CN107589999B - Process communication safety channel establishing method in heaven-earth integrated engineering - Google Patents
Process communication safety channel establishing method in heaven-earth integrated engineering Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
A process communication safety channel establishing method in a heaven and earth integrated engineering belongs to the field of communication safety, and is characterized by comprising the following steps: step one, a main process of the communication of the heaven-earth integrated engineering is operated in a control server of the heaven-earth integrated engineering, step two, an external process is loaded into the control server of the heaven-earth integrated engineering to operate, and the external process requests the communication with the main process; initiating handshake communication between the kernel and the main process according to the main process identification number in the memory space, reading an external process identification number in the memory space by the main process, and comparing the external process identification number with a process identification number list contained in the main process; and judging the process identification number and the process validity, determining whether to start an external process verification flow for verification, and further establishing a safety channel for the process communication of the heaven-earth integrated engineering. The method has good shielding property and high recognition degree, can reduce the risk of the control server being attacked by the virus process, and improves the safety of the technology and data and the utilization rate of system resources.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of communication, and particularly relates to a method for establishing a process communication safety channel in a heaven-earth integrated engineering.
Background
The safety of communication in the integrated heaven and earth engineering is a key index, the current safety strategy mainly aims at the encryption of communication between a satellite and a ground control station, but the integrated heaven and earth engineering is divided into two stages, one stage is between the satellite and the ground control station, and the other stage is between computers in the ground control station. At present, the main research aims at the aspects of anti-interference, anti-trap and the like of communication between a satellite and a ground control station, and neglects the safe communication between computers in the ground station. Various data link encryption is adopted between internal computers to prevent virus intrusion, but the method can not effectively control the virus which has intruded into the internal computers, so that a security strategy aiming at the internal of the ground control station computer is lacked.
The IPC (inter-process communication mechanism) in the work computer L inux system is derived from IPC on a Unix platform, meanwhile L inux also follows IPC standards set by IEEE, and the IPC mechanisms mainly comprise pipelines, named pipelines, signals, message queues, shared memories, semaphores and sockets, through the IPC mechanisms, mutual communication can be completed among user space processes, the IPC mechanisms are mutually independent and closed, the IPC mechanisms serve as an implementation mechanism of communication, the IPC mechanism of the L inux system does not provide a secure transmission mechanism, so that the IPC mechanism of the L inux system cannot judge the legality of the processes in the operation process, and can not intercept system information of some illegal processes which maliciously falsify the specific processes and steal key data, and therefore the safety problem of a control server in the world-ground integrated data link technology is brought and is the technical problem which is aimed at by the technical scheme.
In the process of the heaven and earth integrated engineering research, a specific process of a control server is responsible for controlling various data interactions, but in the process of the operation of the control server, the control server can be attacked by various computer viruses, the computer viruses can possibly tamper with system information of the specific process, and can also forge an eavesdropping process to receive data information transmitted by the specific process and steal key data in a heaven and earth integrated data link.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a safer and more effective method for establishing a process communication safety channel in a heaven-earth integrated engineering.
The invention aims to realize the method for establishing the process communication safety channel in the heaven-earth integrated engineering, which comprises the following steps:
step one, a main process of the heaven-earth integrated engineering communication is operated in a control server of the heaven-earth integrated engineering, the main process comprises a process identification number list of verified processes, and the process identification number list contains process identification numbers which are verified to be legal or illegal.
And step two, operating an external process in a control server of the heaven-earth integrated project, and requesting the external process to establish communication with the main process. Firstly, the external process and the kernel initiate handshake communication to inform the kernel to allocate a memory space, and the identification numbers of the external process and the main process are written into the corresponding positions in the memory space.
And step three, the kernel initiates handshake communication with the main process according to the main process identification number in the memory space, and the main process reads the external process identification number in the memory space and compares the external process identification number with a process identification number list contained in the main process.
When the external process identification number is in the process identification number list and the identification of the external process identification number is a legal process, an IPC communication mechanism is adopted to carry out communication between the main process and the external process; when the external process identification number is in the process identification number list and the identification of the external process identification number is an illegal process, discarding the communication request of the external process; and when the external process identification number is not in the process identification number list, the step four is required to be continued to verify the legality of the external process.
And step four, starting an external process verification flow, informing the kernel of distributing the dynamic memory 1 by the main process, writing encryption information into the memory 1, writing the address of the memory 1 into a corresponding position of the memory space, and writing an external process identification number into a position of the external process identification number fed back by the main process in the memory space.
And step five, the kernel initiates handshake communication with the external process according to the fed back external process identification number in the memory space, the kernel allocates the dynamic memory 2, the external process reads the address of the memory 1 in the memory space, reads the encrypted information in the memory 1 and decrypts by using a decryption algorithm.
And step six, writing the address of the dynamic memory 2 into a corresponding position of the memory space, and then writing the decryption information obtained in the step five into the memory 2.
And step seven, the kernel initiates handshake communication with the main process again according to the main process identification number in the memory space, at the moment, the main process reads the address of the memory 2 in the memory space and reads the decryption information in the memory 2, the decryption information is encrypted by using an encryption algorithm, and the encryption information obtained in the step is compared with the encryption information written in the memory 1.
When the encrypted information in this step is consistent with the encrypted information written in the memory 1, the host process writes the identification number of the external process into a process identification number list of the verified process of the host process, and identifies the process as a legal process; when the encrypted information in this step is inconsistent with the encrypted information written in the memory 1, the host process also writes the identification number of the external process into the process identification number list of the verified process of the host process, but identifies the process as an illegal process.
If the external process is identified as a legal process, the main process initiates handshake communication with the kernel again to inform the kernel that the external process is a legal process and can communicate with the main process, and the external process can directly communicate with the main process through an IPC communication mechanism; if the external process is identified as an illegal process, the main process initiates handshake communication with the kernel again to inform the kernel that the external process is the illegal process, and the kernel discards the communication request of the process.
And step eight, repeatedly executing the step two to the step seven, and establishing a safety channel for the heaven-earth integrated engineering process communication.
The main process sends the communication message of the foreign process identification number added with the encryption information and the feedback to the foreign process through the kernel, and the communication message further comprises the following steps:
when the external process receives the message which is replied by the main process and contains the encryption information and the fed back external process identification number and is overtime, the main process sends a plurality of times of communication messages which contain the encryption information and the fed back external process identification number to the external process, and when the sending times exceed a set numerical value, the main process sends handshake communication to the kernel and the kernel sends handshake communication to the external process again.
The external process establishes handshake communication with the kernel to inform the kernel to allocate a memory space, and the method further comprises the following steps:
the memory space is divided into 5 blocks, which are used to store the external process identification number, the main process identification number, the fed-back external process identification number, the address of the dynamic memory 1 and the address of the dynamic memory 2. When the host process reads the external process identification number in the memory space and compares the external process identification number with a process identification number list contained in the host process, the external process identification number is in the process identification number list of the host process, and the kernel releases the memory space; and when the verification process is finished and the external process is identified as a legal process or an illegal process, the kernel releases the memory space.
The process communication safety channel establishing method in the heaven and earth integrated engineering further comprises the following steps: when the verification process of the external process is started, a dynamic memory 1 and a dynamic memory 2 are created, and after the verification process is finished, the kernel releases the dynamic memory 1 and the dynamic memory 2.
The invention provides a method for establishing a process communication security channel in a world-ground integrated project, which aims to solve the problem that process communication in the world-ground integrated project cannot prevent system information of a specific process of a control server from being tampered or key data from being stolen only by a traditional IPC (Internet control center) communication mechanism. The invention has the following beneficial effects:
the verification method of the external process adopted by the invention is a verification method with good shielding property and high identification degree, can reduce the risk of the control server being attacked and realizes the security of key technology and data in the world integration research; by establishing a process identification number list of the verified process of the main process, some illegal processes and legal processes can be identified quickly and efficiently, and the system resources are prevented from being reused; by means of dynamic memory allocation, system memory resources can be saved, and meanwhile, the control server can be prevented from being incapable of running due to the fact that a large number of communication requests are created by external processes and the resource utilization rate of the control server is occupied; in the heaven and earth integrated engineering, the invention improves the multidimensional property of ensuring the communication safety in the heaven and earth integrated engineering by establishing the safety channel of the local server process communication and combining with the heaven and earth integrated satellite communication safety channel, thereby overcoming the defect of ensuring the unicity of the communication safety in the heaven and earth integrated engineering.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of an IPC communication mechanism between user mode processes according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a transmission diagram of a process communication secure channel establishing method in a heaven and earth integration project according to the present invention;
fig. 3 is a flowchart of a process communication secure channel establishing method in the integrated heaven and earth engineering provided by the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention will be further illustrated by way of example with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is a diagram of conventional IPC communication mechanism between user mode processes, because in an L inux system, two processes are closed and cannot communicate directly, an IPC mechanism is needed as a "man-in-the-middle" to complete communication between user mode processes, fig. 2 and fig. 3 are a transmission schematic diagram and a flow chart of a method for establishing a process communication secure channel in a heaven-earth integration project, which are provided by an embodiment of the present invention, and the present invention is applied between user mode processes in a L inux system, and includes the following steps:
step one, an external process and a kernel initiate handshake communication to inform the kernel to allocate a memory space for writing in identification numbers of the external process and a main process.
The memory space of the embodiment is divided into 5 blocks, which are respectively used for storing an external process identification number, a main process identification number, a fed-back external process identification number, an address of a dynamic memory 1 and an address of a dynamic memory 2, and are called as a first memory space, a second memory space, a third memory space, a fourth memory space and a fifth memory space, wherein the identification numbers of the external process and the main process are written into the first memory space and the second memory space of the memory spaces, the memory spaces exist in each link of communication verification of the external process and the main process, and the memory spaces are released under the following conditions that when a verification process exists and the verification process is finished, when the identification number of the external process exists in a process identification number list of the main process during handshake communication between a first kernel and the main process, the identification number of each process in the L inux system is unique, so that the process identification number adopted by the embodiment of the invention is reasonable.
And step two, the kernel and the main process initiate handshake communication for the first time, and the main process reads the external process identification number in the memory space and compares the external process identification number with a process identification number list contained in the main process.
In the second step of the first handshake communication between the kernel and the main process, when the kernel and the main process initiate the first handshake communication, the kernel sends a command message to the main process, wherein the command message includes an address and a reading instruction of the first memory space, and informs the main process to read the identification number of the external process from the first memory space. The embodiment of the invention carries out verification on the basis of the heaven and earth integration research, and the main process of the control server comprises a process identification number list which is verified by the main process, wherein the identification number list comprises three parameter attributes of a process name, a process identification number and a process identification.
With reference to fig. 3 and step two, the host process compares the external process identification number read from the first memory space with the process identification number attribute in the process identification number list verified by the host process, when the external process identification number is in the process identification number list, if the identification of the external process identification number is legal, the IPC communication mechanism is directly adopted to perform communication between the host process and the external process, and if the identification of the external process identification number is illegal, the communication request of the external process is directly discarded; in this case, the entire memory space is freed regardless of whether the foreign process is legitimate or not. When the external process identification number is not in the process identification number list, the verification process needs to be continued to verify the validity of the external process.
And step three, informing the kernel to allocate the dynamic memory 1, writing encryption information into the memory 1, and writing the address of the memory 1 and the external process identification number into the corresponding position of the memory space.
In the embodiment of the present invention, when the kernel and the host process initiate a first handshake communication, the host process sends a communication message to the kernel to notify the kernel to allocate the dynamic memory 1, and at the same time, the embodiment of the present invention encrypts a string of random plaintext in one of 1024 encryption and DES encryption, and then writes the encrypted information into the memory 1, and simultaneously, needs to write the address of the memory 1 and the identification number of the external process into the fourth memory space and the third memory space.
And step four, the kernel and the external process initiate handshake communication to inform the kernel to distribute the dynamic memory 2, and the information for reading and decrypting the encrypted information of the memory 1 is written into the memory 2.
In the embodiment of the invention, the handshake communication initiated by the kernel and the external process is divided into two stages, wherein the first stage is that after the kernel and the main process initiate the first handshake communication, the third memory space and the fourth memory space are written with the process identification number and the address of the memory 1, which are fed back, at this time, the kernel sends a communication message to the external process according to the process identification number stored in the third memory space, the communication message mainly comprises the address of the memory 1, the external process reads the encrypted information in the memory 1 after receiving the communication message, and then the external process needs to decrypt the encrypted information by adopting an encryption and decryption method agreed by the main process; the second stage is that after the first stage, the external process sends a communication message to the kernel, and after the external process completes decryption information, the external process sends a communication message to the kernel to inform the kernel to allocate the dynamic memory 2, and simultaneously writes the decryption information into the memory 2, and finally needs to write the address of the memory 2 into the fifth memory space.
And fifthly, the kernel and the main process initiate handshake communication for the second time, the main process reads the address of the memory 2 in the memory space, reads the decryption information written in the memory 2, encrypts again and compares the encryption information with the encryption information written in the memory 1.
In the fifth step of the embodiment of the present invention, the kernel and the main process perform the second handshake communication, and when the kernel and the main process initiate the second handshake communication, the kernel sends a command message to the main process, where the command message includes addresses and read instructions of the fourth memory space and the fifth memory space, notifies the main process to read the address of the memory 2 in the fifth memory space, and further reads the decrypted information of the external process according to the address of the memory 2. And the main process encrypts the decryption information, and the encryption algorithm mode needs to be the same as the mode in the second step and the third step.
With reference to fig. 3 and step five, the main process compares the encrypted information obtained by encrypting the decryption information in the memory 2 with the encrypted information of the main process that reads the memory 1 in the fourth memory space, and when the encrypted information obtained by encrypting the decryption information in the memory 2 is consistent with the encrypted information written in the memory 1, the main process writes the identification number of the external process into the process identification number list of the verified process of the main process and identifies the process as a legal process; when the encrypted information obtained by encrypting the decryption information in the memory 2 is inconsistent with the encrypted information written in the memory 1, the host process also writes the identification number of the external process into the process identification number list of the verified process of the host process, but the identification is an illegal process, so that repeated verification of the external process can be effectively prevented.
And step six, the kernel determines whether to discard the foreign process or to approve the communication between the foreign process and the main process according to the comparison result.
If the external process is identified as a legal process, the main process initiates handshake communication with the kernel again to inform the kernel that the external process is a legal process and can communicate with the main process, and the external process can directly communicate with the main process through an IPC communication mechanism. If the external process is identified as an illegal process, the main process can initiate handshake communication with the kernel again to inform the kernel that the external process is the illegal process, and the kernel discards the communication request of the process.
And step seven, repeatedly executing the step two to the step six, and establishing a safety channel for the heaven-earth integrated engineering process communication.
Claims (3)
1. A process communication safety channel establishing method in a heaven and earth integrated engineering is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step one, a main process of the heaven-earth integrated engineering communication is operated in a control server of the heaven-earth integrated engineering, the main process comprises a process identification number list of a verified process, and the process identification number list contains process identification numbers which are verified to be legal or illegal;
step two, loading an external process into a control server of the heaven-earth integrated project to operate, and establishing communication between the external process request and the main process; firstly, initiating handshake communication between the external process and the kernel, informing the kernel to allocate a memory space, and writing the identification numbers of the external process and the main process into corresponding positions in the memory space;
initiating handshake communication between the kernel and the main process according to the main process identification number in the memory space, reading an external process identification number in the memory space by the main process, and comparing the external process identification number with a process identification number list contained in the main process;
when the external process identification number is in the process identification number list and the identification of the external process identification number is a legal process, an IPC communication mechanism is adopted to carry out communication between the main process and the external process; when the external process identification number is in the process identification number list and the identification of the external process identification number is an illegal process, discarding the communication request of the external process; when the external process identification number is not in the process identification number list, the step four is required to be continued to verify the legality of the external process;
step four, starting an external process verification flow, wherein the main process informs the kernel to allocate the dynamic memory 1, writes encryption information into the memory 1, writes the address of the memory 1 into a corresponding position of the memory space, and writes an external process identification number into an external process identification number position fed back by the main process in the memory space;
fifthly, initiating handshake communication with the external process by the kernel according to the fed back external process identification number in the memory space, distributing a dynamic memory 2 by the kernel, reading the address of the memory 1 in the memory space by the external process, reading the encrypted information in the memory 1, and decrypting by using a decryption algorithm;
writing the address of the dynamic memory 2 into a corresponding position of a memory space, and writing the decryption information obtained in the fifth step into the memory 2;
step seven, the kernel initiates handshake communication with the main process again according to the main process identification number in the memory space, at the moment, the main process reads the address of the memory 2 in the memory space and reads the decryption information in the memory 2, the decryption information is encrypted by using an encryption algorithm, and the encryption information obtained in the step is compared with the encryption information written in the memory 1;
when the encrypted information in this step is consistent with the encrypted information written in the memory 1, the host process writes the identification number of the external process into a process identification number list of the verified process of the host process, and identifies the process as a legal process; when the encrypted information in this step is inconsistent with the encrypted information written in the memory 1, the host process also writes the identification number of the external process into the process identification number list of the verified process of the host process, but the identification is an illegal process;
if the external process is identified as a legal process, the main process initiates handshake communication with the kernel again to inform the kernel that the external process is a legal process and can communicate with the main process, and the external process can directly communicate with the main process through an IPC communication mechanism; if the external process is identified as an illegal process, the main process initiates handshake communication with the kernel again to inform the kernel that the external process is the illegal process, and the kernel discards the communication request of the process;
and step eight, repeatedly executing the step two to the step seven, and establishing a safety channel for the heaven-earth integrated engineering process communication.
2. The method for establishing the process communication security channel in the integrated heaven and earth engineering as claimed in claim 1, wherein in the second step, the external process and the kernel initiate handshake communication to notify the kernel to allocate a memory space, further comprising: the memory space is divided into 5 blocks which are respectively used for storing an external process identification number, a main process identification number, a fed-back external process identification number, an address of the dynamic memory 1 and an address of the dynamic memory 2; when the host process reads the external process identification number in the memory space and compares the external process identification number with a process identification number list contained in the host process, the external process identification number is in the process identification number list of the host process, and the kernel releases the memory space; and when the verification process is finished and the external process is identified as a legal process or an illegal process, the kernel releases the memory space.
3. The method for establishing the process communication security channel in the heaven and earth integration project as claimed in claim 1 or 2, wherein the dynamic memory 1 and the dynamic memory 2 are created when the verification process of the external process is started, and the kernel releases the dynamic memory 1 and the dynamic memory 2 when the verification process is finished and the external process is identified as a legal process or an illegal process.
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| CN110008036A (en) * | 2019-02-19 | 2019-07-12 | 西安万像电子科技有限公司 | Data transmission method and device |
| CN112187750B (en) * | 2020-09-17 | 2022-09-20 | 深圳小步奔跑科技有限公司 | Information encryption method and system based on Internet |
| CN113470178A (en) * | 2020-12-15 | 2021-10-01 | 北京构力科技有限公司 | Method for generating three-dimensional building model, electronic device and storage medium |
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