transmitting terminal sends certification request, closes Snr threshold is fed back to transmitting terminal in method receiving end.
In some instances, the transmitting terminal in the above-mentioned signal model such as Fig. 1 may include base station or user equipment.Base station (such as access point), which can be, refers to the accession in net setting by one or more sectors and wireless terminal communications on interface in the sky It is standby.The air frame that base station can be used for receive mutually is converted with IP grouping, its remaining part as wireless terminal and access net / router, wherein the rest part for accessing net may include Internet protocol (IP) network.Base station can also coordinate to sky The attribute management of middle interface.For example, base station can be base station (BTS, the Base Transceiver in GSM or CDMA Station), be also possible to the base station (NodeB) in WCDMA, can also be in LTE evolved base station (NodeB or eNB or E-NodeB, evolutional Node B).
In some instances, user equipment can include but is not limited to smart phone, laptop, personal computer (Personal Computer, PC), personal digital assistant (Personal Digital Assistant, PDA), mobile interchange Net equipment (Mobile Internet Device, MID), wearable device (such as smartwatch, Intelligent bracelet, intelligent glasses) are each Class of electronic devices, wherein the operating system of the user equipment may include but be not limited to Android operation system, IOS operation system System, Symbian (Saipan) operating system, Black Berry (blackberry, blueberry) operating system, Windows Phone8 operating system etc..
In some instances, receiving end may include base station.Base station (such as access point), which can be, to be referred to the accession in net in sky Pass through the equipment of one or more sectors and wireless terminal communications on middle interface.The air frame and IP point that base station can be used for receive Group is mutually converted, as the router between wireless terminal and the rest part of access net, wherein access its remaining part of net Dividing may include Internet protocol (IP) network.Base station can also coordinate the attribute management to air interface.For example, base station can be Base station (BTS, Base Transceiver Station) in GSM or CDMA, is also possible to the base station (NodeB) in WCDMA, It can also be the evolved base station (NodeB or eNB or e-NodeB, evolutional Node B) in LTE.
In other examples, receiving end can also include user equipment or test equipment.User equipment or test equipment It can include but is not limited to smart phone, laptop, personal computer (Personal Computer, PC), individual digital Assistant (Personal Digital Assistant, PDA), mobile internet device (Mobile Internet Device, MID), wearable device (such as smartwatch, Intelligent bracelet, intelligent glasses) each class of electronic devices.Wherein, the user equipment or survey The operating system of examination equipment may include but be not limited to Android operation system, IOS operating system, Symbian (Saipan) operation system System, Black Berry (blackberry, blueberry) operating system, Windows Phone8 operating system etc..
Fig. 2 is to show physical layer authentication method flow diagram involved in the example of the disclosure.Fig. 3 is to show this The structural schematic diagram of the transmitting signal of physical layer authentication method transmitting terminal involved in disclosed example.
In some instances, physical layer authentication method (referred to as " the physical layer certification sometimes based on single-bit concealment agreement Method "), it is the physical layer authentication method with the wireless communication system of transmitting terminal and receiving end.Wherein, receiving end may include Legitimate receipt end and illicit reception end.In addition, in the following description, end is otherwise referred to as monitored at illicit reception end.
In addition, signal model shown in FIG. 1 is based on, as shown in Fig. 2, the physical layer based on single-bit concealment agreement authenticates Method includes that transmitting terminal is based on single-bit concealment agreement to wireless channel emission mark signal, and marking signal includes authentication signal And information signal enables the energy distribution factor of information signal keep solid in interval time section in single-bit concealment agreement Determine and is optimal value (step S110).
In step s 110, the channel state information that the channel assumed condition of physical layer authentication method can be receiving end is deposited The single-bit the case where namely transmitting terminal knows the channel state information of the single-bit of receiving end feedback.Specifically, institute as above It states, receiving end may include legitimate receipt end and illicit reception end.In general communication process, illicit reception end is not to transmitting terminal Feeding back channel state information, and legitimate receipt end is to transmitting terminal feeding back channel state information.I.e. transmitting terminal is possible to not know and appoint What channel state information about illicit reception end, and transmitting terminal it is possible to know the single-bit at legitimate receipt end channel status Information feedback.But under the channel assumed condition of above-mentioned physical layer authentication method, i.e., the channel status at illicit reception end is believed Unknown and legitimate receipt end channel state information is ceased there are in the case where single bit feedback, can also pass through the physics of the disclosure Layer authentication method, the more preferable concealment for assessing physical layer certification.
In some instances, channel state information (Channel State Information, CSI) can be communication chain The channel attribute on road.For example, channel state information can be the information such as signal dispersion, the weak, range attenuation of environment.
In some instances, it is based on above-mentioned signal model, transmitting terminal can be to wireless channel emission mark signal.Namely hair Certification request can be sent by penetrating end.As shown in figure 3, marking signal may include authentication signal and information signal.Authentication signal can To react the knowledge of cryptographic keys shared between transmitting terminal and legitimate receipt end.Information signal can reflect the information to be transmitted.Recognize Card signal can be superimposed upon on information signal.Marking signal can be blocking transmitting.Marking signal can be calculated by following formula (1) It obtains:
xi=ρssi+ρtti (1)
Wherein, xiIndicate i-th piece of marking signal, siIndicate the i-th block message signal, tiIndicate i-th piece of authentication signal.In addition,Indicate the energy distribution factor of message signale,Indicate the energy distribution factor of authentication signal.
Present embodiment is without being limited thereto, and transmitting terminal can emit normal signal to wireless channel.Do not include in normal signal Authentication signal.Namely the energy distribution factor of authentication signalIt is zero, normal signal can be expressed as x at this timei=si.In addition often The rate of rule signal can be set to Rb。
In some instances, the agreement that physical layer authentication method is deferred to can be single-bit concealment agreement.In addition, upper Under the channel assumed condition stated, single-bit concealment agreement is effective for the physical layer optimization Concealment Analyzing method of the disclosure. Single-bit concealment agreement defines the energy distribution factor of information signalIt is kept fixed in interval time section.That is transmitting terminal When to wireless channel emission mark signal, the energy distribution factor of the information signal in marking signal is kept in interval time section It is fixed.In other words, the energy distribution that single-bit concealment agreement defines transmitting terminal to be kept fixed in interval time section The factorSend certification request.Wherein, the energy distribution factor of information signalIt is properly termed as authentication protocol parameter.
In some instances, the energy distribution factor being kept fixed in interval time sectionIndicate energy distribution factor It is not invariable in entire communication process.Section in different times, energy distribution factorCan be different, in the period Interior energy distribution factor can be kept fixed.
In other examples, single-bit concealment agreement alsies specify the energy distribution factor of information signalIt is being spaced It is optimal value in period.Namely the energy distribution factor of the information signal in the periodIt can be the energy in the corresponding period Measure distribution factor optimal value.
In this case, energy distribution factor in this wayOptimal value is constant in entire communication process, then not With the energy distribution factor of period it is identical.Namely the energy distribution factor in entire communication processIt is constant and for optimization Value.In addition, the energy distribution factor in different time sectionsIt can also be different.Energy distribution factorThe acquisition of optimal value is subsequent It is described in detail.
In step s 110, transmitting terminal is based on single-bit concealment agreement to wireless channel emission mark signal.Namely mark Note signal is launched end and is emitted into wireless channel.Wherein, there are channel gain h for wireless channel.Therefore passes through wireless channel and transmit Marking signal may include channel gain h.
In some instances, the physical layer authentication method based on single-bit concealment agreement can also include that receiving end receives Marking signal is based on single-bit concealment agreement, carries out relevant treatment to marking signal, obtains security certification probability (step S120)。
In the step s 120, since the marking signal in step S110 is piecemeal transmitting, therefore marking signal can be connect Receiving end piecemeal receives.Since receiving end may include legitimate receipt end and illicit reception end, therefore receive in a wireless communication system Signal may include legitimate receipt end and illicit reception end.Wherein, the received label by wireless channel in legitimate receipt end Signal can be calculated by following formula (2):
yb,i=hb,ixi+nb,i (2)
Wherein, hb,iIndicate the channel gain of the received i-th piece of marking signal in legitimate receipt end.nb,iIndicate legitimate receipt end Noise.In addition, hb,iObeying 0 mean variance isMultiple Gauss distribution.nb,iObeying 0 mean variance isMultiple Gauss point Cloth.
In some instances, since marking signal can be with receiving end (including legitimate receipt end and illicit reception end) piecemeal It receives, wherein the channel SNRs for every piece of marking signal that legitimate receipt end measures can be calculated respectively by following formula (3):
Wherein,Indicate the noise variance at legitimate receipt end.In addition, the marking signal that legitimate receipt end measures is averaged Signal-to-noise ratio can be calculated respectively by following formula (4):
In addition, in some instances, illicit reception end is received to be surveyed by the marking signal of wireless channel, illicit reception end The average signal-to-noise ratio for the marking signal that the channel SNRs of the every piece of marking signal obtained and illicit reception end measure can be with analogy The above-mentioned calculation at legitimate receipt end.
In some instances, receiving end can carry out channel estimation namely legitimate receipt end and illicit reception end can be into Row channel estimation.By channel estimation, legitimate receipt end and illicit reception end are estimated that the received wireless channel that passes through passes Defeated marking signal yiIn target label signal
In some instances, since legitimate receipt end knows single-bit concealment agreement, list is not known at illicit reception end Bit concealment agreement, therefore legitimate receipt end can be further processed target label signal based on single-bit concealment agreement The receiving end involved in the processing to signal each means legitimate receipt end unless otherwise noted below.
In some instances, single-bit concealment agreement is provided with the energy distribution factor of information signalInitial value (the energy distribution factor of i.e. first periodValue), and becauseTherefore the energy distribution factor of authentication signal ρt 2Value can also determine.Therefore knowing WithIn the case where, receiving end can extract target label signalIn Residue signal ri.In addition, energy distribution factorCan be optimised, (including second period) is single from second period The energy distribution factor being arranged in bit concealment agreementOr the energy distribution factor of optimizationValue.Thereby, it is possible to Optimize single-bit concealment agreement.
In some instances, receiving end obtains residue signal riAfterwards, it can further judge residue signal riIn whether include Authentication signal ti.Receiving end can according to snr threshold μ from the result of judgement to transmitting terminal feedback flag signal single-bit Information.Since the feedback of receiving end is based on single-bit concealment agreement, therefore receiving end can be based on single-bit concealment agreement To the single bit of information of transmitting terminal feedback signal-to-noise ratio threshold value μ.That is, in single-bit concealment agreement, receiving end is to transmitting terminal Feed back the single bit of information of signal-to-noise ratio threshold value μ.In addition, snr threshold μ is in a certain range under single-bit concealment agreement With feasibility.The acquisition of the feasible region of snr threshold μ is subsequent to be described in detail.
In addition, in some instances, receiving end may determine that residue signal riIn whether include authentication signal ti.According to sentencing The disconnected available false-alarm probability in result receiving end (PFA) and verification and measurement ratio (PD).It is based on examining under the constraint of false-alarm probability (PFA) The available security certification probability of survey rate (PD) (Probability of secrecy authentication, PSA).Secrecy Certification probability (PSA) can be calculated by following formula (5):
PSA=max { PD,1-PD,2,0} (5)
Wherein, PD,1Indicate the verification and measurement ratio at legitimate receipt end, PD,2Indicate the verification and measurement ratio at illicit reception end.Pass through guarantor as a result, Close certification probability (PSA) can determine the case where marking signal is monitored by illicit reception end.
In some instances, physical layer authentication method can also include that the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio based on received information signal obtains Certification request transmission probability and hidden certification rejection probability (step S130).
In step s 130, it is specified that the received marking signal in receiving end Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (the terminology Message-to-interference-plus-noise ratio, MINR) it can be calculated by following formula (6):
Wherein,Indicate the energy distribution factor of information signal.Indicate the energy distribution factor of authentication signal.Due to mark Remember that signal piecemeal is sent, γb,iIndicate the channel SNRs of i-th piece of receiving end.hb,iIndicate the received i-th piece of label letter in receiving end Number channel gain.
In some instances, if the signal of transmitting terminal transmitting is normal signal, i.e. the signal of transmitting terminal transmitting does not include recognizing Signal is demonstrate,proved, then the energy distribution factor of authentication signalIt is zero, the energy distribution factor of information signalIt is 1.As a result,If the signal of transmitting terminal transmitting is marking signal, the energy distribution factor of authentication signalIt is not Zero, by formula (6) it is found that letter when the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (MINR) when transmitting terminal emission mark signal emits normal signal than transmitting terminal Dry to make an uproar smaller than (MINR), therefore when transmitting terminal emission mark signal, Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (MINR) meets
In addition, certification request transmission probability (Probability of authentication-request Transmission, PART) it can be obtained according to above-mentioned Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (MINR).Certification request transmission probability (PART) can be with It is calculated by following formula (7):
The performance of certification transmission request delay can be measured according to certification request transmission probability (PART) as a result,.
In some instances, based on the channel assumed condition in above-mentioned steps S110, in order to maintain concealment to require, setting Snr threshold μ, meets snr thresholdConvolution (7) is it can be concluded that certification request shown in formula (8) is transmitted Probability (PART):
Wherein, RbIndicate normal signal rate.
In some instances, under single-bit concealment agreement, the value of certification request transmission probability (PART) needs to meetWherein, εARTIt is the lower limit of certification request transmission probability (PART), and it meets 0≤εART≤εART1。 Wherein, εART1MeetIt, can based on the constraint condition of above-mentioned certification request transmission probability (PART) To obtain the feasible region of the snr threshold μ of receiving end feedback, i.e.,
In addition, in some instances, the information signal in marking signal can not achieve to be solved without error in receiving end When code, receiving end will authenticate hidden refusal event.Probability (the Probability of of the hidden refusal of certification at this time Authentication-covertness rejection, PACR) it is considered certification request transmission probability (PART) item The hidden rejection probability of certification under part.It authenticates hidden rejection probability and is also referred to as hidden certification rejection probability.Hidden certification rejection probability (PACR) it can be obtained according to above-mentioned Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (MINR).Hidden certification rejection probability (PACR) can be counted by following formula (9) It obtains:
In some instances, snr threshold μ is set, snr threshold is metDeforming to it can To obtain,In this case, convolution (9) is it can be concluded that PACR=0.As a result, may be used It can not achieve with the information signal found out in marking signal when receiving end is decoded without error, receiving end can not occur Authenticate hidden refusal event.Namely any hidden constraint is all feasible.
In addition, hidden certification rejection probability (PACR) needs to meet under single-bit concealment agreementWherein, εACRIt is the upper limit of hidden certification rejection probability (PACR), meets 0≤εACR≤1.As a result, The hidden grade of physical layer authentication techniques can be measured according to hidden certification probability (PACR).
In some instances, the constraint condition based on above-mentioned hidden certification rejection probability (PACR), can be received end The feasible region of the snr threshold μ of feedback, i.e.,Wherein,
Therefore under single-bit concealment agreement receiving end feed back snr threshold μ feasible region be in summary can be What the constraint condition of certification request transmission probability (PART) and the constraint condition of hidden certification rejection probability (PACR) obtained.
In addition, in some instances, under single-bit concealment agreement, being based on above-mentioned PACR=0 constraint condition is full FootThe energy distribution factor optimized by following formula (10)
Wherein,
In some instances, physical layer authentication method can also include general based on security certification probability, certification request transmission Rate and hidden certification rejection probability calculate security certification efficiency, to determine the hidden grade (step S140) of physical layer certification.
In step S140, security certification probability (PSA), certification request transmission probability (PART) and hidden certification refusal are general Rate (PACR) can be obtained with S120 through the above steps and S130.
In some instances, it is refused based on security certification probability (PSA), certification request transmission probability (PART) and hidden certification Exhausted probability (PACR) calculates security certification efficiency (secrecy authentication efficiency, SAE).
In some instances, it is specified that security certification efficiency (SAE) can be calculated by following formula (11):
η=PART(1-PACR)PSA (11)
Wherein, PARTIt indicates certification request transmission probability (PART), PACRIndicate hidden certification rejection probability (PACR), PSATable Show security certification probability (PSA).η indicates security certification efficiency (SAE).In addition, making security certification efficiency (SAE) that there is non-zero just The condition of value is to meet the feasible region of above-mentioned snr threshold μ while needing to meet
It in some instances, include certification request transmission probability (PART) and hidden certification in security certification efficiency (SAE) Rejection probability (PACR), wherein certification request transmission probability (PART) can assess the request delay of physical layer certification.It is hidden to recognize Card rejection probability (PACR) can determine the hidden grade of physical layer certification.Security certification efficiency (SAE) can more favorable comment as a result, Estimate request delay and hidden grade.
In addition, in some instances, in the energy distribution factor of optimizationWith the snr threshold μ in feasibility range In the case of, by the security certification efficiency of certification request transmission probability (PART) and hidden certification rejection probability (PACR) constraint (SAE) maximum value is obtained.Specifically, security certification efficiency (SAE) maximum value, certification request transmission probability (PART) and hidden The relationship for authenticating rejection probability (PACR) is obtained by following formula (12):
Wherein, εACRIt is the upper limit of hidden certification rejection probability (PACR), and εARTIt is certification request transmission probability (PART) Lower limit, RbIndicate normal signal rate.
In some instances, transmitting terminal is based on single-bit concealment agreement emission mark signal, and receiving end receives label letter Number, security certification efficiency (SAE) is obtained by processing based on single-bit concealment agreement.Wherein, single-bit concealment agreement is advised The energy distribution factor for determining the information signal in marking signal is kept fixed in interval time section.In this case, it is based on Single-bit concealment agreement and for physical layer certification measurement index --- security certification efficiency (SAE) can be assessed more preferably Hidden grade.
Fig. 4 is to show the receiving end security certification efficiency profile of physical layer authentication method involved in the example of the disclosure Schematic diagram.
In some instances, as shown in figure 4, the signal-to-noise ratio of receiving end is less than or equal under single-bit concealment agreement When 15dB, security certification efficiency (SAE) is zero always, when the signal-to-noise ratio of receiving end continues to increase, security certification efficiency (SAE) It increases sharply and close to 1.
Root is it can be seen from the figure that under non-single-bit concealment agreement, the energy distribution factor of information signalConstant is 0.9 When, when the signal-to-noise ratio in receiving end is less than or equal to 17dB, security certification efficiency (SAE) is zero always.When the signal-to-noise ratio of receiving end When continuing to increase, security certification efficiency (SAE) increases sharply and close to 1.The energy distribution factor of information signalIt is constant to be When 0.8, when the signal-to-noise ratio in receiving end is less than or equal to 24dB, security certification efficiency (SAE) is zero always.When the noise of receiving end When than continuing to increase, security certification efficiency (SAE) increases sharply and close to 1.
As seen from the figure, the signal-to-noise ratio of receiving end is required than under non-single-bit concealment agreement under single-bit concealment agreement Low to the signal-to-noise ratio requirement of receiving end, therefore, single-bit concealment agreement is more superior when in receiving end, noise is relatively low.
Fig. 5 is to show the illicit reception end security certification efficiency of physical layer authentication method involved in the example of the disclosure Waveform diagram.
In some instances, as shown in figure 5, under single-bit concealment agreement, the signal-to-noise ratio at illicit reception end is less than etc. When 17dB, security certification efficiency (SAE) is close to 1 and changes less, when the signal-to-noise ratio at illicit reception end continues to increase, protects Close authentication efficiency (SAE) is reduced rapidly and close to 0, and the signal-to-noise ratio at subsequent illicit reception end continue increase when, secrecy Authentication efficiency (SAE) is slowly decreased to 0.
Root is it can be seen from the figure that under non-single-bit concealment agreement, the energy distribution factor of information signalConstant is 0.9 When, when the signal-to-noise ratio at illicit reception end is less than or equal to 15dB, security certification efficiency (SAE) is close to 1 and changes little.When non- When the signal-to-noise ratio of method receiving end continues to increase, security certification efficiency (SAE) is reduced rapidly and close to 0, and subsequent illegal When the signal-to-noise ratio of receiving end continues to increase, slowly it is decreased to 0.The energy distribution factor of information signalIt is constant when being 0.8, illegally The security certification efficiency (SAE) of receiving end is 0 always.
Comprehensively consider and the different of legal receiving end and illicit reception end are required, for example, to legal receiving end and illegally connecing The different of the security certification efficiency (SAE) of receiving end require, the physical layer authentication method based on single-bit concealment agreement more added with Effect.
Fig. 6 is to show physical layer Verification System structural schematic diagram involved in the example of the disclosure.Fig. 7 is to show this Physical layer Verification System reception device signal processing module schematic diagram involved in disclosed example.
In some instances, the physical layer Verification System based on single-bit concealment agreement is with emitter and to connect The physical layer Verification System of the wireless communication system of receiving apparatus.Wherein, reception device may include legitimate receipt device and illegal Reception device.In addition, the emitter and transmitting terminal in the disclosure can be identical concept, reception device and receiving end can be with It is identical concept.
In some instances, as shown in fig. 6, (the abbreviation physics of physical layer Verification System 1 based on single-bit concealment agreement Layer Verification System 1) it may include emitter 10 and reception device 20.Reception device 20 may include legitimate receipt device and non- Method reception device.
In some instances, emitter 10 is based on single-bit concealment agreement to wireless channel emission mark signal, mark Remember that signal includes authentication signal and information signal, in single-bit concealment agreement, the energy distribution factor of information signal is enabled to exist It is kept fixed in interval time section and is optimal value.
In some instances, the channel assumed condition of the physical layer Verification System 1 where emitter 10 can be reception The channel state information at end the case where there are single-bits namely transmitting terminal know the channel status letter of the single-bit of receiving end feedback Breath.Specifically, can be with the channel assumed condition in analogy above-mentioned steps S110.
In some instances, emitter 10 is to wireless channel emission mark signal.Namely emitter 10 can be sent Certification request.Marking signal may include authentication signal and information signal.Authentication signal can react emitter 10 and legal The knowledge of cryptographic keys shared between reception device.Information signal can reflect the information to be transmitted.Authentication signal can be superimposed upon On information signal.Marking signal can be blocking transmitting.Marking signal can be as shown in formula (1).Present embodiment is not limited to This, emitter 10 can emit normal signal to wireless channel.It does not include authentication signal in normal signal.
In some instances, single-bit concealment agreement is provided with based on above-mentioned channel assumed condition.Emitter 10 When to wireless channel emission mark signal, the agreement deferred to can be single-bit concealment agreement.Single-bit concealment agreement Define the energy distribution factor of information signalIt is kept fixed in interval time section.I.e. transmitting terminal emits to wireless channel and marks When remembering signal, the energy distribution factor of the information signal in marking signal is kept fixed in interval time section.In other words, single The energy distribution factor that bit concealment agreement defines transmitting terminal to be kept fixed in interval time sectionCertification is sent to ask It asks.As shown in fig. 6, solid line indicates that emitter 10 sends certification request.Wherein, the energy distribution factor of information signalIt can be with Referred to as authentication protocol parameter.
In some instances, the energy distribution factor being kept fixed in interval time sectionIndicate energy distribution factor It is not invariable in entire communication process.Section in different times, energy distribution factorCan be different, in the period Interior energy distribution factor can be kept fixed.
In some instances, single-bit concealment agreement alsies specify the energy distribution factor of information signalAt interval Between be optimal value in section.Namely the energy distribution factor of the information signal in the periodThe energy being also possible in the corresponding period Measure distribution factorOptimal value.Energy distribution factorThe optimization energy of optimal value obtained in the above-mentioned physical layer authentication method of analogy Measure distribution factorMethod.
In some instances, emitter 10 is based on single-bit concealment agreement to wireless channel emission mark signal.Its In, there are channel gain h for wireless channel.Therefore the marking signal for passing through wireless channel transmission may include channel gain h.
In some instances, since illicit reception device does not know single-bit concealment agreement and between emitter 10 Also the knowledge of cryptographic keys that do not share, thus illicit reception device the marking signal received generally can not be handled it is hidden to carry out The analysis of covering property.The reception device 20 involved in the processing to signal each means that legitimate receipt fills unless otherwise noted below It sets.
In some instances, as shown in fig. 6, physical layer Verification System 1 can also include reception device 20.Reception device 20 It can be used for receiving and handling the marking signal for passing through wireless channel.Reception device 20 feeds back snr threshold to emitter 10 The single bit of information of μ.As shown in fig. 6, dotted line indicates reception device 20 to the feedback of emitter 10.
In some instances, as shown in fig. 7, reception device 20 may include processing module 21.Processing module 21 receives mark Remember signal, be based on single-bit concealment agreement, marking signal is handled, obtains security certification probability (PSA).
In some instances, since the marking signal that emitter 10 emits is piecemeal transmitting, therefore marking signal can be with It is received the reception of 20 piecemeal of device.Since illicit reception device can also receive marking signal with piecemeal.Therefore in reception device 20 Shown in the marking signal that processing module 21 receives such as formula (2).
In some instances, the processing module 21 in reception device 20 and illicit reception device can carry out channel estimation. By channel estimation, processing module 21 and illicit reception device are estimated that the received label by wireless channel transmission is believed Number yiIn target label signalIn addition, the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) of the received every piece of marking signal of processing module 21 respectively can be as Shown in formula (3).The average signal-to-noise ratio SNR of the received marking signal of processing module 21 respectively can be as shown in formula (4).
In some instances, since reception device 20 knows single-bit concealment agreement, illicit reception device is not known Single-bit concealment agreement, therefore the processing module 21 of reception device 20 can be further processed mesh based on single-bit concealment agreement Mark marking signal
In some instances, single-bit concealment agreement is provided with the energy distribution factor of information signalInitial value (the energy distribution factor of i.e. first periodValue), and becauseTherefore the energy distribution factor of authentication signalValue can also determine.Therefore knowing WithIn the case where, receiving end can extract target label signalIn Residue signal ri.In addition, energy distribution factorCan be optimised, (including second period) is single from second period The energy distribution factor being arranged in bit concealment agreementOr the energy distribution factor of optimizationValue.Thereby, it is possible to Optimize single-bit concealment agreement.
In some instances, processing module 21 obtains residue signal riAfterwards, it can further judge residue signal riIn whether Include authentication signal ti.The threshold value μ of the signal-to-noise ratio of marking signal can be fed back to hair according to the result of judgement by reception device 20 Injection device 10.Namely reception device 20 can be and feed back signal-to-noise ratio threshold value μ to emitter 10 based on single-bit concealment agreement Single bit of information.That is, in single-bit concealment agreement, list of the reception device to emitter feedback signal-to-noise ratio threshold value μ Bit information.The feasible region of snr threshold μ can obtaining with the snr threshold μ in the above-mentioned physical layer authentication method of analogy It takes.
In addition, in some instances, reception device 20 may determine that residue signal riIn whether include authentication signal ti.Root It is judged that 20 available false-alarm probability (PFA) of result reception device and verification and measurement ratio (PD).It can be obtained based on verification and measurement ratio (PD) To security certification probability (PSA).Security certification probability (PSA) can be as shown in formula (5).
In some instances, as shown in fig. 7, reception device 20 may include computing module 22.Computing module 22 is based on connecing The Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio of the information signal of receipts obtains certification request transmission probability and hidden certification rejection probability.
In some instances, it is specified that the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (MINR) of the received marking signal of reception device 20 can be such as formula (6) shown in.If the signal that emitter 10 emits is normal signal, i.e., the signal that emitter 10 emits does not include certification letter Number, then the energy distribution factor of authentication signalIt is zero, the energy distribution factor of information signalIt is 1.As a result,If the signal that emitter 10 emits is marking signal, the energy distribution factor of authentication signal It is not zero, by formula (6) it is found that when the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (MINR) when transmitting terminal emission mark signal emits normal signal than transmitting terminal Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (MINR) it is small, therefore when transmitting terminal emission mark signal, Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (MINR) meets
In addition, certification request transmission probability (PART) can be obtained according to above-mentioned Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (MINR).Certification request Transmission probability (PART) can be as shown in formula (7).Certification request transmission probability (PART) can measure certification transmission request delay Performance.In some instances, since physical layer Verification System 1 is based on above-mentioned channel assumed condition, in order to maintain concealment It is required that setting snr threshold μ, meets snr thresholdConvolution (7) is it can be concluded that shown in formula (8) Certification request transmission probability (PART).
In some instances, under single-bit concealment agreement, the value of certification request transmission probability (PART) needs to meetWherein, εARTIt is the lower limit of certification request transmission probability (PART), and it meets 0≤εART≤εART1。 Wherein, εART1Meet
In addition, in some instances, the information signal in marking signal can not achieve reception device 20 without error When being decoded, reception device 20 will authenticate hidden refusal event.Hidden certification rejection probability (PACR) can be according to upper The Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (MINR) stated obtains.Hidden certification rejection probability (PACR) can be as shown in formula (9).
In some instances, snr threshold μ is set, snr threshold is metIt is deformed It is available,In this case, convolution (9) is it can be concluded that PACR=0.By This, it can be seen that the information signal in marking signal can not achieve when receiving end is decoded without error, and receiving end can not It can occur to authenticate hidden refusal event.Namely any hidden constraint is all feasible.
In addition, hidden certification rejection probability (PACR) needs to meet under single-bit concealment agreementWherein, εACRIt is the upper limit of hidden certification rejection probability (PACR), meets εACR≤1.Basis as a result, Hidden certification probability (PACR) can measure the hidden grade of physical layer authentication techniques.
In addition, in some instances, under single-bit concealment agreement, being based on PACR=0 He The energy distribution factor optimized by formula (10)
In some instances, as shown in fig. 7, reception device 20 may include determination module 23.Determination module 23 is according to guarantor The probability calculation of close certification probability, certification request transmission probability and hidden certification refusal goes out security certification efficiency, to determine physics The request delay of layer certification and hidden grade.
In addition, in some instances, security certification probability (PSA), certification request transmission probability (PART) and hidden certification Rejection probability (PACR) can be obtained by processing module 21 and computing module 22.
In some instances, it is refused based on security certification probability (PSA), certification request transmission probability (PART) and hidden certification Exhausted probability (PACR) calculates security certification efficiency (SAE).Provide that security certification efficiency (SAE) can be by shown in such as formula (11).
It in some instances, include certification request transmission probability (PART) and hidden certification in security certification efficiency (SAE) Rejection probability (PACR), wherein certification request transmission probability (PART) can assess the request delay of physical layer certification.It is hidden to recognize Card rejection probability (PACR) can determine the hidden grade of physical layer certification.Security certification efficiency (SAE) can more favorable comment as a result, Estimate request delay and hidden grade.
In addition, in some instances, in the energy distribution factor of optimizationWith the snr threshold μ feelings in feasibility range Under condition, by the security certification efficiency (SAE) of certification request transmission probability (PART) and hidden certification rejection probability (PACR) constraint Obtain maximum value.Specifically, security certification efficiency (SAE) maximum value, certification request transmission probability (PART) and hidden certification The relationship of rejection probability (PACR) is obtained by formula (12).
Fig. 8 is to show the structural schematic diagram of physical layer authenticating device involved in the example of the disclosure.In some examples In, transmitting terminal and receiving end all include authenticating device 30 as shown in Figure 8.
In some instances, as shown in figure 8, authenticating device 30 includes processor 31 and memory 32.Wherein, processor 31 And memory 32 is separately connected communication bus.In some instances, memory 32 can be high speed RAM memory, can also be with It is non-volatile memory (non-volatile memory).It will be understood by those skilled in the art that recognizing shown in Fig. 8 The structure of card equipment 30 does not constitute the restriction to the disclosure, it is also possible to hub-and-spoke configuration either busbar network, also It may include perhaps combining certain components or different component layouts than more or fewer components shown in Fig. 8.
Wherein, processor 31 is the control centre of authenticating device 30.In some instances, it can be central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU), the various interfaces of utilization of processor 31 and the entire authenticating device 30 of connection Various pieces by running or execute the software program and/or module that are stored in memory 32, and are called and are stored in storage The program code stored in device 32, for performing the following operations:
In the channel state information of receiving end there are in the case where single bit feedback, transmitting terminal is assisted based on single-bit concealment It discusses to wireless channel emission mark signal, marking signal includes authentication signal and information signal, in single-bit concealment agreement, The energy distribution factor of information signal is enabled to be kept fixed in interval time section and be optimal value (by the authenticating device 30 of transmitting terminal It executes).
Receiving end receives marking signal, is based on single-bit concealment agreement, handles marking signal, obtains secrecy and recognizes Demonstrate,prove probability；Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio based on received information signal obtains certification request transmission probability and hidden certification rejection probability；And And security certification efficiency is calculated based on security certification probability, certification request transmission probability and hidden certification rejection probability, with true Determine the hidden grade (being executed by the authenticating device 30 of receiving end) of physical layer certification.
In some instances, the processor 31 of authenticating device 30 also executes following operation: in single-bit concealment agreement, To the single bit of information of transmitting terminal feedback signal-to-noise ratio threshold value μ, settingEnable PACR=0, wherein RbIndicate conventional letter Number rate.
In some instances, the processor 31 of authenticating device 30 also executes following operation: based on PACR=0, the energy of information signal The optimal value of distribution factor is calculated by following formula (10): Wherein,εARTIt is the lower limit of certification request transmission probability, γbIndicate average signal-to-noise ratio, RbTable Show normal signal rate.
In some instances, the processor 31 of authenticating device 30 also executes following operation: security certification efficiency is by following formula (11) it is calculated: η=PART(1-PACR)PSA(11), wherein PARTIndicate certification request transmission probability, PACRIt indicates hidden to recognize Demonstrate,prove rejection probability, PSAIndicate security certification probability.
In some instances, the processor 31 of authenticating device 30 also executes following operation: the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio of information signal by Following formula (6) is calculated:Wherein, Indicate the energy distribution factor of information signal,Indicate that the energy distribution factor of authentication signal, marking signal piecemeal are sent, γb,i Indicate channel SNRs of i-th piece of marking signal in receiving end, hb,iIndicate the channel gain of i-th piece of marking signal,It indicates The noise variance of receiving end.
In some instances, it should be understood that disclosed equipment can be realized in other ways.For example, the above institute It is only schematical in the device examples of description, for example, the division of the unit, only a kind of logical function partition, reality There may be another division manner when realization, such as multiple units or components may be combined or can be integrated into another and be System, or some features can be ignored or not executed.Another point, shown or discussed mutual coupling or direct-coupling Or communication connection can be through some interfaces, the indirect coupling or communication connection of device or unit can be electrical or other Form.
Unit may or may not be physically separated as illustrated by the separation member, shown as a unit Component may or may not be physical unit, it can and it is in one place, or may be distributed over multiple networks On unit.It can some or all of the units may be selected to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment according to the actual needs.
In addition, each functional unit in some instances can integrate in one processing unit, it is also possible to each list Member physically exists alone, and can also be integrated in one unit with two or more units.Above-mentioned integrated unit both can be with Using formal implementation of hardware, can also realize in the form of software functional units.
In some instances, if integrated unit is realized in the form of SFU software functional unit and as independent product pin It sells or in use, can store in a computer-readable access to memory.Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the disclosure Substantially all or part of the part that contributes to existing technology or the technical solution can be with software product in other words Form embody, which is stored in a memory, including some instructions use so that one meter It calculates machine equipment (can be personal computer, server or network equipment etc.) and executes the complete of each embodiment the method for the disclosure Portion or part steps.And memory above-mentioned includes: USB flash disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), arbitrary access Memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), mobile hard disk, magnetic or disk etc. are various to can store program code Medium.
A kind of computer readable storage medium is disclosed in some instances, those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that on Stating all or part of the steps in the various physical layer authentication methods in example is that can instruct correlation by program (instruction) Hardware complete, which can store in computer-readable memory (storage medium), memory can wrap Include: flash disk, read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM), random access device (Random Access Memory, RAM), disk or CD etc..
Although being illustrated in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments to the disclosure above, it will be appreciated that above description The disclosure is not limited in any form.Those skilled in the art can without departing from the connotation and range of the disclosure To be deformed and be changed to the disclosure as needed, these deformations and variation are each fallen in the scope of the present disclosure.

Claims (10)

1. a kind of physical layer authentication method based on single-bit concealment agreement, is the wireless communication comprising transmitting terminal and receiving end The Concealment Analyzing method of the physical layer certification of system, which is characterized in that
Include:
The transmitting terminal is based on single-bit concealment agreement to wireless channel emission mark signal, and the marking signal includes certification Signal and information signal enable the energy distribution factor of the information signal at interval in the single-bit concealment agreement Between be kept fixed in section and for optimal value；
The receiving end receives the marking signal, the single-bit concealment agreement is based on, at the marking signal Reason obtains security certification probability；
Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio based on the received information signal obtains certification request transmission probability and hidden certification rejection probability；And And
Secrecy is calculated based on the security certification probability, the certification request transmission probability and the hidden certification rejection probability Authentication efficiency, to determine the hidden grade of physical layer certification.
2. physical layer authentication method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that:
In the single-bit concealment agreement, single-bit letter of the receiving end to transmitting terminal feedback signal-to-noise ratio threshold value μ Breath, settingEnable PACR=0, wherein RbIndicate normal signal rate.
3. physical layer authentication method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that:
Based on PACR=0, the optimal value of the energy distribution factor of information signal is calculated by following formula (I):
Wherein,εARTIt is the lower limit of certification request transmission probability, γbIndicate average signal-to-noise ratio, Rb Indicate normal signal rate.
4. physical layer authentication method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that:
The security certification efficiency is calculated by following formula (II):
η=PART(1-PACR)PSA(II),
Wherein, PARTIndicate the certification request transmission probability, PACRIndicate the hidden certification rejection probability, PSAIndicate the guarantor Close certification probability.
5. physical layer authentication method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that:
The Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio of the information signal is calculated by following formula (III):
Wherein,Indicate the energy distribution factor of the information signal,Indicate the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal, institute State the transmission of marking signal piecemeal, γb,iIndicate channel SNRs of i-th piece of marking signal in the receiving end, hb,iIndicate i-th piece The channel gain of marking signal,Indicate the noise variance of the receiving end.
6. a kind of physical layer Verification System based on single-bit concealment agreement, which is characterized in that
Include:
Emitter, the emitter are based on single-bit concealment agreement to wireless channel emission mark signal, the label Signal includes authentication signal and information signal, in the single-bit concealment agreement, the energy of the information signal is enabled to distribute The factor is kept fixed in interval time section and is optimal value；
Reception device comprising: processing module receives the marking signal, the single-bit concealment agreement is based on, to institute It states marking signal to be handled, obtains security certification probability；Computing module, the letter based on the received information signal is dry to make an uproar Than obtaining certification request transmission probability and hidden certification rejection probability；And determination module, according to the security certification probability, The probability calculation of the certification request transmission probability and the hidden certification refusal goes out security certification efficiency, to determine that physical layer is recognized The hidden grade of card.
7. physical layer Verification System according to claim 6, it is characterised in that:
In the single-bit concealment agreement, single-bit letter of the receiving end to transmitting terminal feedback signal-to-noise ratio threshold value μ Breath, settingEnable PACR=0, wherein RbIndicate normal signal rate.
8. physical layer Verification System according to claim 6, it is characterised in that:
Based on PACR=0, the optimal value of the energy distribution factor of information signal is calculated by following formula (I):
Wherein,εARTIt is the lower limit of certification request transmission probability, γbIndicate average signal-to-noise ratio, Rb Indicate normal signal rate.
9. physical layer Verification System according to claim 6, it is characterised in that:
In the determination module, the security certification efficiency is calculated by following formula (II):
η=PART(1-PACR)PSA(II),
Wherein, PARTIndicate the certification request transmission probability, PACRIndicate the hidden certification rejection probability, PSAIndicate that secrecy is recognized Demonstrate,prove probability.
10. physical layer Verification System according to claim 6, it is characterised in that:
In the computing module, the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio of the information signal is calculated by following formula (III):
Wherein,Indicate the energy distribution factor of the information signal,Indicate the energy distribution factor of the authentication signal, institute State the transmission of marking signal piecemeal, γb,iIndicate channel SNRs of i-th piece of marking signal in the reception device, hb,iIndicate i-th The channel gain of block marking signal,Indicate the noise variance of the reception device.
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