CN108449344A - The location privacy protection method for preventing velocity correlation from attacking under continuous position service - Google Patents

The location privacy protection method for preventing velocity correlation from attacking under continuous position service Download PDF

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Publication number
CN108449344A
CN108449344A CN201810238561.3A CN201810238561A CN108449344A CN 108449344 A CN108449344 A CN 108449344A CN 201810238561 A CN201810238561 A CN 201810238561A CN 108449344 A CN108449344 A CN 108449344A
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user
ttp
domain
anonymity
anonymous
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CN201810238561.3A
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CN108449344B (en
Inventor
黄海平
张大成
吴敏
胡素君
程琨
吕宽
张勤
胡振超
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Nanjing Post and Telecommunication University
Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
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Nanjing Post and Telecommunication University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/50—Network services
    • H04L67/52—Network services specially adapted for the location of the user terminal

Abstract

The present invention is a kind of location privacy protection method for preventing velocity correlation from attacking under continuous position service, is included the following steps：Step 1: user sends query messages Step 2: TTP generates rectangle anonymity domain according to the Query Information received to TTP, and carry out expanding adaptation step three, LBS to it according to the anonymous domain progress location-based service inquiry received, and the result set inquired is sent back into TTP Step 4: the result set received will be filtered by TTP according to the specific location of user, filtered result is sent back into user steps five, user receives query result, poll-final.The present invention is proposed carries out the method for expanding transformation to anonymous domain, enables its improved anonymous domain that velocity correlation to be effectively prevent to attack, this method is simple and effective, while not reducing inquiry service quality, enhances the protection to the location privacy safety of user.

Description

The location privacy protection method for preventing velocity correlation from attacking under continuous position service
Technical field
The invention belongs to location based services (Location-basedServices, LBS) and security privacy technology to lead Domain particularly relates to a kind of location privacy protection method for preventing velocity correlation from attacking under continuous position service.
Background technology
The rapid growth of new type Intelligent mobile equipment has pushed a kind of based on location-based service (Location-Based Services, LBS) technical field appearance and development, in the Intelligent mobile equipment for passing through carrying using the user of the service GPS device obtain its in real time position, service provider (SP, LBS Provider) is then uploaded to, service provider's Under help, user can obtain the desired query result based on location-based service, such as:Obtain several nearest chafing dish restaurants of periphery Moving line figure when jogging of location information, exercise and its navigation routine when driving, still, obtain location-based service when Time may face the risk that location privacy is stolen, and by analyzing the individual position's private data stolen, attacker pole has The gender of user may be deduced, is liked, occupation and its health, for example, attacker is by analyzing one week position of a user Track finds that the user through the hospital that often comes in and goes out, is then very likely inferred to the user and health problem occurs.
Position k- anonymities are the location privacy protection methods of most mainstream in current LBS applications, and main thought is：Pass through one The trusted servers (TTP, Trusted Third Part) of a third party's anonymity, by user location it is extensive at one include other The anonymous domain of k-1 user location uploads to SP, to improve the location privacy safety of LBS systems, however, this method is even Do not consider that attacker, can when the background information for learning user deduces user's maximum movement speed at this time under continuous inquiry The part anonymity region that user can not possibly reach is excluded to be attacked by velocity correlation, to reduce secret protection effect.
Invention content
To solve the above-mentioned problems, the present invention provides a kind of preventing the position that velocity correlation is attacked under continuous position service Method for secret protection is set, to solve position k- anonymities in continuous-query, attacker can be attacked by velocity correlation and go to steal User location privacy.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention is achieved by the following technical solutions：
The present invention is a kind of location privacy protection method for preventing velocity correlation from attacking under continuous position service, the protection side Method includes the following steps：
Step 1: user sends query messages to TTP：
User sends Query Information to TTP, and Query Information uses hexa-atomic group of form q=(id, loc, time, con, k, Amin), Middle id is user identifier, and loc=(x, y) is user's changing coordinates, and wherein x, y respectively represent longitude and latitude, and time is to send Time when Query Information, con are inquiry content, and k is the size that anonymity degree is selected when user uses k- anonymity algorithms, AminFor User receptible k- anonymities generate the minimum area in anonymous region；
Step 2: TTP generates rectangle anonymity domain according to the Query Information received, and expansion transformation is carried out to it：
TTP generates rectangle anonymity domain according to k- anonymity algorithms, then judges whether the Query Information received is user first time The Query Information of transmission, if so, directly anonymous domain is sent to LBS, if it is not, then carrying out expansion transformation；
Step 3: LBS carries out location-based service inquiry according to the anonymous domain received, and the result set inquired is sent back into TTP；
Step 4: the result set received will be filtered by TTP according to the specific location of user, filtered result is sent Reuse family；
Step 5: user receives query result, poll-final.
Further improvement of the present invention is：In the step 2, expands transformation and include the following steps：
Step 1：The last anonymity domain A of user is expanded with the length of v* △ t firsti-1, the anonymous domain after expansion is denoted as CAi-1, And judge AiWhether by CAi-1Including if being gone to step 3 comprising if, if not by comprising going to step 2；
Step 2：TTP regenerates anonymous domain AiAnd jump to step 1；
Step 3：Judge AiWhether with Ai-1Four vertex be the center of circle, the circle that v* △ t are radius intersects, wherein remembering Ai-1's Four apex coordinates are respectively (x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y1), (x2, y2), wherein x1<x2, y1<y2,If so, algorithm knot Beam, if it is not, then jumping to step 4；
Step 4：Remember that k (x, y) is Ai-1A vertex, and be center of circle v* △ t as the circle of radius and A using kiIt is non-intersecting；
Step 5：If x1≤ x and x2≥x：
If y≤y1Then enable y1=y+v* △ t, return to step 3；
Otherwise, y is enabled2=y-v* △ t, return to step 3；
Step 6：If y1≤ y and y2≥y：
If x≤x1Then enable x1=x+v* △ t, return to step 3；
Otherwise, x is enabled2=x-v* △ t return to step 3.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows：The present invention can effectively prevent attacker and be attacked using velocity correlation to using User location privacy under continuous position service is attacked；Invention enhances k- anonymity algorithms under continuous position service To the reliability of user location secret protection, and without reducing service quality.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the execution flow chart of steps of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is that Hausdorff distances calculate sample.
Fig. 3 is the attack sample that location privacy attack is carried out using velocity correlation.
Fig. 4 is A2Included in A1V* △ t extension fields in schematic diagram.
Specific implementation mode
In order to deepen the understanding of the present invention, the present invention is done below in conjunction with drawings and examples and is further retouched in detail It states, the embodiment is only for explaining the present invention, does not constitute and limits to protection scope of the present invention.
The present invention is a kind of location privacy protection method for preventing velocity correlation from attacking under continuous position service, the guarantor Maintaining method includes the following steps：
Step 1: user sends query messages to TTP：
User sends Query Information to TTP, and Query Information uses hexa-atomic group of form q=(id, loc, time, con, k, Amin), Middle id is user identifier, and loc=(x, y) is user's changing coordinates, and wherein x, y respectively represent longitude and latitude, and time is to send Time when Query Information, con are inquiry content, and k is the size that anonymity degree is selected when user uses k- anonymity algorithms, AminFor User receptible k- anonymities generate the minimum area in anonymous region；
Step 2: TTP generates rectangle anonymity domain according to the Query Information received, and expansion transformation is carried out to it：
TTP generates rectangle anonymity domain according to k- anonymity algorithms, then judges whether the Query Information received is user first time The Query Information of transmission, if so, directly anonymous domain is sent to LBS, if it is not, then carrying out expansion transformation；That is TTP connects User's hair is received in t1When the Query Information q that sends1Afterwards, first judging the Query Information, whether the first time service for being user U is asked It asks, is asked if it is the first time of the user, according to q1In loc, k and AminNumerical value using k- anonymity algorithms generate square Shape anonymity region Area1, wherein Area1≥Amin, if not the service request for receiving user U for the first time, then need pair Area1Expand and be transformed into new anonymous region, makes attacker that can not be used for velocity correlation attack；
Transformation is wherein expanded to include the following steps：
Step 1：The last anonymity domain A of user is expanded with the length of v* △ t firsti-1, the anonymous domain after expansion is denoted as CAi-1, And judge AiWhether by CAi-1Including if being gone to step 3 comprising if, if not by comprising going to step 2；
Step 2：TTP regenerates anonymous domain AiAnd jump to step 1；
Step 3：Judge AiWhether with Ai-1Four vertex be the center of circle, the circle that v* △ t are radius intersects, wherein remembering Ai-1's Four apex coordinates are respectively (x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y1), (x2, y2), wherein x1<x2, y1<y2,If so, algorithm knot Beam, if it is not, then jumping to step 4；
Step 4：Remember that k (x, y) is Ai-1A vertex, and be center of circle v* △ t as the circle of radius and A using kiIt is non-intersecting；
Step 5：If x1≤ x and x2≥x：
If y≤y1Then enable y1=y+v* △ t, return to step 3；
Otherwise, y is enabled2=y-v* △ t, return to step 3；
Step 6：If y1≤ y and y2≥y：
If x≤x1Then enable x1=x+v* △ t, return to step 3；
Otherwise, x is enabled2=x-v* △ t return to step 3；
Step 3: LBS carries out location-based service inquiry according to the anonymous domain received, and the result set inquired is sent back into TTP； That is TTP is by improved anonymity domain Area1It is sent to LBS service device；
Step 4: the result set received will be filtered by TTP according to the specific location of user, filtered result is sent Reuse family；That is LBS carries out service-seeking according to the anonymous domain received, and result set RS is sent to TTP；
Step 5: user receives query result, poll-final, that is to say, that result set RS is filtered by TTP, after filtering Result R be sent back to user U.
Embodiment one
In the present embodiment, following definition is provided：
Define 1：Unidirectional Hausdorff distances：Assuming that there are two secret area Area1And Area2, then unidirectional Hausdorff away from From h (Area1, Area2) indicate from Area1Middle any point is to Area2The maximum value of the minimum range of middle certain point, i.e. h (Area1, Area2)=max(p1∈Area1)min(p2∈Area2)d(p1, p2)。
Define 2：Hausdorff distances：Assuming that there are two secret area Area1And Area2, then between the two Hausdorff distances are H (Area1, Area2)=max{ h(Area1, Area2), h (Area2, Area1)}。
As shown in Fig. 2, from Area1Middle any point is to Area2The maximum value of the minimum range of middle certain point is h (Area1, Area2), similarly, from Area2Middle any point is to Area1The maximum value of middle certain point minimum range is h (Area2, Area1), because For h (Area2, Area1)> h(Area1, Area2), then H (Area1, Area2)= h(Area2, Area1)。
As shown in figure 3, when user is in time period t1And t2Two rectangle secret area A have been used respectively1And A2, and A1＞ AminAnd A2＞ Amin, at this time attacker know user movement maximum speed be v, attacker can pass through check A1In whether deposit T is being moved with maximum speed v in point p2-t1A can not be arrived at after time2Any point, and if it exists, then this point is arranged by attacker Except outside；Similarly, attacker can also same method inspection A2To exclude A2A can not be arrived at1Point therefore avoid user's quilt The condition of velocity correlation attack is ensuring that A1With A2In point be all reachable to each other, in conjunction with defining 2, that is, meet item Part：H(A1, A2)<=v* △ t, by further analyzing, in A2Included in A1V* △ t extension fields under the premise of, we can be with Obtain condition " H (A1, A2)<=v* △ t " and " condition A2With with A14 vertex be the center of circle, v* △ t be radius circle intersect " It is of equal value, because of A2Included in A1V* △ t extension fields in, as shown in figure 4, then A2To A1It is reachable；If A2With A1Certain top Point is non-intersecting, then the vertex can not reach A certainly2, therefore, we provide two conditions for preventing velocity correlation from attacking：
Condition 1：If AiFor the current secret area of user, then the secret area A of subsequent time useri+1A must be included ini's In v* △ t extension fields；
Condition 2：If AiFor the current secret area of user, then the secret area A of subsequent time useri+1Must with A14 top Point is the center of circle, and v* △ t are that the circle of radius intersects.
As shown in Figure 1, steps are as follows for specific implementation：
Step 1: user sends Query Information to TTP：
When user U want inquiry near bar when, can to TTP send Query Information q, wherein q=(id, loc, time, con, K, Amin), wherein id represents user identity U, loc and illustrates that the current geographical coordinate of user, time are the inquiry of user at this time Time, con are inquiry content：Bar near being in this example, k are the anonymous degree needed for user, A in k- anonymity algorithmsminFor Use the anonymous domain Area generated after k anonymity algorithms0The restrictive condition of size, i.e. Area0≥Amin；
And attacker has known that the user U states that FaceBook is issued in social software are to do shopping in a certain store at this time, by It is v that this, which can deduce the maximum speed that he moves at this time,；
Step 2: TTP generates rectangle anonymity domain according to the Query Information received, and expansion transformation is carried out to it：
It, can be according to the inside loc, k, A after TTP has received the Query Information of user UminNumerical value, utilize k- anonymity algorithms generate Secondly rectangle anonymity appropriate domain judges whether the secondary inquiry request is first time inquiries of the user U under continuous position service Request, if the first time inquiry request of user, then by the Area of generation0It is transmitted directly to LBS service device, if not user First time inquiry request, it will be assumed that this time for the i+1 of user time inquiry request, the anonymous domain generated at this time is Areai, then It needs to carry out expansion transformation to it, complies with the requirement of condition 1 and condition 2, steps are as follows for specific algorithm：
Step 1：The last anonymity domain Area of user is expanded with the length of v* △ t firsti-1, the anonymous domain after expansion is denoted as CAreai-1, as shown in Figure 4.And judge AreaiWhether by CAreai-1Including.If being gone to step 3 comprising if, if not by comprising Then go to step 2；
Step 2：TTP regenerates anonymous domain AreaiAnd jump to step 1；
Step 3：Judge AreaiWhether with Areai-1Four vertex be that the circle that center of circle v* △ t are radius intersects, wherein remembering AreaiFour apex coordinates be respectively (x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y1), (x2, y2), wherein x1＜ x2, y1＜ y2。If homogeneous It hands over, then algorithm terminates, if it is not, then jumping to step 4；
Step 4：Remember that k (x, y) is Areai-1A vertex, and be center of circle v* △ t as the circle of radius and Area using kiIt is non-intersecting；
Step 5：If x1≤ x and x2≥x:
If y≤y1Then enable y1=y+v* △ t, return to step 3；
Otherwise, y is enabled2=y-v* △ t, return to step 3；
Step 6：If y1≤ y and y2≥y:
If x≤x1Then enable x1=x+v* △ t, return to step 3；
Otherwise, x is enabled2=x-v* △ t return to step 3；
By above step, improved Area will be expandediUpload to LBS service device；
Step 3: LBS carries out location-based service inquiry according to the anonymous domain received, and the result set RS inquired is sent back TTP；
Step 4: the result set RS received will be filtered by TTP according to the specific location of user, by filtered result R Send back user；
Step 5: user receives query result R, nearby there are the message in which bar, poll-final.
The present invention for position k- anonymities under continuous-query cannot effectively security from attacks person velocity correlation is carried out to it Attack, it is proposed that the method that anonymous domain carries out expanding transformation, its improved anonymous domain is enable to effectively prevent velocity correlation Attack, this method is simple and effective, while not reducing inquiry service quality, enhances the guarantor to the location privacy safety of user Shield.

Claims (2)

1. a kind of location privacy protection method for preventing velocity correlation from attacking under continuous position service, it is characterised in that：It is described Guard method includes the following steps：
Step 1: user sends query messages to TTP：
User sends Query Information to TTP, and Query Information uses hexa-atomic group of form q=(id, loc, time, con, k, Amin), Middle id is user identifier, and loc=(x, y) is user's changing coordinates, and wherein x, y respectively represent longitude and latitude, and time is to send Time when Query Information, con are inquiry content, and k is the size that anonymity degree is selected when user uses k- anonymity algorithms, AminFor User receptible k- anonymities generate the minimum area in anonymous region；
Step 2: TTP generates rectangle anonymity domain according to the Query Information received, and expansion transformation is carried out to it：
TTP generates rectangle anonymity domain according to k- anonymity algorithms, then judges whether the Query Information received is user first time The Query Information of transmission, if so, directly anonymous domain is sent to LBS, if it is not, then carrying out expansion transformation；
Step 3: LBS carries out location-based service inquiry according to the anonymous domain received, and the result set inquired is sent back into TTP；
Step 4: the result set received will be filtered by TTP according to the specific location of user, filtered result is sent Reuse family；
Step 5: user receives query result, poll-final.
2. the location privacy protection method for preventing velocity correlation from attacking under continuous position service according to claim 1, It is characterized in that：In the step 2, expands transformation and include the following steps：
Step 1：The last anonymity domain A of user is expanded with the length of v* △ t firsti-1, the anonymous domain after expansion is denoted as CAi-1, And judge AiWhether by CAi-1Including if being gone to step 3 comprising if, if not by comprising going to step 2；
Step 2：TTP regenerates anonymous domain AiAnd jump to step 1；
Step 3：Judge AiWhether with Ai-1Four vertex be the center of circle, the circle that v* △ t are radius intersects, wherein remembering Ai-1's Four apex coordinates are respectively (x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y1), (x2, y2), wherein x1<x2, y1<y2,If so, algorithm knot Beam, if it is not, then jumping to step 4；
Step 4：Remember that k (x, y) is Ai-1A vertex, and be center of circle v* △ t as the circle of radius and A using kiIt is non-intersecting；
Step 5：If x1≤ x and x2≥x：
If y≤y1Then enable y1=y+v* △ t, return to step 3；
Otherwise, y is enabled2=y-v* △ t, return to step 3；
Step 6：If y1≤ y and y2≥y：
If x≤x1Then enable x1=x+v* △ t, return to step 3；
Otherwise, x is enabled2=x-v* △ t return to step 3.
CN201810238561.3A 2018-03-22 2018-03-22 Location privacy protection method for preventing speed association attack under continuous location service Active CN108449344B (en)

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