CN108683500A - A kind of WBAN method for secret protection based on the characteristic of channel - Google Patents
A kind of WBAN method for secret protection based on the characteristic of channel Download PDFInfo
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- CN108683500A CN108683500A CN201810061659.6A CN201810061659A CN108683500A CN 108683500 A CN108683500 A CN 108683500A CN 201810061659 A CN201810061659 A CN 201810061659A CN 108683500 A CN108683500 A CN 108683500A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0875—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords based on channel impulse response [CIR]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
- H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/068—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
A kind of WBAN method for secret protection based on characteristics of radio channels is claimed in the present invention, is related to wireless body area network field.Wireless body area network provides collection for medical centre and sends the service of user's physiological data, meets real time monitoring of the remote medical center to user's physiological data.However, the privacy of physiological data and the height visit property of body area network telecommunication media, which easily lead to malicious node, starts eavesdropping or Tampering attack, privacy of user data or injection wrong data are obtained.The present invention is directed to the problem of privacy of user safety, it is proposed a kind of body area network certification with cipher key-extraction and Encryption Algorithm, entity authentication is executed using the body area network characteristic of channel, simultaneously, rapid extraction key pair sends information encryption, can effectively prevent malicious node disguise oneself as legitimate node start eavesdropping and Tampering attack, effectively prevent user private data be tampered with and eavesdrop attack.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the method for secret protection in field of communication technology more particularly to wireless body area network.
Background technology
Wireless body area network (Wireless Body Area Network, WBAN) is medical related application by wireless medium
Data transport service is provided, is the core component of a variety of tele-medicine monitoring applications.Since wireless medium has height can
There is certain challenge in the communication security of visit property, WBAN, meanwhile, the personal sign data transmitted in WBAN has stronger hidden
During private, practical application deployment and progress physiological data remote detecting, the problem of security privacy leaks, example will necessarily be faced
Such as eavesdrop attack and Tampering attack.Therefore, the problem of WBAN privacy compromises, is urgently to be resolved hurrily.
The method for solving WBAN privacy compromises mainly uses entity authentication and information to encrypt two class technologies.Wherein, node is recognized
Card is mutual judgement of the coordinator that communicates with of sensor node for identity legitimacy, and conventional node certification is total using key
Enjoy authentication mechanism, with key exchange type centrificate node identities, however malicious attacker by eavesdrop key exchange process, with
The useful information got steals key, causes privacy compromise;The encrypted conventional method of information is with third party's release mechanism key
Centered on, key is distributed by the channel of safety, utilizes the cipher key encryption information of distribution.The distribution procedure relies on third party's machine
Structure, and distribution procedure is complicated, is not suitable for resource-constrained body area network.
Currently, for body area network method for secret protection being made that correlative study both at home and abroad, wherein a kind of body area network is mutually recognized each other
The security mechanism of card is mutually authenticated using public key realization legitimate node and to the encrypted method of transmission data, in computing capability and energy
In the limited wireless body area network of amount, this method generates larger computing cost and energy expense, is not suitable for resource-constrained body
Domain net.A kind of security system algorithm of body area network is legal using node ID and the cryptographic Hash mode certification under random number collective effect
Node, and to data encryption and decryption in the way of shared symmetric key.
With the appearance of the development of computing technique, especially quantum computer, attacker's computing capability significantly improves, seriously
The foundation for security method for threatening this kind of key shared.And these methods must establish key by network infrastructure, exist
Complicated key distribution procedure.In order to solve the process that the above key is established, it need to study and independently establish key in wireless body area network
Information encryption mechanism improve applicability and reliability.It is proposed in existing method not against third-party Key Management Center,
Key is directly established by equipment autonomously, is encrypted using the cipher key pair information independently established.A kind of living things feature recognition body area network is hidden
Private protection algorism utilizes the biological physiology feature such as electrocardiosignal that sensor node is collected, and is established as entity authentication and key
Foundation, however these physiological characteristic datas are influenced to morph by environment such as noises, can not ensure consistency.Channel measurement is given birth to
HRUBE and ARUBE are proposed in bit extraction algorithm at higher bit high robust in shared key algorithm and wireless sensor
Method, this method realize RSS measured values using the methods of more interval quantizations, KLT transformation, rank sequences and Gray code error correction
Key is autonomously generated.
It can be divided into single-bit and multi bit quantization two ways when these method quantization bits.Using single-bit quantification mode
The inconsistent rate generated is low, but key production rate is low.However, key production rate can be improved using multi bit quantization mode, but
The inconsistent rate of bit is higher.Above-mentioned technology is difficult to meet simultaneously asking for the inconsistent rate of low bit and two aspects of high key production rate
Topic.
Invention content
The technical problems to be solved by the invention:In actual application, there are malicious attackers to appear randomly in pendant
Around wearer or Key Management Center, it is intended to pretend legitimate node and start further to attack or the key of eavesdropping Key Management Center
Distribution procedure, to obtain the crucial key of legitimate node, attacker can forge physical address, eavesdrop wireless channel, reset or
Inject false data etc., compared with legal sensor its physical location apart from wearer farther out, be normally at one meter to tens meters.
In view of the above-mentioned problems, for WBAN entity authentications and the encrypted applicability of information and reliability is effectively ensured, while meeting low bit
Inconsistent rate and high key production rate propose a kind of WBAN method for secret protection of characteristics of radio channels perception.
The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the technical problems:By the related coefficient of the characteristic of channel make coordinator with
Legal sensor node realization is mutually authenticated, and malicious attacker is unsatisfactory for its similitude and can not pass through certification.And the technology is not
Key is distributed by the cipher key pre-distribution technology of heterogeneous wireless network using network infrastructure, only passes through the nothing between WBAN nodes
The line characteristic of channel, that is, RSS is extracted key to realize entity authentication and information encryption, due to RSS transient changes in wireless channel, is carried
It is dynamic key to take key, and the information of different moments is encrypted with different keys, and transmission key changes, and improves safety.And
And inconsistent removal is used, multidimensional quantization and key uniform technical ensure the inconsistent rate of low bit and high key production rate.Have
Low overhead, high flexibility, and network infrastructure is not used, the communication of physical layer attributes discretionary security is only relied on, is saved by WBAN
Radio channel characteristic between point realizes entity authentication and information encryption.
The channel characteristics of communicating pair within a wireless communication network can be used as random signal source, with space-time uniqueness,
Randomness and reciprocity.In WBAN node communication routines, there are body masking, reflection, diffraction and suctions in transmission process for signal
The case where receipts, causes to decline.It is defined in t time slots, the channel between sensor S that coordinator C is obtained as receiving terminal (S,
C RSS observations) are:Wherein, Ys,c(t) it is true channel gain in t time slots,
It is observation noise gain.
The present invention is directed to using in WBAN wireless channels RSS certifications legitimate node and establish key between sensor node,
The sensor worn to itself first with the RSS features of Proximity Sensor node is authenticated;Secondly WBAN nodes are utilized
The randomness of RSS extracts key pair, and final realize prevents attacker from starting to distort and eavesdrop the purpose of attack.The invention is not related to
Third party distributes cipher key technique, and no complicated setting can realize fast Node certification without additional hardware or other changes.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 RSS quantizer samples.
Fig. 2 Fuzzy extractor structures.
Specific implementation mode
Specific description is done to the implementation of the present invention below in conjunction with the drawings and specific embodiments.
When body area network sensor is communicated with coordinator, node obtains RSS values in the same time by sending detection packet, with
RSS values reflect its channel quality.The propagation ducts environment of human peripheral is complicated, radio propagation by multipath, block etc. because
The influence of element, channel quality changes with the change of environment and the movement of body, in different body parts, different positions
It will be affected, and there is bigger difference in the position of attacker with legitimate node, therefore be affected by factors such as multipaths, and
The waveform that the influence of many factors makes its channel quality be measured to the channel quality between legitimate node is uncorrelated, and attacker can not
Predict legitimate node RSS values.
RSS values are obtained for transmission detection packet between legitimate node, although sensor wearing position differs, position phase
Closely, similar to the communication channel quality of coordinator, thus the characteristic of channel is similar.Therefore, it is legal with similarity to carry out certification by the present invention
Node has certain reasonability.Detailed process is as follows:
Coordinator sends detection packet in the form of broadcasting, to each sensor, in transmission detection packet, establishes a time
The RSS values of sequence.Assuming that coordinator and sensor node s1RSS values be Ys1, coordinator and sensor node s2Value be Ys2,
In order to describe the similarity degree of two RSS, coefficient c is selected, cY is mades2It goes to approach Ys1, utilize mean square errorTo indicate
Similarity is expressed as
Coordinator and sensor s1, s2The situation of similarity minimum is sought, after obtaining similarity with the situation by RSS values
To judge the similarity situation of two kinds of waveforms.It is known to work asWhen,Most
It is small.At this timeAnd obtain phase
Relationship numberForIfAt this timeYs1And Ys2
It is identical;IfLevel off to 0, at this timeMaximum, Ys1And Ys2It is orthogonal.
Coordinator executes the RSS values that the algorithm obtains its corresponding all the sensors, is influenced by the factors of human body, body
The propagation channel complexity of body sensor it is difficult to predict.For legal body sensor, distance is closer, and channel fading is opposite
Stablize;For malicious attacker, farther out, channel fading is complicated, unstable for distance.Therefore malicious attacker propagation channel
RSS values without similitude,It is maximum.At this point, coordinator obtains similarity with arbitrary two kinds combinations, if
Node c1Related coefficient with other combination of nodes is not 0, then the node is by certification, and otherwise, which can not be by recognizing
Card.
After coordinator is mutually authenticated with legal sensor node, the communication information is sent, which is passed with symmetric key encryption
It send, which establishes process and need to be perfectly safe, and the present invention proposes that a kind of key based on channel quality establishes algorithm.The algorithm
Each sensor node is set to extract effective key, no key distribution procedure, attacker can not obtain key by eavesdropping.
Quantify RSS measurements as a pair of of transmitting-receiving node to extract effective key, coordinator node and general sensor nodes
Value, to obtain random sequence, the shared key as coordinator and sensor.Due to the half duplex mode of communication of sensor, RSS
There was only coverlet orientation measurement in the same time, therefore the key that two nodes mutually extract is deviated.But bidirectional measurement is fast
Rate is more much smaller than channel variation rate, and there are similar RSS measured values by both sides.Once bit is extracted in sending and receiving end from measured value
Stream, it is necessary to correct the inconsistent bit of dibit stream.
In existing key extraction method, the inconsistent rate of low bit and high key production rate can not ensure simultaneously.If reducing ratio
Special inconsistent rate will cause key production rate to decline;The inconsistent rate of bit will be caused to increase if increasing key production rate.It is proposed one
The efficient key extracting method that kind is quantified based on multidimensional improves key production rate in the case where not increasing quantized interval, simultaneously
The inconsistent rate of bit will not increase.Detailed process is as follows:
First, inconsistent removal.In quantizing process, to eliminate inconsistency, RSS characteristics caused by analyzing.Conventional amounts
Change using average value as boundary, is quantified as 1 (or 0) higher than average value, subaverage is quantified as 0 (or 1).However, its average value is attached
The value fluctuation closely changed is small, and being directly quantized causes quantized result inconsistency to increase.Therefore the upper bound and lower bound are chosen, is given up flat
Amplitude is set as virtual value by the value that mean value nearby changes higher than q+ or less than q-, according to such as q+=average values+α × error and
Q+=average values+α × error.Wherein 0 < α < 1, defined function L (x) are as the removal algorithmic function, the function
As shown in Figure 1, the RSS values more than q+ are labeled as 1, it is less than q- and is labeled as 0.Value among q+ and q- is lost
It abandons, to eliminate otherness.
Secondly, n dimensions quantization.Existing method lower quantization interval leads to the inconsistent rate of bit to improve key production rate
Increase.This problem is not solved, proposes, based on the efficient bit extraction method of n dimension quantizations, to efficiently use channel information, do not increasing
Under the premise of the inconsistent rate of bit, key production rate is improved.
Assuming that it is Y={ y that the input RSS values of n dimension quantizations are worth after inconsistent removal1,y2,...,yd},yi∈ Z, establish n
Dimensional vector isWherein, Δ={ Δ1,Δ2,...,Δn-1Indicate the sampling interval,
That is ΔjIndicate jth and+1 slot time of jth.D indicates input RSS value numbers.One is inputted, output n dimension quantized values can table
It is shown asWherein, R (x) indicates corresponding quantization function.
N ties up quantizer using RSS measured values as input, with yiFor standard, quantify next spacing value, until corresponding n-th,
Output bit flow.And function generation value is arranged.Therefore, the input value y of quantizeri, corresponding to export the output that length is n
Value, bit production rate are 1:n.Illustrate that n ties up quantizing process so that two dimension quantifies as an example.With yiFor input, quantizer searches for second
ComponentThe two-dimentional quantized value of outputQuantizer formula is shown below
Finally, key is unified.The key unified approach that fuzzy extraction is introduced after quantization, is corrected using obscuring with scattering nature
Error chooses suitable Hamming distance to map to the same random sequence.This method not only makes the bit stream conversion of a low entropy
For more random bit stream, two similar random bits can also be allowed to be mapped as the same bit stream.This method grade solves
Low randomness solves inconsistency again.The Fuzzy extractor is as shown in Figure 2.
(M, l, a t) Fuzzy extractor is defined, is made of two steps, Gen processes and Rep processes generate and lived again
Journey.Wherein M is a string of list entries, and l is the length of key R, and t indicates to generate when the Hamming distance of two sequences is no more than t
The same random sequence.
In generating process, Gen inputs Y ∈ M, exports public information p, which is that coordinator and sensor are total
Enjoy information, the second step process of aid sensors.That is Gen (Y) → (R, P).
During living again, Rep inputs Y' ∈ M and p, if Hamming distance dis (Y, Y')≤t, then Rep (Y', p) → R.
In the present invention, the similar bit stream Y that coordinator generates after inconsistent removal quantization, it is imported as input
In Gen, the public information p and key R with stronger randomness is generated.Then p is sent to sensor, sensor by coordinator
The public information and Y ' bits are inputted in Rep jointly, generate identical key R.Information is encrypted using key R full
The high key production rate of foot and the inconsistent rate of low bit.
The present invention propose a kind of lightweight rely only on WBAN channel characteristics measured values RSS carry out autonomous node certification and
The method that key is established.Sensor sends detection information before transmission data first, and coordinator obtains each sensor RSS, meter
Calculate the legitimacy that its related coefficient judges each node;Secondly sensor and coordinator quantify RSS successively, and pass through inconsistent shifting
It removes, the quantization of n dimensions and key Unified Algorithm obtain final key;Last sensor is encrypted using the cipher key pair information, coordinator
Information is received using the key pair to decrypt.
Claims (6)
1. a kind of WBAN method for secret protection based on characteristics of radio channels, which is characterized in that coordinator obtains itself and sensor
Between RSS to obtain its related coefficient between sensor, certification legitimate node completes entity authentication, sensor and coordinator section
Point obtains key by characteristics of radio channels, that is, RSS between quantifying node, and sensor is encrypted using cipher key pair information, coordinator profit
It is decrypted with the cipher key pair information.
2. coordinator certification legitimate node according to claim 1 completes entity authentication algorithm, which is characterized in that coordinator
Obtain its corresponding all the sensors RSS measured valueRelated coefficient is obtained with arbitrary two kinds combinationsIf node c1
Related coefficient with other combination of nodes is not 0, then the node is by certification, and otherwise, which can not pass through certification.
3. sensor and coordinator node are obtained by characteristics of radio channels, that is, RSS between quantifying node according to claim 1
Take encryption key method, which is characterized in that coordinator node and general sensor nodes quantify RSS as a pair of of transmitting-receiving node and measure
Value, to eliminate inconsistency, is first affected to key inconsistency by inconsistent removal removal with obtaining random sequence
Bit efficiently use channel information using n dimension quantizations under the premise of not increasing bit inconsistent rate, improve key life
At rate, key unification is carried out finally by the key unified approach for obscuring extraction is introduced, the result of acquisition is as coordinator and biography
The shared key of sensor.
4. n according to claim 3 ties up quantization method, which is characterized in that choose the upper bound and lower bound, give up near average value
Amplitude is set as virtual value higher than q+ or less than q-, is averaged according to such as q+=average values+α × error and q+=by the value of variation
Value+α × error.
5. n according to claim 3 ties up quantization method, which is characterized in that using RSS measured values as input, with yiFor mark
Standard quantifies next spacing value, is divided into Δ, until corresponding n-th, output bit flow, therefore, the input value y of quantizeri, right
The output valve that length is n should be exported, bit production rate is 1:n.
6. fuzzy extraction method according to claim 3, which is characterized in that coordinator is used as by the bit stream of n dimension quantizations
Gen is inputted, and error correction sequence P is generated by BCH (23,12) error correcting code, and is carried out SHA-1 functions to Y and generated strong close of randomness
Key, input and the output length ratio of function are 1:1.Then error correcting code P is sent to sensor node, sensor node by coordinator
The key Y' error correction quantified to it according to error correcting code P, reverts to Y.Strong close of identical randomness is equally generated with SHA-1 Hash
Key.The true form length that emulation should choose BCH (23,12) in the process is 12, error correction code length 11, minimum distance 7, Ke Yijiu
Lookup error bit is 3.Therefore the key that context of methods generates has the inconsistent rate of low-down key.
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