CN107682149A - A kind of method of the vehicular ad hoc network secret protection close based on label - Google Patents
A kind of method of the vehicular ad hoc network secret protection close based on label Download PDFInfo
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- CN107682149A CN107682149A CN201711009706.4A CN201711009706A CN107682149A CN 107682149 A CN107682149 A CN 107682149A CN 201711009706 A CN201711009706 A CN 201711009706A CN 107682149 A CN107682149 A CN 107682149A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
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Abstract
A kind of method of the vehicular ad hoc network secret protection close based on label is claimed in the present invention, and this method is used for solving Privacy Protection when vehicle node (OBU) communicates with roadside unit (RSU) under car networking environment.On the basis of data signature mechanism and assumed name mechanism, the present invention proposes a kind of close mechanism of label, and the mechanism is an Integrated Solution of integration encryption and signature, in the method, passes through secret protection of the assumed name mechanism realization to vehicle node.Under vehicle net environment, vehicle node by the identity information of oneself by being sent to TRA (generation assumed names, key corresponding to the private key of key generation centre generation assumed name, vehicle node using the assumed name and key of generation message sign it is close after be sent to roadside unit, roadside unit is decrypted and verified to message with private key after receiving message, is verified then received message.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to cryptography and car networking security fields, the secret protection of user particularly under car networking environment.
Background technology
According to the statistics to car accident, etesian motor-vehicle accident is more than 6,000,000 on United States highways.It is probably more
It is dead because of such accident in 42000 people, meanwhile, therefore and injured personnel about 3,000,000, and so caused by pass through
Ji loss is more than 23,000,000,000.It is especially surprising that in the U.S., 5 people are about had per hour and are fled in these accidents, namely it is average
Just have within every 12 minutes 1 people death.To alleviate the threat that these potential crash events are brought, and improve driving for driver
Experience is sailed, car manufactures have made huge effort be equipped with wireless device to each automobile with telecommunications enterprise.So,
Between vehicle and the roadside infrastructure of vehicle and highway key node such as delivery or can be mutual between building a station
Communication, by being that car networking is also arisen at the historic moment., can be fully real between vehicle and between vehicle and road side facility in car networking
Show the exchange of information and share, beacon message real-time perception road like is passed through by car networking driver and traffic administration platform
Condition, help driver the traffic accident such as effectively avoid vehicle collision, knock into the back from improving road safety, while also improve traffic administration
Intelligence degree.Car networking has a wide range of applications, and is safety-relevant applications first, such as danger position alerts and collision avoids
Deng as far as possible the common feature of this kind of application is exactly closely bound up with the life security of people, and such service will be helpful to avoid endangering
The accident of evil life occurs.Therefore, in this type of application safety be must overriding concern, also must be compulsory execution.
The correctness of all operations must all be guaranteed in these applications, even if there is attacker, should also ensure its peace
Quan Xing.Next to that non-security class application, such as non-parking charge service, location Based service, access, remote diagnosis etc..It is aobvious
So, security is the indispensable attribute of this kind of service, particularly in chargeable service.In general, this kind of application is wanted to time delay
Ask not high.
In recent years, with the development and progress of technology, and active demand of the people to traffic safety and efficiency,
VANET shows the trend of fast development, and it is a huge promotion to safe driving and traffic administration that it, which creates and risen,.But
It is that VANET security and privacy protection problem is also increasingly prominent, and particularly people are to various leakage of private information in VANET
Worry, which even becomes, restricts the further bottleneck problems disposed with development of VANET.Only ensure the various necessary privacies of user
Information is effectively protected, and effectively contains the malice illegal activities stolen based on privacy, could really provide one
Good traffic environment so that vehicle driver and crew do not have trouble and worry when using VANET.
Car networking (Vehicular ad hoc network, abbreviation VANET) is that one kind emerging in recent years is mobile from group
Network is Internet of Things tide intelligent transportation field it is emerging one in important application form, relate generally to mobile ad hoc network
Network and sensor network, have become academia and the common study hotspot of industrial quarters in recent years.VANET is intended to lift road friendship
Logical traffic safety and driving efficiency, it can effectively strengthen traffic safety, take precautions against to administer congestion and improve and drive environment, have and compel
The functional need cut, wide application prospect, and the great strategic significance to improve People's livelihood.But meanwhile privacy information in VANET
Compare abundant and very sensitive, big plus scale, speed is fast, it is open the features such as so that VANET faces serious privacy leakage
Threaten.People are less likely to receive and participated in the case where its safety of worry and individual privacy cannot be ensured fully
VANET, this seriously constrains VANET further development and application.Therefore, design effective Privacy Preservation Mechanism just gradually into
In order to VANET studies with designing, using urgent, basic and challenge vital with one in deployment the problem of.
At present, increasing researcher puts into this hot fields, has excavated many problems, and have accumulated many achievements.
By the network analysis of security threat and privacy requirements to car networking, sum up that identity is there are in car networking is hidden
Private and two main privacy concerns of location privacy.The present invention is absorbed in the privacy of identities that demand is most urgent in VANET applications and protected
This main study subject is protected, system analyzes VANET secret protections field related notion, demand for security and present Research,
It has extensively studied based on the close VANET Privacy Preservation Mechanisms of label.
The existing safety communication technology based on VANET usually considers the confirmability and confidentiality of message respectively,
But in practical application, we often need the two properties simultaneously, therefore, how to design efficiently and have the two simultaneously
The Privacy Preservation Mechanism of property undoubtedly has realistic meaning very much.
The content of the invention
Present invention seek to address that above problem of the prior art.A kind of effectively prevention rogue attacks are proposed, ensure that logical
The security of letter, greatly improve system efficiency based on the method for signing close vehicular ad hoc network secret protection.This hair
Bright technical scheme is as follows：
A kind of method of the vehicular ad hoc network secret protection close based on label, it comprises the following steps：
S1, system initialization step：Key generation centre PKG and trusted party TRA generation system common parameters, and system
System common parameter is preloaded onto in the tamper resistant device of each vehicle node；
S2, assumed name generation and private key generation step：The true identity of oneself is sent to TRA generation assumed names by vehicle node,
And obtained assumed name is issued into PKG to generate private key；
It is S3, close to message label and the step of send：Vehicle node uses the assumed name that TRA is generated in step S2 to be generated with PKG
Private key message sign close handle and be sent to roadside unit；
S4, the step of message is decrypted and verified：Roadside unit is disappeared after receiving the message of encryption with the private key decryption of oneself
Cease and verify the validity of message, verification process can batch operation.
Further, step S1 key generation centres and trusted authority are centrally generated system common parameter, including as follows
Step：
S11：Key generation centre PKG is initialized, and PKG selects random number s to calculate P as main private keypub=sP is as master
Public key；
S12：Trusted party TRA is initialized, and TRA selects random number t to calculate P as private keytra=tP is as public key, generation
The cryptographic Hash function H of four safety1, H2, H3And H4, initialization system common parameter is { G1,G2,q,P,Ppub,Ptra,H1,H2,
H3,H4}。
Further, the generation of step S2 assumed names and private key generation step comprise the following steps：
S21：The true identity of oneself is sent to TRA generation assumed names by vehicle node, is comprised the following steps：
S211：Vehicle node chooses random number diCalculate PIDi,1=diP, then by (RIDi,PIDi,1) it is sent to TRA；
S212：TRA receives (RIDi,PIDi,1) after, calculateWherein tiIt is
The effective time limit of assumed name, PIDi=(PIDi,1,PIDi,2,ti) it is vehicle node assumed name；
S22：The vehicle node assumed name of generation is sent to key, wherein step S22 bags corresponding to PKG generation assumed names by TRA
Include following steps：
S221：PKG chooses random number kiCalculate Ki=kiP and si=ki+H2(PIDi,Ki) × smodq is as vehicle node
Private key.
Further, the step S3 vehicle nodes to message sign close including as follows using the assumed name and key of generation
Step：
S311：Choose random number riCalculateWherein Mi=PIDi||
Ki||sti||mi, wherein stiIt is to carry out signing close timestamp, miIt is origination message, YRIt is the public key of roadside unit；
S312：Sign it is close after the completion of by ci=(Ri,Vi,Zi) it is sent to roadside unit as signing close ciphertext.
Further, the step of step S4 is decrypted and verified to message includes as follows：
S41：Roadside unit calculates after receiving messageMessage is decrypted, wherein xR
It is the private key and Y of roadside unitR=xRP；
S42：First verify that stiWhether effectively, invalid then direct refuse information, effectively the message of decryption is carried out again
Checking, calculate cryptographic HashAnd the Formula V such as checkingiP=hi,2Ri+Ki+hi,1PpubWhether into
Stand, the received message if setting up, otherwise refuse information；
S43：To message batch validation, roadside unit first carries out polymerization processing to the message received, verifies equation (∑
Vi) P=(∑ hi,2Ri)+∑Ki+(∑hi,1)PpubWhether set up, then message is effective for establishment, otherwise abandons message.
Further, the vehicular ad hoc network model is made up of four entities, is trusted authority center TRA respectively, close
Key generation center PKG, vehicle node OBU and roadside unit RSU, TRA are responsible for system initialization generation common parameter and vehicle
The registration of node, registration generation assumed name are simultaneously sent to PKG；PKG is responsible for the generation of key, and it is close to choose random-number-generating system master
Key, the assumed name for receiving TRA transmissions generate the related key of assumed name and are sent to vehicle node afterwards；Vehicle node uses generation
Assumed name and roadside unit are communicated.
Further, the AES that the vehicular ad hoc network model uses is built upon on two-wire group, meets two-wire
Property mapping property, the definition of bilinear map is given below：If G1And G2It is the multiplicative cyclic group that two ranks are prime number p.G is
G1Generation member, bilinear map e:G1×G1→G2, this is mapped with following characteristic：
(1) bilinearity：For any u, v ∈ G1,a,b∈Zp,e(ua,vb)=e (u, v)ab；
(2) non degenerate：e(g,g)≠1；
(3) computability：For any u, v ∈ G1, can effectively calculate e (u, v).
Advantages of the present invention and have the beneficial effect that：
The present invention is based on signing close and assumed name mechanism, and proposition is a kind of to sign the close vehicular ad hoc network privacy guarantor being combined with assumed name
Protection mechanism, the mechanism are effectively protected the privacy of identities problem of vehicle node by assumed name mechanism；By signing close mechanism not only
Signature authentication during communication can be realized, and message is transmitted in a manner of ciphertext, only possesses user's ability of key
Message is decrypted, effectively prevents rogue attacks, ensure that the security of communication；Roadside unit is disappeared using batch validation plan-validation
Breath, greatly improve the efficiency of system.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the system model of the preferred embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the FB(flow block) of the preferred embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 3 is system initialization step；
Fig. 4 is generation assumed name and association key step；
Fig. 5 is that vehicle node carries out signing close and forwarding step to message；
Fig. 6 is that roadside unit receives message and verification step.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawing in the embodiment of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention is carried out clear, detailed
Carefully describe.Described embodiment is only the part of the embodiment of the present invention.
The present invention solve above-mentioned technical problem technical scheme be：
The vehicular ad hoc network Privacy Preservation Mechanism close based on label provided by the invention, comprises the following steps, referring to Fig. 2：
1st, it is a kind of based on close vehicular ad hoc network method for secret protection is signed, comprise the following steps
S1：System initialization, key generation centre (Private Key Generator, PKG) and trusted authority center
(TrustedAuthority) generate system common parameter, wherein system common parameter include Bilinear Groups G that two ranks are p and
GT, generation member g and bilinear map e in G：G×G|GT, four hash functions, systematic parameter is preloaded onto each vehicle node
Anti-tamper center (Tamperproofdevice)；Referring to Fig. 3
Further, step S1 comprises the following steps：
S11：PKG is initialized, and generates system common parameter, and PKG selects random number s to calculate P as main private keypub=sP makees
For main public key
S12：TRA is initialized, and TRA selects random number t to calculate P as private keytra=tP is as public key.Generate four Hash
Function, system common parameter are { G1,G2,q,P,Ppub,Ptra,H1,H2,H3,H4}
S2：Assumed name is generated and the true identity of oneself is sent to trusted authority center by private key generation, vehicle node
(TrustedAuthority) assumed name is generated, key generation centre (PrivateKey Generator, PKG) generates the private of assumed name
Key；Referring to Fig. 4；
Further, step S2 comprises the following steps：
S21：The true identity of oneself is sent to TRA generation assumed names by vehicle node；
Wherein step S21 comprises the following steps：
S211：Vehicle node chooses random number diCalculate PIDi,1=diP, then by (RIDi,PIDi,1) it is sent to TRA；
S212：TRA receives (RIDi,PIDi,1) after, calculatetiIt is assumed name
Effective time limit, PIDi=(PIDi,1,PIDi,2,ti) it is assumed name；
S22：The assumed name of generation is sent to key corresponding to PKG generation assumed names by TRA；
Wherein step S22 comprises the following steps：
S221：PKG chooses random number kiCalculate Ki=kiP and si=ki+H2(PIDi,Ki) × smodq is as vehicle node
Private key pair；
S3：Close to message label and send, vehicle node to message sign and close handle and be sent to using the assumed name of generation
Roadside unit (RSU)；Referring to Fig. 5；
Further, step S3 comprises the following steps：
S31：Vehicle node to message sign close using the assumed name and key of generation；
Wherein, step S31 comprises the following steps：
S311：Choose random number riCalculateWherein Mi=PIDi|
|Ki||sti||mi, stiIt is to carry out signing close timestamp, miIt is origination message, YRIt is the public key of roadside unit.
S312：Sign it is close after the completion of by ci=(Ri,Vi,Zi) it is sent to roadside unit as signing close ciphertext.
S4：Message is decrypted and verified, roadside unit is decrypted message with the private key of oneself after receiving the message of encryption and tested
Demonstrate,prove the validity of message (step includes batch certificate scheme, and both roadside unit can be with one-time authentication multiple messages)；Referring to figure
6；
Further, step S4 comprises the following steps：
S41：Roadside unit calculates after receiving messageMessage is decrypted, wherein xR
It is the private key and Y of roadside unitR=xRP；
S42：First verify that stiWhether effectively, invalid then direct refuse information, effectively the message of decryption is carried out again
Checking, calculateThe Formula V such as checkingiP=hi,2Ri+Ki+hi,1PpubWhether set up, if setting up
Then received message.
S43：To message batch validation, roadside unit first carries out polymerization processing to the message received, verifies equation (∑
Vi) P=(∑ hi,2Ri)+∑Ki+(∑hi,1)PpubWhether set up.It is effective to set up then message, otherwise abandons message.
The above embodiment is interpreted as being merely to illustrate the present invention rather than limited the scope of the invention.
After the content for having read the record of the present invention, technical staff can make various changes or modifications to the present invention, these equivalent changes
Change and modification equally falls into the scope of the claims in the present invention.
Claims (7)
- It is 1. a kind of based on the method for signing close vehicular ad hoc network secret protection, it is characterised in that to comprise the following steps：S1, system initialization step：Key generation centre and trusted authority are centrally generated system common parameter, and system is public Parameter is preloaded onto the tamper resistant device TPD of each vehicle node altogether；S2, assumed name generation and private key generation step：First, the true identity of oneself is sent to trusted party TRA by vehicle node Assumed name is generated, then, key generation centre PKG calculates private key and its safety is sent into vehicle node；It is S3, close to message label and the step of send：Vehicle node uses the private of the assumed name that TRA is generated in step S2 and PKG generations Key carries out signing close processing and is sent to roadside unit to message；S4, the step of message is decrypted and verified：Roadside unit receives and decrypts message simultaneously with the private key of oneself after the message of encryption Verify the validity of message.
- It is 2. according to claim 1 based on the method for signing close vehicular ad hoc network secret protection, it is characterised in that step S1 key generation centres and trusted authority are centrally generated system common parameter, comprise the following steps：S11：Trusted party TRA and key generation centre PKG is initialized, TRA generation multilinear pairing relevant parameters, including G1, G2,q,P,e:G1×G1→G2, wherein, G1And G2It is the cyclic group that two exponent numbers are q, P is group G1Generation member, e is bilinearity Mapping, PKG select random number s to calculate P as main private keypub=sP is as Your Majesty's key；S12：Trusted authority center TRA is initialized, and TRA selects random number t to calculate P as private keytra=tP is as public key, choosing Select the cryptographic Hash function H of four safety1,H2,H3And H4, system common parameter is { G1,G2,q,P,Ppub,Ptra,H1,H2,H3, H4}。
- It is 3. according to claim 2 based on the method for signing close vehicular ad hoc network secret protection, it is characterised in that described Step S2 assumed names generate and private key generation step comprises the following steps：S21：The true identity of oneself is sent to TRA generation assumed names by vehicle node, is comprised the following steps：S211：Vehicle node chooses random number diAnd calculate PIDi,1=diP, then by true identity information RIDiWith value PIDiOne Rise and be sent to TRA；S212：TRA receives (RIDi,PIDi,1) after, calculate PIDi,2=RIDi⊕H1(Ptra,tPIDi,1,ti), wherein tiIt is false The effective time limit of name, PIDi=(PIDi,1,PIDi,2,ti) be the vehicle assumed name；S22：TRA by the vehicle node assumed name of generation be sent to PKG generation assumed name corresponding to key, comprise the following steps：S221：PKG chooses random number kiCalculate Ki=kiP and si=ki+H2(PIDi,KiPrivate keys pair of the) × smodq as vehicle.
- It is 4. according to claim 3 based on the method for signing close vehicular ad hoc network secret protection, it is characterised in that described Step S3 vehicle nodes carry out signing close comprise the following steps using the assumed name and key of generation to message：S311：Choose random number riAnd calculateWherein Mi=PIDi||Ki| |sti||mi, stiIt is to carry out signing close timestamp, miIt is origination message, YRIt is the public key of roadside unit；S312：Sign it is close after the completion of by ci=(Ri,Vi,Zi) it is sent to roadside unit as signing close cipher-text message.
- It is 5. according to claim 4 based on the method for signing close vehicular ad hoc network secret protection, it is characterised in that described The step of step S4 is decrypted and verified to message includes as follows：S41：Roadside unit calculates M after receiving messagei=Zi⊕H4(YR,xRRi,Ri) message is decrypted, wherein xRIt is trackside The private key and Y of unitR=xRP；S42：First verify that stiWhether effectively, invalid then direct refuse information, effectively the message of decryption is verified again, Calculate cryptographic HashAnd the Formula V such as checkingiP=hi,2Ri+Ki+hi,1PpubWhether set up, if into Vertical then received message, otherwise refuse the message；S43：In addition, batch validation can also be carried out to message, roadside unit first carries out polymerization processing to the message received, verifies Equation (∑ Vi) P=(∑ hi,2Ri)+∑Ki+(∑hi,1)PpubWhether set up, then message is effective for establishment, otherwise abandons message.
- 6. being existed based on the method for signing close vehicular ad hoc network secret protection, its feature according to one of claim 1-5 In, the vehicular ad hoc network model is made up of four entities, be respectively trusted authority center TRA, key generation centre PKG, Vehicle node OBU and roadside unit RSU, TRA are responsible for the registration of system initialization generation common parameter and vehicle node, registration Generation assumed name is simultaneously sent to PKG；PKG is responsible for the generation of key, chooses random-number-generating system master key, receives TRA transmissions The related key of assumed name is generated after assumed name and is sent to vehicle node；Vehicle node is entered using the assumed name and roadside unit of generation Row communication.
- It is 7. according to claim 6 based on the method for signing close vehicular ad hoc network secret protection, it is characterised in that described The AES that vehicular ad hoc network model uses is built upon on two-wire group, is met the property of bilinear map, is given below The definition of bilinear map：If G1And G2It is the multiplicative cyclic group that two ranks are prime number p, g is G1Generation member, bilinear map e:G1×G1→G2, this is mapped with following characteristic：(1) bilinearity：For any u, v ∈ G1,a,b∈Zp,e(ua,vb)=e (u, v)ab；(2) non degenerate：e(g,g)≠1；(3) computability：For any u, v ∈ G1, can effectively calculate e (u, v).
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