CN106161297B - Anti- pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation and recognition methods in ofdm system based on independent component analysis - Google Patents

Anti- pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation and recognition methods in ofdm system based on independent component analysis Download PDF

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CN106161297B
CN106161297B CN201610459942.5A CN201610459942A CN106161297B CN 106161297 B CN106161297 B CN 106161297B CN 201610459942 A CN201610459942 A CN 201610459942A CN 106161297 B CN106161297 B CN 106161297B
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channel
receiver
uplink
pilot
pilot tone
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CN201610459942.5A
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CN106161297A (en
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任品毅
徐东阳
王熠晨
杜清河
孙黎
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西安交通大学
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L25/00Baseband systems
    • H04L25/02Details ; Arrangements for supplying electrical power along data transmission lines
    • H04L25/0202Channel estimation
    • H04L25/024Channel estimation channel estimation algorithms
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L27/00Modulated-carrier systems
    • H04L27/26Systems using multi-frequency codes
    • H04L27/2601Multicarrier modulation systems

Abstract

The present invention provides anti-pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation and recognition methods based on independent component analysis in a kind of ofdm system, pilot tone spoofing attack is weakened using the characteristic of random pilot as Pilot Interference attack, while the legitimate channel under Pilot Interference environment between the legal transmitter and receiver of uplink is estimated and identified according to the autonomous behavior of channel.The present invention only needs to spend the time resource and a certain number of band resources of 3 OFDM symbols, and immune to the Pilot Interference power of active listener-in.The legal transmitter of uplink upsets the premeditated pilot tone attack of active listener-in by sending uplink random pilot tone, simultaneously, receiver, which passes through, to be utilized and the mutual independence between legitimate channel and attack channel, legitimate channel information is extracted from the contaminated signal received, the precision of channel estimation for promoting legitimate channel, to solve the problems, such as that precision of channel estimation caused by pilot tone spoofing attack is low.

Description

Anti- pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation in ofdm system based on independent component analysis and Recognition methods

Technical field

The invention belongs to wireless communication field, it is related to the channel estimation and cognitron of anti-pilot tone spoofing attack in ofdm system System, anti-pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation and recognition methods specially in ofdm system based on independent component analysis.

Background technique

With the fast development of wireless communication technique, security risk gradually threatens and restricts wireless communication technique Using and development.The broadcast characteristic of wireless channel can make unwanted signals source eavesdrop other nodes secret and private information or Person endangers the communication link for interfering other normal nodes.Currently, the password encryption decryption system on upper layer can be to a certain extent Guarantee the safety of wireless communications environment, but with the development of computer technology, unwanted signals source often has powerful meter It calculates, eavesdropping and attacking ability, or even the encryption system on upper layer can be decoded completely, and then the information of legitimate user is caused to be completely exposed In oneself.For this purpose, safety of physical layer mechanism causes extensive concern and research, from initial theory α coefficient performance evaluation to most The safety of physical layer Mechanism Design towards practical communication system, safety of physical layer technology were evolving always in recent years, however, It is also seldom that physical layer research towards anti-interference attack is especially the anti-interference Mechanism Design towards practical communication system.OFDM system The wireless communication system architecture united as current main-stream, is widely used in each actual wireless communication system.But due to Agreement and the relatively-stationary characteristic of framework, attacker's often these available information, and then system is posed a serious threat.

The angle estimated from physical layer channel, when a listener-in learns the frame synchronization information and pilot tone letter of legal transceiver After number, pilot tone spoofing attack can be started, during which, which believes by synchronously sending identical pilot tone with a certain legitimate user Number, channel estimation between the pairing of interfering legality transceiver promotes security risk to reduce the security performance of system.Moreover, leading After successful implementation, legal transceiver is difficult to obtain accurate legal downlink channel state information again for frequency spoofing attack.? In ofdm system, channel estimation is needed by the certainty pilot signal in different sub-carrier, these pilot signals can be attacked Person is known, and then implements pilot tone spoofing attack.Therefore, it is necessary to new channel estimation mechanisms and pilot design mechanism to resist and cut Influence of the pilot tone spoofing attack to channel estimation in weak ofdm system.

Summary of the invention

Aiming at the problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides anti-based on independent component analysis in a kind of ofdm system Pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation and recognition methods make full use of channel and active listener-in between legal transceiver extremely to receive The independence of channel between machine need to only occupy the time of 3 OFDM symbols, can significantly be promoted in conjunction with pilot tone feedback mechanism The estimated accuracy of legitimate channel, and this precision not under fire influence of jamming power.

The present invention is to be achieved through the following technical solutions:

Anti- pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation and recognition methods in ofdm system based on independent component analysis, including it is as follows Step,

Step1 regards the pilot signal in ofdm system as linear system, and channel regards the signal source of input system as, turns Change the reception model of pilot signal;

Step2, the legal transmitter of uplink emits random pilot signal in an ofdm system, after receiver is based on conversion The reception model of pilot signal analyzes the pilot signal received, detects two kinds of behavior patterns of active listener-in;

Step3, according to the behavior pattern of the attacker detected, receiver takes corresponding signal analysis strategy to carry out letter Road estimation: if detecting attack, carrying out channel estimation using CS-JADE algorithm, otherwise, carries out channel using LS algorithm and estimates Meter;

Step4, after channel estimation, the random pilot signal of the legal transmitter feedback channel estimated service life of uplink is to being connect Receipts machine;If receiver detects that pilot tone is attacked, identified from the channel estimated in Step3 using the random pilot signal Channel information between legal transceiver pairing;Occur if detected without attack, according to LS algorithm, receiver directly knows conjunction Channel information between method transceiver.

It preferably, include a pair of legal transceiver and an active listener-in in ofdm system, two uplinks of formation are logical Believe that link is respectively the legal transmitted from transmitter to receiver of 1. uplinks, is defined as legitimate channel;2. active listener-in defines to receiver For attack channel;Receiver possesses NTRoot antenna, the legal transmitter of uplink and active listener-in are single antenna, every uplink The every antenna on road occupies N number of subcarrier simultaneously in each OFDM symbol;Channel coefficients on each subcarrier are obeyed Mean value is the independent same distribution that 0 variance is 1, and it is the independent same distribution that 0 variance is 1 that the noise on each subcarrier, which obeys mean value, White Gaussian noise.

Further, the pilot signal reception model converted in Step1 is as follows,

Wherein,

J, k, t are three OFDM symbols,For the signal that receiver receives,For pilot signal,For receiver Receiving end noise, H are channel, y(i,j)The signal received for i-th antenna of receiver in j-th of time slot;dL,(i,j)(n), dE,(i,j)It (n) is respectively the legal transceiver user of uplink and active listener-in in j-th of OFDM symbol, i-th antenna, n-th The uplink pilot signal used between receiver in sub-carrier channels;It is receiver in i-th antenna, j-th of time slot Interior noise;hL,(i,j), hE,(i,j)Respectively downlink legitimate receiver and active listener-in are in j-th of time slot to the legal hair of downlink Penetrate the sub-carrier channels of i-th antenna of machine.

Further, CS-JADE algorithm described in Step3 includes the following steps,

The 3.1 any 2 time slots j stored according to receiver, the data that k is receivedIt is used under receiver line JADE method estimates contaminated channel matrix

3.2 according to Y, and calculating weighting matrix W makes its satisfaction:Weighting matrix S is estimated simultaneouslyH

3.3 calculating weighting matrix G make its satisfaction

Wherein,dL,j, dL,kIt is obtained by the pilot signal fed back;

3.4 estimate the legal transmitter of uplink uplink sub-carrier channel vector it is as follows:

Wherein: P meets

Preferably, use the method based on noise subspace to the signal received in Step2It is detected, with judgement Whether active attack is occurred, it is specific as follows,

Firstly, rightEigenvalues Decomposition is carried out, three characteristic value σ are obtained0≤σ1≤σ2

Secondly, if σ10=0, then pilot tone attack does not occur, otherwise, there are pilot tone attacks.

Preferably, when the random pilot signal that user feedback channel estimation uses in Step4 is to receiver, according to such as ShiShimonoseki System carries out the feedback of pilot signal,

θjk0t1

Wherein, θjktThe phase of respectively three OFDM symbol times corresponding random pilot signal, and meet and fix Phase difference, corresponding phase difference is respectively θ01;.

Compared with prior art, the invention has the following beneficial technical effects:

The present invention weakens pilot tone spoofing attack using the characteristic of random pilot as Pilot Interference attack, while according to channel Autonomous behavior estimate and identify the legitimate channel under Pilot Interference environment between the legal transmitter and receiver of uplink.This hair Bright needs to spend the time resource and a certain number of band resources of 3 OFDM symbols, and to the pilot tone of active listener-in Jamming power is immune.The legal transmitter of uplink upsets the premeditated pilot tone attack of active listener-in by sending uplink random pilot tone, Meanwhile receiver passes through utilization and the mutual independence between legitimate channel and attack channel, from the contaminated signal received In extract legitimate channel information, the precision of channel estimation of legitimate channel is promoted, to solve letter caused by pilot tone spoofing attack The low problem of road estimated accuracy.The present invention improves the estimation to legitimate channel using dual stage process help system simultaneously;First Stage, the legal transmitter of uplink emit random pilot;Second stage, the pilot tone that the uplink legal transmitter feedback first stage uses Signal is to receiver;If receiver detects the channel that pilot tone is attacked, and is just further estimated from the first stage using this information In identify legitimate channel information;If occurred without attack, according to traditional LS algorithm, it is legal that uplink receiver can directly be known Channel information.

Further, since active listener-in in the first stage may send random pilot interfering legality channel estimation, lead to It crosses the method based on noise subspace to detect the signal that receiver receives, to judge whether active attack occurs, such as Fruit detects attack, carries out channel estimation using the CS-JADE algorithm of proposition, otherwise, carries out channel using traditional LS algorithm Estimation;The present invention is to improve the uplink channel estimation of legitimate user under pilot tone attack context as target, by according with to three OFDM Statistical Analysis of Signals received on subcarrier in number time can recover legal use uplink receiving end is high-precision The uplink channel information at family.Also, the influence of the jamming power of suggested plans bring precision of channel estimation not under fire, from And the significantly robustness of boosting algorithm.

Detailed description of the invention

Fig. 1 is time-frequency structure schematic diagram.

Fig. 2 is the flow diagram of method described in present example.

Fig. 3 is normalized channel mean square error described in present example and legal pilot SNR curve graph.

Fig. 4 is normalized channel mean square error described in present example and antenna and subcarrier number curve graph.

Fig. 5 is that normalized channel mean square error and legal pilot tone are believed under disturbance power described in present example It makes an uproar and compares curve graph.

Specific embodiment

Below with reference to specific embodiment, the present invention is described in further detail, it is described be explanation of the invention and It is not to limit.

Method of the present invention in system model when establishing, considers a pair of legal transceiver and an actively eavesdropping Person, two uplink communication links, respectively 1. upstream transmitters → receiver are defined as 2. active listener-in of legitimate channel → connect Receipts machine is defined as attack channel.Receiver possesses NTRoot antenna, upstream transmitter and active listener-in are single antenna, such as Fig. 1 Shown, every antenna of every uplink occupies N number of subcarrier simultaneously in each OFDM symbol.On each subcarrier It is 0 that channel coefficients, which all obey mean value, the independent same distribution that variance is 1, and it is 0 that the noise on each subcarrier, which obeys mean value, side The independent same distribution white Gaussian noise that difference is 1.If upstream transmitter uses certainty pilot tone, when pilot pollution, which is attacked, to be occurred, Active listener-in can emit identical pilot signal in pilot point identical with the legal transmitter of uplink position, when uplink is legal When transmitter uses random pilot, active listener-in may emit random in pilot point identical with legal transmitter position Pilot signal carries out channel estimation interference.Wherein, the signal-to-noise ratio of pilot signal is respectively,

|dL,(i,j)(n)|2L,|dE,(i,j)(n)|2E,0≤n≤N-1;

Pilot pollution in order to prevent, upstream transmitter carries out channel estimation using random pilot, at this point, active listener-in can Two kinds of behavior patterns: 1. channel estimations having to using random pilot interfering legality channel are taken, then, pilot tone spoofing attack Also just it is converted into Pilot Interference attack;2. keeping silent.So-called active listener-in is a kind of only legal transceiver of active interference The listener-in of channel estimation.

Fig. 2 gives the system framework figure of the method, includes the following steps:

Step 1 proposes new pilot signal reception model for the problem that channel coherency time resource is limited;Pass through Conversion obtains new pilot signal reception model, and uplink receiver is received in j-th of OFDM symbol of i-th antenna Pilot signal:

HL,(i,j)=diag { hL,(i,j)(0),...,hL,(i,j)(N-1)}

HE,(i,j)=diag { hE,(i,j)(0),...,hE,(i,j)(N-1)};

dL,(i,j)=[dL,(i,j)(0),...,dL,(i,j)(N-1)]T

dE,(i,j)=[dE,(i,j)(0),...,dE,(i,j)(N-1)]T

vL,(i,j)=[vL,(i,j)(0),...,vL,(i,j)(N-1)]T

Wherein, I expression does not receive pilot tone attack, and II indicates to be attacked by pilot tone, hL,(i,j)(n) and dL,(i,j)(n) it is respectively In j-th of OFDM symbol, the legal transmitter of uplink to n-th of uplink sub-carrier channel between i-th antenna of receiver and upper Row pilot signal, hE,(i,j)(n) and dE,(i,j)It (n) is respectively active listener-in to i-th day of receiver in j-th of OFDM symbol N-th of uplink sub-carrier channel and ascending pilot frequency between line, vL,(i,j)It (n) is receiver in j-th of OFDM symbol, i-th day The noise on n-th of uplink sub-carrier channel on line.

For this purpose, by making all uplink pilot signals of each user on each subcarrier and antenna identical:

dL,(i,j)(0)=...=dL,(i,j)(N-1)=dL,j

We obtain pilot signal reception model new in three OFDM symbols j, k, t:

Wherein:

hL,(i,j)=[hL,(i,j)(0),...,hL,(i,j)(N-1)]T;hE,(i,j)=[hE,(i,j)(0),...,hE,(i,j)(N- 1)]T

Unlike prior art, pilot signalIt is considered as linear hybrid system, H is considered as signal Source.

Based on pilot signal reception model mentioned above, the present invention is based on the anti-pilot tone spoofing attacks of independent component analysis Channel estimation and recognition methods are divided into two stages: first stage, and the legal transmitter of uplink emits random pilot, actively steals at this time There are two types of selections by hearer: 1. send random pilot interfering legality channel estimation, and 2. keep silent, do not send the legal letter of Pilot Interference Road estimation;In order to detect the behavior of active listener-in, uplink receiver is using the method based on noise subspace to receiving Signal is detected, to judge whether active attack occurs.If detecting attack, uplink receiver utilizes CS-JADE algorithm Channel estimation is carried out, otherwise, channel estimation is carried out using traditional LS algorithm;Second stage, uplink legal transmitter feedback the The pilot signal that one stage used is to receiver;If receiver detects that pilot tone is attacked, just using this information further from the Legitimate channel information is identified in the channel of one stage estimation;If occurred without attack, according to traditional LS algorithm, uplink receiving Machine can directly know legitimate channel information.It is implemented as follows:

Step2 whether there is to detect pilot tone attack, using the method based on noise subspace to the signal receivedIt is analyzed: firstly, rightEigenvalues Decomposition is carried out, three characteristic values: σ are obtained0≤σ1≤σ2;Secondly, if σ10 =0, then pilot tone attack does not occur, otherwise, there are pilot tone attacks.

In order to improve the estimated accuracy of legitimate user's channel, a kind of pilot signal feedback mechanism, the machining function are proposed After pilot tone estimation procedure, specific design mechanism is as follows:

θjk0t1

Wherein, θjktRespectively three OFDM symbol times corresponding random pilot signal, but meet fixed phase Potential difference θ01

Step3, according to the above results, if there is pilot tone attack, then execute CS-JADE algorithm carry out channel estimation and Identification, otherwise, directly executes traditional LS channel estimation;

The CS-JADE algorithm of it is proposed carries out channel estimation and identification, the algorithm by means of feedback pilot signal so that connecing Receipts machine lower online can complete channel estimation and identification, estimate legal sub-carrier channels vectorSpecific step is as follows:

Step3.1: any 2 time slots j stored according to receiver, the data that k is receivedUnder receiver line Contaminated channel matrix is estimated using JADE method

Step3.2: according to Y, calculating weighting matrix W makes its satisfaction:Weighting matrix is estimated simultaneously SH

Step3.3: calculating weighting matrix G makes its satisfaction:Wherein,dL,j, dL,kIt can be obtained by the pilot signal fed back;

Step3.4: the uplink sub-carrier channel vector of the legal transmitter of uplink is estimated:

Wherein: P meets:

Step4, after being based on channel estimation, the random pilot signal of the legal transmitter feedback channel estimated service life of uplink To receiver, the legal transmitter of uplink need to only feed back θjktIn some phase information, receiver is according to the phase Information and known phase difference θ01, i.e., knowable all pilot signals.

Simulating, verifying of the invention is expressed as Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.Fig. 3 illustrates the invention in pilot tone spoofing attack High-precision legitimate channel can be recovered under environment, break precision of channel estimation platform caused by pilot tone attack.Fig. 4 is indicated The normalized mean squared error of estimation channel of the invention is with antenna number and subcarrier number situation of change, with antenna number Or the raising of subcarrier number, precision of channel estimation of the invention gradually tend towards stability.Fig. 5 shows the present invention and leads in difference The robustness of normalized mean squared error performance under the conditions of frequency jamming power, particularly, with active attack person's jamming power It gradually increases, the influence of precision of channel estimation of the invention almost interference-free power.

Claims (3)

  1. Anti- pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation and recognition methods, feature in 1.OFDM system based on independent component analysis exist In, include the following steps,
    Step1 regards the pilot signal in ofdm system as linear system, and channel regards the signal source of input system as, and conversion is led The reception model of frequency signal;
    Step2, the legal transmitter of uplink emits random pilot signal in an ofdm system, and receiver is based on pilot tone after conversion The reception model of signal analyzes the pilot signal received, detects two kinds of behavior patterns of active listener-in;
    Step3, according to the behavior pattern of the attacker detected, receiver takes corresponding signal analysis strategy progress channel to estimate Meter: if detecting attack, carrying out channel estimation using CS-JADE algorithm, otherwise, carries out channel estimation using LS algorithm;
    Step4, after channel estimation, the random pilot signal of the legal transmitter feedback channel estimated service life of uplink is to receiving Machine;If receiver detects that pilot tone is attacked, conjunction is identified from the channel estimated in Step3 using the random pilot signal Channel information between the pairing of method transceiver;Occur if detected without attack, according to LS algorithm, it is legal that receiver is directly known Channel information between transceiver;
    It include a pair of legal transceiver and an active listener-in, two uplink communication links of formation in the ofdm system The legal transmitted from transmitter to receiver of respectively 1. uplinks, is defined as legitimate channel;2. active listener-in to receiver, is defined as attacking Channel;Receiver possesses NTRoot antenna, the legal transmitter of uplink and active listener-in are single antenna, every uplink it is every Root antenna occupies N number of subcarrier simultaneously in each OFDM symbol;It is 0 that channel coefficients on each subcarrier, which obey mean value, The independent same distribution that variance is 1, it is the independent same distribution white Gaussian that 0 variance is 1 that the noise on each subcarrier, which obeys mean value, Noise;
    The pilot signal reception model converted in Step1 is as follows,
    Wherein,
    J, k, t are three OFDM symbols,For the signal that receiver receives,For pilot signal,For the reception of receiver Noise is held, H is channel, y(i,j)The signal received for i-th antenna of receiver in j-th of time slot;dL,(i,j)(n), dE,(i,j) It (n) is respectively the legal transceiver user of uplink and active listener-in in j-th of OFDM symbol, i-th antenna, n-th of subcarrier The uplink pilot signal used between receiver on channel;For receiver making an uproar in i-th antenna, j-th of time slot Sound;hL,(i,j), hE,(i,j)Respectively downlink legitimate receiver and active listener-in are in j-th of time slot to the legal transmitter of downlink The sub-carrier channels of i-th antenna;
    CS-JADE algorithm described in Step3 includes the following steps,
    The 3.1 any 2 time slots j stored according to receiver, the data that k is receivedJADE method is used under receiver line Estimate contaminated channel matrix
    3.2 according to Y, and calculating weighting matrix W makes its satisfaction:
    3.3 calculating weighting matrix G make its satisfaction
    Wherein,dL,j, dL,kIt is obtained by the pilot signal fed back;
    3.4 estimate the legal transmitter of uplink uplink sub-carrier channel vector it is as follows:
    Wherein: P meets
  2. 2. anti-pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation in ofdm system according to claim 1 based on independent component analysis and Recognition methods, which is characterized in that using the method based on noise subspace to the signal received in Step2It is detected, It is specific as follows to judge whether to occur active attack,
    Firstly, rightEigenvalues Decomposition is carried out, three characteristic value σ are obtained0≤σ1≤σ2
    Secondly, if σ10=0, then pilot tone attack does not occur, otherwise, there are pilot tone attacks.
  3. 3. anti-pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation in ofdm system according to claim 1 based on independent component analysis and Recognition methods, which is characterized in that when the random pilot signal that user feedback channel estimation uses in Step4 is to receiver, according to Following relationship carries out the feedback of pilot signal,
    θjk0t1
    Wherein, θjktThe phase of respectively three OFDM symbol times corresponding random pilot signal, and meet fixed phase Potential difference, corresponding phase difference are respectively θ01
CN201610459942.5A 2016-06-22 2016-06-22 Anti- pilot tone spoofing attack channel estimation and recognition methods in ofdm system based on independent component analysis CN106161297B (en)

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CN108540413B (en) * 2018-03-19 2019-06-07 北京邮电大学 A kind of channel direction blind separating method towards pilot tone attack in communication system
CN108768901A (en) * 2018-05-30 2018-11-06 北京邮电大学 A kind of disabled user emits detection method, system and the device of eavesdropping pilot tone
CN108847911A (en) * 2018-06-14 2018-11-20 西安交通大学 A kind of OFDM channel training method for authenticating based on independence check code
CN108881217A (en) * 2018-06-14 2018-11-23 西安交通大学 A kind of safety multi-purpose family pilot tone method for authenticating based on layering two dimensional character coding

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