CN107656839A - Research on Integrated Circuit Security is assessed and detection method - Google Patents
Research on Integrated Circuit Security is assessed and detection method Download PDFInfo
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- CN107656839A CN107656839A CN201710684900.6A CN201710684900A CN107656839A CN 107656839 A CN107656839 A CN 107656839A CN 201710684900 A CN201710684900 A CN 201710684900A CN 107656839 A CN107656839 A CN 107656839A
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- Prior art keywords
- trojan horse
- hardware trojan
- design
- integrated circuit
- silicon
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/22—Detection or location of defective computer hardware by testing during standby operation or during idle time, e.g. start-up testing
- G06F11/2273—Test methods
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
- G01R31/00—Arrangements for testing electric properties; Arrangements for locating electric faults; Arrangements for electrical testing characterised by what is being tested not provided for elsewhere
- G01R31/28—Testing of electronic circuits, e.g. by signal tracer
- G01R31/2851—Testing of integrated circuits [IC]
Abstract
The present invention relates to Research on Integrated Circuit Security field, ensure IC reliability to realize, strengthen the security of related system, it is proposed a kind of Research on Integrated Circuit Security assessment and detecting system, detected by being designed defect checking and hardware Trojan horse to circuit under test, realize the safety evaluation to IC system.The technical solution adopted by the present invention is that Research on Integrated Circuit Security is assessed and detection method, step are as follows：1) hardware Trojan horse storehouse is established, is divided into before silicon and silicon latter two aspect：2) design defect verification step, simulation result is compared with expected results by checking mechanism using the design defect of the method analysis circuit of simplation verification, it is thus found that the functional defect of design；3) detecting step：Complete the detection of hardware Trojan horse.Present invention is mainly applied to Research on Integrated Circuit Security occasion.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to Research on Integrated Circuit Security field, and in particular to a kind of efficient Research on Integrated Circuit Security is assessed and detection
System, comprehensive assessment effectively can be carried out to the security performance of integrated circuit, and realize the detection of hardware Trojan horse.
Background technology
With the rapid development of EDA Technique and semiconductor fabrication process, single-chip digital IC chip
Integrated function becomes increasingly complex, and circuit scale is increasing, integrated level more and more higher, so as to be widely used in modern science and technology
Every field, especially in finance device, mobile communication, communications and transportation, the Sensitive Domain such as government and the energy.Integrated circuit is to society
Can progress and expanding economy play increasing impetus, have become support socio-economic development it is strategic,
Basic and advanced sector.
In today of business globalization, the design of IC chip gradually tends to globalize with manufacturing.Ic core
The listing of piece needs to undergo design, manufacture, packaging and testing four-stage.It is advanced and complicated due to IC products
Property, while in order to more reasonably utilize resource and fund to configure, the design and manufacturing process of monolithic integrated optical circuit are completely by more families
Unit consolidation is completed, wherein being no lack of joint venture or overseas-funded enterprise.The design of integrated circuit and the separation of manufacturing process, this gives
The security of integrated circuit brings great security risk, such as is largely multiplexed third party's IP kernel in the design phase, is manufacturing
During incredible mask plate be present, there may be in encapsulation process redundancy encapsulation etc..In the whole production of integrated circuit
In manufacturing process, whether because error caused by circuit defect, or malicious attacker deliberately to circuit carry out modification, all
Security threat will be caused to whole IC system.
Production defect can influence the correctness of circuit function, and reduce circuit performance to a certain extent, can also be by malice
Attacker utilizes, so as to reduce the reliability of IC system.
And the malicious modification carried out by not trusted third party to circuit or implantation are then referred to as hardware Trojan horse, hardware Trojan horse
Penetrated from bottom hardware, attacker is cleverly designed for specific system, the hidden aspect in circuit.Hardware wood
Marko with complete independently attack function, such as reveal information to attacker, change circuit function, even directly destruction circuit, also may be used
Systemic-function can be destroyed with software collaboration.Hardware Trojan horse can be realized to application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), microprocessor, microcontroller
The modification of the hardware such as device, network processing unit, digital signal processor (DSP), can also realize and the firmwares such as FPGA bit streams are repaiied
Change.
The huge impact that the appearance of hardware Trojan horse brings for IC industry security, cause the extensive pass of people
Note.Recently as gradually going deep into for hardware Trojan horse research, many achievements are achieved in terms of the detection technique of hardware Trojan horse, it is main
There are physical detection, Function detection, by-passing signal to analyze three kinds.Although above-mentioned detection technique comparative maturity, detection side
Formula is separate, and detection type is excessively single, still can not carry out all-position safety assessment to IC chip.Security with
Reliability undoubtedly turns into the huge challenge that has faced of IC industry, if manufacturing defect or malice implantation in circuit hard
Part wooden horse can not be detected, and make it that unsafe IC chip comes into the market, and contemporary information systems can be caused safe
It cannot ensure, inestimable loss will be caused.
Bibliography
[1]Xiao K,Forte D,Jin Y,et al.Hardware Trojans:Lessons Learned after
One Decade of Research[J].Acm Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic
Systems,2016,22(1):6.
[2]Shende R,Ambawade D D.A side channel based power analysis
technique for hardware trojan detection using statistical learning approach
[C]//Thirteenth International Conference on Wireless and Optical
Communications Networks.2016:1-4.
[3]Kumar P,Srinivasan R.Detection of hardware Trojan in SEA using
path delay[C]//Electrical,Electronics and Computer Science.IEEE,2014:1-6.
[4]Wang J,Li H,Lv T,et al.Functional test generation guided by
steady-state probabilities of abstract design[M].2014。
The content of the invention
For overcome the deficiencies in the prior art, it is contemplated that realizing ensures IC reliability, strengthen related system
Security, propose that a kind of Research on Integrated Circuit Security is assessed and detecting system, by circuit under test is designed defect checking with
And hardware Trojan horse detection, realize the safety evaluation to IC system.The technical solution adopted by the present invention is integrated circuit
Safety evaluation and detection method, step are as follows：
1) hardware Trojan horse storehouse is established, is divided into before silicon and silicon latter two aspect：
A) the silicon last stage：
The silicon last stage refers to the design phase before flow, it is necessary first to which existing hardware Trojan horse design of increasing income is searched
Collection arranges, and extracts function, active mode, insertion position, the inserted mode feature of hardware Trojan horse, it is divided according to feature
Class, and then form preliminary hardware Trojan horse storehouse；
B) stage after silicon：
The stage then refers to the IC chip after flow after silicon, by the way of the Multiple Channel Analysis of side, to containing difference
Electric current, power consumption, electromagnetism, delayed data during the hardware Trojan horse chip operation of species carry out feature extraction, excavate various types of
Hardware Trojan horse changes form to integrated circuit side channel information, the hardware Trojan horse feature database formed after silicon；
2) design defect verification step, using the design defect of the method analysis circuit of simplation verification, by testing automatically
The mode of vector generation applies test and excitation to design to be measured, output result is obtained by emulation, by covering in simulation process
Cover mold type records coverage rate result, and finally simulation result is compared with expected results by checking mechanism, it is thus found that design
Functional defect；
3) detecting step：In the silicon last stage by analyzing design data, test script is write, using hardware Trojan horse storehouse as reference
The few state Activity On the Node of sample on-line monitoring, matching excavate hardware Trojan horse, identify suspicious instruction, and the security breaches of positioning circuit；
In the stage after silicon, the side channel information of online acquisition integrated circuit, algorithm process number is corresponded to using principal component analysis, mahalanobis distance
According to by being contrasted with the characteristic information collected in hardware Trojan horse storehouse, completing the detection of hardware Trojan horse.
In step 1), on the basis of classification, with reference to the hardware Trojan horse feature and project needs extracted, multiclass is carried out
Type, the design of the hardware Trojan horse of multi-quantity, enrich hardware Trojan horse storehouse content.
Specifically, typical hardware Trojan horse at this stage is collected first, including project team has accumulated, and domestic and foreign literature
In the hardware Trojan horse be described in detail, supplement hardware Trojan horse storehouse secondly by autonomous Design hardware Trojan horse.Design phase passes through
Write program code and realize hardware Trojan horse specific function, and integrated by code and carry out functional simulation checking, to ensure to design work(
Can correctness, separately design two parts of trigger module and payload of hardware Trojan horse in design process, and pass through two
The independent assortment of individual part realizes that hardware Trojan horse species extends.
The features of the present invention and beneficial effect are：
(1) present invention devises a kind of Research on Integrated Circuit Security assessment and detecting system, can be to the security of integrated circuit
Comprehensive assessment (comprising design defect checking, logic function test, hardware Trojan horse detection etc.) is carried out, and generates corresponding security
Assessment report.
(2) the detection platform design phase have collected a large amount of Research on Integrated Circuit Security relevant informations, be enriched comprising detection content,
A set of perfect detection architecture is formd, and corresponding detection operation is relatively simple.
Brief description of the drawings：
Fig. 1 Research on Integrated Circuit Security is assessed and detecting system.
Logic circuit after Fig. 2 insertion wooden horses.
Embodiment
Various countries are studied excessively single for the correlation detection technology of design defect and hardware Trojan horse at this stage, not yet form system
One standard, it is impossible to effective assessment is made to Research on Integrated Circuit Security.Based on integrated circuit user's aspect, to ensure integrated electricity
Road reliability, strengthens the security of related system, and the present invention proposes a kind of Research on Integrated Circuit Security assessment and detecting system.Should
Method initially sets up hardware Trojan horse storehouse, extracts many-sided hardware Trojan horse characteristic information, forms hardware Trojan horse feature samples.As
Basis, detected by being designed defect checking and hardware Trojan horse to circuit under test, realize the safety to IC system
Property assess.
Research on Integrated Circuit Security is assessed with detecting system structure as shown in figure 1, including hardware Trojan horse Sample Storehouse, design defect
Verification platform, hardware Trojan horse detection platform and the part of Research on Integrated Circuit Security Evaluation Platform four, can be Research on Integrated Circuit Security
Evaluation and test rectification provides solution with safety detection.This platform is with the hardware Trojan horse characteristic information extracted and the hardware wood of foundation
Based on horse Sample Storehouse, by modes such as Inspection, the matching analysis, source code security loophole evaluation and test, hardware Trojan horse can be achieved
The functions such as excavation, design defect detection, security breaches positioning and hardware Trojan horse detection.
The key property of system includes：
Support the hardware description languages such as VHDL and Verilog
Support the ASIC source codes test based on Cadence or Synopsys
Support the FGPA source codes test based on platforms such as Xilinx, Altera, Actel
Support the collection of the by-passing signal such as power consumption and electromagnetic signal
Support the data analysis algorithms such as PCA, SOM, ACO, PSO, GA, SVM
Support user's extensive diagnostic algorithm development
Collecting typical hardware Trojan horse at this stage first, (including project team has accumulated, and in domestic and foreign literature in detail
The hardware Trojan horse described), supplement hardware Trojan horse storehouse secondly by autonomous Design hardware Trojan horse.Design phase is by writing
Verilog codes realize hardware Trojan horse specific function, and are integrated by code and carry out functional simulation checking, to ensure design function
Correctness.Two parts of trigger module and payload of hardware Trojan horse are separately designed in design process, and pass through two
Partial independent assortment realizes that hardware Trojan horse species extends.
Polytype hardware Trojan horse is covered in hardware Trojan horse storehouse, is according to the function of hardware Trojan horse, active mode, side channel
The multi-party region feature such as information carries out extracting resulting Sample Storehouse.Substantial amounts of existing exemplary hardware wooden horse is included in Sample Storehouse, with
The multi-faceted information such as insertion stage, physical layer is that foundation is classified respectively.For the hardware Trojan horse in the storehouse, it is extracted
Many-sided hardware Trojan horse characteristic information (such as electromagnetic information, power consumption information, temperature information etc.), these characteristic informations are integrated circuit
The foundation of safety evaluation and detecting system provides technical foundation.As shown in Fig. 2 the foundation on hardware Trojan horse storehouse, can divide
For before silicon and silicon latter two aspect.
A) the silicon last stage：
The silicon last stage refers to the design phase before flow, relates generally to Verilog/VHDL source code levels circuit, netlist
Level circuit, domain level circuit.For the circuit in this stage, it is necessary first to existing hardware Trojan horse design of increasing income collect whole
Reason, the multi-party region features such as the function of hardware Trojan horse, active mode, insertion position, inserted mode are extracted, it is carried out according to feature
Classification, and then form preliminary hardware Trojan horse storehouse.On the basis of classification, needed with reference to the hardware Trojan horse feature and project extracted
Will, polymorphic type, the design of the hardware Trojan horse of multi-quantity are carried out, enriches hardware Trojan horse storehouse content.
B) stage after silicon：
The stage then refers to the IC chip after flow after silicon.Chip for having manufactured and designed completion, directly
It is big that analysis cost height, difficulty are carried out to its internal structure, therefore herein by the way of the Multiple Channel Analysis of side.For autonomous Design and search
The chip sample containing hardware Trojan horse collected and original maternal circuit, with reference to side Multiple Channel Analysis technology, to containing not of the same race
The information such as electric current, power consumption, electromagnetism, delay during the hardware Trojan horse chip operation of class carry out feature extraction.Excavate various types of
Hardware Trojan horse changes form to integrated circuit side channel information, the hardware Trojan horse feature database formed after silicon.
Design defect checking relates generally to Verilog/VHDL levels and the simulating, verifying of netlist level circuit.Platform mainly uses
The design defect of the method analysis circuit of simplation verification, applied by way of automatic test vector generation (ATPG) to design to be measured
Add test and excitation, output result obtained by emulation, in simulation process by overlay model record coverage rate result, finally by
Checking mechanism compares simulation result with expected results, it is thus found that the functional defect of design.
Hardware Trojan horse detection platform be also classified into silicon before, latter two stage of silicon, in the silicon last stage by analyzing design data, compile
Test script is write, monitors few state Activity On the Node on-line by reference sample of hardware Trojan horse storehouse, hardware Trojan horse is excavated in matching, and identification can
Doubt instruction, and security breaches of positioning circuit etc.；In the stage after silicon, the side channel information of online acquisition integrated circuit, utilize master
The corresponding algorithm process data such as constituent analysis, mahalanobis distance, by being contrasted with the characteristic information collected in hardware Trojan horse storehouse, complete
The detection of hardware Trojan horse.
After the design defect checking and hardware Trojan horse detection of integrated circuit is completed, Research on Integrated Circuit Security Evaluation Platform
Meeting comprehensive verification testing result, analysis circuit under test performance deficiency that may be present and security risks, generation integrated circuit peace
Full property assessment report.According to the particular content of testing result in assessment report, and combined circuit actual conditions provide corresponding to it is anti-
Model opinion and corrective measure, realize the function of real-time automatic judgment circuit safety.
The present invention devises a set of Research on Integrated Circuit Security and assessed and detection system from Research on Integrated Circuit Security angle
System.First by establishing corresponding hardware Trojan horse Sample Storehouse, hardware Trojan horse characteristic information is collected, and collect other hardware security phases
Information is closed, establishes design defect verification platform, hardware Trojan horse detection platform, Research on Integrated Circuit Security Evaluation Platform respectively.Commenting
Estimate and in detection process, first IC chip to be measured is analyzed, excavate the problem of it there may be, then using corresponding
Detection platform it is detected successively.In detection process, hardware Trojan horse Sample Storehouse provides for the other three detection platform
Technical support, after undergoing each detection platform, system can all record corresponding testing result information, final Research on Integrated Circuit Security
Property Evaluation Platform can generate a comprehensive integrated circuit detection safety analysis report.Report is by all kinds of testing results
Analyzed, dissect the security and reliability of circuit under test comprehensively.
Claims (3)
1. a kind of Research on Integrated Circuit Security is assessed and detection method, it is characterized in that, step is as follows：
1) hardware Trojan horse storehouse is established, is divided into before silicon and silicon latter two aspect：
A) the silicon last stage：
The silicon last stage refers to the design phase before flow, it is necessary first to existing hardware Trojan horse design of increasing income collect whole
Reason, extracts function, active mode, insertion position, the inserted mode feature of hardware Trojan horse, it is classified according to feature, entered
And form preliminary hardware Trojan horse storehouse；
B) stage after silicon：
The stage then refers to the IC chip after flow after silicon, by the way of the Multiple Channel Analysis of side, to containing variety classes
Hardware Trojan horse chip operation during electric current, power consumption, electromagnetism, delayed data carry out feature extraction, excavate various types of hardware
Wooden horse changes form to integrated circuit side channel information, the hardware Trojan horse feature database formed after silicon；
2) design defect verification step, using the design defect of the method analysis circuit of simplation verification, automatic test vector is passed through
The mode of generation applies test and excitation to design to be measured, output result is obtained by emulation, by covering mould in simulation process
Type records coverage rate result, and finally simulation result is compared with expected results by checking mechanism, it is thus found that the function of design
Defect；
3) detecting step：In the silicon last stage by analyzing design data, test script is write, using hardware Trojan horse storehouse as reference sample
The few state Activity On the Node of on-line monitoring, matching excavate hardware Trojan horse, identify suspicious instruction, and the security breaches of positioning circuit；In silicon
In the stage afterwards, the side channel information of online acquisition integrated circuit, algorithm process data are corresponded to using principal component analysis, mahalanobis distance,
By being contrasted with the characteristic information collected in hardware Trojan horse storehouse, the detection of hardware Trojan horse is completed.
2. Research on Integrated Circuit Security as claimed in claim 1 is assessed and detection method, it is characterized in that, in step 1), dividing
On the basis of class, with reference to the hardware Trojan horse feature and project needs extracted, polymorphic type is carried out, the hardware Trojan horse of multi-quantity is set
Meter, enrich hardware Trojan horse storehouse content.
3. Research on Integrated Circuit Security as claimed in claim 2 is assessed and detection method, it is characterized in that, specifically, collect first
Typical hardware Trojan horse at this stage, including project team have accumulated, and the hardware Trojan horse being described in detail in domestic and foreign literature,
Hardware Trojan horse storehouse is supplemented secondly by autonomous Design hardware Trojan horse.Design phase realizes hardware Trojan horse by writing program code
Specific function, and integrated by code and carry out functional simulation checking, to ensure the correctness of design function, distinguish in design process
Two parts of trigger module and payload of hardware Trojan horse are designed, and hardware wood is realized by the independent assortment of two parts
Horse species extends.
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Cited By (12)
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108446555A (en) * | 2018-02-11 | 2018-08-24 | 复旦大学 | The method that hardware Trojan horse is monitored in real time and is detected |
| CN108629187A (en) * | 2018-05-03 | 2018-10-09 | 电子科技大学 | A kind of on-chip multi-processor security assessment method |
| CN109543464A (en) * | 2018-10-19 | 2019-03-29 | 天津大学 | Based on FPGA local reconfigurable hardware Trojan horse safety protecting method and device |
| CN109543522A (en) * | 2018-10-18 | 2019-03-29 | 天津大学 | Hardware Trojan horse noise preprocess method based on gaussian kernel function SVM |
| CN109871688A (en) * | 2018-09-21 | 2019-06-11 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | vulnerability threat degree evaluation method |
| CN110865936A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-03-06 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | White box plug FPGA prototype verification method oriented to integrated circuit safety function |
| CN112487503A (en) * | 2020-12-09 | 2021-03-12 | 电子科技大学 | Detection system and method based on hardware Trojan horse data information statistics |
| CN112685800A (en) * | 2019-10-17 | 2021-04-20 | 北京大学 | Hardware Trojan horse detection method based on time window self-comparison |
| CN115544958A (en) * | 2022-11-30 | 2022-12-30 | 北京智芯仿真科技有限公司 | Method for diagnosing and automatically repairing integrated circuit layout design defect |
| US11579185B2 (en) * | 2019-07-01 | 2023-02-14 | University Of Florida Research Foundation, Inc. | Maximization of side-channel sensitivity for trojan detection |
| CN116736088A (en) * | 2023-08-11 | 2023-09-12 | 上海类比半导体技术有限公司 | Chip testing method for assisting post-silicon test |
| CN117034374A (en) * | 2023-08-28 | 2023-11-10 | 绍兴龙之盾网络信息安全有限公司 | LM-BPNN hardware Trojan detection method and system based on PSO |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108446555A (en) * | 2018-02-11 | 2018-08-24 | 复旦大学 | The method that hardware Trojan horse is monitored in real time and is detected |
| CN108629187B (en) * | 2018-05-03 | 2021-08-17 | 电子科技大学 | On-chip multiprocessor safety evaluation method |
| CN108629187A (en) * | 2018-05-03 | 2018-10-09 | 电子科技大学 | A kind of on-chip multi-processor security assessment method |
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| CN109543464A (en) * | 2018-10-19 | 2019-03-29 | 天津大学 | Based on FPGA local reconfigurable hardware Trojan horse safety protecting method and device |
| US11579185B2 (en) * | 2019-07-01 | 2023-02-14 | University Of Florida Research Foundation, Inc. | Maximization of side-channel sensitivity for trojan detection |
| CN112685800A (en) * | 2019-10-17 | 2021-04-20 | 北京大学 | Hardware Trojan horse detection method based on time window self-comparison |
| CN110865936B (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2022-09-30 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | White box plug FPGA prototype verification method oriented to integrated circuit safety function |
| CN110865936A (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2020-03-06 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | White box plug FPGA prototype verification method oriented to integrated circuit safety function |
| CN112487503A (en) * | 2020-12-09 | 2021-03-12 | 电子科技大学 | Detection system and method based on hardware Trojan horse data information statistics |
| CN115544958A (en) * | 2022-11-30 | 2022-12-30 | 北京智芯仿真科技有限公司 | Method for diagnosing and automatically repairing integrated circuit layout design defect |
| CN115544958B (en) * | 2022-11-30 | 2023-03-10 | 北京智芯仿真科技有限公司 | Method for diagnosing and automatically repairing integrated circuit layout design defects |
| CN116736088A (en) * | 2023-08-11 | 2023-09-12 | 上海类比半导体技术有限公司 | Chip testing method for assisting post-silicon test |
| CN116736088B (en) * | 2023-08-11 | 2023-11-17 | 上海类比半导体技术有限公司 | Chip testing method for assisting post-silicon test |
| CN117034374A (en) * | 2023-08-28 | 2023-11-10 | 绍兴龙之盾网络信息安全有限公司 | LM-BPNN hardware Trojan detection method and system based on PSO |
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Application publication date: 20180202 |