CN107623569A - Block chain key escrow and restoration methods, device based on Secret sharing techniques - Google Patents

Block chain key escrow and restoration methods, device based on Secret sharing techniques Download PDF

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CN107623569A
CN107623569A CN201710929244.1A CN201710929244A CN107623569A CN 107623569 A CN107623569 A CN 107623569A CN 201710929244 A CN201710929244 A CN 201710929244A CN 107623569 A CN107623569 A CN 107623569A
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private key
key
user
secret
block chain
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谢翔
李升林
何德彪
孙立林
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Matrix Technology (shenzhen) Co Ltd
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Matrix Technology (shenzhen) Co Ltd
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Abstract

A kind of block chain key escrow and restoration methods, device based on Secret sharing techniques, its method include：A1:User is by private key sk1Utilize (t, n) privacy sharing mode be grouped, n be private key split shared secret fragment number, t be recover private key minimum fragment number, 2≤t≤n；A2:The key protected using the information including comprising customer identification information as private key, private key is subjected to block encryption using the key afterwards；A3:Trustship storage is carried out by being stored in block chain comprising the secret string information dispersion including ciphertext after encryption or being sent respectively to trusted node；When user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, key recovery request is sent, according to the secret string storage mode of key, selects to obtain at least t secret string from trusted node or block chain, and extracts the content in secret string, decrypts and is recombinated, so as to recover private key.The present invention realizes Secret sharing techniques first Application to block chain scene the safety issue of private key keeping and recovery.

Description

Block chain key escrow and restoration methods, device based on Secret sharing techniques
Technical field
It is more particularly to a kind of that existing block chain technology is improved using Secret sharing techniques the present invention relates to block chain technology Block chain key escrow and restoration methods, the device of upper key management.
Background technology
Block chain technology is initiated by the decentralization distribution account book technology of bit coin, its by technology endorse rather than in Xin Hua credit institutions facilitate transaction, have the characteristics that decentralization, without center trust, can not distort and encryption safe.Section Participant of the point as block catenary system, safeguards a data trnascription respectively.Node keeps backup database by algorithm of knowing together The uniformity of data.Each account is made up of address (public key) and private key in block catenary system.User is come by using private key The assets in account are controlled, private key is unique data for proving user identity, and the core asset of user can only be carried out by private key Control, the confirmation of transaction could be only realized by the signature of private key, so the protection on block chain private key is particularly important.
If private key is directly deposited in user's hard disk with document form, in such a mode, the storage of private key and the peace used Full property and convenience have all been short of.It is security first, private key is easily stolen, and private key, which is once stolen, means ownership Steal.National GB/T 25065-2010《The safety of information security technology PKIX signature generation application program will Ask》Middle clear stipulaties：Storage is unsafe in the form of document certificate, can not be stored in hard, floppy disk.Secondly may be damaged Bad, private key once damages the loss for meaning that ownership on block chain.Therefore must there are certain measure and technology to key Storage and using carry out specification.
In existing block catenary system, the storage and use of key have four kinds of main stream approach：Platform trustship, native client End, stored value card and offline cold storage.And in these four methods, only platform trustship method can be by the private key of user in core Backed up at node, it is extensive so as to provide key when user key loss or death, it is necessary to entrust core node to give private key for change Multiple service.Although this method can solve the demand for giving private key for change, the excessive right of core node is imparted, it is impossible to meet visitor Family demand, trustee can actually control account completely, it might even be possible to run counter to the operation of consigner's wish.
In summary, in existing block catenary system key storage and use problems be present：Security is low, Yong Humi Key, which is lost, to be not easy to recover, or new safety problem is brought in storing process due to the demand for solving to give private key for change.
The content of the invention
It is an object of the invention to provide a kind of block chain key escrow and restoration methods based on Secret sharing techniques, with Solve in the prior art that security is low, user key is lost and is not easy to recover, or deposited due to the demand for solving to give private key for change New safety problem is brought during storage again.
A kind of block chain key escrow and restoration methods based on Secret sharing techniques, comprise the following steps：
(1) launch phase
A1：User is by private key sk1The mode of (t, n) privacy sharing is utilized to be grouped, n is that private key splits shared secret Fragment number, t be recover private key minimum fragment number, 2≤t≤n；
A2：The key protected using the information including comprising customer identification information as private key, utilize the key will afterwards Private key carries out block encryption；
A3：Block chain will be stored in comprising the secret string information dispersion including ciphertext after encryption or be sent respectively to credible Node is appointed to carry out trustship storage；
(2) the key recovery stage
When user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, key recovery request is sent, according to the secret string storage mode of key, Selection obtains at least t secret string from trusted node or block chain, and extracts the content in secret string, decrypts and carries out weight Group, so as to recover private key.
A kind of block chain key escrow based on Secret sharing techniques and recover device, wherein, including Transmit-Receive Unit and Processing unit,
Processing unit：For utilizing the mode of (t, n) privacy sharing to be grouped private key sk1 in the trustship stage；
And the key protected for the information including using comprising customer identification information as private key, the key is utilized afterwards Private key is subjected to block encryption；
And for the content in the secret reconstruction stage, the secret string of extraction, decrypt and recombinated to recover private key；
Transmit-Receive Unit：Block chain is stored in for including the secret string information dispersion after encryption including ciphertext in the trustship stage System is sent respectively to the progress trustship storage of trusted node；For in the key recovery stage, selecting from trusted node Or at least t secret string is obtained on block chain.
The core of the present invention is existing Secret sharing techniques first Application to block chain scene realizing that private key is protected Pipe and the safety issue recovered.First, the introducing of Secret sharing techniques so that user can back up the ciphertext block of private key At different core nodes, center of dispersal node authority, secret is prevented excessively to concentrate, the risk that distributed key is resumed, and It is inbreak-tolerated.Furthermore, it is possible to according to the requirement of security, suitable t values are set, to improve its reliability.Secondly, private key encryption The introducing of technology so that even if core node is conspired, recover the ciphertext content of private key for user, can not also know the true interior of key Hold, the backup and recovery of private key are safer, protect user's right.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is a kind of schematic diagram of privacy sharing；
Fig. 2 is a kind of block chain key escrow and restoration methods string routine figure based on Secret sharing techniques；
Fig. 3 is a kind of implementation process exemplary plot of launch phase；
Fig. 4 is a kind of implementation process exemplary plot of Restoration stage.
Embodiment
The technical scheme that the embodiment of the present invention is provided is applied to most block catenary systems, and block catenary system is a kind of Acentric network system, most common is bit coin network system.Bit coin system is made up of multiple terminals, in the system In and in the absence of central server or the equipment with similar functions, each terminal in system is all " equality ", can Build, send and receive Transaction Information.If terminal bit coin network to be added.Terminal has one in bit coin system Unique address.This address can be voluntarily inputted after a string of characters by user by bit coin Software Create, between terminal It is portable with transacting targeted address information in Transaction Information when carrying out the transaction of bit coin.According to transacting targeted address information, Bit coin network system takes midsequent forward mode to transmit Transaction Information, i.e., when a system node receives a transaction letter After breath, the transacting targeted address information in Transaction Information judges whether it is the address information of oneself, if it is not, then to neighbour Near system node broadcasts the Transaction Information.Bit coin network system is a kind of relatively conventional block catenary system, except than Outside special coin system, such as the other digital coin systems in ether mill also all have similar principle and feature, should be included in the present invention Among example.
The core point of the present invention is：The present invention provides user key in block catenary system using Secret sharing techniques and recovered Mechanism.Consider any user node in block catenary system, the private key for the recovery loss that it can be safe by this key recovery mechanism. The mechanism is divided into two stages：Launch phase and key recovery stage.In launch phase, user is locally passing through secret sharing Mode to own private key carry out block encryption after, obtain ciphertext group, there is two kinds of alternatives afterwards：Ciphertext component is dissipated into storage In block chain, or after being digitally signed respectively to ciphertext group, signature and corresponding ciphertext group are sent respectively to trusted Node.In the key recovery stage, when user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, key recovery request is sent, and according to issue rank The custody scheme of section selection, obtain ciphertext fragment and relevant parameter respectively from trusted node or block chain, user is at this Ground is decrypted, so as to recover key.The encryption key of the method only has user oneself to know, and privacy sharing method is drawn Enter to have disperseed the right of key escrow node, single node can not recover complete private key ciphertext so that it is any remaining Node can not obtain the private key of user in ciphertext, ensure that user entrusts the security of private key with this.That is, the present invention uses Encryption technology and Secret sharing techniques collective effect, private key for user will not be known except user itself by other sides, ensure private key Backup and recover it is safer.
The applicant first introduces Secret sharing techniques.Shared is a kind of cryptographic technique for splitting the secret into storage, it is therefore an objective to Prevent secret from excessively concentrating, diversified risks and inbreak-tolerated purpose with reaching, be important in information security and data confidentiality Means.(t, n) privacy sharing mode therein is as shown in figure 1, its main flow is described below：
1. secret S is split as the shared secret of n fragment
2. in fragment distribution phase, secondary n secret fragments are sent respectively to n participant
3. in secret reconstruction stage, using individual or more the shared fragment can Restore Secret of any t (2≤t≤n), And any t-1 or less shared fragment are can not to obtain any useful information on secret S.
This privacy sharing mode has a robustness, and one fragment of exposure or more to t-1 fragments are and few all without jeopardizing key Can not possibly conspire to obtain key in t-1 user, if while a fragment be lost or corrupted, can also recover key.According to t and N selection, safety and reliability can be weighed.If the larger t of selection, can provide high security, but reliability is relatively low；And select Less t, high reliability can be provided, but comparatively, security is with regard to relatively low.
The core of the present invention is existing Secret sharing techniques first Application to block chain scene realizing that private key is protected Pipe and the safety issue recovered.
Referring to Fig. 2, a kind of block chain key escrow and restoration methods flow chart based on Secret sharing techniques.It includes Launch phase and key recovery stage.
S10：Launch phase
S110：User is by private key sk1The mode of (t, n) privacy sharing is utilized to be grouped, n is that private key splits shared secret Fragment number, t be recover private key minimum fragment number, 2≤t≤n；
S120：The key protected using the information including comprising customer identification information as private key, the key is utilized afterwards Private key is subjected to block encryption；
S130：Block chain will be stored in comprising the secret string information dispersion including ciphertext after encryption or be sent respectively to can Trusted node carries out trustship storage；
S20：The key recovery stage
S210：When user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, key recovery request is sent, according to the secret string storage of key Mode, select to obtain at least t secret string from trusted node or block chain, and extract the content in secret string, decryption is simultaneously Recombinated, so as to recover private key.
The present invention has following advantage：First, user need not back up private key completely to any core or Centroid, can To prevent its authority excessive.Secondly, the introducing of Secret sharing techniques so that user can back up the ciphertext block of private key not At same core node, center of dispersal node authority, secret is prevented excessively to concentrate, the risk that distributed key is resumed, and tolerate Invasion.Finally, the introducing of private key encryption technology so that even if core node is conspired, the ciphertext content of private key for user is recovered, The true content of private key can not be known, the backup and recovery of private key are safer, protect user's right.
Example 1
Key recovery scheme is divided into launch phase and key recovery stage.Any domestic consumer's node body in consideration system Part, detailed process is as follows：
Launch phase：User forms the private key ciphertext group after oneself block encryption and user biological information and/or password The scattered storage such as public key information arrive block chain, with trustship encryption key, idiographic flow such as Fig. 3：
1. user generates the public private key pair (sk on elliptic curve1, pk1)=(x, xG), wherein G is generation member.Certainly, The generation of public private key pair can also use other existing algorithms.
2. by sk1The privacy sharing of (t, n) is carried out, is decomposed into sk1→(sk1 1, sk1 2... .., sk1 n), wherein 1≤t≤ N, i.e., by sk1The shared secret of n fragment is split as, the shared fragment can using any t and more than t recovers sk1；
3. user utilizes its biological characteristic B (may include fingerprint, iris, palm print and palm vein, shape of face etc.), using existing fuzzy Extractor or other existing algorithms disclose parameter P and secret parameter R to generate parameter, and formula is：Gen (B) → (P, R)
4. user's alternative has two kinds, scheme one is individually using secret parameter R cryptographic Hash as private key for user protection Private key, generate user private key protection public private key pair：(sk2, pk2)=(h (R), h (R) G)；Wherein h () represents cryptographic Hash Calculating function；Scheme two is that R and reception user's input user password pw are calculated into cryptographic Hash together, is protected as private key for user The private key of shield, generate the public private key pair of the private key protection of user：(sk2, pk2)=(h (R, pw), h (R, pw) G)
5. use pk2To by the sk after being split after privacy sharing1Block encryption is carried out, ciphertext group C is obtained, is designated as (C1, C2..., Cn), wherein Enc (pk2, sk1 i)=Ci.Special, as n=1, encipherment scheme is to sk1Overall encryption is carried out, It is the special shape of block encryption
6. user is by parameter P, CiAnd pk2Packet packing is carried out, is divided into n secret string, is designated as ((P, C1, pk2), (P, C2, pk2) ... (P, Cn, pk2))
7. user is by ((P, C1, pk2), (P, C2, pk2) ... (P, Cn, pk2)) be synchronized on block chain, and scattered progress Storage.User issues private key success.
Restoration stage：When user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, key recovery request is sent, is gone here and there according to the secret of key Storage mode, select to obtain at least t secret string from block chain, and extract the content in secret string, in local decrypted user Private key, and recombinated, so as to recover private key, idiographic flow such as Fig. 4.
1. user asks to recover private key, private key recovery request is sent to block chain；
2. t secret string is at least obtained on block chain, so as to obtain (P, Ci, pk2), wherein CiCorresponding obtained t secret Any ciphertext fragment in close string；
3. utilize open parameter P and user biological fingerprint B ' reduction Rep (P, B ') → R '.By the general of Fuzzy extractor Read, if biological characteristic B ' and raw biometric B distance (B, B ') ＜ θ, then the R ' of front and rear generation=R, i.e., fuzzy to carry Value is identical；Wherein distance () is similarity distance function, and θ is the numerical value provided in advance so that front and rear two biology The similarity distance of feature is necessarily less than this numerical value.
4. user is according to the scheme for whether selecting addition password pw to verify before, if not using password pw, user's profit With R ', the private key sk of reduction private key protection2, to ciphertext CiIt is decrypted, so as to obtain private key sk1 i；If using password pw, use Family utilizes R ' and pw, the private key sk of reduction private key protection2, to ciphertext CiIt is decrypted, obtains private key sk1 i。
5. according to t obtained private key sk1 i, recover sk1, key recovery success.
Example 2
Launch phase：User forms the private key ciphertext group after oneself block encryption and user biological information and/or password The storage such as public key information to trusted node, with trustship encryption key.Can any node can be in advance in block catenary system It is defined.
1. user generates the public private key pair (sk on elliptic curve1, pk1)=(x, xG), wherein G is generation member.Certainly, The generation of public private key pair can also use other existing algorithms.
2. by sk1The privacy sharing of (t, n) is carried out, is decomposed into sk1→(sk1 1, sk1 2... .., sk1 n), wherein 1≤t≤ N, i.e., by sk1The shared secret of n fragment is split as, the shared fragment can using any t and more than t recovers sk1；
3. user utilizes its biological characteristic B (may include fingerprint, iris, palm print and palm vein, shape of face etc.), using existing fuzzy Extractor or other existing algorithms disclose parameter P and secret parameter R to generate parameter, and formula is：Gen (B) → (P, R)
4. user's alternative has two kinds, scheme one is individually using secret parameter R cryptographic Hash as private key for user protection Private key, generate user private key protection public private key pair：(sk2, pk2)=(h (R), h (R) G)；Scheme two is by R and reception The user password pw of user's input calculates cryptographic Hash together, as the private key of private key for user protection, generates the private key protection of user Public private key pair：(sk2, pk2)=(h (R, pw), h (R, pw) G)
5. use pk2To by the sk after being split after privacy sharing1Block encryption is carried out, ciphertext group C is obtained, is designated as (C1, C2..., Cn), wherein Enc (pk2, sk1 i)=Ci.Special, as n=1, encipherment scheme is to sk1Overall encryption is carried out, It is the special shape of block encryption
6. user is by parameter P, CiAnd pk2Packet packing is carried out, is divided into n secret string, is designated as ((P, C1, pk2), (P, C2, pk2) ... (P, Cn, pk2))
7. user utilizes the private key sk of private key protection2To each secret string (P, Ci, pk2) signedAnd the S that will signiWith corresponding (P, Ci, pk2) at random or according to distribution algorithms set in advance The trusted node being sent respectively on block chain is stored.
Restoration stage：When user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, key recovery request is sent, is gone here and there according to the secret of key Storage mode, select to obtain t secret string from trusted node, and extract the content in secret string, it is private in local decrypted user Key, and recombinated, so as to recover private key.
1. user asks to recover private key, private key recovery request is sent to block chain；
2. first pass through the public key pk of private key for user protection2The authentication being digitally signed, authentication is by then obtaining Gone here and there to secret, t secret string is obtained to trusted node, obtain t secret string (P, Ci, pk2) wherein CiCorresponding obtained t Any ciphertext fragment in secret string；
3. utilize open parameter P and user biological fingerprint B ' reduction Rep (P, B ') → R '.By the general of Fuzzy extractor Read, if biological characteristic B ' and raw biometric B distance (B, B ') ＜ θ, then the R ' of front and rear generation=R, i.e., fuzzy to carry Value is identical；
4. user is according to the scheme for whether selecting addition password pw to verify before, if not using password pw, user's profit With R ', the private key sk of reduction private key protection2, to ciphertext CiIt is decrypted, so as to obtain private key sk1 i；If using password pw, use Family utilizes R ' and pw, the private key sk of reduction private key protection2, to ciphertext CiIt is decrypted, obtains private key sk1 i。
5. according to t obtained private key sk1 i, recover sk1, key recovery success.
A kind of block chain key escrow based on Secret sharing techniques and recover device, wherein, including Transmit-Receive Unit and Processing unit,
Processing unit：For in the trustship stage by private key sk1The mode of (t, n) privacy sharing is utilized to be grouped；
And the key protected for the information including using comprising customer identification information as private key, the key is utilized afterwards Private key is subjected to block encryption；
And for the content in the secret reconstruction stage, the secret string of extraction, decrypt and recombinated to recover private key；
Transmit-Receive Unit：Block chain is stored in for including the secret string information dispersion after encryption including ciphertext in the trustship stage System is sent respectively to the progress trustship storage of trusted node；For in the key recovery stage, selecting from trusted node Or at least t secret string is obtained on block chain.
The present invention be with reference to method according to embodiments of the present invention, equipment and computer program product flow chart and/or Block diagram describes.It should be understood that can be by each flow in computer program instructions implementation process figure and/or square bearer figure And/or square frame and the flow in string routine figure and/or block diagram and/or the combination of square frame.These computer programs can be provided Instruct the processor of general-purpose calculator, special-purpose computer, Embedded Processor or other programmable data processing equipments with Produce a machine so that use is produced by the instruction of computer or the computing device of other programmable data processing equipments In the function of realizing above-mentioned one flow of flow chart or the instruction of multiple string routines.
Although the present invention is disclosed as above with preferred embodiment, it is not for limiting claim, any this area Technical staff without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, can make possible variation and modification, therefore the present invention Protection domain should be defined by the scope that the claims in the present invention are defined.

Claims (9)

1. a kind of block chain key escrow and restoration methods based on Secret sharing techniques, it is characterised in that comprise the following steps：
(1) launch phase
A1:User is by private key sk1The mode of (t, n) privacy sharing is utilized to be grouped, n is the fragment that private key splits shared secret Number, t be recover private key minimum fragment number, 2≤t≤n；
A2:The key protected using the information including comprising customer identification information as private key, afterwards using the key by private key Carry out block encryption；
A3:Block chain will be stored in comprising the secret string information dispersion including ciphertext after encryption or be sent respectively to trusted section Point carries out trustship storage；
(2) the key recovery stage
When user has found that the private key of oneself is lost, key recovery request is sent, according to the secret string storage mode of key, selection At least t secret string is obtained from trusted node or block chain, and extracts the content in secret string, decrypts and is recombinated, So as to recover private key.
2. the method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that customer identification information includes the biological characteristic of user itself, step Rapid A2 further comprises：
User utilizes the biological characteristic of itself, and open parameter P and secret are generated using the maker including Fuzzy extractor Parameter R；
The private key that secret parameter R cryptographic Hash is protected as private key for user, generate the private key protection public private key pair (sk of user2、 pk2)；
Use above-mentioned public key pk2To by the private key for user sk after being split after privacy sharing1Block encryption is carried out, obtains ciphertext group C, it is designated as (C1,C2,....,Cn), Ci, its calculation formula is：Enc(pk2,sk1 i)=CiIt is thereinFor private key sk1Secret packet Obtained secret fragment；
User is by parameter P, CiAnd pk2Packet packing is carried out, obtains n secret string information ((P, C in step A31,pk2), (P,C2,pk2),....(P,Cn,pk2))。
3. the method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that customer identification information includes the biological characteristic and use of user itself Family password information, step A2 further comprise：
User utilizes the biological characteristic of itself, and open parameter P and secret are generated using the maker including Fuzzy extractor Parameter R；
The cryptographic Hash that the password information that secret parameter R and user input is calculated in the lump, it is raw as the private key of private key for user protection Into the private key protection public private key pair (sk of user2、pk2)；
Use above-mentioned public key pk2To by the private key for user sk after being split after privacy sharing1Block encryption is carried out, obtains ciphertext group C, it is designated as (C1,C2,....,Cn), wherein Enc (pk2,sk1 i)=Ci；
User is by parameter P, CiAnd pk2Packet packing is carried out, obtains n secret string information ((P, C in step A31,pk2), (P,C2,pk2) ... (P, Cn,pk2))。
4. method as claimed in claim 2 or claim 3, it is characterised in that the biological characteristic include fingerprint, iris, palm print and palm vein, Characteristic including shape of face.
5. such as the method any one of claim 1,2,3, it is characterised in that secret string information is sent respectively to credible Appoint node to carry out trustship storage to further comprise：
User utilizes the private key sk of private key protection2To each secret string (P, Ci,pk2) signedAnd the S that will signiWith corresponding (P, Ci,pk2) at random or according to distribution algorithms set in advance The trusted node being sent respectively on block chain is stored.
6. method as claimed in claim 5, it is characterised in that the key recovery stage further comprises：
User is asked to recover private key, and private key recovery request is sent to trusted node；
The public key pk protected by private key for user2The authentication being digitally signed, authentication by, then obtain secret string, At least t secret string (P, C are obtained to trusted nodei,pk2), wherein CiAny ciphertext in the corresponding secret string of t obtained Fragment；
Utilize open parameter P and user biological fingerprint B ' reduction Rep (P, B ') → R '；
User is according to the scheme for whether selecting addition password pw to verify before, if not using password pw, user utilizes R ', also The private key sk of former private key protection2, to ciphertext CiIt is decrypted, so as to obtain private key sk1 i；If using password pw, user utilizes R ' and pw, the private key sk of reduction private key protection2, to ciphertext CiIt is decrypted, obtains private key sk1 i；
According to the private key sk for obtaining being no less than t1 i, recover sk1, key recovery success.
7. such as the method any one of claim 1,2,3, it is characterised in that secret string information dispersion is stored in into area Block chain further comprises：User is by all secret ((P, C of going here and there1,pk2),(P,C2,pk2),....(P,Cn,pk2)) it is synchronized to area On block chain, stored according to decentralized algorithm set in advance is scattered.
8. method as claimed in claim 7, it is characterised in that the key recovery stage further comprises：
User is asked to recover private key, and private key recovery request is sent to block chain；
At least t secret string is obtained to block chain, obtains t secret string (P, Ci,pk2), wherein CiCorresponding t obtained is secret Any ciphertext fragment in string；
Utilize open parameter P and user biological fingerprint B ' reduction Rep (P, B ') → R '；
User is according to the scheme for whether selecting addition password pw to verify before, if not using password pw, user utilizes R ', also The private key sk of former private key protection2, to ciphertext CiIt is decrypted, so as to obtain private key sk1 i；If using password pw, user utilizes R ' and pw, the private key sk of reduction private key protection2, to ciphertext CiIt is decrypted, obtains private key sk1 i；
According to the private key sk for obtaining being no less than t1 i, recover sk1, key recovery success.
9. a kind of block chain key escrow based on Secret sharing techniques and the device recovered, wherein, including Transmit-Receive Unit and place Manage unit,
Processing unit：For in the trustship stage by private key sk1The mode of (t, n) privacy sharing is utilized to be grouped；
And the key protected for the information including using comprising customer identification information as private key, afterwards using the key by private Key carries out block encryption；
And for the content in the secret reconstruction stage, the secret string of extraction, decrypt and recombinated to recover private key；
Transmit-Receive Unit：Block catenary system is stored in for including the secret string information dispersion after encryption including ciphertext in the trustship stage Or it is sent respectively to trusted node and carries out trustship storage；For in the key recovery stage, selecting from trusted node or area At least t secret string is obtained on block chain.
CN201710929244.1A 2017-09-30 2017-09-30 Block chain key escrow and restoration methods, device based on Secret sharing techniques Pending CN107623569A (en)

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CN108377187A (en) * 2018-03-21 2018-08-07 山东超越数控电子股份有限公司 A kind of block chain private key application method and device based on biological characteristic
CN108632386A (en) * 2018-05-15 2018-10-09 众安信息技术服务有限公司 A kind of block chain set of node group building method and device
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Application publication date: 20180123