CN108881215B - Bell state-based semi-quantum secure direct communication method - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention belongs to the field of quantum secure communication, and discloses a semi-quantum secure direct communication method and a system, wherein two users participate in the execution of the protocol, the first user has a high-level quantum function, can prepare a Bell state, can measure the quantum state by using a Bell base, and has a quantum storage function; the second participating user only has a basic quantum function, specifically: measurement: measuring quanta by using a classical basis { |0>, |1> }, generating a quanta |1> (|0>) in an opposite state according to a measurement result |0> (|1>), and sending out the quanta; reflection: after receiving the quantum, the quantum is directly sent back to the sender without any modification; disorder: the transmission sequence of the quantum sequences is disturbed by using a delay technology. The protocol provided by the invention is a semi-quantum secure direct communication protocol, and the communication efficiency of the protocol is also improved on the premise of ensuring the absolute security of secret information transmission.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of quantum secure communication, and particularly relates to a semi-quantum secure direct communication method and system.
Background
Currently, the current state of the art commonly used in the industry is such that:
the quantum secure direct communication is an important research direction in quantum information science, and mainly realizes that secret information is directly transmitted through a quantum channel on the premise of not negotiating a shared key between two legal users; in 2000, longgui lu et al pioneered a quantum secure direct communication scheme (QSDC) 1 based on Einstein-podlsky-rosen (epr) pairs; subsequently, researchers have done a lot of work on quantum secure direct communication protocols; in 2003, Dunfu proposed a well-known two-step quantum secure direct communication protocol [2 ]; subsequent researchers have proposed a class of controllable quantum secure direct communication protocols (CQSDC) based on the quantum secure communication protocol, in which a receiver can obtain final secret information only by the permission of a controller; however, in these quantum secure direct communication protocols, it is almost always necessary that all participants have strong quantum capabilities, such as preparing various quantum states, measuring quanta by using different bases, storing quanta, and the like; recently, researchers have investigated how much quantum capacity a participant in a quantum protocol should have; because quantum equipment is very expensive, in executing a quantum protocol, if only part of nodes can be ensured to have stronger quantum functions, the protocol can be executed, the purpose of safety is achieved, and the method has important significance for popularization of a quantum communication network; in 2007, Boyer et al first proposed a half-quantum key distribution protocol [3 ]; the Boyer protocol relates to an application scenario that comprises a first participating user and a second participating user of two users, wherein the first participating user is a server with a strong quantum function, and the second participating user only has basic quantum capacity; the first participating user can prepare various quanta, measure the quanta based on various bases and temporarily store the quanta; the second participating user can only prepare photons in either the |0> or |1> state; measuring photons using the bases { |0>, |1> }; sending the received photons or newly prepared photons; and a quantum channel is arranged between the first participating user and the second participating user, the laboratory and the outside of the first participating user are connected together, and the second participating user can only access partial functions of the quantum channel; in 2009, Boyer improves the half-quantum protocol, and in order to improve the security of the protocol, by adding quantum delay equipment to a second participating user only having a half-quantum function, the second participating user can reorder the quantum to be sent, so as to prevent a hacker from deducing relevant operation information executed by the second participating user according to the state of the quantum; subsequently, researchers have applied semi-quantum techniques to solve various quantum security problems, such as semi-quantum secret sharing (SQSS) [5-9], semi-quantum secret distribution (SQKD) [10-13], and semi-quantum secure direct communication (SQSDC) [14-16 ].
In summary, the problems of the prior art are as follows:
the hardware cost requirement for users is high: the existing quantum secure direct communication protocol based on quantum technology requires a user to be equipped with advanced quantum equipment, such as a quantum generator, a quantum memory, a unitary operator and the like; however, as a common user, such expensive quantum devices cannot be borne, which limits the application of the quantum secure direct communication protocol, and further limits the popularization of the quantum communication network.
The existing half-quantum secure direct communication protocol is not considered enough in the aspects of safety and efficiency; in 2014, Zou et al proposed a first three-step half-quantum secure direct communication protocol [14] based on single photons; however, the protocol efficiency of Zou and the like is low, and the quantum communication efficiency is only 25%; subsequently, Luo et al proposed two authenticated semi-quantum secure direct communication protocols [15], which require participants to share a shared key in advance in order to implement secure communication between two users; recently, Zhang et al construct a new semi-quantum secure direct communication protocol [16] based on EPR; the Zhang and other protocols comprise two stages, wherein a first participating user is a strong quantum server and divides a Bell-state particle into two parts which are used for eavesdropping detection and secret information transmission respectively, and the two parts of particles are transmitted by the first participating user respectively in the protocol execution process, so that the protocol cannot resist measurement-replay attack (intercept-measure-replay attack) due to the working mechanism; in the second stage of protocol execution, the first participating user sends the quantum sequence to the second participating user and informs the position of the detected photons, and then the second participating user directly reflects the detected photons and encodes the rest photons according to the secret information of the second participating user; since an attacker can avoid the detection photons according to the position of the detection photons published by the first participating user and only measure the remaining photons so as to obtain the secret information, protocols such as Zhang have the risk of secret information leakage.
The quantum communication efficiency of the existing semi-quantum secure direct communication protocol is low, namely the bit rate of final secret information obtained by transferring quanta is low; the quantum communication efficiency of the currently best semi-quantum secure direct communication protocol [16] is 33.3%.
The difficulty and significance for solving the technical problems are as follows:
the difficulty in solving this problem is: the method ensures that only a first participating user in two communication parties has a strong quantum function, and a second participating user in the other party has a basic quantum function, so that the aim of directly transmitting secret information to the first participating user by the second participating user through a quantum channel can be finally realized.
The significance of this problem to solve later: after the problem is solved, not only the absolute safety of secret information distribution is ensured, but also the hardware cost of a user is reduced; the participants of the two parties of the protocol only need one party with strong quantum function, and can complete the distribution of the secret information without complex quantum operation, which is very easy to realize for common terminal users, and the application of the quantum secure direct communication protocol is promoted; in addition, the half-quantum secure direct communication protocol designed by the patent can resist measurement-replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack and Trojan horse attack, the detected probability is increased along with the increase of the information quantity obtained by an attacker, and when the information quantity obtained by the attacker is 1, the probability that the attacker is not detected is 1/2; thus, when sending large amounts of information, an attacker cannot obtain the complete amount of information passed between the first participating user and the second participating user; meanwhile, the quantum communication efficiency of the protocol can reach 50 percent, which is higher than 25 percent of Zou and the like [15] and 33.3 percent of Zhang and the like [16 ].
Reference to the literature
[1]Long G.L.and Liu X.S.:Theoretically efficient high-capacityquantum-key-distribution scheme.Phys.Rev.Lett.65(3),032302(2002)
[2]Deng,F.G.,Long,G.L.,Liu,X.S.:Two-step quantum direct communicationprotocol using the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen pair block.Phys.Rev.A 68(4),042317(2003)
[3]Boyer,M.,Kenigsberg,D.,Mor,T.:Quantum key distribution withclassical Bob.Phys.Rev.Lett.99(14),140501(2007)
[4]Boyer,M.,Gelles,R.,Kenigsberg,D.,et al.:Semiquantum keydistribution.Phys.Rev.A 79(3),032341(2009)
[5]Wang,J.,Zhang,S.,Zhang,Q.,et al.:Semiquantum secret sharing usingtwo-particle entangled state.Int.J.Quantum Inf.10(5),1250050(2012)
[6]Li,Q.,Chan,W.H.,Long,D.Y.:Semiquantum secret sharing usingentangled states.Phys.Rev.A 82(2),022303(2010)
[7]Li,L.Z.,Qiu,D.W.,Mateus,P.:Quantum secret sharing with classicalBobs.J.Phys.AMath.Theor.46(4),045304(2013)
[8]Gao,G.,Wang,Y.,Wang,D.:Multiparty semiquantum secret sharing basedon rearranging orders ofqubits.Mod.Phys.Lett.B 30(10),1650130(2016)
[9]Yu K F,Gu J,Hwang T and Gope P.Multi-party semi-quantum keydistribution-convertible multi-party semi-quantum secret sharing.QuantumInf.Process.2017,16(8),194.
[10]Zou,X.,Qiu,D.,Li,L.,Wu,L.,Li,L.:Semiquantum-key distributionusing less than four quantum states.Phys.Rev.A 79(5),052312(2009)
[11]Xian-Zhou,Z.,Wei-Gui,G.,Yong-Gang,T.,Zhen-Zhong,R.,Xiao-Tian,G.:Quantum key distribution series network protocol with M-classicalBob.Chin.Phys.B 18(6),2143(2009)
[12]Jian,W.,Sheng,Z.,Quan,Z.,Chao-Jing,T.:Semiquantum keydistribution using entangled states.Chin.Phys.Lett.28(10),100301(2011)
[13]Yu,K.F.,Yang,C.W.,Liao,C.H.,Hwang,T.:Authenticated semi-quantumkey distribution protocol using Bell states.Quantum Inf.Process.13(6),1457–1465(2014)
[4]Zou,X.F.,Qiu,D.W.:Three-step semiquantum secure directcommunication protocol.Sci.China Phys.Mech.Astron.57(9),1696–1702(2014)
[15]Luo,Y.P.,Hwang,T.:Authenticated semi-quantum direct communicationprotocols using Bell states.Quantum Inf.Process 15(2),947–958(2016)
[16]Zhang,M.H.,Li,H.F,and et al.:Semiquantum secure directcommunication using ERP pairs.Quantum Inf.Process.16(5),117,(2017)。
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the invention provides a semi-quantum secure direct communication method and a semi-quantum secure direct communication system.
The invention is realized in this way, a half-quantum secure direct communication method, comprising:
the protocol execution process comprises a first participating user and a second participating user of two participants; the first participating user has strong quantum functions, while the second participating user is a classical node and can only perform the following operation (1) measurement: measuring quanta by using classical bases { |0>, |1> }, and preparing and sending a photon with an opposite state according to a measurement result; (2) reflection: re-transmitting the received quanta back; (3) the sending sequence of the quanta is disturbed by using a delay technology;
in the protocol execution process, a first participating user is responsible for preparing 2n Bell state quantum sequences, extracting a particle composition particle sequence in each Bell state and sending the particle composition particle sequence to a second participating user; after receiving the quantum, the second participating user randomly selects n particles as detection particles for detecting an external eavesdropper; the other n particles are used for loading secret information; the second participating user carries out random operation on the detection particles and utilizes the residual particles to encode secret information; the second participating user sends the generated particle sequence to the first participating user after disorder processing; after receiving the information, the first participating user detects whether an eavesdropper exists by using the detection particles, and finally obtains the secret information sent by the second participating user through the measurement and analysis of the quantum if the eavesdropper is not found; wherein the four Bell states are respectively
And
further, the half-quantum secure direct communication method comprises the following steps:
step one, a first participating user prepares 2n Bell states, wherein n is the length of secret information; extracting each Bell stateThe first and second particles are arranged in sequence, and the quantum sequence formed by the first particles in all Bell states is S1All second particles of Bell state form a quantum sequence S2(ii) a First participating user saves S1Will S2To a second participating user, S1And S2Are all 2 n;
step two, in order to resist Trojan horse attack (Trojanhorse attack), adding a photon beam splitter and a wavelength filter device for a second participating user;
step three, when the second participating user receives the quantum sequence S2Then, the second participating user randomly selects half of the n particles as detection photons; subsequently, the second participating user performs measurement and reflection operations on the detected photons randomly; for the other half of the n particles, the second participant user is given the secret information m ═ m1,m2,……,mnSelect the corresponding operation, if miPerforming a measurement operation if m is 0iPerforming a reflection operation as 1; the second participating user uses the delay technology to disorder the transmission sequence of the particles to form a new quantum sequence S'2No other than the second participating user can pass through the quantum sequence S'2Reduction of S2；
Step four, the first participating user receives S'2Then, the information that all the particles are successfully received is published outwards; subsequently, the second participating user publishes S'2The original order of each particle, the position of the detected photon, and the operation performed by the particle on the detected photon;
the first participating user rearranges the particle sequence, then performs Bell combined measurement operation on the received particles and the particles at the corresponding positions in the hands of the first participating user, and according to the measurement result, the first participating user can restore the corresponding operation of the second participating user on the particles; suppose that in the quantum sequence, the initial state of a certain particle state sent by the first participating user is | phi+>If the second participating user performs the measurement operation, the result obtained after the first participating user performs the joint measurement should be | ψ+>Or | ψ->If the second participating user performs a reflection operation, the result obtained after the first participating user performs the joint measurement should be | φ+>(ii) a The first participating user can find the attacker by comparing the measurement result of the detected photon with the corresponding operation published by the second participating user, if the corresponding error rate exceeds a reasonable range, the protocol is terminated, otherwise, the protocol continues to execute the next step;
step five, the first participating user restores the secret information sent by the second participating user according to the measurement result of the non-detection photons, for example, the initial state prepared by the first participating user is | phi+>The result of the measurement is | ψ+>Or | ψ->Then m isi0, the measurement result is | φ+>Then m isi＝1。
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer program for implementing said semi-quantum secure direct communication method.
Another object of the present invention is to provide a quantum information processing apparatus implementing the semi-quantum secure direct communication method.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer-readable storage medium including instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the half-quantum secure direct communication method.
Another object of the present invention is to provide a semi-quantum secure direct communication system, comprising:
the quantum preparation module is used for preparing 2n Bell states by a first participating user with a strong quantum function; extracting all the first particles and the second particles in the Bell state, and respectively forming quantum sequences S by arranging the first particles and the second particles in sequence1And S2Will S2Sending the information to a second participating user only having a basic quantum function;
receiver encoding module, second participating user randomly selecting S2N quanta, encoding the quanta according to the value of the secret information, if miPerforming a measurement operation if m is 0iPerforming a reflection operation as 1; second participating user pair S2The remaining n quanta in (a), performing a reflection sum randomlyMeasuring operation;
the receiver sending module is used for disordering the original sequence of the quantum by the second participating user and sending the disordered quantum sequence back to the first participating user;
the interception detection module is used for the first participating user to announce that all the quanta are received, and the second participating user to publish the original sequence of the particles in the quantum sequence, the position of the intercepted particles and corresponding operations; after the first participating user restores the sequence of the quantum sequence, performing Bell joint measurement on the received particles and the particles at the corresponding positions in the hand, and detecting an eavesdropper according to the measurement result;
and after the first participating user determines that no eavesdropper exists, the secret information extraction module restores the secret information sent by the second participating user according to the measurement result of the non-eavesdropping particles and the initial state of the particles by bit, and finally obtains all the secret information sent by the second participating user.
Another object of the present invention is to provide a quantum information processing device equipped with a half-quantum secure direct communication system.
In summary, the advantages and positive effects of the invention are：
The invention is realized by adopting a semi-quantum technology, and after the problem is solved, the absolute safety of secret information distribution is ensured, and the hardware cost of a user is reduced; the two participants of the protocol only need one participant to have strong quantum function, and can complete the distribution of secret information without complex quantum operation, which is very easy to realize for common terminal users, and the application of the quantum secure direct communication protocol is promoted, and the innovation of the protocol is mainly embodied in the following aspects:
the invention provides a new half-quantum secure direct communication protocol; the protocol is realized by adopting a half-quantum technology, so that the hardware cost of a user is reduced; a first participating user and a second participating user of both parties participating in protocol execution, wherein the first participating user needs to have the functions of preparing a Bell state, measuring the Bell state and temporarily storing a quantum state; the second participating user only needs to have basic quantum functions; reflecting the received quanta; measuring photons by using a measuring base { |0>, |1> }, generating a quantum |1> (|0>) in an opposite state according to a measuring result |0> (|1>), and sending out the quantum |1> (|0 >); carrying out disorder processing on the transmitted quanta by using a delay technology; the two parties participating in the protocol operation can realize the direct transfer of the secret between the users only by one party having the strong quantum function;
the half-quantum secure direct communication protocol designed by the invention can resist measurement-replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack and Trojan horse attack, and through protocol analysis, the detected probability is proved to be increased along with the increase of the information quantity obtained by an attacker, and when the information quantity obtained by the attacker is 1, the probability of undetected information is 1/2; thus, when a large amount of information is transferred, an attacker cannot obtain the complete information transferred between the first participating user and the second participating user;
the quantum communication efficiency of the half-quantum secure direct communication protocol designed by the invention can reach 50 percent, which is higher than 25 percent of Zou and the like and 33.3 percent of Zhang and the like;
and (3) safety analysis:
measurement-replay attack: in the protocol execution process, the second participating user randomly selects n particles from the 2n particles for eavesdropping detection; since the attacker cannot know the position of the detection particle, the detection particle is found with a certain probability as long as the attacker performs measurement-replay on the detection particle; assume that the initial Bell state for the first participating user to prepare is | φ+>The first participating user will be | φ+The second particle in > is sent to the second participating user, if the attacker intercepts the particle, and uses the basis { |0>,|1>Measuring the particle in an initial state | φ+Will collapse to State |00>Or |11>(ii) a Preparing a new particle by an attacker according to the measurement result and sending the new particle to a second participating user; according to the protocol, the second participating user performs a measurement or reflection operation on the detected photons; if the second participating user performs the measurement, the behavior of the attacker cannot be found, and if the second participating user performs the reflection, the first participating user performs the Bell combined measurement to obtain the result of | φ when detecting the attack+Is greater than or | phi->. The probability is given to bit 1/2 where-Is greater than is wrongThe first participating user can discover the attacker according to the wrong measurement result; thus, the probability of not being detected for a photon attacker is
For n photons, the probability that an attacker is detected is
The probability of attacker detection approaches 1 as the value of n increases;
man-in-the-middle attack: if an attacker intercepts the photons sent by the first participating user to the second participating user, a new Bell state | φ is preparede>, | phie>One particle is sent to a second participating user, the second participating user can execute operation on the particle and returns the operation to the first participating user, at the moment, an attacker intercepts the particle again, and the attacker can distinguish the operation of the second participating user through the path; however, since the second participating user breaks up the order of sending the particles, the attacker does not know the real order of the particles, and cannot recover the operation performed by the second participating user through the intercepted particles; therefore, the protocol can resist man-in-the-middle attacks;
trojan horse attack: a photon beam splitter and a wavelength filter device are added to the protocol for the second participating user, so that the Trojan horse attack (Trojan horse attack) can be resisted;
detection probability of information stealing by an attacker: assuming that there is an eavesdropper Eve trying to obtain the secret information sent by the second participating user, he can only analyze the S sent by the first participating user during the protocol execution2Obtaining secret information by sequence; suppose Eve is at S2On is performing an attack operation
Since Eve does not tell which particles are the detection particles, it will perform the same attack operation on all particles
All particles are at |0>Or |1>State, i.e. the current particle is at |0>Or |1>The probabilities of states are all p0＝p10.5 Eve is on pair |0>Or |1>Particle execution attack operation
After that, corresponding |0>Or |1>The particles become:
due to the operation
Uniquely determined, and | a2+|b|2＝1，|c|2+|d|2＝1，|a|2＝|d|2＝F，|b|2＝|c|2D; assume that the Bell state prepared by the first participating user is | φ+>After Eve attack, Bell states transition to:
the second participating user randomly selects a measurement or reflection operation; if the second participating user selects a measurement operation,
will collapse to (a |0, ε) with a probability of 1/200＞+c|1,ε10＞)AE|0＞BOr (b |0, ε)01＞+d|1,ε11＞)AE|1＞BThen the second participating user prepares a reverse from the measurement resultsThe quantum of the state is sent to a first participating user; if the second participating user selects a reflection operation,
it is apparent that when the first participating user performs a Bell measurement on the detected photon, Eve is not detected with a probability of
The lowest detection rate is
Due to p0＝p1The amount of information that Eve can obtain is I-Flog, therefore 0.52F+(1-F)log2(1-F), i.e. I ═ - (1-d) log2(1-d)+dlog2d；
From the above analysis, if Eve wants to obtain the maximum information amount (I ═ 1), the probability of detection is 50%, and when the length of the detected photon is n, Eve is detected with the probability of detection being n
As n increases, the probability of Eve being detected is close to 1.
And (3) communication efficiency analysis: the efficiency of communication performed by the quantum protocol can be calculated
Obtaining, wherein c is the bit number of the finally obtained secret information, q is the quantum number transmitted in the protocol execution process, and b is the classical information bit number transmitted in the protocol execution process; since the protocol does not use classical information when secret information is transferred, b is 0; in order to obtain n secret information in a protocol, 2n quantum information is required, from which it is possible to obtain
The quantum communication efficiency is higher than that of the similar protocol on the basis of ensuring the execution safety of the protocol because the quantum communication efficiency is higher than that of the similar protocol because the quantum communication efficiency is higher than that of Zou and the like and is higher than that of Zhang and the like.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a semi-quantum secure direct communication method provided by an embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 2 is a comparison of quantum communication volume of a semi-quantum secure direct communication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention and a similar method;
FIG. 3 is a probability map of corresponding detections after Eve obtains information provided by embodiments of the present invention;
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more clearly apparent, the present invention is further described in detail with reference to the following embodiments; it should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention;
in the prior art, the hardware cost requirement on users is high: the existing half-quantum secure direct communication protocol needs all users to be equipped with advanced quantum equipment, such as a quantum generator, a quantum memory, a unitary operator and the like; but as a common user, the expensive quantum equipment cannot be borne, so that the application of a quantum secure direct communication protocol is limited, and the popularization of a quantum communication network is further limited; in addition, the prior art is not considered enough in the aspects of safety and efficiency, information leakage risks exist, and quantum communication efficiency is not high;
the half-quantum secure direct communication method provided by the embodiment of the invention comprises the following steps:
the protocol execution process comprises a first participating user and a second participating user of two participants; the first participating user has strong quantum functions, while the second participating user is a classical node, and can only perform the following operation (1) measurement: measuring quanta by using classical bases { |0>, |1> }, and preparing a photon with an opposite state according to a measurement result; (2) reflection: resending the received quanta; (3) the sending sequence of the quanta is disturbed by using a delay technology;
in the protocol execution process, a first participating user is responsible for preparing 2n Bell state quantum sequences, extracting a particle composition particle sequence in each Bell state and sending the particle composition particle sequence to a second participating user; second oneAfter receiving the quantum, the participating user randomly selects n particles as detection particles for detecting an external eavesdropper; the other n particles are used for loading secret information; the second participating user carries out random operation on the detection particles and utilizes the residual particles to encode secret information; the second participating user sends the generated particle sequence to the first participating user after disorder processing; after receiving the information, the first participating user detects whether an eavesdropper exists by using the detection particles, and finally obtains the secret information sent by the second participating user through the measurement and analysis of the quantum if the eavesdropper is not found; wherein the four Bell states are respectively
And
the specific scheme is described as follows:
step one, a first participating user prepares 2n Bell states, wherein n is the length of secret information; extracting the first and second particles in each Bell state, and arranging the first particles in the Bell state in sequence to form a quantum sequence S1All second particles of Bell state form a quantum sequence S2(ii) a First participating user saves S1Will S2To a second participating user, S1And S2Are all 2 n;
step two, in order to resist Trojan horse attack (Trojanhorse attack), adding a photon beam splitter and a wavelength filter device for a second participating user;
step three, when the second participating user receives the quantum sequence S2Then, the second participating user randomly selects half of the n particles as detection photons; subsequently, the second participating user performs measurement and reflection operations on the detected photons randomly; for the other half of the n particles, the second participant user is given the secret information m ═ m1,m2,……,mnSelect the corresponding operation, if miPerforming a measurement operation if m is 0iPerforming a reflection operation as 1; the second participating user uses the delay technology to disorder the transmission sequence of the particles to form a new quantum sequence S'2No other than the second participating user can pass through the quantum sequence S'2Reduction of S2Therefore, the safety of the protocol is ensured;
step four, the first participating user receives S'2Then, the information that all the particles are successfully received is published outwards; subsequently, the second participating user publishes S'2The original order of each particle, the position of the detected photon, and the operation performed by the particle on the detected photon;
the first participating user rearranges the particle sequence, then performs Bell combined measurement operation on the received particles and the particles at the corresponding positions in the hands of the first participating user, and according to the measurement result, the first participating user can restore the corresponding operation of the second participating user on the particles; suppose that in the quantum sequence, the initial state of a certain particle state sent by the first participating user is | phi+>If the second participating user performs the measurement operation, the result obtained after the first participating user performs the joint measurement should be | ψ+>Or | ψ->If the second participating user performs a reflection operation, the result obtained after the first participating user performs the joint measurement should be | φ+>(ii) a The first participating user can find the attacker by comparing the measurement result of the detected photon with the corresponding operation published by the second participating user, if the corresponding error rate exceeds a reasonable range, the protocol is terminated, otherwise, the protocol continues to execute the next step;
step five, the first participating user restores the secret information sent by the second participating user according to the measurement result of the non-detection photons, for example, the initial state prepared by the first participating user is | phi+>The result of the measurement is | ψ+>Or | ψ->, then m i0, the measurement result is | φ+>, then mi＝1；
In summary, the main working process of the scheme is that a first participating user with a stronger quantum function prepares 2n Bell states, extracts one particle from the Bell states to form a particle sequence, and sends the particle sequence to a second participating user; after receiving the quantum, a second participating user with a basic quantum function randomly selects n particles as detection particles for detecting an external eavesdropper; the other n particles are used for loading secret information; the second participating user carries out random operation on the detection particles and utilizes the residual particles to encode secret information; the second participating user sends the generated particle sequence to the first participating user after disorder processing; after receiving the information, the first participating user detects whether an eavesdropper exists by using the detection particles, and if the eavesdropper does not exist, the first participating user extracts secret information according to Bell joint measurement results and the initial state of the quantum;
another object of the present invention is to provide a half-quantum-based secure direct communication system, including:
the quantum preparation module is used for preparing 2n Bell states by a first participating user with a strong quantum function; extracting all the first particles and the second particles in the Bell state, and arranging the first particles and the second particles in sequence to respectively form a quantum sequence S1And S2Will S2Sending the information to a second participating user only having a basic quantum function;
receiver encoding module, second participating user randomly selecting S2N quanta, encoding the quanta according to the value of the secret information, if miPerforming a measurement operation if m is 0iPerforming a reflection operation as 1; second participating user pair S2The remaining n quanta in the process, and randomly performing reflection and measurement operations;
the receiver sending module is used for disordering the original sequence of the quantum by the second participating user and sending the disordered quantum sequence back to the first participating user;
the interception detection module is used for the first participating user to announce that all the quanta are received, and the second participating user to publish the original sequence of the particles in the quantum sequence, the position of the intercepted particles and corresponding operations; after the first participating user restores the sequence of the quantum sequence, performing Bell joint measurement on the received particles and the particles at the corresponding positions in the hand, and detecting an eavesdropper according to the measurement result;
the secret information extraction module is used for bit-wise reducing the secret information sent by the second participating user according to the measurement result of the non-eavesdropping particles and the initial state of the particles after the first participating user determines that no eavesdropper exists, and finally obtaining all the secret information sent by the second participating user;
the invention will be further described with reference to specific examples;
example 1
Referring to fig. 1, the present embodiment includes a first participating user with a strong quantum function and a second participating user with only a basic quantum function, where the second participating user needs to transmit secret information to the first participating user;
the method comprises the steps that a first participating user Alice prepares 2n Bell states, extracts a particle in each Bell state to form a particle sequence and sends the particle sequence to a second participating user Bob; after receiving the quantum, a second participating user Bob with a basic quantum function randomly selects n particles as detection particles for detecting an external eavesdropper; the other n particles are used for loading secret information; the second participating user carries out random operation on the detection particles and utilizes the residual particles to encode secret information; the second participating user sends the generated particle sequence to the first participating user after disorder processing; after receiving the particle sequence, the first participating user detects whether an eavesdropper exists by using detection particles, and if the eavesdropper does not exist, the first participating user extracts secret information according to Bell joint measurement results and the initial state of the quantum;
example 2
Referring to fig. 2, the method of use of embodiment 1, the protocol implements quantum traffic required for secret information transfer and compares it with related work;
example 3
See fig. 3, the use of embodiment 1, if the attacker wants to obtain complete information, the probability of detecting it is 50%;
the invention needs to be executed in the quantum communication network environment, so that the computers needing to participate have the quantum function, and the quantum network is needed during transmission;
in the above embodiments, it may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof; when used in whole or in part, the computer program product comprises one or more computer instructions; when loaded or executed on a computer, cause the processes or functions according to embodiments of the invention to occur, in whole or in part; the computer needs to be configured with a quantum device; the computer instructions may be stored in a computer readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer readable storage medium to another, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via a quantum communication network in combination with wire (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.);
the above description is only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not to be construed as limiting the invention, and any modifications, equivalents and improvements made within the spirit and principle of the present invention are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. A half-quantum secure direct communication method is characterized in that the half-quantum secure direct communication method comprises the following steps:
the first participating user is responsible for preparing 2n Bell state quantum sequences, extracting a particle composition particle sequence in each Bell state and sending the particle composition particle sequence to the second participating user;
after receiving the quantum, the second participating user randomly selects n particles as detection particles for detecting an external eavesdropper; the other n particles are used for loading secret information; the second participating user carries out random operation on the detection particles and utilizes the residual particles to encode secret information;
the second participating user sends the generated particle sequence to the first participating user after disorder processing; after receiving the information, the first participating user detects whether an eavesdropper exists by using the detection particles, and finally obtains the secret information sent by the second participating user through the measurement and analysis of the quantum if the eavesdropper is not found;
wherein the four Bell states are respectively
And
2. the semi-quantum secure direct communication method of claim 1, wherein the semi-quantum secure direct communication method comprises:
step one, a first participating user prepares 2n Bell states, wherein n is the length of secret information; extracting the first and second particles in each Bell state, and arranging the first particles in the Bell state in sequence to form a quantum sequence S1All second particles of Bell state form a quantum sequence S2(ii) a First participating user saves S1Will S2To a second participating user, S1And S2Are all 2 n;
secondly, in the defense of Trojan horse attack (Trojan horse attack), a photon beam splitter and a wavelength filter device are added for a second participating user;
step three, when the second participating user receives the quantum sequence S2Then, the second participating user randomly selects half of the n particles as detection photons; subsequently, the second participating user performs measurement and reflection operations on the detected photons randomly; for the other half of the n particles, the second participant user is given the secret information m ═ m1,m2,……,mnSelect the corresponding operation, if miPerforming a measurement operation if m is 0iPerforming a reflection operation as 1; the second participating user uses the delay technology to disorder the transmission sequence of the particles to form a new quantum sequence S'2In addition to the second participationOther than the house, the other person cannot pass through the quantum sequence S'2Reduction of S2The safety of the protocol is ensured;
step four, the first participating user receives S'2Then, the information that all the particles are successfully received is published outwards; subsequently, the second participating user publishes S'2The original sequence of each particle, the position of the detected photon and the operation of the second participating user on the detected photon;
the first participating user rearranges the particle sequence, then performs Bell combined measurement operation on the received particles and the particles at the corresponding positions in the hands of the first participating user, and according to the measurement result, the first participating user can restore the corresponding operation of the second participating user on the particles; suppose that in the quantum sequence, the initial state of a certain particle state sent by the first participating user is | phi+>If the second participating user performs the measurement operation, the result obtained after the first participating user performs the joint measurement should be | ψ+>Or | ψ->If the second participating user performs a reflection operation, the result obtained after the first participating user performs the joint measurement should be | φ+>(ii) a The first participating user can find the attacker by comparing the measurement result of the detected photon with the corresponding operation published by the second participating user, if the corresponding error rate exceeds a reasonable range, the protocol is terminated, otherwise, the protocol continues to execute the next step;
step five, the first participating user restores the secret information sent by the second participating user according to the measurement result of the non-detection photons, for example, the initial state prepared by the first participating user is | phi+>The result of the measurement is | ψ+>Or | ψ->Then m isi0, the measurement result is | φ+>Then m isi＝1。
3. A computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the semi-quantum secure direct communication method of any one of claims 1-2.
4. A semi-quantum secure direct communication system based on a semi-quantum secure direct communication method according to claim 1, wherein the semi-quantum secure direct communication system comprises:
the quantum preparation module is used for preparing 2n Bell states by a first participating user with a strong quantum function; extracting all the first particles and the second particles in the Bell state, and respectively forming quantum sequences S by arranging the first particles and the second particles in sequence1And S2Will S2Sending the information to a second participating user only having a basic quantum function;
receiver encoding module, second participating user randomly selecting S2N quanta, encoding the quanta according to the value of the secret information, if miPerforming a measurement operation if m is 0iPerforming a reflection operation as 1; second participating user pair S2The remaining n quanta in the process, and randomly performing reflection and measurement operations;
the receiver sending module is used for disordering the original sequence of the quantum by the second participating user and sending the disordered quantum sequence back to the first participating user;
the interception detection module is used for the first participating user to announce that all the quanta are received, and the second participating user to publish the original sequence of the particles in the quantum sequence, the position of the intercepted particles and corresponding operations; after the first participating user restores the sequence of the quantum sequence, performing Bell joint measurement on the received particles and the particles at the corresponding positions in the hand, and detecting an eavesdropper according to the measurement result;
and after the first participating user determines that no eavesdropper exists, the secret information extraction module restores the secret information sent by the second participating user according to the measurement result of the non-eavesdropping particles and the initial state of the particles by bit, and finally obtains all the secret information sent by the second participating user.
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| CN109525327B (en) * | 2018-12-11 | 2021-07-06 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司南京供电分公司 | Free space quantum secure direct communication method with preset threshold selected in real time |
| CN109714158B (en) * | 2018-12-21 | 2020-09-22 | 成都信息工程大学 | Bell state-based semi-quantum privacy comparison method and system |
| CN109995528B (en) * | 2019-04-25 | 2021-02-02 | 成都信息工程大学 | Semi-quantum secure direct communication method and storage medium |
| CN110098930B (en) * | 2019-05-27 | 2020-04-07 | 成都信息工程大学 | Bell state-based two-party quantum key negotiation method and system |
| CN110493000B (en) * | 2019-09-02 | 2021-11-16 | 福建师范大学 | Multi-party quantum secret comparison method and system based on single particles |
| CN110505060B (en) * | 2019-09-02 | 2021-07-02 | 苏州大学 | Non-maximum entangled two-level bell state quantum conversation method |
| CN110460389B (en) * | 2019-09-02 | 2020-10-30 | 福建师范大学 | Cluster state-based multiparty controlled bidirectional quantum secure direct communication method and system |
| CN110730069B (en) * | 2019-09-27 | 2022-04-15 | 浙江工商大学 | Bell entanglement state-based semi-quantum conversation method |
| CN113259102B (en) * | 2021-06-15 | 2021-10-08 | 成都信息工程大学 | Efficient key negotiation method and system based on Fourier transform |
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