CN108449344B - Location privacy protection method for preventing speed association attack under continuous location service - Google Patents

Location privacy protection method for preventing speed association attack under continuous location service Download PDF

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CN108449344B
CN108449344B CN201810238561.3A CN201810238561A CN108449344B CN 108449344 B CN108449344 B CN 108449344B CN 201810238561 A CN201810238561 A CN 201810238561A CN 108449344 B CN108449344 B CN 108449344B
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anonymous
ttp
query
area
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CN108449344A (en
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黄海平
张大成
吴敏
胡素君
程琨
吕宽
张勤
胡振超
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Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/50—Network services
    • H04L67/52—Network services specially adapted for the location of the user terminal

Abstract

The invention relates to a location privacy protection method for preventing speed association attack under continuous location service, which comprises the following steps: step one, a step two of sending a query message to a TTP by a user, the TTP generates a rectangular anonymous domain according to received query information, and carries out an expansion and reconstruction step three, the LBS carries out position service query according to the received anonymous domain, and sends a queried result set back to a step four of the TTP, the TTP filters the received result set according to the specific position of the user, the filtered result is sent back to a step five of the user, the user receives the query result, and the query is finished. The invention provides a method for expanding and transforming an anonymous domain, so that the transformed anonymous domain can effectively prevent speed correlation attack.

Description

Location privacy protection method for preventing speed association attack under continuous location service
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of Location-based Services (LBS) and security privacy, and particularly relates to a Location privacy protection method for preventing speed association attack under continuous Location service.
Background
The rapid growth of new types of smart mobile devices has promoted the emergence and development of Location-Based Services (LBS) technology, where a user using the service obtains its real-time Location via a GPS device in a portable smart mobile device and uploads it to a service Provider (SP, LBS Provider), and with the help of the service Provider, the user can obtain a desired query result Based on the Location service, such as Location information of nearby nearest hot pot shops, a sports route map during jogging, and a navigation route during driving, but may face a risk of Location privacy theft when obtaining the Location service, and through analyzing stolen personal Location privacy data, an attacker is highly likely to infer the gender, hobbies, occupation, and health of the user, for example, by analyzing a Location track of a user in a week, finding that the user frequently visits the hospital, it is highly likely that a health problem arises with the user.
The location k-anonymity is the most mainstream location privacy protection method in the LBS application at present, and the main idea is as follows: the method has the advantages that the user position is generalized into an anonymous domain containing other k-1 user positions through a Trusted server (TTP) anonymous by a Third party and uploaded to the SP, so that the position privacy security of the LBS system is improved, however, the method does not consider that when an attacker learns the background information of the user and deduces the maximum moving speed of the user at the moment, the Part of anonymous area which cannot be reached by the user can be eliminated through speed correlation attack under continuous query, and the privacy protection effect is reduced.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the problems, the invention provides a location privacy protection method for preventing speed correlation attack under continuous location service, so that an attacker can steal the location privacy of a user through the speed correlation attack in the continuous query of location k-anonymity.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
the invention relates to a location privacy protection method for preventing speed correlation attack under continuous location service, which comprises the following steps:
step one, a user sends a query message to a TTP:
the user sends query information to the TTP, and the query information adopts a six-tuple form q = (id, loc, time, con, k, A)min) Where id is the user identifier, loc = (x, y) is usedThe current coordinates of the user, wherein x and y respectively represent longitude and latitude, time is the time when the query information is sent, con is the query content, k is the selected anonymity when the user uses a k-anonymity algorithm, and AminGenerating a minimum area of an anonymous region for k-anonymity accepted by the user;
step two, the TTP generates a rectangular anonymous domain according to the received query information, and carries out expansion and reconstruction on the rectangular anonymous domain:
the TTP generates a rectangular anonymous domain according to a k-anonymous algorithm, then judges whether the received query information is the query information which is sent by the user for the first time, if so, directly sends the anonymous domain to the LBS, and if not, expansion and transformation are carried out;
step three, LBS carries out position service inquiry according to the received anonymous domain, and sends the inquired result set back to TTP;
step four, the TTP filters the received result set according to the specific position of the user and sends the filtered result back to the user;
and step five, the user receives the query result and the query is finished.
The invention is further improved in that: in the second step, the expanding and reforming comprises the following steps:
step 1: firstly, the last anonymous domain A of the user is expanded by the length of v x delta ti-1The expanded anonymous domain is marked as CAi-1And judging AiWhether or not to be CAi-1If the data is contained, the step 3 is carried out, and if the data is not contained, the step 2 is carried out;
step 2: TTP regeneration of anonymous domain AiAnd skipping to the step 1;
and step 3: judgment AiWhether or not to be combined with Ai-1The circles with the four vertexes as the center and the v, the delta t as the radius are intersected, wherein, A is markedi-1Has four vertex coordinates of (x)1，y1)，(x1，y2)，(x2，y1)，(x2，y2) Wherein x is1<x2，y1<y2，If yes, finishing the algorithm, otherwise, jumping to the step 4;
and 4, step 4: let k (x, y) be Ai-1And a circle with k as the center v x Δ t as the radius and AiAre not intersected;
and 5: if x1X and x are not more than x2≥x：
If y is less than or equal to y1Then let y1= y + v Δ t, return to step 3;
otherwise, let y2= y-v Δ t, return to step 3;
step 6: if y is1Y is less than or equal to y2≥y：
If x is less than or equal to x1Then let x1= x + v Δ t, return to step 3;
otherwise, let x2And (= x-v) Δ t) returns to step 3.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the invention can effectively prevent an attacker from attacking the user position privacy under the condition of using continuous position service by using speed correlation attack; the invention enhances the reliability of the k-anonymous algorithm on the protection of the user position privacy under the continuous position service without reducing the service quality.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the steps performed by the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a Hausdorff distance calculation sample.
Fig. 3 is an attack sample for a location privacy attack using velocity correlation.
FIG. 4 is A2Is contained in A1V Δ t expanded intra-domain schematic of (a).
Detailed Description
For the purpose of enhancing the understanding of the present invention, the present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples, which are provided for the purpose of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.
The invention relates to a location privacy protection method for preventing speed correlation attack under continuous location service, which comprises the following steps:
step one, a user sends a query message to a TTP:
the user sends the inquiry information toTTP, query information adopts six-tuple form q = (id, loc, time, con, k, A)min) Where id is a user identifier, loc = (x, y) is a current coordinate of the user, where x, y represent longitude and latitude, respectively, time is a time when the query information is sent, con is query content, k is a size of a degree of anonymity selected when the user uses a k-anonymity algorithm, aminGenerating a minimum area of an anonymous region for k-anonymity accepted by the user;
step two, the TTP generates a rectangular anonymous domain according to the received query information, and carries out expansion and reconstruction on the rectangular anonymous domain:
the TTP generates a rectangular anonymous domain according to a k-anonymous algorithm, then judges whether the received query information is the query information which is sent by the user for the first time, if so, directly sends the anonymous domain to the LBS, and if not, expansion and transformation are carried out; that is to say, the TTP receives the user's transmission at t1Query information q sent in time1Then, firstly judging whether the inquiry information is the first service request of user U or not, if so, according to q1Loc, k, and A in (1)minThe value of (A) is used for generating a rectangular anonymous Area by using a k-anonymous algorithm1Wherein Area1≥AminIf the service request of the user U is not received for the first time, the Area needs to be processed1Expanding and modifying the region into a new anonymous region, so that an attacker cannot carry out relevant attack on the use speed of the region;
the expansion and transformation comprises the following steps:
step 1: firstly, the last anonymous domain A of the user is expanded by the length of v x delta ti-1The expanded anonymous domain is marked as CAi-1And judging AiWhether or not to be CAi-1If the data is contained, the step 3 is carried out, and if the data is not contained, the step 2 is carried out;
step 2: TTP regeneration of anonymous domain AiAnd skipping to the step 1;
and step 3: judgment AiWhether or not to be combined with Ai-1The circles with the four vertexes as the center and the v, the delta t as the radius are intersected, wherein, A is markedi-1Has four vertex coordinates of (x)1，y1)，(x1，y2)，(x2，y1)，(x2，y2) Wherein x is1<x2，y1<y2，If yes, finishing the algorithm, otherwise, jumping to the step 4;
and 4, step 4: let k (x, y) be Ai-1And a circle with k as the center v x Δ t as the radius and AiAre not intersected;
and 5: if x1X and x are not more than x2≥x：
If y is less than or equal to y1Then let y1= y + v Δ t, return to step 3;
otherwise, let y2= y-v Δ t, return to step 3;
step 6: if y is1Y is less than or equal to y2≥y：
If x is less than or equal to x1Then let x1= x + v Δ t, return to step 3;
otherwise, let x2= x-v Δ t returns to step 3;
step three, LBS carries out position service inquiry according to the received anonymous domain, and sends the inquired result set back to TTP; that is to say, the TTP will transform the anonymous domain Area1Sending the information to an LBS server;
step four, the TTP filters the received result set according to the specific position of the user and sends the filtered result back to the user; that is, the LBS performs service query according to the received anonymous domain, and sends a result set RS to the TTP;
and step five, the user receives the query result, the query is finished, namely the TTP filters the result set RS, and the filtered result R is returned to the user U.
Example one
In this example, the following definitions are given:
definition 1: one-way Hausdorff distance: suppose there are two hidden areas Area1And Area2Then one-way Hausdorff distance h (Area)1，Area2) Represents from Area1From any point to Area2The maximum value of the minimum distance at a certain point in the space, i.e., h (Area)1，Area2)=max(p1∈Area1)min(p2∈Area2)d(p1，p2)。
Definition 2: hausdorff distance: suppose there are two hidden areas Area1And Area2And the Hausdorff distance between the two is H (Area)1，Area2)=max{ h(Area1，Area2)，h(Area2，Area1)}。
As shown in fig. 2, from Area1From any point to Area2The maximum value of the minimum distance at a certain point in the image is h (Area)1，Area2) In the same way, from Area2From any point to Area1The maximum value of the minimum distance at a certain point in the image is h (Area)2，Area1) Because of h (Area)2，Area1)> h(Area1，Area2) Then H (Area)1，Area2)= h(Area2，Area1)。
As shown in fig. 3, when the user is in the time period t1And t2Respectively using two rectangular hidden regions A1And A2And A is1＞ AminAnd A2＞ AminAt this time, the attacker knows that the maximum speed of the user movement is v, and the attacker can check A1Whether or not the point p is present at the time of moving t at the maximum speed v2-t1Can not reach A after time2If the point exists, the point is excluded by an attacker; similarly, the attacker can check A in the same way2To exclude A2Can not reach A1Therefore, the condition for avoiding the user from being attacked by the velocity correlation is to ensure a1And A2Are all reachable to each other, in combination with definition 2, i.e. the condition is fulfilled: h (A)1，A2)<V Δ t, by further analysis, at A2Is contained in A1On the premise that v × Δ t of (c) expands the domain, we can derive the condition "H (a)1，A2)<= v Δ t "and" condition a2And with A1The circles with the 4 vertexes as the center and the v, the delta and the t as the radius are all intersectedEquivalent because A2Is contained in A1V.Δ t of (a) expands the domain, as shown in FIG. 4, then A2To A1Is reachable; if A2And A1If a vertex does not intersect, then the vertex must not reach A2Therefore, we present two conditions to prevent speed-related attacks:
condition 1: if AiThe hidden area A of the user at the next moment is the current hidden area of the useri+1Must be contained in AiV Δ t expanded domain of (a);
condition 2: if AiThe hidden area A of the user at the next moment is the current hidden area of the useri+1Must be combined with A1The 4 vertexes of (a) and (b) are circle centers, and circles with the radius of v, delta t are intersected.
As shown in fig. 1, the specific implementation steps are as follows:
step one, a user sends query information to a TTP:
when the user U wants to query a nearby bar, query information q is sent to the TTP, where q = (id, loc, time, con, k, a)min) Wherein id represents a user identity U, loc represents a current geographic coordinate of the user, time is the query time of the user at the moment, con is query content: i.e. a nearby bar in this example, k is the anonymity required by the user in the k-anonymity algorithm, aminFor anonymous domain Area generated after using k-anonymization algorithm0Size limitation, i.e. Area0≥Amin；
At the moment, the attacker knows that the state of FaceBook issued by the user U on the social software is shopping in a certain shopping mall, so that the maximum moving speed of the user U at the moment can be estimated to be v;
step two, the TTP generates a rectangular anonymous domain according to the received query information, and carries out expansion and reconstruction on the rectangular anonymous domain:
when TTP receives the inquiry information of user U, it will use the inner loc, k, AminThe proper rectangular anonymous domain is generated by utilizing a k-anonymous algorithm, then, whether the query request is the first query request of the user U under the continuous position service is judged, and if the query request is the first query request of the user U under the continuous position service, the query request is the first query request of the user URequest, then Area to be generated0Directly sending the query request to an LBS server, if the query request is not the first query request of the user, assuming that the query request is the i +1 th query request of the user, and the generated anonymous domain is AreaiAnd then, the method needs to be expanded and modified to meet the requirements of the condition 1 and the condition 2, and the specific algorithm steps are as follows:
step 1: firstly, expanding the last anonymous Area of the user by the length of v x delta ti-1And the expanded anonymous domain is marked as CAreai-1As shown in fig. 4. And judge AreaiWhether or not it is CAreai-1Comprises the following steps. If the data is contained, turning to the step 3, and if the data is not contained, turning to the step 2;
step 2: TTP regeneration of anonymous domain AreaiAnd skipping to the step 1;
and step 3: judging AreaiWhether or not to cooperate with Areai-1The four vertexes of (1) are circles with the circle center v, delta t and radius, and all the circles are intersected, wherein the circles are marked with AreaiHas four vertex coordinates of (x)1，y1)，(x1，y2)，(x2，y1)，(x2，y2) Wherein x is1＜x2，y1＜y2。If the two phases are intersected, the algorithm is ended, and if not, the step 4 is skipped;
and 4, step 4: let k (x, y) be Areai-1And a circle and an Area with k as the center v x Δ t as the radiusiAre not intersected;
and 5: if x1X and x are not more than x2≥x:
If y is less than or equal to y1Then let y1= y + v Δ t, return to step 3;
otherwise, let y2= y-v Δ t, return to step 3;
step 6: if y is1Y is less than or equal to y2≥y:
If x is less than or equal to x1Then let x1= x + v Δ t, return to step 3;
otherwise, let x2= x-v Δ t returns to step 3;
through the steps, the Area after expansion and transformation is realizediUploading to an LBS server;
step three, LBS carries out position service inquiry according to the received anonymous domain, and sends the inquired result set RS back to TTP;
step four, the TTP filters the received result set RS according to the specific position of the user and sends the filtered result R back to the user;
and step five, the user receives the query result R to obtain the information of which bars are nearby, and the query is finished.
Aiming at the situation that the k-anonymity of the position can not effectively prevent the attack of the speed correlation on the k-anonymity by an attacker under the continuous inquiry, the invention provides a method for expanding and modifying the anonymous domain, so that the modified anonymous domain can effectively prevent the speed correlation attack.

Claims (2)

1. A location privacy protection method for preventing speed-related attacks under continuous location services, characterized by: the protection method comprises the following steps:
step one, a user sends a query message to a TTP:
the user sends query information to the TTP, and the query information adopts a six-tuple form q = (id, loc, time, con, k, A)min) Where id is a user identifier, loc = (x, y) is a current coordinate of the user, where x, y represent longitude and latitude, respectively, time is a time when the query information is sent, con is query content, k is a size of a degree of anonymity selected when the user uses a k-anonymity algorithm, aminGenerating a minimum area of an anonymous region for k-anonymity accepted by the user;
step two, the TTP generates a rectangular anonymous domain according to the received query information, and carries out expansion and reconstruction on the rectangular anonymous domain:
TTP generates a rectangular anonymous domain according to a k-anonymous algorithm, then judges whether the received query information is the query information which is sent by the user for the first time, if so, directly sends the anonymous domain to LBS, and if not, carries out expansion transformation, namely the TTP receives the query information which is sent by the user at t1Look-up sent by timeEnquiry information q1Then, firstly judging whether the inquiry information is the first service request of user U or not, if so, according to q1Loc, k, and A in (1)minThe value of (A) is used for generating a rectangular anonymous Area by using a k-anonymous algorithm1Wherein Area1≥AminIf the service request of the user U is not received for the first time, the Area needs to be processed1Expanding and modifying the region into a new anonymous region, so that an attacker cannot carry out relevant attack on the use speed of the region;
step three, LBS carries out position service inquiry according to the received anonymous domain, and sends the inquired result set back to TTP;
step four, the TTP filters the received result set according to the specific position of the user and sends the filtered result back to the user;
and step five, the user receives the query result and the query is finished.
2. The location privacy protection method for preventing speed-related attacks under continuous location services according to claim 1, characterized in that: in the second step, the expanding and reforming comprises the following steps:
step 1: firstly, the last anonymous domain A of the user is expanded by the length of v x delta ti-1The expanded anonymous domain is marked as CAi-1And judging AiWhether or not to be CAi-1If the data is contained, the step 3 is carried out, and if the data is not contained, the step 2 is carried out;
step 2: TTP regeneration of anonymous domain AiAnd skipping to the step 1;
and step 3: judgment AiWhether or not to be combined with Ai-1The circles with the four vertexes as the center and the v, the delta t as the radius are intersected, wherein, A is markedi-1Has four vertex coordinates of (x)1，y1)，(x1，y2)，(x2，y1)，(x2，y2) Wherein x is1<x2，y1<y2，If yes, finishing the algorithm, otherwise, jumping to the step 4;
and 4, step 4: note k (x, y) are Ai-1And a circle with k as the center v x Δ t as the radius and AiAre not intersected;
and 5: if x1X and x are not more than x2≥x：
If y is less than or equal to y1Then let y1= y + v Δ t, return to step 3;
otherwise, let y2= y-v Δ t, return to step 3;
step 6: if y is1Y is less than or equal to y2≥y：
If x is less than or equal to x1Then let x1= x + v Δ t, return to step 3;
otherwise, let x2And (= x-v) Δ t) returns to step 3.
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Assignee: NANJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS NANTONG INSTITUTE Co.,Ltd.

Assignor: NANJING University OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Contract record no.: X2021980013917

Denomination of invention: Location privacy protection method for preventing speed Association attack under continuous location service

Granted publication date: 20210824

License type: Common License

Record date: 20211202

EE01 Entry into force of recordation of patent licensing contract